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Abstract 
In January of 2001 the Government announced its intention to repeal Part 11 of the 
Family Law Act 1996. Originally scheduled for implementation in 2000, the Act 
had provided for fundamental changes to English divorce law, including removing 
matrimonial 'fault' from the divorce process, and encouraging mediation as the 
preferred method of dispute resolution. 
The Family Law Act began life as a set of recommendations intended primarily to 
bring marriages to an end with minimum hostility and distress. Yet what emerged 
from the policy 'process' was a piece of legislation that explicitly declared its 
support for marriage, and which imposed a framework of mechanisms designed to 
encourage couples to stay together. The first 'phase' of this thesis examines how 
the Act, with its dual aims of supporting and ending marriage, was reached. 
Initially the history of divorce law is traced. Through a series of interviews 
conducted with individuals involved in the Family Law Act 'process', the 
achievement of this 'middle-way' is then explored in detail. The second 'phase', 
drawing on a series of interviews conducted with individuals working with families 
on the ground, subsequently goes on to examine the 'street-level' response to 
marriage and relationship breakdown. 
Whilst national policy is something of a compromise between idealism and 
pragmatism, for those at street-level their work is unambiguously pragmatic 
- 
policy is constructed primarily in terms of a non-judgemental 'service' catering to 
the diversity of the modern family experience. The apparent success of this 
approach, particularly when compared to the 'failure' of the Family Law Act, 
prompts the question of whether there are lessons to be learnt for national policy. 
Indeed the study suggests that a new mind-set and approach akin to that operating 
on the ground is also needed at national level, if workable divorce law reform is to 
be achieved. 
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Introduction 
At the outset of my doctoral studies I envisaged this thesis as a comparative study 
of the concept of 'parental responsibility' in the post-divorce and youth crime 
contexts. However, upon commencing the substantive work, I found that I was 
increasingly drawn to the question of how the state has responded to the breakdown 
of intimate relationships. This reflected both an academic and a 'professional' 
interest, as during my previous 'career' as a solicitor I had spent some time with a 
small firm that dealt solely with divorce, relationship breakdown and related issues. 
It is true to say that both debate and change when it comes to this area of law is a 
longstanding issue (Eekelaar et al 2000). However, during the late 1980s, policy- 
makers finally began to grasp the nettle of reforming the basis of modem divorce 
law. The end result of what proved to be quite a lengthy process, was the enactment 
of the Family Law Act 1996. This Act represented an interesting development for a 
number of reasons. In one sense it was somewhat unique, in that it constituted the 
first government sponsored reform of divorce law since 1857. In addition it also 
provided for two fundamental changes to divorce law 
- 
namely the removal of the 
concept of matrimonial 'fault' from the divorce process, and the encouragement of 
mediation rather than lawyers as the preferred method of resolving disputes (Day 
Sclater and Piper 1999). 
The 1996 Act has been described as introducing a 'revolutionary mechanism' for 
obtaining divorce (Eekelaar et al 2000: 1). It certainly proved to be an extremely 
controversial piece of legislation, generating huge debate and experiencing a 
particularly rough ride through Parliament. Indeed what began life as a set of 
recommendations from the Law Commission designed primarily to bring marriages 
to an end with minimum hostility, upset and bitterness, ultimately culminated in 
legislation that both explicitly declared its support for marriage, and which 
established a framework of mechanisms that were designed to encourage couples to 
stay together 
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In view of the fact that the modern 'family' is evolving into both a diverse and fluid 
entity, this prompted the question as to how this policy 'shift' in favour of marriage 
had come about. In particular I wanted to understand why, at the end of the 
twentieth century, policy-makers had produced a piece of legislation that attempted 
to both support and save marriages, as well as bringing them to an end. The thesis 
was therefore refocused, with the central aim of exploring the policy process that 
had culminated in the Family Law Act of 1996 
- 
in effect to interrogate how the 
role of law and policy is formulated when relationships break down. 
The 1996 Act process has generated many documents, and even greater amounts of 
commentary. However, in addition to utilising the documentary evidence, this 
study provides access to some of the key players who were active during the course 
of that process. Yet policy cannot be understood purely through an examination of 
policy-making at the national level 
- 
indeed it is used, mediated, developed etc. by 
those who work with and within it. I was therefore also extremely interested to 
explore whether the dual policy aims that appeared to characterise national policy 
were in fact similarly present at 'street-level'. The second phase of the empirical 
part of the study thus goes on to contrast the national perspective(s) with the work 
that is actually being done with families 'on the ground'- in particular to examine 
the kinds of thinking and ideas that are utilised by local workers, and indeed to see 
whether there are any implications for policy-making at the national level. 
During the course of the study the Government announced its intention initially to 
delay, and then subsequently to repeal the new divorce provisions contained within 
the Family Law Act. Indeed at the time of writing a date for that repeal is still 
awaited. Although this decision did initially cause me some degree of 
consternation, it has actually had what is arguably the perverse effect of rendering 
this study and its findings even more timely. The issue of divorce and how to 
respond to it is both a complex and emotive one. Divorce excites strong feelings 
and opinions, and is a policy arena that touches on a range of controversial and 
contested issues including marriage, concepts of 'family', children's welfare, 
parenting and morality. This study explores how policy-makers have charted a 
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course through these various issues, and suggests that a new approach and way of 
thinking is required if workable divorce law reform is to be achieved in the future. 
V 
Chapter 1 
The Policy'Dilemma' 
Introduction 
'The Act has two critical purposes. First, to support the institution 
of marriage. Support for marriage and for the family is at the heart 
of the Government's strategy for modernising Britain. Marriage is 
one tried and tested means of delivering the stability children need 
and crave. The Government believes that, if couples choose to marry 
in order to offer their children stability and security, then we should 
offer them our support. ' 
'The British Government accepts 
... 
that in many cases it will 
not be possible to repair broken marriages. So the second objective 
underlying the Family Law Act is that, where all attempts to save a 
marriage have failed and the marriage has broken down irretrievably, 
it should be brought to an end with the minimum distress to the parties 
and any children affected. ' 
(Lord Irvine of Lairg, The Lord Chancellor. Speech for the closing 
session of the Fourth European Conference on Family Law, Strasbourg 
2 October 1998. ) 
These two policy objectives, both of which relate to the Family Law Act of 1996, 
reveal a dichotomy that resides at the centre of policy. The nature of that 
dichotomy revolves around the issue of whether law and policy within the divorce 
context is about dealing with the 'reality' of bringing marriages to an end, or should 
instead be concentrating on the 'ideal' in the sense of supporting marriage. In 
essence, is policy about families as they actually are 
- 
namely recognising the 
diverse and fluid entity that modern family has become? Alternatively is it about 
families as 'we', or at least the legislators, would like them to be? 
I 
Rodger's analysis of British social policy 
- 
in particular the distinction that is drawn 
between what he labels 'moral regulation', and what is termed 'family policy' 
- 
provides a useful paradigmatic tool with which to explore this policy 'dilemma 
Policy falling within the moral regulation category is underpinned by a belief in a 
set of 'fundamental moral precepts' (1995: 5). Those precepts, in turn, operate to 
guide all aspects of family policy and practice. One example of just such a policy is 
arguably provided by the Major Government's 'Back to Basics' campaign, which 
despite recent denials, was generally understood to involve the promotion of 
'traditional' family and moral values. 
One practical consequence of moral regulation is identified in terms of a policy 
focus on matters of individual morality and family structure. In addition, it is also 
suggested that such policies are inherently political animals. Indeed moral 
regulation is defined in terms of a 'broader political project', that effectively 
crystallises into an emphasis on the traditional nuclear family as uniquely beneficial 
to well being. In contrast, 'family policy' involves measures that are aimed 
primarily towards supporting family life (and responsibility) in its various different 
forms. 
These different aspects or 'faces' of policy are, in turn, framed by two different 
perspectives. Whilst moral regulation adopts a 'correctional' perspective, family 
policy operates within what is termed an 'appreciative' one (Rodger 1996). Each 
perspective thus creates a particular role for law. As Rodger explains: 
'The idea of 'moral regulation' can imply an explicitly coercive attempt 
to shape and define the parameters of behaviour by legal and institutional 
means. ' (1995: 13) 
In contrast, family policy involves recognising, and responding to a change or 'real 
movement' in family life (ibid: 14). In effect policy seeks to consolidate what is 
already happening in social practice, into law. It might therefore be said that the 
distinction is effectively one between the policing and supporting of families 
respectively. 
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Law and morality 
One central aspect of the distinction between moral regulation and family policy is 
the nature of the relationship that exists between law and morals. The fundamental 
character of the precepts that underpin Rodger's moral regulation, have the effect of 
casting morality in absolute terms. In addition, the objective of enforcing those 
absolutist terms has the knock-on effect of constituting personal (and indeed family) 
morality as the legitimate site of legal regulation. In contrast, however, family 
policy appears to regard morality as more of an individual issue. As such it 
becomes something to be primarily supported, rather than positively or coercively 
shaped to fit a particular model. 
The relationship between law and morality has long been the subject of 
jurisprudential debate, a full consideration of which lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Within this chapter the aim is therefore to selectively 'cherry-pick' the field 
- 
in particular to 'borrow' from the positions advocated by Patrick Devlin during the 
1960s, and by the American Legal Realists. It is acknowledged that both of these 
positions are complex, and have generated much comment. For example, Devlin's 
assertions have been the subject of both significant, and indeed well-known 
criticism. However, rather than exploring these in any detail, the aim is to utilise 
his perspective as an 'orientation' towards the law 
- 
in effect to provide a 
(theoretical) insight into approaching and understanding law. Indeed whilst 
Devlin's views have largely fallen out of favour within jurisprudence, his position 
(complete with its alleged Taws') remains fundamentally relevant within the 
family policy field. 
The 'Realist' position is also utilised in a similarly selective manner. Firstly, 
realists represent a broad church, a full consideration of which is beyond the bounds 
of the present discussion. Indeed they have been described as a 'heterodox lot' 
(Rumble 1968), and even as a 'mood' or 'intellectual tendency' (Duxbury 1995). 
Secondly, the thesis is not concerned with a detailed engagement with the debate 
surrounding what are identified by a number of commentators as central 
propositions of realist thought 
- 
namely a distrust of both traditional legal rules to 
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the extent that they purport to describe what courts or people are actually doing, and 
of the idea that rules expressed in the form of legal doctrine constitute the key factor 
in producing court decisions. What is key, for current purposes, are realist notions 
of and engagement with the 'real world'. 
The Devlin 'view' 
For the purposes of the present discussion, the interest in Devlin lies primarily in his 
response to the 1957 Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution ('Wolfenden Report', Cmd. 247). Although this aspect of Devlin's 
'thesis' is focussed on the criminal law he does, nevertheless, provide an extremely 
useful perspective on the role or function of law vis a vis morality that can be 
employed beyond the immediate confines of the 'criminal' context. 
It was the opinion of Wolfenden, that homosexual behaviour between consenting 
adults in private should no longer constitute a criminal offence (para. 62). 
Underpinning this recommendation was the view that the proper function of 
criminal law was to 'preserve public order and decency', to protect individual 
citizens 'from what is offensive or injurious', and to provide 'sufficient safeguards' 
against corruption and exploitation (para. 13). its role did not therefore include 
either intervening in an individual's private life or seeking to enforce particular 
patterns of behaviour, beyond what was necessary in order to preserve order and 
prevent harm. As the Report stated: 
'there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality which is, 
in brief and crude terms, not the law's business. ' (para. 61). 
The stance adopted by Wolfenden represents something of a reiteration of Mill's 
'harm principle'. Writing in 1859, Mill advanced what has been described as the 
classic liberal view of the relationship between law and morality. Indeed the 'one 
very simple' principle advocated by his essay, is the absolute nature of individual 
liberty. As he observes: 'Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual 
is sovereign' (1974: 69). The one exception to this general rule is where the 
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exercise of that sovereignty does harm to another. The result is that law is thus 
precluded from intervening in the realm of morality on a purely paternalistic basis, 
with the dividing line instead being located in the idea of causing harm to others: 
'The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it would be 
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because in the 
opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. ' Gbid.: 68) 
Support for this general position can be derived from Joseph Raz (1996), who offers 
a combination of what is termed 'perfectionism', with a commitment to the harm 
principle. The concept of perfectionism reflects the belief that one key objective of 
government is to help people to lead valuable and fulfilling lives. However, the 
harm principle operates in order to proscribe government activities to this end 
- 
in 
effect the use of coercion in order to protect or advance the moral well-being of 
citizens is excluded. 
According to Raz, 'personal autonomy' constitutes the basic 'condition' for the 
achievement of 'personal well-being' in today's society. That personal autonomy is 
described as involving, 'the successful pursuit of valuable activities and 
relationships largely chosen by the person involved' Gbid.: 113). The role of 
government is thus constructed in terms of ensuring that individuals have the 
necessary resources in order to pursue the activities and relationships they choose 
- 
in essence to shape the various different options that are available to people. 
However, the importance that is accorded to an individual's autonomy of choice, 
means that serious limits are placed upon the circumstances in which coercive 
moral paternalism may be justified. 
A somewhat different perspective on the question of law and morality is, however, 
provided by James FitZiames Stephen. Writing in direct response to Mill, Stephen 
argues in favour of legislation whose purpose is described in the following terms: 
'to establish, to maintain, and to give power to that which the legislator regards as a 
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good moral system or standard' (1967: 150). This argument is based upon the 
belief that, in every society at any particular point in time, there are a number of 
things that appear 'good' or 'bad' to its members. It is recognised that they may be 
so regarded to varying degrees, nevertheless, 'virtue and vice' are believed to 
possess 'quite definite' meanings. The end result is thus articulated as follows: 
'the object of promoting virtue and preventing vice must be admitted 
to be both a good one and one sufficiently intelligible for legislative 
purpose. ' (loc. cit. ) 
In a similar vein, George offers a more recent argument in favour of government 
possessing a legitimate interest in the promotion of certain views as to what 
constitutes the good life. In his view, the legal prohibition of certain immoral acts 
for the sake of supporting public morality does not necessarily violate either 'a 
norm of justice', or indeed 'political morality' (1993: viii). This is, however, 
subject to the caveat that there may be prudential reasons for the legal toleration of 
such moral wrongdoing. Thus in order to answer the question of whether 
something that is reasonably judged to be immoral should be prohibited or tolerated 
by law, an understanding of the particular circumstances of the community in 
question will be required. 
At this point it is useful to turn back to Devlin, in order to explore his 'take' on the 
issue under consideration. Responding to the Wolfenden Report, Devlin (1965) 
challenged the idea that law's intervention in private life was limited to the 
circumstances of preserving order and preventing harm. He also questioned the 
emphasis placed by the Report on the importance that society and law ought to 
accord to individual freedom of choice and action in matters of morality. Indeed 
Devlin actually went so far as to pose the question of whether there really was a 
private morality lying beyond the remit of law. 
When it comes to the question of whether society is entitled to pass judgement on 
moral matters, Devlin answers firmly in the affirmative. Morality is 'public' in the 
sense that society is made up of a 'community of ideas' about the way that its 
members should behave (1965: 9). That community of ideas represents an 
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important part of the glue, or as Devlin terms it, the 'bondage' that holds society 
together. However, in addition to this entitlement to make judgements about 
morality, Devlin also regards society as entitled to use the law as a means of 
enforcing those judgements. The basis for this assertion, can be located in the 
analogy that is drawn between immoral conduct and treason 
- 
essentially both are 
regarded as representing a threat to the continued existence of society. As he 
argues: 
'the suppression of vice is as much the law's business as the suppression 
of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of private 
morality than it is to define a sphere of private subversive activity. ' 
Gbid.: 13-14) 
For Wolfenden, the determining factor was whether an act was likely to damage 
others. If not, then it was private and thus not of public concern. In contrast, the 
issue for Devlin is whether an act has anti-social consequences. However, once an 
act has been condemned as violating society's constitutive morality, then such anti- 
social consequences are regarded as an automatic given. In defying that 
constitutive or shared morality the act poses a threat to social cohesion, and thus 
becomes an offence against society itself (George 1993). As Devlin explains: 
'Any immorality is capable of affecting society injuriously and in effect to 
a greater or lesser extent it usually does; this is what gives the law its locus 
standi. ' (Devlin 1965: 15) 
It should, however, be noted that the question surrounding the instances in which 
society is entitled to use the law does remain somewhat unclear. For Devlin, the 
'dividing line' involves the balancing of public and private interests. Indeed he 
argues as to the impossibility of formulating any absolute rule. Instead the general 
principle is set out in the following terms: 
'there must be toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is 
consistent with the integrity of society' (1965: 16) 
Parallels can be drawn between Devlin's position, and some of the more recent 
arguments that have been advanced by communitarian theorists. Indeed it has been 
suggested that Devlin's position can actually be described as a 'communitarian' one 
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(George 1993). Certainly it is the case that some theorists argue strongly in favour 
of a greater community involvement 
- 
in the sense of individual, institutional and 
official involvement 
- 
in the creation and maintenance of a moral order. Within 
that process law and legal coercion is accorded a small, but extremely integral part. 
Indeed, even where the legal rules in question are not positively enforced, law is 
regarded as having a valuable expressive or symbolic role. For example, Etzioni 
advances the following argument: 
'laws do represent, in every society, a proper method of expressing social 
and moral values and of signalling the conduct that the community 
considers proper or abhorrent 
- 
even when these laws are rarely enforced 
through fines, jail sentences, or other coercive means. ' (1995: 47) 
Law may thus be used both to express the moral concerns of a community, and also 
to influence what is deemed to be appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. As 
Etzioni continues: 
'the law as a deterrent has its place in any moral order. Morality rests 
on intricate interactions among three factors: individual conscience, the 
moral voice of the community, and the state. Each one helps to sustain 
the others. Hence, while it is best to build up individual consciences and 
community voices, communities must on occasion fall back on the law. 
Without punishing those who do serious injury to our commonly held 
values 
... 
no moral order can be sustained. ' (loc. cit. ) 
The 'Realist' approach 
Whilst connections can be made between Devlin's position and the universal 
morality and corrective framework of 'moral regulation', echoes of the pragmatism 
that implicitly characterises the appreciative perspective and supportive role of 
Rodger's 'family policy', can be similarly located within the American realist 
'tradition'. 
As alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, much of the realist focus is directed 
towards understanding judicial decision-making, and the critiquing of legal 
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reasoning. In effect, therefore, Realism is concerned to look beyond ideals and 
appearances, in order to attempt to discover what is actually going on. One 
example of this 'approach' can be seen in the belief that the way to discover what 
courts do, is to examine law 'in action'. Indeed Karl Llewellyn (1930) draws a 
distinction between 'paper rules' (law on the books) and 'real rules' (court 
practices), arguing that legal rules merely guide rather than control the decision- 
making process. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, the key point to take from all of this, 
relates to Llewellyn's assertion that what he describes as the 'real rules', operate 
'on the level of isness and not of oughtness' (1930: 448). This distinction between 
'isness' and 'oughtness' also surfaces in his nine 'common points of departure' for 
realists (1931). Although recognising that there was no 'school' of realists, nor 
indeed was there ever likely to be, Llewellyn was of the opinion that they did share 
certain points of departure from which their work effectively branched out. Of 
these, five are of particular interest to the discussion. 
One such common point of departure relates to the separation of the study of law as 
it is, from speculation as to what it should be. Whilst it is recognised that value 
judgements are crucial when identifying legal objectives, when it comes to the task 
of examining the law: 'The temporary divorce of Is and Ought is required' (1931: 
62). The realist belief is therefore that it is simply not possible to judge what law 
should do in the future, until one has understood what it is actually doing right now. 
Two further points of departure reflect what can be described as an instrumental 
view of law. Firstly law is regarded as a 'means to social ends', with the result that 
it, 'needs constantly to be examined for its purpose, and for its effect' (loc. cit. ). In 
what is arguably a contrast to the kind of position adopted by Devlin and his 
supporters, the focus is thus very much on law in action as opposed to law as 
doctrine. Indeed this is further reiterated by the second 'point', which contains the 
assertion that realists share the following orientation, namely: 
9 an insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms of its effects, 
and an insistence on the worthwhileness of trying to find these effects. ' 
9 
Gbid.: 63) 
Law is thus something to be assessed and valued primarily in terms of its effects or 
performance. 
As Cotterrell (1989) observes, the realist outlook is underpinned by a particular 
philosophy 
- 
namely pragmatism. In the view of William James, the 'pragmatic 
method' is regarded as constituting, 'an attitude for orientation'. The essence of 
this attitude is descr ibed in the following terms: 
'looking away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed 
necessities: and looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, 
facts. ' (1907: 54-55) 
The result is that realists tend to view developments in legal philosophy in terms of 
their functional relevance, or indeed their lack of relevance to the legal needs of 
time and place (Cotterrell: 1989). 
This type of orientation is reflected in Llewellyn's concept of 'law jobs' (1941). 
The argument here is that law is an institution that exists to ensure that certain jobs 
are done. In essence these jobs, which are defined as common to all societies, 
consist of the following: the disposition of 'trouble-cases', for example dispute 
resolution; 'preventive channelling' or problem avoidance 
- 
in effect the 
reorientation of conduct and expectations in order to avoid trouble; and the 
allocation and exercise of public authority. Once again, the key point to draw from 
this lies in the importance accorded to ensuring that these jobs are effectively and 
well carried out. For Llewellyn, a functioning institution is one that is both firmly 
rooted in the life of the community, and which is constantly tested against the needs 
of that community. 
Linked to this are two further 'points of departure' identified by Llewellyn 
- 
namely that realists regard both law and society as being in a constant state of 'flux' 
(1931). The general belief is that society is in flux at a rate that is faster than that 
experienced by the law. The result is that law thus needs to be re-examined in order 
to, 'determine how far it fits the society it purports to serve' (1931: 62). This idea 
that law should 'fit' the society in which it operates, arguably contains echoes of 
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Holmes famous statement: 'The life of the law has not been logic, it has been 
experience'. Indeed as he then went on to observe, the legal standards by which 
citizens are to be judged conform to, amongst other things, 'the felt necessities of 
the time' (1946: 1). Furthermore, and in a similar vein, Jerome Frank endorses the 
following position: 
'Rules (whether made by legislatures or judge-made) are embodiments 
of social policies, values, ideals, and 
... 
for that reason 
... 
should be 
recurrently and informedly re-examined. ' (1949: xxiv) 
Discussion 
What can be taken from this extremely brief foray into the jurisprudential field, are 
the different perspectives that are offered with regards to the nature of law. It is 
important not to overstate the case, in the sense that both Devlin and the realists 
would probably agree that there are certain basic functions that the law should fulfil 
- 
for example, the resolution of disputes. However, Devlin's vision of law can 
arguably be described as both 'corrective', and 'top-down'. The term 'top-down' is 
employed here in the (Austinian) sense of law as somehow separate from society 
- 
as deriving primarily from the state. In essence law thus becomes largely 
constructed as an independent agency of social control and direction. The realist 
version is however, by comparison, a more 'bottom-up' and 'appreciative' one. 
The basic idea is of law as a human creation 
- 
to be understood as it is and not as it 
might be, and with doctrine as less important than those who create it. Whilst not 
denying the impact of broader policy priorities, or indeed the normative or 
regulatory aspects of legal rules, law is consequently viewed as more engaged with 
- 
and indeed as something that 'should' be more engaged with 
- 
the realities of 
social life. 
For Devlin, the law's objectives are arguably imbued with idealism in the sense of 
the setting of a (common) standard, and effectively enforcing a particular model of 
the good life. Morality is defined in terms of common ideas about the 'right' way 
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to live 
- 
in essence morals are those standards of which the reasonable man 
approves. This 'commonsense' idea of morality is arguably somewhat at odds with 
the more political nature that appears to characterise Rodger's (1995) 'fundamental 
moral precepts'. However, the key point to emphasise here is the universal and 
absolutist nature of both moral visions, and the perceived importance to society of 
having such a universal moral code. ' 
It is arguable that Devlin's position does go a 'stage further' than Rodger, in the 
sense that an established morality is regarded as essential to the very welfare of 
society. Indeed it was felt that society was in danger of disintegration when no such 
common morality was observed. Law's role in the protection of society is thus 
extended to include protecting the political and moral community of ideas, without 
which people cannot live together. In effect the law may legitimately intervene in 
individual morality, in order to preserve the cohesion and fabric of society. As 
Devlin argues: 
6society is not something that is kept together physically; it is held together 
by the invisible bonds of common thought 
... 
The bondage is part of the 
price of society; and mankind, which needs society, must pay its price. ' 
(1965: 10) 
For the realists, the danger of societal disintegration is located not in moral 
fragmentation, but rather in the failure of law to carry out essential 'law jobs' 
(Llewellyn 1941). Within this 'group', law is recognised as dealing with real life on 
the ground 
-a task that involves an appreciation of the variety of circumstances 
with which it is confronted on a daily basis. For example, Llewellyn (1960) talks of 
judges being guided by their 'situation sense'. It has been suggested that the precise 
meaning of this concept is difficult to grasp, however it does seem to involve a 
'true' understanding of the facts and the 'right' evaluation of them (Freeman 1994). 
In essence therefore, the law is concerned to deal with particular situations. 
It arguable that the pragmatism that characterises the realist perspective, is also 
reflective of a different moral view. Indeed it might even be argued that the concept 
of pragmatism actually implies some distrust of fundamental values. For example, 
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Pound talks of a 'sociological movement in jurisprudence', which is described as 'a 
movement for pragmatism as a philosophy of law'. The essence of that movement 
is set out in the following terms: 
'for the adjustment of principles and doctrines to the human conditions 
they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles; for putting the 
human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true position 
as an instrument. ' (1908: 609-610) 
It is important to emphasise that it is not suggested that the realist perspective is 
somehow 'moral free'. It is, however, certainly the case that an appreciation of 
moral pluralism does sit more comfortably within it. Such an appreciation is also 
evident amongst those arguing specifically in favour of a realm of private morality. 
For example, Mill argues that moral progress is more likely to occur when 
alternative views about morality are discussed, and ways of living based upon these 
alternative values are tolerated (Bix 1999). Similarly, the position adopted by Raz 
(1996) is grounded on the principle (amongst others) that there are a variety of 
moral goods, and a variety of different ways of living a morally good life. 
Parallels can be drawn between these ideas, and the more recent views articulated 
by Selznick. Challenging the universal ideas of morality advocated by 
communitarians, he stresses the need for both solidarity and autonomy. A 'proper' 
(sociological) understanding of community, 'presumes diversity and pluralism as 
well as social integration' (1992: xi). In comparison to the pessimistic 
interpretations adopted by communitarians, a much more positive view of moral 
change and fragmentation is offered: 
6 modem life offers a welcoming if risky challenge to the moral order. As 
self-determination is enlarged, as awareness is sharpened, the complexity 
of moral choice increases. The responsibility of individuals and groups 
becomes in many ways more self-conscious and more demanding. More is 
asked of us, and we ask more of ourselves. The peril, therefore, need not 
be understood as a sign of pervasive decay. It may also be understood as a 
price paid for certain kinds of moral development. ' (ibid.: 4) 
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The competing interpretations of moral individuation and development are mirrored 
within the family context. For example, amongst commentators within the field 
there is a strong line of thought that adopts Devlin's disintegration thesis 
- 
indeed 
there is a strong tendency to view family change in terms of moral decline, 
degeneration and selfish individualism. One example of the perceived importance 
of universal values when it comes to family, is provided by the Bishop of Oxford: 
'Fundamental values are there to be recognised, not made up as we go along. 
we need to get away from a pick and mix attitude to morality, to acknowledge 
that certain fundamental insights are inherent in the nature of things, and are 
essential for the well-being of both individuals and society. ' 
(The Guardian, 1 January 1997. Quoted in Smart 2000: 23) 
The opposing view is also articulated by a section of sociological writing within the 
family 'field'. For example, Sevenhuijsen (1998) regards moral values as deriving 
from individual agency, rather than being somehow imposed from above. 
Furthermore, the growth of new types of personal relationships are regarded as 
opportunities for the development of new values. In a similar vein, Beck 
emphasises that the process of individual isation is not simply about the dis- 
embedding from traditional ways of life. Indeed it also involves the extremely 
important task of re-embedding new ways of life: 'in which individuals must 
produce, stage and cobble together their own biographies themselves' (1998: 33). 
Such re-embedding involves the forging of new values that are better suited to 
modem society. 
This view is reinforced by Smart and Neale (1999), whose empirical work with 
divorcing parents reveals that far from representing a journey into immorality, the 
experience of divorce actually involves what is often the difficult task of negotiating 
new moral terrains. The demise of moral absolutes has thus led to the view that to 
be moral in contemporary society no longer involves the unthinking adherence to 
some kind of 'abstract imperatives'. Instead morality is constructed in terms of 
actively and reflexively exercising 'choice with responsibility' (Ribbens-McCarthy 
et al 2000: 36). 
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Within the family context, these different views of morality are, in turn, 
underpinned by very different conceptions of 'family'. Indeed the concept of 
family itself arguably embodies a fundamental 'tension' between absolutism and 
plurality, and between ideal and reality. Family is, at the same time, both obvious 
and elusive. At one 'level' it is arguably self-evident and un-contentious, 
conveying connotations of naturalness and commonsense. As Finch (1989) notes, 
we all have some experience of family life. At a second 'level', to talk of family 
also implies some kind of fundamental universality. For example, Bernades (1985) 
refers to a process of reification whereby the family assumes a 'thing-like' status. 
Similarly Ribbens (1994) observes that as an element of contemporary western 
culture, 'the family' is conceptualised as an entity that exists as a concrete and 
natural unit. 
Yet measured against this ideological construct of family (Morgan 1991), is the 
undeniable recognition that families are changing. Indeed Morgan (1975) suggests 
that family actually has change built into it. For example, at the 'practical' level, 
increasing numbers of children are experiencing lone parenthood and / or step- 
family life at some stage of their childhood. Thus family is not (and indeed 
arguably never was) a unitary concept with a single meaning or reference point for 
all (Fox Harding 1996). The reality is that 'family' has many meanings and many 
contexts, whilst people have different and differing experiences of family and 
family life (O'Donovan 1993). 
This fragmentation of experience has led to a reorientation of sociology away from 
the definition of 'family' in terms of physical properties, towards a focus on the 
meanings that it conveys. For example, in his attempt to identify what is referred to 
as the 'whatness' of family, Morgan utilises the term 'family' as an adjective 
- 
in 
essence to refer to sets of practices which deal in some way with the ideas, 
expectations and obligations of parenthood, kinship and marriage. These practices 
do not necessarily emphasise the centrality of the conjugal bond, may not insist on 
co-residence and may not be organised around heterosexuality. As he argues: 
"Family'.. 
-represents a quality rather than a thing' 
(1996: 186). 
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Following what might be described as this sociological adoption of a 'realist' 
perspective 
- 
in the sense of being concerned with what is actually happening on 
the ground 
- 
family has come to be conceptualised as the subjective meaning of 
intimate connections and relationships rather than of formal, objective blood ties. 
As Silva and Smart observe: 'What a family is appears to be intricately related to 
what it does' (1999: 7). In essence the focus is firmly placed on 'doing' family. 
For example, Bozett (1987) argues that lesbian and gay relationships share all the 
significant defining features of 'non-gay' families, whilst Nardi (1992) describes 
friends 'as' family. 
In a similar vein, Gubrium and Holstein (1990) argue that although family does 
have legal and biological definitions, it is actually a socially constructed 
phenomenon whose meaningful reality is derived through discourse and interaction. 
In essence the assertion is that family is as much a way of thinking and talking 
about relationships, as it is a specific set of social ties and sentiments. This view is 
echoed by Finch and Mason (1993), who argue that rather than being pre- 
determined or flowing automatically from specific relationships, family 
responsibilities are actually created through interaction and negotiation. 'Family 
ties' are effectively as much a product of 'working out', as they are of blood. Thus 
what characterises these various approaches is a challenge to the conventional 
understanding of the family as a distinct entity. Here family is re-conceptualised as 
a 'reality project' of those who both live, and describe it. 
'As an object of descriptive practice, family is neither just a thing or an 
objective set of bonds, nor merely an idea about the quality of social 
relations. It is, rather, an object which is assembled out of experience. ' 
(Gubrium and Holstein 1990: 175). 
Concluding Comments 
Divorce is an aspect of policy that appears to represent something of a focus for 
anxieties and debate about family change and how to respond to it. As Smart et al 
observe: 
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'Divorce has been envisaged as, symbolically speaking, the originating 
stone that was dropped into a previously calm lake of intimacy and 
traditional family life only to generate most of the ripples of change 
we are now witnessing. ' (1998: 1) 
Those engaged in the task of drafting policy to govern the legal exit from marriage 
are thus faced with several fundamental issues. These include how far it is 
desirable to regulate such behaviour, the extent to which such regulation is feasible, 
and the nature and aim of such regulation. To return to the question posed at the 
outset of the chapter, is legislation about dealing with the reality of the breakdown 
of intimate relationships, or of somehow seeking to reshape outcomes? In other 
words is it about trying to 'correct' behaviour, or rather to 'appreciate' it? 
With its two 'critical purposes' of supporting and ending marriage, the Family Law 
Act of 1996 attempts to negotiate something of a compromise between the two 
opposing positions that are discussed in this chapter. Indeed whilst the objective of 
supporting marriage suggests the desire to promote fundamental or common 
standards, that of ending marriage reflects a recognition of the reality of marital 
breakdown. However, in order to understand how this position was reached, it is 
first necessary to look back. As Holmes has pointed out, law embodies the story of 
a nation's development through many centuries. The result is that in order to 
understand the law it is necessary to, 'know what it has been and what it tends to 
become'. This requires reference both to 'history', and also to 'existing theories of 
legislation' (1946: 1). Over the course of the next two chapters, the thesis engages 
in just such a task. The history of divorce law is traced, culminating with an 
exploration of the 1996 Act and some of the theories and commentary that 
surrounds it. This provides the essential basis from which to launch a more focused 
examination of the Act itself, and of the policy dilemma that resides at its centre. 
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Chapter 2 
The History of Divorce Law 
Part 1: 1857-1969 
Introduction 
This chapter explores how divorce law in England developed from the mid- 
nineteenth century, through to 1969. The starting point for this exploration is 
located in the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857, which has been identified as 
effectively heralding the advent of secular divorce (Gibson 1994). Subsequent 
developments are then traced, with particular emphasis being placed upon the 
'reform' debates that took place during the 1950s and 60s. The period of analysis 
then culminates with a brief examination of the Divorce Reform Act of 1969. The 
1969 Act represents a significant event in the history of English divorce law 
- 
not 
least because it contains the last major reform of the grounds for divorce to be fully 
implemented, and thus continues to remain the basis of divorce law today. 
Within this review, the chapter is particularly concerned to examine how the exit 
from marriage has been regulated, the extent to which the legislation can be 
regarded as correctional or appreciative, and the legislative 'mechanisms' employed 
in order to achieve the its regulatory aims. 
The advent of divorce 
The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 has been described as representing the 
'transformation' of divorce into a 'judicial procedure' (Wolframl987: 3). Prior to 
its enactment divorces were effected by private Acts of Parliament, principally for 
the benefit of the wealthy few. In addition to this, the ecclesiastical courts were 
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able to grant a separation 'from bed and board' (divorce a mensa et thoro), on proof 
of either adultery or extreme cruelty. It should, however, be noted that this did not 
constitute an absolute divorce in the sense that although spouses were relieved from 
the obligation to live together, the marriage tie remained in existence. 
The 1857 Act consolidated these matrimonial jurisdictions that were being 
exercised by Parliament and the ecclesiastical courts, and transferred them across to 
a civil court of law. The result was that the matrimonial jurisdiction of the 
ecclesiastical courts was thus abolished, effectively being recreated in a new 'Court 
for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes'. 
This development has been described as 'making a decisive break with the past' 
(McGregor 1957: 17). However, the general tendency amongst commentators has 
not been to interpret the 'transfer' of jurisdiction as constituting a change in either 
the principles or the substance of divorce law. Lawrence Stone provides one 
example of this perspective. He accepts that removing control over all matrimonial 
affairs from the Church did represent a rejection of the theological principle of the 
indissolubility of marriage. However, he goes on to make the point that the 
predominant morality displayed during debates on the 1857 Bill was far from being 
liberal 
- 
indeed a more correct interpretation would be one of 'nervously defensive 
conservatism' (1990: 383). In a similar vein, Sir Morris Finer and O. R. McGregor 
make the following observations in Appendix 5 ('History of The Obligation to 
Maintain') to the Report of the Committee on One Parent Families (1974, Cmnd. 
5629): 
'the Act of 1857 did not, as is sometimes mistakenly thought, introduce 
divorce into England or discard a hitherto sacred principle of indissolubility 
of marriage 
...... 
The only substantial change which it effected was to make 
more widely available matrimonial remedies which only the very few had 
until then enjoyed. ' (para. 30) 
The result has therefore been largely assessed in terms of providing a more 
accessible secular framework, albeit one that continued to be based upon Christian 
principles and canon law. Divorce was thus available on the basis of matrimonial 
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'fault' 
- 
in essence on the basis of adultery. It should, however, be noted that fault 
was not applied equally to men and women. The legislation enabled the 
presentation of a petition for divorce by a husband, on the simple grounds of his 
wife's adultery. In contrast, however, a wife seeking divorce required her 
husband's adultery to be aggravated by incest, bigamy, rape, sodomy, bestiality, 
cruelty or desertion, in order to be able to proceed. 
The centrality of 'fault' 
The adherence to the concept of matrimonial fault as the basis for divorce proved to 
be extremely durable during the initial stages of the twentieth century. Indeed the 
Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes (Gorrell Commission) 
provides one early example of the 'pull' that was exerted by the offence doctrine 
during this period. Appointed in 1909, the Commission had been accorded a broad 
remit to enquire into the general state of the law in England and its administration in 
divorce and matrimonial causes, with the additional direction that particular regard 
be paid to 'the position of the poorer classes in relation thereto' (1912: iii). 
The Commission's Report was published in 1912, comprising both a Majority 
Report, and a Minority Report that was signed by three of the Commission 
members (Cd. 6478). It has been suggested that the Majority Report was anxious to 
deal with the two principal criticisms that had been levelled at the 1857 Act 
- 
namely the unequal treatment of men and women by the existing divorce 
legislation, and the continuing inaccessibility of law to the poorer classes 
(McGregor 1957). As Doggett (1993) observes, the reality of the 1857 Act proved 
to be that only the upper and middle classes were able to take advantage of the 
legislative changes 
- 
divorce proceedings remained extremely costly, and could 
only be brought in a single divorce court located in London. 
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The solution proposed by the Majority was, firstly, that the law should be amended 
in order to secure equal treatment of men and women with regards to the ground for 
divorce: women would be given access to divorce on the grounds of their husbands' 
adultery alone. Secondly, in an attempt to ensure that poverty did not constitute a 
bar to legal relief, a simplification and decentralisation of divorce procedure was 
recommended: in essence the High Court would be able to sit and exercise divorce 
jurisdiction locally. 
With regards to the issue of matrimonial fault, the Commission's recommendations 
are of particular interest. Having examined the various Christian principles relating 
to the dissolubility of marriage, the Commission was faced with a distinct absence 
of any general consensus of opinion. Indeed 'Christian' opinions were found to 
range from those who maintained that marriage was fundamentally indissoluble, 
through to those who suggested that divorce should actually be available on certain 
serious grounds based on the 'necessities of human life'. Situated between these 
poles of opinion were those arguing that marriage should be dissoluble purely on 
the grounds of adultery, and more flexible constituencies supporting an extension to 
include the additional ground of desertion (Royal Commission on Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes 1912: paras. 39-40). 
The Majority ultimately rejected the previously accepted view that adultery should 
constitute the only matrimonial offence justifying the legal ending of a marriage. In 
contrast, however, the Minority Report firmly rejected any extension to the grounds 
for divorce. This stance was based upon a belief that the result of any such 
extension would be easier divorce. Easier divorce would, it was felt, in turn lead to 
an increase in the number of divorces. Furthermore, and drawing upon religious 
doctrine, any extension beyond (female) adultery was believed to be against the 
express words of Christ (ibid.: pp 171-185). 
Eekelaar observes that the Commission constructed the problem of divorce 
primarily in terms of the adverse consequences that were believed to result from 
separation without divorce (1991: 233). The solution was thus perceived to lie in 
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the expansion of both access to, and the grounds for divorce. Indeed the Majority 
also recommended that desertion for more than three years, cruelty, incurable 
insanity, incurable drunkenness and imprisonment under the commuted death 
sentence should all be elevated to the status of matrimonial offences (Royal 
Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 1912: para. 329). This, it was 
hoped, would put an end to the 'evil' of judicial separation for those who lacked the 
money and circumstances to obtain a divorce (ibid.: para 234). Ultimately, 
however, these proposals were not acted upon 
- 
indeed it was only in 1937, by 
virtue of the Matrimonial Causes Act of that year, that the grounds for divorce were 
expanded to include desertion and cruelty. 
Stone suggests that the Majority recommendations were based upon the principles 
that divorce should be primarily regarded as a 'legal mopping up operation' 
following the spiritual death of a marriage, and that no correlation necessarily 
existed between the number of divorces and the level of sexual immorality (1990: 
393). However as other commentators have suggested, the Report did not actually 
represent a major shift away from ideology and towards a more practical legal 
approach. Firstly, it is argued that the proposals were underpinned by a hope that 
they would allow remarriage. Indeed Lewis suggests that 'liberalisation' was 
actually proposed in order to both draw a firmer line between the married and the 
unmarried, and to promote marriage (2001: 102). Secondly, it is important to 
emphasise the centrality that continued to be accorded to the fault doctrine within 
the Commission's thinking. Although in favour of expanding the grounds for 
divorce, the Majority were firmly against recognising marriage breakdown that did 
not rely on fault. Such a move was inevitably believed to involve some recognition 
of divorce by consent 
-a recognition that it was felt would fatally undermine the 
concept of life-long marriage (Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial 
Causes 1912). As McGregor observes, the recommendation to extend the grounds 
for divorce was regarded as cementing rather than undermining the 'status' of fault: 
'The Report wished to retain the principle of the matrimonial offence as 
the basis for divorce law, but applied it to a wider range of behaviour. 
The recommendations are thus to be regarded as an extension of the old 
principle rather than the establishment of a new. ' (1957: 28) 
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A concerted attempt to introduce a form of no-fault divorce into English Law was 
ultimately to take several decades to materialise. In 1951 Mrs Eirene White 
introduced a Private Members Bill into Parliament, which proposed to allow 
divorce following a period of seven years separation. Supporters of the Bill argued 
that such a provision would both allow dead marriages to be legally brought to an 
end, and would enable the legitimation of other 'sinful' unions. However, its 
departure from the matrimonial offence principle, meant that it was strongly 
criticised for effectively allowing a 'guilty' spouse to divorce an 'innocent' one 
against his or her will (Smart 1984). The Government itself was opposed to the 
Bill. However, upon realising that it was likely to reach the Committee stage, an 
attempt was made to encourage MPs to vote against by promising a Royal 
Commission in return. The end result of this political manoeuvring was that the 
Bill was withdrawn from Parliament. It has, however, been noted that the reaction 
provoked by this attempt to introduce no fault legislation, illustrates the hold that 
the offence principle continued to retain over the official version of just what 
divorce actually meant (Eekelaar 1991). 
The promised Royal Commission was subsequently appointed in September 1951, 
under the chairmanship of Lord Morton of Henryton. It was accorded a wide brief 
to enquire into the law 'concerning divorce and other matrimonial causes': 
'and to consider whether any changes should be made in the law or its 
administration 
... 
having in mind the need to promote and maintain healthy 
and happy married life and to safeguard the interests and well-being of 
children. ' 
(Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 1956 (Cmd. 9678): iii-iv) 
The Commission found itself faced with a fundamental division of opinion. 
Advocates for reform based their position largely on the argument that the doctrine 
of the matrimonial offence no longer reflected the reality of either marital 
behaviour, or expectations. However, the opposing view was strongly articulated 
by the Church of England, who opposed any movement for change. The doctrine of 
fault was regarded as according with the New Testament, whilst divorce was 
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portrayed as a threat both to the family and to the conception of marriage as a 
lifelong obligation. 
Wooton provides an illuminating summary as to the nature and extent of this 
divergence of opinion that formed the backdrop to the Commission's work. For 
example, she identifies that on one side of the 'debate', were those who believed in 
the primacy of family and marriage: 
'the family and marriage, as institutions, have a value in their own fight, 
over and above their effect on the welfare of any individuals affected by 
them. In the extreme case, this value may be held to outweigh everything 
else and to preclude divorce altogether. Whom God hath joined together 
let no man put asunder 
- 
no matter how wretched their lives may be. ' 
(1955: 407). 
A more modified version of this stance involved weighing the sanctity of marriage 
as one of a range of factors. As Wooton puts it: 'Whom God hath joined together 
man may put asunder provided that the situation is sufficiently desperate; but the 
presumption is that they ought to stay joined' (loc. cit. ). In contrast, and situated on 
the opposite side of the debate, was the view of divorce as neither inherently 'good' 
nor 'bad'. For this constituency it was regarded primarily as a private matter: 
'Whom man hath joined together, man may put asunder 
- 
but only with 
due consideration for the interests of the helpless. ' (loc. cit. ) 
Ultimately the Commission itself also proved to be largely divided on how to 
proceed (Smart 2000). Indeed with regards to the proposal that there should be a 
new ground for divorce founded on the complete breakdown of marriage, the 
members were evenly split. In comparison, however, when it came the question of 
whether the matrimonial offence doctrine should be retained as the basis of divorce, 
there was virtual unanimity in favour (Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 
1956: para. 65). 
Referring to Mrs. White's 1951 Bill, nine of the commissioners regarded the fact 
that it would have enabled a guilty party to obtain a divorce against the will of an 
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innocent one, as a 'chief criticism' of the no-fault framework Gbid.: para 69(xxix)). 
It was their clear view that the proper function of divorce law was, 'to give relief 
where a wrong has been done' (ibid.: para 69(xii)). It is also noteworthy that these 
particular signatories to the Report went a stage further, and rejected the 
introduction of the doctrine of marriage breakdown in any form. Such a move, it 
was felt, 'would be to foster a change in the attitude to marriage which would be 
disastrous for the nation'. Indeed, it was thought that the result would be to 
encourage people to 'abandon their marriages on the flimsiest provocation' (ibid.: 
para 69(viii)). In contrast, the remaining nine members of the Commission 
proposed the limited introduction of the doctrine of breakdown of marriage 
- 
namely making divorce available on the basis of seven years separation. 
The one dissenting voice on the matrimonial offence doctrine was proffered by 
Lord Walker. Unlike the rest of the Commission he did not support the retention of 
matrimonial fault, favouring instead the substitution of irretrievable breakdown of 
marriage as the sole ground for divorce. Such breakdown was to be evidenced by 
three years separation, and where the 'facts and circumstances' made it 
'improbable' that cohabitation would ever be resumed (ibid.: page 340, para. 4). 
Underpinning this position was the following belief: 
'The true significance of marriage, is life long cohabitation 
... 
But when the 
prospect of continuing cohabitation has ceased the true view as to the 
significance of marriage seems to require that the legal tie should be dissolved. 
Each empty tie 
... 
adds increasing harm to the community and injury to the ideal 
of marriage. ' Obid.: page 341, para. 6) 
A 'correctional' framework 
Adopting Rodger's (1995) moral regulation-family policy paradigm, the first 
hundred years of secular Oudicial) divorce can clearly be located towards the moral 
regulation end of the spectrum. Throughout this period the legislation is 
characterised by its firm grounding in the doctrine of the matrimonial offence, the 
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enforcement of which has the effect of 'casting' law into a particular role 
- 
in 
essence that of a 'correctional code' (Rodger 1996: 61). The matrimonial offence 
doctrine is based upon a fundamental moral premise 
- 
namely the theory that one 
spouse commits a grievous act that goes to the root of the marriage, and that the 
other spouse is to be given the choice of petitioning for dissolution. The 
assumption is thus that the petitioner is innocence personified, whilst the respondent 
is totally responsible for marital disharmony. Indeed Freeman makes reference to 
the 'quasi-criminal nature of the matrimonial offence', and the 'moral blame 
underlying the finding of fault' (1971: 181). 
As Rodger (1996) explains, the correctional code is dominated by a view of 
marriage that involves constraints, rules, prescribed social roles and the imposition 
of penalties against those who choose to contravene the conventions and norms that 
govern marital relations. In turn, the imposition of what is essentially an external 
regulatory moral framework is founded on the basic premise that the state can and 
should regulate family dissolution (and indeed (re)formation) in the light of 
particular, and thus universal, ideas or conventions about marriage and family life. 
Horstman provides an early example of the way in which divorce law has been 
underpinned by an external regulatory moral framework. Although the Matrimonial 
Causes Act of 1857 was regarded as making divorce more accessible, Horstman 
suggests that the legislation actually did what he describes as, 'its work' of keeping 
families together. Many people did not feel that adultery was in their interests, 
while for others it was simply 'not their style'. In addition, the blame inherent 
within the process, and the scandal that attached to divorce, also meant that the law 
operated to deter adultery and encourage forgiveness. The end result was that the 
1857 Act actually operated as, 'the bulwark of the Respectable family, that most 
distinctive aspect of Victorianism' (1985: 171). 
A further example of law operating in this way is provided by Lewis' (2001) 
observations on the Gorrell Commission proposals of 1912. As outlined earlier, it 
has been suggested that the proposed expansion of the framework of fault beyond 
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adultery was motivated by the desire to promote marriage. Lewis argues that this 
expansion was justified as the means of imposing an external code more effectively 
- 
principally by stopping the poor from making informal cohabiting arrangements. 
In effect, therefore, a degree of liberalisation was actually proposed in order to 
enhance the imposition of the external moral code (2001: 102). 
This construction of divorce law in terms of the external imposition of a moral 
code, also features in much of the discussion that surrounds the Morton 
Commission. An example of such an interpretation is provided by Smart who 
argues that, when formulating its recommendations, the Commission relied on 'high 
principles' and 'orthodox moral guidelines'. Indeed she goes on to make the 
following suggestion: 
'The Royal Commission expressed 
- 
albeit implicitly 
-a strong sense of 
homogenous nationhood within which only one form of family life could 
be seen as morally appropriate. ' (2000: 9) 
McGregor is extremely critical of the Commission's failure to engage with the 
reality of everyday life, describing the prevailing attitudes towards divorce as 
reflected in the Morton Report as, 'defensive if not atavistic' (1957: x). In a similar 
vein Freeman, writing in 1971, comments on the striking nature of the Report's 
6complacent tone and lawyers' insularity' (183). However, Smart makes the point 
that the Commission's approach was not actually meant to be either populist or 
representative, 'nor did it mean to follow current trends. Its aim was to set 
standards and to reiterate the moral rules outlined in the law of divorce' (2000: 9). 
One 'aspect' of law's regulatory framework, relates to perceptions as to the nature 
of marriage. Indeed it has been observed that divorce law, 'reflects a particular 
vision of the moral foundations of marriage' (Eekelaar 1991: 15). Commenting on 
the virtual consensus of Morton when it came to retaining fault as the basis for 
divorce, Smart argues that the Commissioners effectively adhered to the definition 
of marriage as a contract between spouses and state - marriage was constructed as 
an institution, not as a relationship simply between two spouses. A marital offence 
was thus committed against the institution, thereby harming the broader moral and 
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social fabric. This, she argues, reveals that the quality of the marriage itself was 
actually deemed irrelevant 
- 
instead concern was reserved for the 'greater good' 
(2000: 8). During this period, the correctional 'framework' was thus characterised 
by the perception of marriage as a social institution, with personal relationships 
constructed primarily in terms of conservatism, control and social order. 
This concern for the fabric of society is reflective of the argument advanced by 
Devlin (1965). Indeed another 'characteristic' of much of the debate that 
surrounded reform during this period is, if the discussion in the preceding chapter is 
recalled, the way in which arguments are couched in similar terms to that of Devlin 
- 
namely that society is entitled to pass judgement on moral matters and thus to 
regulate 'private' morality, in order to protect the common morality forming the 
basis of society. One example of such 'framing' is provided by the Church of 
England's evidence to the Morton Commission. Here change was opposed on the 
basis of the damage that it would cause to the social order. In the Church's opinion, 
such damage outweighed any possible relief of individual suffering and hardship. 
The result was therefore the submission of the individual to dominant culture and 
social order. 
McGregor (1957) observes that in their evidence given to the Commission, all the 
churches actually agreed that the practical policies stemming from their theological 
convictions did coincide with those dictated by the secular good of wider society. 
Indeed the evidence that was put before the Commission advocated policies 
directed to securing the stability of the family, and hence the general social good. It 
was also the case that when the Commission ultimately split over the question of 
irretrievable breakdown as a new ground for divorce, both sides based their view on 
the belief that their position was not only in the interests of the parties immediately 
involved, but also that of the community as a whole (Lee 1974). Therefore whilst 
there was certainly some divergence of opinion over what would benefit or protect 
public morality, the policy 'process' was clearly characterised by a strong belief 
that this did constitute a legitimate role for divorce law. 
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One particular 'facet' of this idea that divorce law has a role to play in supporting 
the wider community has been linked to broader developments taking place at the 
time. It is interesting that present, once again, are echoes of Devlin's belief in a 
shared morality constituting an essential aspect of social cohesion. Indeed during 
this period, much of the divorce reform and review process was characterised by a 
concern for the more general upheaval and disruption being experienced within the 
country. Divorce law thus became incorporated into an agenda that went 
significantly wider than simply dealing with broken relationships. 
An early example of this broader concern is provided by the Committee on 
Procedure in Matrimonial Causes (Denning Committee). The Committee was 
established in June of 1946, as a response to a sudden rise in divorce 
- 
the number 
of divorces quadrupled between 1944 and 1946 
- 
and resulting concerns about the 
strain that was being placed on the legal system (Dingwall and Eekelaar 1988). The 
Committee's terms of reference were thus as follows: 
'To examine the present system governing the administration of the law of 
divorce and nullity of marriage in England and Wales; and, on the assumption 
that the grounds upon which marriages may now be dissolved remain 
unchanged, to consider and report upon what procedural reforms ought to be 
introduced in the general interests of litigants, with special reference to 
expediting the hearing of suits and reducing costs and to the Courts in which 
such suits ought to proceed; and in particular whether any (and if so, what) 
machinery should be made available for the purpose of attempting a reconciliation 
between the parties, either before or after proceedings have been commenced. ' 
(Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes 1947 (Cmd. 7024): para. 1) 
The Committee's Final Report, published in 1947, devoted significant attention to 
the issue of reconciliation (Dingwall and Eekelaar 1988). One proposal, that a 
tribunal be established in order to consider the possibility of reconciliation in 
undefended divorces was, however, rejected. It was felt that this would introduce 
the possibility of reconciliation into the equation at too late a stage - indeed the 
feeling was, 'that the procedure would quickly develop into a formality to be 
undergone by persons intent at that stage not on reconciliation but only on divorce' 
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(Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes 1947: para 25). What is 
interesting for the purposes of the present discussion, however, is the fact that the 
Report nevertheless placed great emphasis on preserving marriage and attempting 
reconciliation in every case where there was a possibility of success (Maclean: 
2000). Indeed it concluded that a state 'sponsored' Marriage Welfare Service 
should be established, whose work would include the provision of 'help and 
guidance' to those preparing for marriage, and to spouses experiencing 'difficulties' 
thereafter (Committee on Procedure in Matrimonial Causes 1947: para. 28(iii)). 
A further recommendation made by the Committee was the appointment of welfare 
officers, to whom the Court would be able to refer divorce cases involving children. 
The role of such officers was envisaged in terms of investigating the circumstances 
of the case, and exploring the possibility of reconciliation (ibid.: para 29(viii)). 
Thus what can be seen here is an attempt to 'encourage' behaviour to conform to 
the preferred model of the traditional nuclear family 
- 
in essence the imposition of 
an external moral code, but through a more paternalistic, rather than a purely 
coercive or punitive mechanism. 
The nature of the external moral code contained within divorce law, has been linked 
to a wider policy agenda to recapture pre-war society. In particular, a number of 
feminist writers have identified the incorporation of family law into a broader 
correctional or moral code in post-war Britain. For example, Lewis (2001) argues 
that one effect of war time disruption, was to strengthen both conservative views 
about the family, and the need for a strong moral code. In a similar vein, Finch and 
Surnmerfield (1991) suggest that the desire to consolidate family life following the 
disruption of war 
- 
and in particular to create a future in which marriage and the 
home would constitute the foundations of a 'better' life - became a central aim of 
post-war reconstruction. Economic and environmental reconstruction is identified 
as a pre-requisite for achieving this consolidation - after all stable family life 
requires a conducive physical and material environment. However, in addition to 
this, the policy agenda also incorporated a more moral and ideological element. 
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Following the end of the Second World War, public discussions of family life 
tended to focus on the falling birth rate and the overall shape of the British 
population. The birth rate had actually fallen to a record low in 1940, which 
prompted speculation that the population would fall below replacement level. Finch 
and Summerfield (1991) observe that this debate had implications both for ideas 
about motherhood in the post-war period, and also for the models of marriage that 
were deemed appropriate to the promotion of that motherhood. Indeed they 
describe the 1949 report of the Royal Commission on Population as 'the main 
clearing house for 'pronatalist' ideas' (1991: 9). 
Part of the 'problem' for the Royal Commission is identified as being that of the 
emergence of the 'companionate marriage' (Finch and Surnmerfield 1991). Indeed 
it is suggested that the Commission's recommendations reflected a belief that the 
movement for more equality between men and women had impeded the task of 
raising the birth rate. As more women were drawn into paid work, it was felt that a 
potential conflict was created with the demands of motherhood. At the same time, a 
weakening of the traditional dominance of husbands was seen to emphasise the 
wife's role as partner and companion, rather than as the producer of children (loc. 
cit. ). 
It is interesting to note the similarity between the Royal Commission on Population, 
and Morton's subsequent explanations of the rise in post-war divorce. Clearly 
evident within Morton is a concern both about the impact of war on the family, and 
the steadily increasing divorce rate (see, for example, Royal Commission on 
Marriage and Divorce 1956: paras. 39-40). In addition to locating responsibility for 
increased divorce rates in the impact of war, and of legislation widening the 
grounds for divorce and extending financial aid to those seeking divorce, Morton 
suggested that general cultural trends were also contributory factors. One such 
trend was that of the emancipation of women. This was regarded as having the dual 
effect of increasing friction within marr iages as women demanded greater equality 
with their husbands and, as more women entered the labour market, of reducing the 
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fear amongst women that divorce would inevitably herald financial disaster (Stone 
1990). 
Following the post-war baby boom, fears regarding the declining birth rate did 
begin to subside (Finch and Surnmerfield 1991). Nevertheless, the policy focus 
continued to remain firmly on the family. As Smart observes: 
'The concept of family, in particular the romanticised notion of the 
Victorian family, was 
... 
identified as a source of national stability, and 
attempts to re-stabilise the nation were thus seen as logically concentrating 
on the family' (1984: 50). 
Smart goes on to make the point that, in reality, this concept of 'family' actually 
comprised the mother and child(ren). In a similar vein, Lewis (1986) suggests that 
this focus on the mother can be related to the issue of the welfare of children. 
Against a backdrop of concerns that social dislocation was the primary cause of 
family failure 
-a major fear was that the disruption created by evacuation and 
intensive bombing had caused family life to disintegrate 
- 
policy increasingly 
emphasised the socialisation of children. The end result was that the mother-child 
relationship became viewed as the key to a child's healthy development. This re- 
focusing on motherhood also reflected the influence of the dominant psychological 
'maternal deprivation thesis', most notably propounded by John Bowlby (e. g. 1951) 
- 
namely that disruption to the mother-child bond could cause potentially 
irreparable psychological harm to children. 
The reconstruction of society and family thus took place around a very clear vision 
of the family, namely that of the male breadwinner 
- 
female housewife and mother. 
This ideal became enshrined within national politics and policies, primarily through 
its incorporation into the social security system via the Beveridge Report of 1942. 
This shift in emphasis away from 'women-as -wives' towards 'women-as mothers' 
is underlined by Parker, who identifies it as a 'central change' in post-war family 
law: 
'The point to be made here is that Beveridge was not purporting to devise a 
scheme of social insurance which was adapted to existing employment 
32 
patterns: he was devising a model of how it should be in the future. In other 
words, the new social security was intended for a new model family' (1990: 101). 
With regards to stated ideology on the role of women within the family, Smart 
highlights the similarities that exist between Beveridge and the Morton 
Commission's 1956 Report. She argues that, in common with Beveridge, Morton 
recognised the economic dependence of women. It then proceeded to enforce that 
dependence by refusing to improve the property rights of married women. She goes 
on to argue that although the Commission paid 'lip service' to the concept of 
marriage as an equal partnership, it was not willing to take the requisite steps in 
order to achieve any real legal or economic equality 
- 
for example the concept of a 
community of property in marriage was rejected (1984: 38). 
It should, however, be noted that Lewis adopts a slightly different approach to the 
Beveridge reforms. She does recognise that Beveridge assumed that a married 
woman would not engage in paid work, and could therefore be classified as a 
dependent. However, she then goes on to argue that Beveridge actually welcomed 
the idea of companionate marriage, regarding the marital relationship as a 
partnership. It was the nature of that partnership that was not equal 
- 
Beveridge 
believed that husband and wife had 'strictly traditional, complementary roles to 
play' within the partnership, with the husband as breadwinner and the wife as 
housewife and carer (1986: 44). 
Smart suggests that against this backdrop populated by ideologies of motherhood 
and family life, the Morton Commission gave a, 'renewed legitimacy to dominant 
ideologies concerning the patriarchal family and further established the Church in 
the realms of marriage and the family' (1984: 40). She argues that in an effort to 
recapture pre-war family and society, the government could be seen to be delaying 
the development of family law. Legislation was thus utilised in an attempt to 
prevent social change 
- 
in effect, as the country emerged from war, the family had a 
'particular form of patriarchal relations' imposed upon it. This form of relations, it 
is argued, was 'increasingly incompatible with the economic and social reality of 
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family life and the needs of the economy' (loc. cit. ). The resulting failure to 
legislate on divorce during the 1950s is thus held up as an example of how law was 
utilised in an attempt to reproduce a particular family form 
- 
namely one in which 
women remained economically dependent upon men. 
This issue of the role of law, and indeed of what the law can realistically achieve in 
this context, is also considered by Smart. Again focussing on the Morton 
Commission, she suggests that it set itself the task of 'inducing responsibility', and 
of 'countering the blurring of moral values in the public mind' (1984: 37). She 
argues that the presumption made here was that the law could be used to achieve the 
well being of the community 
- 
the basis of that well being having been defined as 
stable marriage. In essence therefore, law is viewed as an active agent in shaping 
social behaviour and attitudes. In addition to providing relief when a wrong has 
been done, the function of law is thus described as a control on 'bad' impulses, and 
an encouragement to the 'good' (loc. cit. ). 
The feasibility of such legislative restraint is, however, subject to question. In a 
subsequent work, Smart argues that the Commission made the assumption that it 
was faced with a 'homogenous society' that was in the early stages of 'moral 
decline' (2000: 10). The regulation of marriage was regarded as a moral issue, 
requiring a response that was, 'a form of moral rearmament in which individuals 
would become bound securely again to the (supposed) values of the pre-war era' 
(ibid.: 11). In a similar vein, Finch and Surnmerfield describe the Commission's 
recommendations in terms of the re-implantation of moral and social sanctions 
(1991: 27). Indeed they make the point that the ultimate remedy was apparently 
seen by the Commission to lie in the following: 
'in fostering in the individual the will to do his duty by the community; 
in strengthening his resolution to make marriage a union for life; in 
inculcating a proper sense of his responsibility towards his children. ' 
(Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce 1956: para. 51). 
It was envisaged that education would be key to reinforcing this sense of 
responsibility and commitment. Such education was to involve the development of 
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6a carefully graded system' for young people in order to 'fit them for family living', 
in addition to the provision of 'specific instruction' for those about to get married 
(ibid.: para. 330). 
Smart describes this approach as a form of 'rational teaching based on reason' 
(2000: 12). However, the efficacy of such an approach is questioned by 
McGregor's argument that people's lives were actually changing in relation to 
structural changes 
- 
they were not simply a result of moral laxity. He continues: 
'The essence of democratic living is the rational exercise of choice. Choice 
necessarily implies change and fear of change has never been a successful guardian 
of morality' (1957: x). In addition, he is critical of the Commission for failing to 
attempt to investigate the social reality which divorce seeks to regulate, arguing that 
people will not 'model their behaviour upon principles laid down by backward 
looking Royal Commissions' (loc. cit. ). 
In a similar vein, Smart argues that the Commission could not see that this form of 
regulation 
- 
which she describes as 'a combination of traditional modes of banning 
behaviour, combined with more modem methods of instruction to ensure 
obedience' 
- 
was actually 'irrelevant' in post-war Britain (2000: 12-13). She 
argues that both the Morton Commission, and the Church were afraid of releasing 
people from the constraints of Christian marriage. Furthermore, she suggests that 
they were also unable to envisage alternative mechanisms for regulating family life. 
Consequently the end result was that the, 'pre-war methods of imposing restraint 
through legislative and religious measures which simply banned or punished 
incorrect behaviour, were still attractive and potentially feasible' (2000: 11). 
Summary 
During this initial period in the history of the development of English divorce law, 
the exit from marriage was governed by a family law system that was underpinned 
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by a strong external moral code. This code, it is argued, was designed to operate in 
concert with the traditional male-breadwinner model of family (Lewis 2001). Thus 
the prevalent concept of family during this period was of a fixed and concrete entity 
that stands outside and above social change (Silva and Smart 1999). Indeed as 
Dewar and Parker have observed, this 'formal era' during which family law 
emerged from ecclesiastical law to become a matter for the civil state, was 
characterised by a 'coherent edifice of thought'. This edifice was founded on 
patriarchal assumptions, the sexual double standard, the assumed economic 
dependence of women, and the ideology of motherhood (2000: 126). 
The dominant discourse was thus a universal moral one. Within the sphere of 
marriage breakdown and divorce, constructions of law were dominated by the belief 
that 'private' conduct should conform to publicly set standards. Reflecting the 
influence of Christian theology, the 'nature' of those standards centred around a 
firm belief in the importance and primacy of marriage. This was underpinned by a 
'version' of the disintegration thesis 
- 
namely that divorce and marriage breakdown 
was indicative of societal degeneration and decline. The end result was thus a legal 
divorce process that sought to regulate intimate relationships and define the 
parameters of marital behaviour. At the heart of that regulation was the doctrine of 
matrimonial fault 
- 
indeed the central position accorded to fault created a primarily 
punitive regulatory framework that both sought to reinforce marriage by deterring 
divorce, and punished those individuals who failed to live up to the marital ideal. 
It should, however, be recognised that the policy 'dilemma' discussed in Chapter 1 
was not completely absent during this period. Indeed some policy actors did offer 
an alternative perspective on the whole divorce question. For example, the Gorrell 
Commission Report of 1912 articulated what can arguably be described as a 
challenge to the more traditional view of divorce as deterioration or pathology 
requiring corrective intervention. Indeed the Commission made reference to the 
following obligation: 
'to recognise human needs, that divorce is not a disease but a remedy for 
a disease, that homes are not broken up by a court 
... 
and that the law should 
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be such as would give relief where serious causes intervene, which are generally 
and properly recognised as leading to the break up of married life. If a 
reasonable law, based upon human needs, be adopted, we think that the 
standard of morality will be raised and regard for the sanctity of marriage 
increased. ' (Royal Commission on Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 
1912: para. 243) 
A strand of opinion was therefore present to the effect that divorce was not simply 
about failure or deviance, that law should have some awareness of the social reality, 
and that the role of law should include the provision of relief to individuals 
experiencing marital difficulties 
- 
in essence that law should have a 'service' 
element. However, despite some recognition of societal change, the latter stages of 
the period under discussion continued to be characterised by a belief that it was 
possible to hold on to a form of marriage that had been consolidated in the previous 
century (Smart 2000) 
- 
and that a corrective framework remained the primary 
mechanism for its achievement. It is true to say that the argument that fault failed 
to accord with the social reality did begin to find a voice during this period. It was 
not, however, until the 1960s that criticism of the whole fault-based process really 
began to come to the fore. 
The shifting balance 
The following observation has been made with regards to the 1956 Morton Report: 
'The Morton Report was the death pangs of the school of thought which 
saw divorce as a legal problem, the greatest evil, and which believed that 
one fostered marital stability by making divorce difficult. ' 
(Freeman 1971: 183) 
The arrival of the 1960s did witness a shifting away from the law's exclusive 
reliance on the matrimonial offence doctrine, and consequently something of a 
4 chipping away' at the overtly corrective approach to marriage breakdown. A 
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change in the approach of the Church towards the whole issue of marriage and 
divorce has been identified as an important contributing factor in this shift. Indeed 
in 1964, a group was appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to look into the 
whole issue of divorce. The group interpreted its task in terms of making 
recommendations as to divorce law reform, but 'without prejudicing the stability of 
marriage or the lifelong nature of the marriage covenant' (1966: para. 8). Its report, 
'Putting Asunder', was published two years later in 1966. 
Writing in 1971, Freeman identifies three 'evils as having attracted the particular 
attention of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Group. These comprised the 'social 
evil' of the stable but illicit union, the 'image' of the law in view of the widespread 
awareness that a huge discrepancy existed between the letter and practice of law, 
and the 'harm' that the existing legal process was believed to be causing to the 
institution of marriage (184). 
In contrast to the position that had been previously adopted by the Church, 'Putting 
Asunder' ultimately chose to reject the matrimonial offence doctrine. The basis for 
this rejection lay in the group's perception that it was failing to uphold either the 
sanctity of marriage, or indeed its public repute. The doctrine was criticised for the 
fact that it concentrated on making findings of past faults, and for its encouragement 
of perjury, collusion and even the commission of offences in order to facilitate the 
legal escape from an unhappy marriage. The group thus concluded: 'As a piece of 
social mechanism the present system has not only cut loose from its moral and 
juridical foundations: it is, quite simply, inept' (Archbishop of Canterbury's Group 
1966: para. 45). As an alternative to 'fault', 'Putting Asunder' recommended 
divorce based on the breakdown of marriage 
- 
such breakdown to be assessed by 
way of judicial inquest. This inquest or investigation was envisaged in terms of 
assessing whether or not the marriage was still viable, and not in order to find 
evidence of any individual deficiencies or fault. 
'Putting Asunder' was closely followed by the Law Commission's Report, 'Reform 
of the Grounds of Divorce: The Field of Choice' (Cmnd. 3123), which was 
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published in November of 1966. 'Field of Choice' commented on the range of 
existing proposals for reform, but focussed particularly on those suggested by 
'Putting Asunder'. Indeed it has been described in some quarters as constituting a 
direct response to the Archbishop of Canterbury's Group (see, for example, Smart 
1984). The Report defined the objectives of a 'good' divorce law in dual terms 
- 
namely buttressing rather than undermining the stability of marriage, and enabling 
marriages that had irretrievably broken down to be brought to an end with 
maximum fairness and minimum bitterness, distress and humiliation (Law 
Commission 1966: para. 15). It was the Commission's opinion that the principle of 
matrimonial fault was failing to achieve either of these. In addition four 'major 
problems' were identified with the existing fault-based system. These comprised 
the need to encourage reconciliation; the prevalence of 'illicit' unions that could not 
be regularised (or the children legitimated); the injustice experienced by the 
economically weaker party to the marr iage (generally the wife); and the need for 
adequate protection for the children of failed marriages (ibid.: para. 1200). 
'Field of Choice' did accept the general philosophy that underpinned 'Putting 
Asunder' (Smart 1984). However, adopting a more pragmatic perspective, the Law 
Commission felt that the recommendations of the Archbishop's Group would be 
unworkable. Their principal objections were based upon the practical difficulties of 
time and cost 
- 
both human and financial 
- 
that breakdown by inquest was thought 
to involve. In addition, it was felt that such a procedure was overly reliant on the 
subjective opinion of the court. Inquisition was rejected as 'not easily triable' (Law 
Commission 1966: para. 58(i)), whilst a 'detailed inquest' into the marriage was felt 
likely to prove 'more distasteful and embarrassing than proceedings under the 
present law' (ibid.: para 58(m)). 
Three proposals for reform were ultimately identified by the Commission as 
'practicable'. These comprised 'breakdown without inquest', whereby the court 
could assume that the marriage had broken down on receiving proof of a period of 
separation, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary; 'divorce by consent , 
although this was considered unlikely to be acceptable where dependent children 
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were involved; and 'the separation ground', which would involve divorce on the 
basis of a period of separation 'substantially longer' than six months (ibid.: para. 
120(4)). 
A more appreciative perspective? 
What emerges through the policy 'developments' of the 1960s is, to utilise Rodger 
(1996) once again, what can arguably be described as a more 'appreciative' 
discourse. Both 'Putting Asunder' and 'Field of Choice' display a greater 
appreciation of the 'real world' 
- 
both in the sense of the reality of social behaviour, 
and the impact of law on individuals and families. Indeed the extent to which the 
approach to the whole issue of divorce had shifted, is underlined by the Law 
Commission who made the statement: 'our point of departure must be the hard facts 
about social habits and public opinion in this country at the present time' (1966: 
para. 52). Similar factors were also regarded as being fundamentally relevant to 
proposals for reform: 'The field of choice for reform is circumscribed by a number 
of practical considerations and public attitudes, which cannot be ignored if 
acceptable and practicable reforms are to be undertaken' (ibid.: para. 120(4)). In a 
similar vein, 'Putting Asunder' stated that breakdown was the preferable principle 
when compared to fault, because it accorded 'better with social realities' 
(Archbishop of Canterbury's Group: 1966: para. 26). 
This perspective thus represents the beginning of a real, and indeed more pragmatic 
engagement with social reality. Indeed Lewis and Wallis suggest that 'Field of 
Choice' was concerned to promote a 'modernising, efficiency 
-orientated view of 
the everyday practices of the courts' (2000: 329). The perspective echoes that of 
the legal realists in the sense that much of the concern is with the impact of law and 
its 'fit' with the society in which it operates, rather than in simply approaching the 
situation in terms of first principles. For example, the Commission set out a number 
of considerations which were, in its opinion, 'undeniably real' in the sense that to 
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disregard them might render a proposal useless, unjust, or unacceptable to public or 
Parliamentary opinion (Law Commission 1966: para. 52). Such considerations 
included the fact that public opinion would not accept more difficult or lengthy 
divorce, unless it could be shown that a significant number of marriages would be 
mended as a result; that the chances of reconciliation were almost negligible by the 
time a divorce petition was filed; that spouses will separate if life becomes 
intolerable, regardless of whether a divorce is actually obtainable; and that marital 
breakdown usually tends to precede the matrimonial offence on which the divorce 
petition is actually based. 
Aspects of the legal 'realist' perspective can also be found in the fact that both 
'Putting Asunder' and 'Field of Choice' were characterised by something of a 
distinction along the lines of Llewellyn's (1930) 'isness' and 'oughtness'. Indeed 
both documents display a sense of needing to understand the impact and effects that 
current law has 'on the ground', in order to decide the appropriate direction for 
future reform. 
What also seems to have emerged during this period, are the beginnings of a 
movement away from a universal moral discourse, towards a more flexible and 
individualistic approach. One example is the clear shift in the Church's position on 
divorce as articulated in 'Putting Asunder', when compared to its stance before the 
Morton Commission a decade earlier. The point made by the later document is that 
divorce is not invariably about fault. Indeed the reality of divorce is regarded, 'not 
a reward for marital virtue on one side and a penalty for marital delinquency on the 
other; but a defeat for both' (Archbishop of Canterbury's Group 1966: para. 26). 
Smart (1984) observes that during the 1960s, the Church was in retreat from the 
position of imposing Christian beliefs on the mass of the population. She argues 
that the reasons behind this reorientation included: the fact that it was becoming 
increasingly difficult to support a divorce law that tended to increase unhappiness 
and injustice; that the divorce process neither enhanced marriage, nor prevented 
relationship breakdown; that by maintaining its traditional position, the Church 
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would be running the risk of becoming an unpopular and repressive institution; and 
an increasing feeling it simply was not possible to force faith and belief upon 
people. 
One aspect of this shift may thus be interpreted in terms of the difficulties of 
imposing an external moral code. However, Lewis and Wallis (2000) suggest that 
this re-positioning also had much to do with changing views as to the source of 
sexual morality. At this point it is helpful to make reference to an earlier work by 
Lewis (1999), who argues that the 1960s witnessed a reformulation of ideas about 
morality amongst both churchmen, and politicians. These ideas were subsequently 
utilised in certain quarters in order to justify more individualistic behaviour, whilst 
those individuals themselves became advocates for further relaxation of the divorce 
laws. 
One such individual is identified as John Robinson, the Bishop of Woolwich. 
Writing in 1963, Robinson broke with the traditional Christian view that the 
teachings of Jesus and the Bible provided unalterable and absolute laws concerning 
moral behaviour (Smart 1984). In his work, 'Honest to God', he advocated a moral 
position based on love 
- 
which was described as possessing 'a built-in moral 
compass' (1963: 115). For Robinson, the disappearance of the 'old land-marks' of 
universal standards supported by the law was regarded as something to be 
welcomed rather than deplored (ibid.: 117). Indeed love was regarded as more 
searching and demanding than anything required by law, 'because it goes to the 
heart of the individual personal situation' (ibid.: 118). It was further argued that, 
for Christians, there could be no "packaged' moral judgements' 
-a stance that was 
underpinned by the basic belief that, 'persons are more important even than 
'standards" (ibid.: 120). 
This perspective would seem to reflect the introduction of Pound's (1980) 'human 
factor' into the equation. As Lewis (1999) observes, a more individual morality 
coming from within, was therefore sought as a replacement for the traditional moral 
code imposed from without. In the presence of love, nothing (including divorce) 
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could be labelled as 'wrong'. Furthermore, once the idea of love as the true moral 
basis of marriage had become paramount, then only the couple themselves could 
determine the state of their marriage. The purpose of the marriage thus became the 
welfare of the couple. Indeed as Smart also observes: 
'There was an important shift away from status towards a recognition 
of the individual occupying the status. In this context it became the quality 
of the relationship that became the yardstick of its moral worth, not simply 
the marital status of the parties. ' (2000: 14) 
In what can arguably be described as reflective of Mill's (1974) appreciation of 
moral pluralism, it is suggested that the importance of this shift lies in the 
acknowledgment that individualisation did not necessarily equate to moral decline. 
This acknowledgment was also combined with an acceptance that the moral 
worthiness of relationships could be assessed in terms of their internal quality, 
rather than their external structure (Smart 2000). 
Care should, however, be taken in order not to overstate the nature of the shift that 
actually took place. The 1960s did herald an increasing acceptance of choice and 
creativity in personal relationships. However, policy processes did not go so far as 
to embrace the rational individual, empowered to shape family life in accordance 
with his or her life project, who characterises the truely appreciative code or 
framework. Indeed it is suggested that those who argued in favour of a morality 
from within, did not do so on the basis of the right of the individual to exercise his 
or her personal preference. Rather, for the majority of reformers, the aim was 
actually to achieve a 'higher morality' (Lewis 2001: 72). Furthermore, it also true 
to say that the developments during this period cannot be described as heralding the 
end of idealism. As previously discussed, 'Field of Choice' talked of the need to 
encourage reconciliation, to adequately protect children, and to deal with the 
problem of injustice to the weaker partner to the marriage. These aspirations have 
led the Law Commission's Report to be characterised, in some quarters, in terms of 
'idealised standards', 'humanitarian values' and a 'confident morality' (O'Donovan 
1993: 111). 
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The'compromise' 
The outcome of this 'debate' surrounding divorce law reform was ultimately the 
compromise (Winnett 1968) of the Divorce Reform Act 1969. That compromise 
took the form of the introduction of a regime of partial no-fault divorce 
- 
which has 
been described by some as a 'rather strange formulation' (Lewis and Wallis 2000: 
309). By virtue of the 1969 Act, the sole ground for obtaining a divorce became the 
'irretrievable breakdown of marriage'. The five conditions or 'facts', at least one of 
which had to be demonstrated in order to establish that breakdown, embraced both 
instances of 'fault' 
- 
namely adultery, unreasonable behaviour and desertion 
- 
and 
the 'no-fault' situations of two years separation with consent, and five years simple 
separation. 
One consequence of this retention of matrimonial fault was that the martial 
relationship, at least in theory, remained a legitimate object of state intervention. 
However, commentators have generally identified the 1969 legislation as 
representing a significant change in policy. 
'The enormity of the breach with the past which this reform represented 
was shrouded by the use of traditional language and the continuation 
(for a time) of traditional procedures. But the ideological premisses of the 
structure of a community's norms governing family and sexual behaviour 
generate an ineluctable logic which has repercussions reaching into the 
innermost recesses of the lives of its members. In this case, the old 
premisses were fatally undermined. ' (Eekelaar 1991: 4) 
The end result, it is argued, was that the state ceased to regulate the dissolution of 
marriage, turning its attention instead to adjusting the situation between the parties 
(see, for example, Eekelaar 1984). 
The 1969 Act is characterised by Lewis as a 'liberalisation' of divorce law (1999: 
35). However, in contrast to the developments in the early part of the century, this 
liberalisation is not additionally characterised in terms of facilitating the external 
imposition of morality. In fact in this instance, it is argued that reform reflected a 
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major shift in thinking about the extent to which the law could, and indeed should 
impose certain standards of behaviour in intimate relationships. 
The idea of greater limits being placed upon the capacity and role of law is one that 
is echoed by Dewar. He suggests that the legislation reflected the assumption that 
there was relatively little law could do to stop married couples from divorcing. 
Instead the 'best' that could be hoped for was that marriages could be brought to an 
end with minimal distress and upset: 
'the decision to divorce was to be the private decision of the parties, and 
the law's role was to assist them to effect that decision while acting as 
go-between or arbiter between the parties as to its terms: a sort of social 
service in other words. ' (1998: 477) 
Although it is therefore arguable that the Divorce Reform Act does represent a shift 
towards a more pragmatic (or legal realist) stance, the theme of moral regulation 
continues to retain a very real presence. The movement towards no-fault divorce 
has been characterised as part of a process of deregulating family law (for example, 
Glendon 1981). However, commentators such as Lewis (1999,2001) suggest that 
this characterisation of the legal changes is somewhat problematic. Indeed whilst 
accepting that there has been a rethinking of the moral underpinnings of the law, 
whether this should really be classed as deregulation is subject to some questioning. 
It is argued that the debate in the 1960s was decided largely in favour of the view 
that it was very difficult to impose a prescriptive moral code in what was an 
increasingly secularist and pluralist society. However, it does not necessarily 
follow that the space that is effectively opened up, is filled by simple de-regulation. 
Indeed it is suggested that the view that morality should come from within, was 
actually accompanied by a shift in the nature of regulation. The nature of that shift 
is identified as a movement away from judging the affairs of the couple according 
to pre-set criteria, towards ensuring that they take responsibility for sorting out their 
own affairs (Lewis 2001). 
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The view that liberalisation does not equate to de-regulation also derives support 
from Smart (1984). She notes that the 1969 Act did herald an end to punishing 
those individuals who fell short of the ideal of one life-long, monogamous, 
heterosexual relationship by labelling them guilty of a matrimonial offence, and 
imposing financial and emotional hardships. However, it is argued, that the result 
was not a liberalisation of individuals from the institution of marriage or its 
'regulatory effects' 
- 
in fact one aim of the legislation is identified as bringing 
people back into conformity, through the legitimisation of their previously illicit 
relationships. Consequently it could not be said that the family was any less 
regulated by law: 
'the law has facilitated a shifting of persons around different family 
groups and has, in the process, averted a large-scale dissent from legally 
controlled marriage. Moreover it has legitimated an increased surveillance 
over families, particularly where there are children, through welfare agencies. 
What might otherwise be understood as a 'reform', or a break with previous 
practices, can in consequence be seen as a continuation of modes of regulation 
over sexual and reproductive relationships through the agency of marriage. ' 
(1984: 56) 
In a subsequent work this position is reiterated 
- 
indeed the 1969 reforms are 
identified as marking a shift away from traditional methods of controlling family 
life through restriction and limitation on movement and change, towards regulation 
through the provision of directions for that movement and change (Smart: 2000). 
Much of the discourse that surrounded the reform process (particularly that 
articulated by politicians), characterised divorce as a process by which individuals 
could leave miserable relationships in order to start new legitimate ones. As Smart 
observes: 'Quite simply, the solution to the divorce problem was seen as 
(re)marriage' (2000: 16). This interpretation is reinforced by Freeman, who 
describes the Divorce Reform Act as, 'an unconscious adjustment to the acceptance 
of serial marriage' (1971: 179). 
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Concluding comments 
The 1960s witnessed something of a challenge to the previously dominant universal 
moral framework. Enacted against the backdrop of a more appreciative moral and 
policy discourse, the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 arguably represented a step away 
from the idea that divorce required a corrective response. However, although the 
law was no longer solely based on denial and restriction, the concept of matrimonial 
fault was retained. The end result was that divorce law thus retained the potential, 
at least in theory, to operate as a punitive moral code. Furthermore, the fact that the 
courts also retained a duty to scrutinise the alleged marital breakdown, meant that 
intimate relationships (and thus arguably individual morality) remained a legitimate 
site of state regulation. 
It should be emphasised that despite the greater appreciation of moral pluralism that 
emerged during this period, the legislation continued to adhere to the concept of the 
traditional family based on marriage. Indeed it has been argued that the 1969 Act 
was undertaken with the specific aim of making family law more fit for the purpose 
of upholding marriage, by acknowledging changes both in behaviour, and in ideas 
about marriage (Lewis 2001). It is therefore suggested that divorce law also 
continued to operate as an external moral code in the sense that it aimed to 
encourage remarriage 
- 
although, in comparison to the use of the matrimonial fault 
doctrine, this 'regulatory' aspect was directive rather than punitive in nature. 
The 1960s also continued to be characterised both by a concern for the greater 
societal good, and a conviction that divorce law did have a role in its achievement, 
or at least in its support. For example, 'Putting Asunder' had described part of its 
remit as investigating whether, 'there is any amendment or reform of that law we 
can recommend in the interests of the nation as a whole' (Archbishop of 
Canterbury's Group 1966: para. 7). In addition, both 'Putting Asunder' and the 
Law Commission's 'Field of Choice' accepted the argument that the fault doctrine 
was acting to prejudice (public) morality -a stance that arguably suggests an 
acceptance, at least implicitly, that the law has a role in 'supporting' that morality. 
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This was a perspective that was to prove to be extremely enduring, as will be 
illustrated by the discussion contained in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
The History of Divorce Law 
Part 2: 1970 
- 
1996 
Introduction 
This chapter 'picks up' the story of the development and reform of divorce law 
following the enactment of the Divorce Reform Act of 1969. The various 
developments that took place during the 1970s, after the Act's implementation, are 
briefly considered. The reform 'process' that spanned the late 1980s and 1990s is 
then explored. As with the preceding period, the chapter is interested to examine 
the extent to which legislation and policy has sought to correct and / or support the 
decision to leave a marriage, and the ways in which it has attempted to achieve 
those aims. 
The reform process ultimately culminated in the enactment of the Family Law Act 
in 1996. The 1996 Act has proved to be an extremely controversial piece of 
legislation, and has prompted a huge amount of debate both within and beyond the 
academic community. The chapter therefore goes on to conclude with an 
examination of this Act 
- 
the perspective(s) that it adopts, the aims that it seeks to 
achieve, the regulatory techniques that it employs, and some of the discussion and 
commentary that it has generated. 
The 1970s: the focus on practicalities 
The Divorce Reform Act 1969, with its mixed regime of fault-based and no-fault 
divorce, came into force on 1 January 1971. The Act formed part of a decade that 
has been described as one in which the 'axes of regulation' of divorce shifted away 
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from morality towards economics (Smart 1984a). It is certainly the case that much 
of the development on the legislative front during the 1970s, did focus on the 
financial aspects of marital breakdown. The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property 
Act 1970 and the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 provide two examples of this. A 
detailed exploration of these developments is beyond the scope of this work. 
However, one effect of the former was to codify the law governing the financial 
consequences of divorce, whilst the latter introduced a somewhat 'new' approach to 
financial issues 
-a duty was placed upon the courts to exercise their powers in order 
to place the parties in the financial position that they would have been in had the 
marriage not broken down (section 25). The developments thus seem to be 
reflective of an apparent reorientation of law towards the practical consequences of 
divorce. 
A further example of this shift is evidenced by the 1974 Report of the Finer 
Committee on One-Parent families (Cmnd. 5629). Established five years earlier, in 
1969, the Committee's terms of reference included: considering the 'problems' of 
one-parent families in society; examining the 'nature' of any 'special difficulties' 
encountered by the single parents including the extent to which they were able to 
obtain financial support when it was needed, and 'the ways in which other 
provisions and facilities are of help to them'; and considering how and to what 
extent it would be 'appropriate' to provide one-parent families with further state 
assistance (Committee on One-Parent Families 1974: para. 1.1). 
One part of the resulting Report emphasised the importance of improving the 
provision of, 'machinery and services 
... 
to deal realistically with the practical 
problems resulting from marriage breakdown' (ibid.: para. 4.282). The 
Committee's stance can thus be seen as representing something of a contrast to that 
of the Denning Committee in the 1940s. Whereas Denning placed great emphasis 
on the preservation of the marriage tie, and on attempting reconciliation where the 
possibility of success existed, Finer concentrated instead on the issue of 
6conciliation'. The objective of such conciliation was not to effect reconciliation, 
but rather to provide the following assistance to the parties: 
'to deal with the consequences of the established breakdown of their 
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marriage 
... 
by reaching agreements or giving consents or reducing the area 
of conflict upon custody, support, access to and education of the children, 
financial provision, the disposition of the matrimonial home, lawyer's fees, 
and every other matter arising from the breakdown which calls for a decision 
on future arrangements. ' (ibid: para. 4.288) 
The Committee did investigate whether divorce actually constituted the right 
vehicle for promoting reconciliation. The conclusion reached, was that the court's 
ability in this regard was limited. Instead it was suggested that the advantages 
offered by the family court in this context, should be seen primarily in terms of its 
capacity to help families, 'to make the best decision and reach the best solutions 
over the whole range of problems which the fact of breakdown produces in the 
circumstances of each particular case' (ibid.: para. 4.313). The Report continues: 
'The welfare service associated with the family court will remain 
- 
as will, 
indeed, the judge 
- 
alive to any sign that a reconciliation is possible, and will 
in such a case take the steps 
... 
seen most likely to procure it. But it will remain 
alive, also, to the policy of the law that dead marriages should be decently 
buried. Decency in this connection involves diagnosing the practical needs 
of the family at the time when the court assumes control over the relationship 
between its members and their affairs 
... 
encouraging the victims of the 
family breakdown to wind up their failure with the least possible recrimination, 
and to make the most rational and efficient arrangements possible for their own 
and their children's future'. (loc. cit. ) 
Finer also tackled the issue of whether law had any place in trying to control marital 
behaviour. It is argued that the Committee's statement that the burden of 
supporting lone parent families would inevitably fall on the state, effectively 
constitutes a recognition that government could not seek to directly control 
reproductive and marital behaviour (Kiernan and Lewis 1996). With specific regard 
to the Committee's decision not to make marriage and divorce more difficult, Lewis 
(1996) suggests that the grounds for that decision were that such legislation would 
have the inevitable effect of imposing a stricter code of familial conduct and sexual 
morality on the poorer sections of society. Such a result would be inappropriate in a 
liberal democratic state. 
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This theme of the apparent 'withdrawal' of law from the immediate sphere of 
intimate relationships, is also reflected in amendments made to the divorce process 
itself during this period. Whatever the relationship between divorce law and the 
divorce rate 
- 
and this has been the subject of considerable debate 
- 
the 
implementation of the Divorce Reform Act 1969 was followed by an increase in the 
number of divorce cases. Indeed the number of decrees absolute granted in England 
and Wales rose from 74,000 in 1971, to a figure of 127,000 in 1976 (Central 
Statistical Office: 1987). One result of this increase was a growing concern over 
the burden that divorce cases were placing on the Legal Aid Fund. For example, in 
1976 it was found that costs had risen by E7.5 million when compared to the 
preceding year (Eekelaar 1991: 27, referring to the 25 th Reports of the Law Society 
and the Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Aid, 1976, (HC 629)). 
In June of 1976, the Lord Chancellor announced that a procedure, initially 
introduced in 1973 for certain divorce cases in which no children were involved, 
would be extended to all undefended cases. Under this 'Special Procedure', instead 
of orally presenting divorce petitions to a judge in the presence of the petitioner, 
they would now simply be read by a Registrar. Provided the judge was satisfied 
that the conditions for a divorce were met, a certificate would then be issued on the 
basis of which a divorce must be granted. This was subject to the proviso that 
where children were involved, an appointment should be made in order for the 
petitioner to meet with the judge. 
The introduction of a universal Special Procedure in 1977 thus constituted, in part, a 
response to the financial difficulties of the mid 1970s, and the need to cut the legal 
aid budget. An additional factor in the equation is identified by Cretney (2000), 
who states that the sheer appetite for divorce necessitated the transfer of the process 
for dissolving a marriage into an essentially administrative one. He suggests that 
the result was thus that by the mid 1970s, courts were barely concerned with 
whether or not a marriage should be legally dissolved. Instead their concerns were 
focussed on financial matters, and on parenting arrangements. 
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Discussion 
At the end of the 1970s the focus of law, in the sense of legal regulation, had shifted 
towards the consequences of and practicalities surrounding divorce. As the Family 
Law Sub-Committee of the Law Society stated: 
'the important decisions are no longer about the rights and wrongs of 
the spouses' behaviour in relation to the decree of divorce, but rather those 
that relate to children and the division of family resources. ' 
('A Better Way Out', 1979: para. v) 
Arguably one result of the developments was a greater vesting of responsibility, at 
least with regards to the breakdown of the marital relationship, in the parties 
involved. As Davis and Murch note: 
'In terms of the state's responsibility to safeguard the exit from marriage, 
we have witnessed the gradual triumph of the liberal position. This is 
reflected in the shift of focus away from the matrimonial offence, first 
towards an examination of whether the marriage is truly at an end, but 
subsequently to an almost laissez-faire attitude to the award of the 
divorce decree. ' (1988: 13) 
This shift in attitude not only had implications for the 'role' of law, but also for that 
of the lawyers working within the process. One example of this is provided by 
Davis et al (1982), who argue that the impact of the special procedure, combined 
with the withdrawal of legal aid from undefended divorces, effectively created a 
system which although providing 'comparatively generous' support for legal 
representation in ancillary matters, did not allow solicitors to give 'adequate' time 
to their divorcing clients. The kind of role envisaged by the residual Green Form 
system of funding was little more than a series of administrative tasks - thus scope 
was not really provided for solicitors to consider the social and emotional aspects of 
divorce with clients, explore possibilities for reconciliation, or act as sounding 
boards for clients who might be unsure as to how to proceed. 
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Whilst the 'law on the books' retained the compromise framework of corrective and 
appreciative elements originally established in 1969, subsequent practice effectively 
undermined those corrective (moral) elements with regards to the marital 
relationship itself. Indeed it is arguable that the traditional ideological premise of 
divorce law itself was undermined (Eekelaar 1991). The removal of any real 
investigation into the facts alleged to have caused a marriage to break down can be 
said to have had the effect of reconstituting the state of marital relationship within 
the private sphere, and out of the direct public (in the sense of official) gaze. Indeed 
it is argued that the 'eclipse' of the matrimonial offence doctrine post 1971, 
represents an abandonment of the attempt by divorce law to spread normative 
standards in favour of what is described as the, 'simple instrumentality of no-fault 
divorce' (Eekelaar 1987: 133). 
Certainly the perception of divorce law as evolving into an essentially 
administrative process is one that is reiterated by a number of commentators. For 
example, Freeman (1976) regards the introduction of the Special Procedure as 
effectively heralding divorce on demand. It is true that section 10 of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (into which the 1969 Act was consolidated) does 
impose a duty on the court, 'to enquire so far as it reasonably can into the facts 
alleged. ' However, the effect of the universal Special Procedure was arguably to 
signal the end of any real attempt to adhere to this duty. Indeed, even prior to the 
introduction of the Special Procedure, significant question marks had been raised as 
to the extent to which the duty was actually being carried out. For example, in their 
study of three county courts during the course of 1973, Elston et al (1975) found 
that the majority of hearings (85%) in undefended divorces lasted less than ten 
minutes. Following the withdrawal of legal aid and the introduction of the Special 
Procedure, the granting of a decree thus appeared to become the inevitable 
consequence of filing a divorce petition (Freeman 1976). 
During this period, the reorientation in the focus of legal regulation in order to deal 
with the reality and consequences of marriage breakdown, appears to reflect both a 
recognition of the limits of the law when it comes to intimate relationships, and also 
the constraints and context of broader society and the circumstances within which 
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law has to operate. It is arguable that this pragmatic concern with the consequences 
of divorce, is largely a product of the 'self-interest' of law and state 
- 
in particular 
the need both to reduce the cost of the legal process itself, and to safeguard the 
financial position of wives on divorce thereby minimising their reliance upon the 
state. However, the resulting concentration on the necessity of getting certain 
practical rather than 'moral' jobs done, does seem to represent something of a 
movement towards, to use Rodger's (1995) vocabulary once again, a more 'family 
policy' type of perspective. 
The 1980s: the movement for reform 
During the 1980s, much of the legislative focus continued to be directed towards 
issues of finance and property. However, what also began to emerge during this 
period was the question of children within the divorce process. Initially that 
visibility arose primarily within the financial 'arena'. For example, in 1981, the 
Law Commission recommended that when dealing with financial matters, the 
provision of adequate financial support for children should be given overriding 
priority by the courts (Law Com. No. 112). A watered down version of this 
recommendation was subsequently enacted by the Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 
-a new section 25 was inserted into the Matrimonial Causes 
Act of 1973, requiring the court to give first consideration to the welfare of any 
minor child of the family. 
However, at this time, concern also began to crystallise around the perceived impact 
of divorce law and process on the individuals involved. It was felt that the necessity 
of alleging 'fault' aggravated conflict which, in turn, had the potential to impact 
adversely on the parties 
- 
in particular on their children. One result of these 
growing concerns was the appointment, in 1982, of the Matrimonial Causes 
Procedural Committee under the chairmanship of Mrs. Justice Booth (Booth 
Committee). The Committee's task was to recommend reforms that would (a) 
mitigate the intensity of disputes; (b) encourage settlements; and Q provide further 
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for the welfare of the family, having regard to the desirability of simplifying 
procedure and saving costs (Matrimonial Causes Procedural Committee 1985: para. 
1.1). 
The view of the Committee was that the 'problem' with the existing system, lay 
primarily in the fact that law required spouses think in terms of wrongdoing and 
blameworthiness from the outset. The result was thus a perpetuation of images of 
innocence and guilt. On the evidence presented to it, Booth recognised that a 
minority did support the retention of the fault concept, principally on the basis that 
its removal would lead to a denial of justice. However, it was felt that there was a 
general acceptance that, in the majority of divorces, both parties were at fault to 
some degree. The idea that marriages broke down because one party had 
committed a matrimonial 'offence' was thus regarded by most as 'unreal': 
'divorce should be truly and not merely artificially based upon a no-fault 
ground 
... 
the concepts of guilt and innocence which have ruled our divorce 
laws, and consequently our divorce procedures, since 1857 should no longer 
have any part to play. ' (ibid.: para. 2.9). 
Commenting on the impact of the Special Procedure, the Committee noted the 
extent to which the ability of courts to comply with their statutory duty to 
investigate the facts alleged had been circumscribed: 'In the great majority of cases 
the court is quite simply in no position to make findings of fact' (ibid.: para. 2.17). 
Consequently the Report's recommendation was that this duty of inquiry be 
removed. Instead the court should merely be required to satisfy itself on the 
evidence, as was the situation in other cases of civil litigation (ibid.: para. 2.18). 
For the Booth Committee, the way forward was perceived to lie in allowing parties 
to present a joint petition for divorce in all cases. In order to avoid the distress that 
might be caused by the reciting of marital details in such a document, the 
Committee suggested that no such details should be given. Instead the parties 
would simply state that they agreed that one of them had behaved in such a way that 
the other could not reasonably be expected to live with him or her. Underpinning 
this approach was the belief that 'primary decision-making responsibility should 
56 
rest with the spouses themselves'. The role of the law was thus constructed 
principally in terms of providing the parties with, 'all necessary help in deciding for 
themselves what should happen to their children, their property and their marriage' 
(ibid.: para. 3.2). 
The Law Commission 
The Law Commission subsequently took up task of divorce law reform, and the 
issues that had been raised by Booth. In 1988, following continued criticism of the 
existing system, a Discussion Paper entitled 'Facing the Future' was published with 
the aim to both 'discuss and inform' (Law Commission 1988 (HC 479): para. 6.5). 
One interesting aspect of the Paper, lies in its clear reiteration of those objectives of 
a 'good' divorce law originally outlined in 1966 
- 
namely 'the support of marriages 
which have a chance of survival', but also 'the decent burial with the minimum of 
embarr assment, humiliation and bitterness of those that are indubitably dead' (ibid.: 
para. 3.1). However, on the question of the mechanisms by which those objectives 
could be best achieved, the 1988 Paper took a somewhat different view from that of 
its predecessor. 
The Commission outlined a number of 'problems' with regards to the existing law. 
These included the allegation that it was guilty of failing to support marriage 
through an inability to prevent parties from obtaining a speedy divorce. The 
retention of fault-based facts was also highlighted as generating hostility. The end 
result was thus a much more painful process for all of those involved, little or no 
scope for reconciliation, conciliation or the re-negotiation of relationships, and a 
potentially detrimental impact on the nature and quality of relationships post- 
divorce (ibid.: paras. 3.48 
- 
3.49). 
The current law was also criticised for its failure to recognise that divorce was not, 
6a final product but part of a massive transition for the parties and their children' 
(ibid.: para. 3.50). The Commission felt that it was crucial both for children, and 
for their parents, that this transition be as smooth as possible. This was underpinned 
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by the belief that the child's adjustment to divorce was largely dependent upon how 
his or her parents adjusted to the situation, and on the quality of his or her 
relationship with each parent after divorce. The Commission thus concluded: 
'Although divorce law can do little actively to this end, it can and should 
ensure that the divorce process is not positively adverse to this adjustment. 
As Lord Hailsham has said, "though the law could not alter the facts of life, 
it need not unnecessarily exaggerate the hardships inevitably involved". 
There seems little doubt that the present law is guilty of just this. ' (loc. cit. ) 
With this in mind, the Paper reviewed a number of possible options for reform. The 
Commission recognised that it was working against a particular social backdrop that 
inevitably affected those possibilities 
- 
indeed reference was made to the academic 
literature exploring changes in expectations, attitudes and behaviour towards 
marriage and the family (Law Commission 1988: paras. 2.19-2.21). In the light of 
these changes, which were found to include a greater acceptance of both marriage 
breakdown and cohabitation, it was felt that imposing a more restrictive divorce 
system would not succeed in bolstering stability in marriage (ibid.: para 5.3). The 
reintroduction or retention of fault-based grounds, together with the introduction of 
an inquest into each marriage, was also rejected as being impracticable and likely to 
exacerbate an already difficult situation. In addition, divorce on the basis of either 
mutual consent or unilateral demand was thought to provide no safeguard against 
'hasty' applications that failed to properly consider post-divorce arrangements 
Obid.: para. 6.2). In view of the importance placed by the Commission upon both 
promoting co-operation between the parties, and recognising divorce as a process, 
two proposals thus emerged as the 'most realistic'. These comprised divorce 
following a period of separation, and also divorce after a period of transition in 
which the parties would be given time and encouragement to reflect, and to make 
arrangements for the future (ibid.: para. 6.3). 
Having considered these two options, the Commission put forward a scheme that 
was based upon the latter. Either or both parties would be able to initiate divorce 
proceedings simply by filing a statement alleging that the marriage had irretrievably 
broken down. This would then initiate a 'transition' period intended for the 
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consideration of future arrangements, and for reflection. At the expiry of that 
period, either party would be entitled to apply for the divorce decree. The main 
advantage of such a scheme was felt to be that 'it combines the logical position that 
the only true test of breakdown is that one or both parties consider the marriage at 
an end, with the need to provide a period for reflection and transition' (ibid.: para. 
5.25). It was also hoped that the process would encourage parties to focus on their 
continuing obligations to children, and would enable them to make arrangements 
for their children's future in as civilised a manner as possible. 
The 1988 Paper concluded by inviting comments and responses with regards to this 
proposed scheme of no-fault divorce. Following a subsequent period of 
consultation, the Commission published its final recommendations for reform in 
October of 1990: 'Family Law: The Ground for Divorce' (Law Com. No. 192). 
Like its predecessor, the report again endorsed the 'original' 1966 objectives of 
'good' divorce law, although this time a caveat was added as to the difficulty of 
actually achieving them in practice. Interestingly, however, the 1990 document also 
saw the addition of the following new objectives: 
'to encourage so far as possible the amicable resolution of practical issues 
relating to the couple's home, finances and children and the proper discharge 
of their responsibilities to one another and their children. ' 
And: 
'to minimise the harm that the children may suffer, both at the time and in the 
future, and to promote as far as possible the continued sharing of parental 
responsibility for them. ' (Law Commission 1990: para. 1.6) 
The Commission recommended that irretrievable breakdown of marriage should 
remain the sole ground for divorce. Such breakdown was, however, now to be 
established by the expiry of a minimum period of one year. The purpose of this 
period was to allow for the consideration of the practical consequences of divorce, 
and for parties to reflect on whether the breakdown was really irreparable. It was 
hoped that such a framework would provide time for the parties to adapt 
emotionally, socially and psychologically to their new circumstances; encourage 
them to focus on the practical consequences of divorce; provide the potential for 
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increased use of conciliation and mediation; increase the chances of reconciliation; 
and foster more constructive and co-operative attitudes towards the future of any 
children Gbid.: paras. 3.29-3.33). 
Discussion 
The approach adopted by the Law Commission to the issue of divorce law reform, 
has been characterised by several commentators as pragmatic. Lewis and Kiernan 
provide one example of this interpretation, describing the 1988 Discussion Paper as 
talking, 'pragmatically of the need to make procedures more consumer friendly' 
(1996: 381). This construction of law as some kind of consumer product that 
reflects the needs or demands of its market did previously emerge in the 
Commission's 1966 Report, 'Field of Choice'. However, what is notable during 
this later period, is the increasing reference to parties as 'consumers' of divorce. 
The fact that more people were divorcing than had been the case in the 1960s, was 
seen to enhance the need to take the 'consumer interest' into account 'in any 
evaluation of the present law or proposals for reform' (Law Commission 1988: 
para. 2.22). Indeed prior to publishing the 1990 recommendations, a public opinion 
survey was commissioned 
- 
the aim being to identify the views of the public 
regarding both the present law and the acceptability of various different bases for 
divorce, and to probe possible models for reform in more depth. The ensuing 
results were subsequently published in Appendix D to the Commission's 1990 
Paper. 
The policy debate conducted by the Commission has also been described as one 
characterised by a preparedness to admit that it would be extremely difficult to turn 
the clock back, especially in respect of divorce (Kiernan and Lewis: 1996). This 
(re)orientation of perspective was welcomed by Walker, who suggested that the aim 
of a good divorce law was actually to ensure that marriages were dissolved 'as 
painlessly and with as few negative consequences as possible. ' In his view, the 
proposals advanced by the Commission thus constituted a 'significant step forward' 
(1991: 235). 
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The Commission's view was that the concept of matrimonial fault was unable to 
provide either a moral framework for marriage, or to act as a restraint on the 
behaviour of spouses. One reason for this was the perception that law was an 
unsuitable mechanism for carrying out the task of 'engaging in the complex and 
sensitive factual and moral judgements which would be necessary accurately to 
reflect the relative blameworthiness of the parties to a marriage' (Law Commission 
1990: para. 3.6). In addition, it was suggested that restricting divorce to 
matrimonial fault constituted an, 'illogical and ineffective means of trying to 
achieve acceptable standards of behaviour' (ibid.: para. 3.7). For example, if the 
6guilty' spouse actually wants a divorce, then the law will not operate to restrain his 
or her behaviour. Furthermore, by granting that spouse a divorce, law is actually 
failing to provide a sound moral framework. It was also suggested that allowing the 
innocent party to punish the guilty by refusing a divorce was unlikely, in reality, to 
change that 'guilty' behaviour (loc. cit. ). The end result was that the role of the 
courts was thus constructed in much more limited, and indeed more pragmatic, 
terms: 
'There are always going to be some fights and the courts are there to 
resolve them. But the courts should be kept to their proper sphere of 
adjudicating upon practical disputes, ensuring that appropriate steps 
are properly taken, and enforcing the orders made. They should not be 
pretending to adjudicate upon matters they cannot decide or in disputes 
which need never arise. ' (Law Commission 1990: para. 2.21) 
This pragmatic framing of divorce law has generated some criticism. For example, 
O'Donovan (1993) compares the position adopted in 1988 and 1990, to that of the 
1960s. In the 1969 Divorce Reform Act, fault had been retained in the facts to be 
elicited as evidence of marital breakdown - this was despite the fact that the Law 
Commission had stated in 1966 that breakdown was not justicable. In 1990, the 
Commission justified the removal of fault in terms of encouraging parties to look to 
the future, rather than the past (Law Commission 1990: para. 3.3). However, 
O'Donovan argues that end the result was actually an abandonment of law's claim 
to establish truth and blame in the divorce arena. This abandonment, in turn, is seen 
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to constitute, 'part of the retreat of family law from an overt moral discourse, 
because the notion of shared, or imposed values is being abandoned' (1993: 112). 
O'Donovan also goes on to suggest that it is possible to read the Law Commission 
documents as placing limits on the power of law when it comes to human 
relationships. Indeed it is suggested that the 1988 text is underlain by resignation 
- 
in essence a retreat from the earlier confidences of 1966 in the basic 'goodness' of 
individuals. Whilst recognising that this retreat might be welcomed as making way 
for pluralism, she argues that it actually takes place in the name of pragmatism 
- 
essentially because the law is being manipulated, because it generates antagonism, 
and because of the impossibility of allocating blame between spouses. The fact that 
reform is proposed for such reasons, rather than in the name of liberty, is regarded 
as a cause for criticism. 
O'Donovan also asserts that the idealism originally present in the 1966 document is 
now marked by its absence. 'Justice' has become defined in terms of procedure 
rather than substance, and the whole debate is described as having shifted from 
idealised standards and a confident morality, to consumer led options and 
efficiency: 'The language of 1966 contained humanitarian values 
... 
The language of 
1988 is of efficiency, pragmatism and resignation' (1993: 111). In a similar vein 
Deech (1990) is also critical of the move to make the law more realistic, and of the 
ongoing shift in emphasis from the moral dimension of marriage to the personal and 
economic. 
Continuing the trend that characterised the 1970s, the legal attention during this 
period did remain focussed primarily on the practical consequences of divorce. 
However, the reforms proposed during this period also arguably offered a 
reconstruction of the state role in divorce 
- 
indeed the proposed introduction of a 
no-fault framework can interpreted as the formal abandonment of the attempt to 
directly impose an external moral code through divorce law. This can be said to 
represent an increasing awareness of the limitations of law, particularly when 
functioning against a backdrop of fragmented social and moral values, and is thus 
reflective of a more legal realist type of perspective. However, this must be 
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balanced against the fact that policy makers were not completely abandoning the 
idea of creating a coherent and consistent moral law (Law Commission 1990: para. 
3.40) 
- 
and certainly the various proposals put forward for reform continued to 
emphasise the importance of, and their support for marriage. 
It has been suggested that the proposed new model of divorce had no standards of 
justice, no adjudication and no responsibility 
- 
'only a norm of negotiation' (Deech: 
1990: 244). Other commentators would, however, disagree (see, for example, 
Lewis 2001). Indeed it is arguable that what was actually present within the reform 
proposals, was an expansion of a more 'indirect' form of regulation 
- 
namely the 
encouragement of personal responsibility when relationships break down, and the 
formal provision of space within the divorce process in which to exercise it. 
The 1990s: the 'process' of reform 
The Government response to the Law Commission's proposals for reform came 
three years later with the publication of a Green Paper, 'Looking to the Future. 
Mediation and the ground for divorce', in December of 1993 (Lord Chancellor's 
Department, Cm. 2424). The aim of the Paper was articulated as seeking to canvass 
opinion on the recommendations made by the Commission. In particular, opinion 
was sought on the question of mediation, and the possibility of incorporating it into 
the divorce process. 
The Green Paper did make several changes to the process originally envisaged by 
the Law Commission. One such change was the suggestion that the process should 
commence with a single first 'port of call' for those wishing to initiate proceedings 
(Lord Chancellor's Department 1993: para. 8.1). It was envisaged that this would 
comprise a personal interview incorporating the provision of advice on marr iage 
guidance, information about the divorce process and possible alternative options, 
and an explanation of mediation and how it might work (ibid.: paras. 8.2,8.7). 
Following this meeting, the period of reflection and consideration would be initiated 
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by either or both parties filing a statement to the effect that the marriage had broken 
down. This was to be accompanied by statements of circumstances containing 
information about children, property, and finances. Within twelve weeks the court 
would then be required to hold a preliminary assessment, in order to monitor 
progress on the arrangements being made, and to make any necessary orders. At 
the expiry of the period, either or both parties would then be able to apply for a 
divorce order. 
The publication of the Green Paper initiated yet another period of consultation, 
which finally culminated in the publication of the Government's detailed proposals 
for reform in its 1995 White Paper, again entitled 'Looking to the Future. Mediation 
and the ground for divorce' (Lord Chancellor's Department, Cm 2799). Echoing 
previous proposals, the irretrievable breakdown of marriage was to be demonstrated 
by the passage of 'a period of time for reflection and consideration' 
- 
this would 
enable couples 'to address what has gone wrong in the marriage', and to explore 
'whether there is any hope of reconciliation' (Lord Chancellor's Department 1995: 
para. 2.34). However, in the event that the parties decided that reconciliation was 
not possible, they were now to be required, 'to make proper arrangements for living 
apart before a divorce order can be made' (loc. cit. ). 
The minimum period for reflection and consideration was fixed at twelve months. 
In addition, the personal interview envisaged in the Green Paper was replaced by 
the requirement to attend a group information giving session prior to commencing 
proceedings. The function of this meeting was described in the following terms: 
Jto] introduce parties to the benefits of marriage guidance and counselling, 
provide information about the emotional, psychological, financial and legal 
aspects of separation and divorce, and its effects on parents and children. 
The session will Provide an important opportunity for the objectives of 
family mediation to be explained, and the benefits of couples working 
together on future arrangements to be described. ' 
(Law Commission 1995: para. 2.37) 
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Discussion 
Much of the 1993 Green Paper appears to echo the kind of thinking that 
underpinned the Law Commission_'s stance on divorce reform. For example the 
Lord Chancellor, who had strong personal views regarding the value of the 
institution of marriage to both individuals and the wider community, stated in his 
foreword: 
'The breakdown of marriage is a serious problem. Seeking to prevent the 
breakdown of marriages is an objective which goes far beyond the scope 
of the law. The divorce law is intended to deal with the situation in which 
a breakdown has taken place. ' 
He then continued: 
'I believe that a good divorce law will support the institution of marriage 
by seeking to lay out for the parties a process by which they receive help to 
prevent a marriage being dissolved. If that is not possible it should seek to 
eliminate unnecessary distress for the parties and particularly for their 
children in those cases where a marriage has broken down irretrievably. ' 
(Lord Chancellor's Department 1993: iii) 
The proposals contained within the Green Paper have been described as based upon 
the following: 
'a clear-sighted view that marriage and family life have been changing 
and that there is little that public policy can do to transform deeply 
entrenched social changes; it can only facilitate the best possible 
outcome for failed marriages. ' (Rodger 1995: 14) 
It is true to say that one objective accorded to the law by the Green Paper, was that 
of saving saveable marriages 
- 
indeed much of the emphasis of the proposed new 
process was placed upon the identification of such marriages, and on couples 
seeking appropriate professional help (see for example, Lord Chancellor's 
Department 1993: para. 1.10). However, the role of law was not extended to save 
'irretrievable' marriages, and there was a clear focus both on the impact that law 
and procedure could have on the conduct of divorce and the parties involved, and 
on the provision of effective mechanisms to protect those parties and adjust their 
financial and living arrangements (Lord Chancellor's Department 1993: paras. 1.3, 
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3.4). It is thus argued that the Paper constituted the recognition of the 'real 
movement' in family life 
- 
in effect it was seeking to consolidate in law what is 
already happening in practice. As such it has been regarded as representing a prime 
example of 'family policy' (Rodger: 1995). 
Adopting what is arguably a 'related' perspective, Lewis makes the point that the 
Green Paper accepted that the basis for marriage was love, and that a decision as to 
whether this was present or absent could only be made by the parties themselves 
(2001: 92). It is, however, important to recognise that this acceptance did not 
equate to the emergence of some kind of 'moral free' system. For example, the 
Green Paper continued to assert that part of the function of law was to, 'reflect the 
seriousness and permanence of the commitment involved in marriage' (Lord 
Chancellor's Department, 1993: para. 3.1). Consequently it should ensure that, 
'divorce is not so easy that the parties have no incentive to make a success of their 
marriage and, in particular, to overcome temporary difficulties' (loc. cit. ). 
With regards to the subsequent White Paper, some commentators have noted the 
beginnings of a real shift away from the position of the late 1980s and early 90s. 
Lewis (1996,2000,2001) does make the point that although the Lord Chancellor 
did initially announce his intention to introduce measures that would cut the rate of 
divorce, what was ultimately proposed in the White Paper was actually a collection 
of measures that were designed to make divorce more amicable and less expensive. 
However, Davis finds evidence of more regulatory (in the sense of directive) and 
idealistic elements within the proposals for compulsory information sessions, the 
period of reflection, and the encouragement of mediation. Indeed, as he comments: 
'I am left with the feeling that this White Paper seeks to improve on human nature 
and to fly in the face of social change' (1995: 556). 
Both the Green and White Papers concluded that the support of marriage must 
continue to be one of the objectives of divorce law. It has been argued that the 
approach adopted in order to achieve that objective, amounted to a 'new 
formulation'. Certainly the abandonment of a fault-based law of divorce was 
confirmed. However, alongside that abandonment, government also created a space 
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for both reconciliation, and for ensuring that people took responsibility for settling 
their own affairs: 
'The optimism that morality would come from within and that people would 
behave in a caring fashion towards one another gave way to public effort to 
impose structures and conditions to ensure that they did so' (Lewis 2001: 93). 
Thus Lewis argues that although attempts to enforce an external moral code were 
being abandoned, the same could not be said for regulation. Indeed it would seem 
that the more individual morality of personal responsibility was increasingly 
becoming the focus of the new regulation. 
The parliamentary 'stage9 
The government proposals, in the form of the Family Law Bill, were introduced 
into the House of Lords on 16 November 1995. Over the following months the Bill 
was changed quite significantly, largely as a result of Conservative backbench 
opposition in both Houses (Read and Marsh 1997). Those changes included the 
insertion of a set of 'general principles', which constructed a framework within 
which the courts and all others using the Act would be required to operate (section 
1). These principles included that the institution of marriage was to be supported; 
that the parties to a marriage that had irretrievably broken down were to be 
encouraged to take all practicable steps to save the marriage; and that where a 
marriage had irretrievably broken down it should be brought to end with minimum 
distress to parties and children, and with questions dealt with so as to promote as 
good a continuing relationship between parties and their children as possible. 
Certain procedural changes were also made to the divorce process. These included 
the extension of the period of reflection from twelve to eighteen months, where 
children under the age of sixteen were involved (sub-sections 70 1) and 0 3)). in 
addition, attendance at an Information Meeting was to be required at least three 
months prior to the initiation divorce proceedings (sub-section 8(2)). That meeting 
was now to include the provision of an opportunity to meet with a marriage 
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counsellor, and would involve encouraging parties to attend such a meeting (sub- 
section 8 (6) (b)). 
These various changes made to the original Bill were result of intense debate within 
both Houses, much of which focussed on the state of marriage and the need to 
reduce marital breakdown. A consideration of the debates falls beyond the scope of 
the present discussion, however, it is useful to provide a 'snapshot' of some of the 
issues involved. An example of one 'side' of the debate is provided by Lord 
Jakobovits, whose stance was underpinned by the perception that the state of 
modern marriage was a 'national disaster area' causing economic, social and moral 
harm. Reflecting the views of a significant number of members, he made the 
following statement: 
'It may be argued 
... 
that it is not the business of government or Parliament 
to give moral advice or to urge people how to conduct themselves in their 
private lives. I reject that argument as false and irresponsible. It is the 
business of government to protect society from any looming peril, especially 
when it is liable to be of catastrophic proportions, as the breakdown of 
marriage now is. ' (House of Lords debates, 30 November 1995, c. 721) 
In a similar vein, Baroness Young argued that marriage constituted the basis of 
society, and that the effect of removing fault from the divorce process was to 
undermine individual responsibility. Indeed the removal of fault was regarded as an 
active discouragement on the part of the state of, 'any concept of lifelong 
commitment in marriage, to standards of behaviour, to self-sacrifice, to duty, to any 
thought for members of the family' (ibid.: c. 733). 
Situated on the other 'side' of the debate were Parliamentarians such Lord Marsh, 
who refuted the idea that legislators should be providing some kind of moral lead: 
'It is all well and good to be superior about modern trends. On an issue such 
as this, it is the will of people in a democracy that is changing. The whole 
institution of marriage is changing. By all means, provide, as the Bill does 
for those who need it, assistance towards the least bad agreement between 
the parties 
... 
But divorce will continue to be a major fact of modern life. 
Modern marriage is different from the past because the participants are 
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different. ' (ibid.: c. 757) 
Earl Russell highlighted a related issue 
-namely the limits of the law when it came 
to the issue of the breakdown of intimate relationships. It was argued that the belief 
that marriage breakdown could be prevented by tightening the divorce laws, 'is a bit 
like thinking that one can prevent death by postponing the funeral; it is altogether 
aimed in the wrong place. ' For the Earl, the test of a good divorce law was thus not 
to be measured in terms of whether it produced more 
-or less divorces: 
'It will be whether when a marriage has broken down it minimises conflict; 
provides orderlY arrangements for protecting the interests of children; settles 
money and property; and is generally an orderly procedure. ' Gbid.: c. 713) 
During the Parliamentary stage, the view that law could guide people in the right 
direction, in essence that it could determine a particular type of marital behaviour 
became increasingly vocal. Indeed Lewis (2001) suggests that much of the debate 
surrounded the question of whether legislation should once again seek to impose a 
moral code of behaviour. She does, however, ultimately characterise the legislation 
that was finally enacted as part of a trend across the latter part of the twentieth 
century away from the attempt to directly impose such a code on divorcing spouses. 
Nevertheless, what is also undoubtedly present through this policy process, is a 
concern by the state to promote those values in which it believes. 
The Family Law Act 1996 
The Family Law Act finally received the Royal Assent on 4 th jUjy 1996. Asa result 
of the various changes made during the reform process, the final 'form' of the 
legislation contains various elements of 'duality'. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
Act is characterised by a basic duality between supporting and ending marriage. An 
additional aspect of that duality is also identified as lying in the Act's attempt to 
enforce the obligations of the parties in their capacity as parents through the 
provisions for conciliation whilst, at the same time, attempting to buttress marriage 
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- 
and thus enforce obligations in the parties' capacity as spouses 
- 
through the 
promotion of reconciliation and marriage-saving. Therefore, in essence, an attempt 
is made to utilise the arrangements for no-fault divorce in order to save marriages 
(Lewis 2000: 117). 
One further 'aspect' of the 1996 Act's duality has been located in the fact that the 
legislation places a premium upon marriage as the traditional basis for family, 
whilst also recognising the importance of ties between parents and children. A 
'tension' thus exists between the traditional and the biological family: 
'the provisions of the Family Law Act negotiate the fine line between 
reinforcing 'traditional' family values 
... 
at the same time as it restates and 
underlines the salience of both biological 'traditional' practices and 
acknowledging the trend (demographic and attitudinal) of departure away 
from those practices. ' (Day Sclater and Piper 2000: 146) 
It is argued that the aim of the Act was to incorporate both the idea that the decision 
to divorce should be that of the couple involved, and that the parties should take 
responsibility for sorting out their own affairs, particularly with regards to the 
children (Lewis 2001). Indeed Cretney suggests that under the Act, the court's role 
in deciding whether the status of marriage should be terminated was to be reduced 
to little more than that of, 'a gatekeeper checking that the correct boxes have been 
ticked on the form'. The 'staple' business of the divorce court would thus comprise 
dealing with the financial consequences of divorce, determining how children's 
interests could be best promoted, and possibly mediating in grievances (2000: 5). 
However, the extent to which parties are actually entrusted to make decisions about 
the state of their marriage, and to which the exercise of personal responsibility is 
genuinely privatised, is subject to some debate. 
A tension between autonomy and coercion is present within the Family Law Act. 
For example, it attempts to both modify behaviour, and to informalise or de-legalise 
divorce through mediation. As highlighted earlier in the discussion - and reflecting 
a trend that runs through the reform process - the Act seeks to give parties greater 
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autonomy, whilst at the same time seeking to influence how they use it. As 
Eekelaar argues: 
'People are at one and the same time treated as if they were independent, 
responsible and autonomous individuals, with the freedom of choice that 
entails, but because of the persuader's belief that he holds the only rational 
view, they are effectively denied any real choice at all' (1999: 388). 
In a similar vein Dewar states: 'Gone is the idea that the role of law is to facilitate 
and implement private decisions: it now seeks to influence the decisions 
themselves' (1998: 477). 
A preference for regulation by individual initiative is perhaps unsurprising in a state 
based on liberal principles (Dingwall 1992,1994, Dingwall and Eekelaar 1988, 
Dingwall et al 1984). However, Lewis (2000) suggests that the question of how to 
enforce that responsibility or initiative has actually had the effect of opening the 
way for what Mead calls a 'new paternalism'. The child support legislation is 
identified by Lewis as one example of this new paternalism operating within the 
family arena. It is true that the Child Support Act of 1991 does represent a more 
'direct' form of intervention, something which similarly characterises much of 
Mead's (1997) own discussion of social policies that attempt to reduce poverty and 
other social problems through directive and supervisory means. However, it is 
arguable that his 'vision' is also applicable to the 1996 developments in divorce law 
and process. 
Mead defines 'paternalism' in terms of 'supervisory policies' (1997: 2). Inherent 
within paternalistic policy, is regulation in order to improve the enforcement of 
'norms'. Policies are directive in the sense of telling people what they are supposed 
to do. Paternalism also asserts the authority to judge individual interests. Society 
claims the right to tell its dependents how to live, whilst the enforcement of 
society's interest in good behaviour is deemed to also serve the interest of the 
individual. The assumption here is that government can know and serve 
individuals' interests better than they would themselves (1997: 5). In essence 
therefore Mead's vision is about setting standards and helping people to function 
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'better' 
- 
elements of policy which are, as will be discussed in the remainder of this 
chapter, undoubtedly present within the Family Law Act framework. 
The 'nature' of regulation 
The 'nature' of the regulation present within the Family Law Act has formed the 
subject of some discussion. At one 'level', the exercise of personal responsibility is 
enforced through the imposition of explicitly coercive mechanisms 
- 
in the sense 
that there are a number of procedural steps that must be complied with. However, 
whilst the regulation imposed by the Act has been described in some quarters as 
mild, Davis presents the legislation in a somewhat different light: 
'it marks an extension to, rather than a retreat from, the presumption that 
divorce law can of itself reinforce commitment to the marital tie. In the 
time limit it imposes 
... 
in the various obligations under which it places 
people, this is the first reversal of the liberal trend for 150 years. For 
once the rhetoric of divorce law and its attempts to bolster the institution 
of marriage actually has some meaning potentially. ' 
(Speaking as discussant at: 'Commitment: Who CaresT One Plus One 
Marriage and Partnership Research conference, 25 October 1999. ) 
Another regulatory 'aspect' of the legislation is highlighted by Dewar and Parker. 
The opening sections of the Act, which contain a statement of principles and objects 
exhorting parties to end their marriage and sort out their affairs by the most 
amicable and cost-efficient means possible, are identified as an example of modern 
family law attempting to speak directly to the families themselves. One possible 
reason suggested for the adoption of this new style of law, is that politicians 'seek to 
use legislation to perform an overtly educative role' (2000: 139). The law's role is 
thus to state the principles which, in turn, set the tone for mediation or negotiation: 
'Private ordering is encouraged against a backdrop of clearly articulated principles 
of public policy which dictate how that bargaining freedom should be used' (loc. 
cit. ). As Davis observes of the 1996 Act: 'It is clearly an attempt to offer a guide to 
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the individual conscience' (One Plus One Marriage and Partnership Research 
Conference, 25 October 1999). 
Inherent within the Family Law Act, is also the ideal or model of the 'good' divorce 
(see, for example, Collier 1999). Parties are not simply left to choose their own 
moral standard of outcome at the point of relationship breakdown, but rather are 
bombarded by messages as to how they should behave. The nature of those 
messages is that the 'responsible' individual will reflect on whether his or her 
marriage can be saved, behave in a reasonable and conciliatory manner, engage in 
mediation, maintain contact with children after divorce, and meet any financial 
responsibilities towards his or her children and former spouse. 
Dewar regards this as an example of the 'expressive' function which, he argues, is 
increasingly being performed by family law 
- 
in effect law is concerned to 'radiate 
messages' that are designed to influence behaviour in a general, rather than any 
detailed way (1998: 483). He suggests that the Act is thus best understood 'as 
setting out general aspirations on how to divorce well' (loc. cit. ). Adopting a 
slightly different perspective, Collier argues that divorce has effectively been 
'reconstituted' within the Act 'as a different kind of 'governable space" (1999: 260- 
1). For example, an individual attending the compulsory information meeting, is 
regarded as, 'entering a point of regulation a central aim of which is to foster a 
particular consciousness on the part of the subject attending' (ibid.: at note 20). A 
certain kind of good divorcing subject (in particular a 'good parenting' subject) is 
thus brought into being 
- 
in this instance one who will make a 'better' decision 
about the ending of their marriage. 
The divorce 'process' 
If the focus of discussion is now shifted to the various elements that comprise the 
new divorce process, it is possible to consider the nature of regulation within the 
Family Law Act in some more detail. For example, the information meeting has 
been described as, 
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6a strikingly direct form of regulation of social relations in which the law 
can be seen as supporting the authorisation of some explicit normative 
strategies by those counsellors and other 'experts' of human relationships 
who have so vigorously promoted what has been described as the new 
consensus around family law policy enshrined in the FLA. ' 
(Collier 1999: 259). 
It is argued that divorce is conceptualised, and indeed is experienced, at both the 
collective and the individual level. Much of the debate surrounding reform may 
have been premised on the paramountcy of the welfare of the child, however, 
'within this regulation of the family by government' a particular notion of the 'good 
society' has also been generated. The construction of family members as the 
objects of intervention has effectively been fused both with ideas of what are 
desirable family forms, and with the production of 'social health': 
'Men and women, notably in their role as parents, have been subjected 
to identification, explanation and disposition as 'familial' individuals 
via the production of normative criteria around what constitutes a 'good' 
marriage, good (enough) parenting and 
... 
what is, or should be, a good 
divorce. ' (ibid.: 260). 
This perspective contains echoes of Nikolas Rose's, 'complex apparatus of health 
and therapeutics'. It is argued that this has been assembled in the name of both 
social and personal well-being 
- 
it is concerned with the management of 
individuals, of the social body, and also of 'problems of living'. The make-up of 
this apparatus is described as comprising techniques of advice and guidance, which 
are then utilised by medics, clinics, guides and counsellors (1996: 37). As Rose 
goes on to argue: 
'The lines between public and private, compulsory and voluntary, law 
and norm operate as internal elements within each of these assemblages, as 
each links the regulation of public conduct with the subjective emotional 
and intellectual capacities and techniques of individuals, and the ethical 
regimes through which they govern their lives. ' (ibid.: 38). 
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The result is thus the construction of the actively responsible individual. However, 
as Rose notes 
- 
and this is something that can be seen with the Family Law Act 
- 
broader political and social goals are also 'translated' into the choices and 
commitments of individuals. Arguably parallels can also be drawn between Rose's 
'medical' experts and the processes of mediation and marriage counselling within 
the 1996 framework. In both instances individuals are apparently exercising 
personal freedom and choice, however they are actually involved in situations in 
which they are effectively binding themselves to expert advice. 
The information meeting, and particularly the extension of the information provided 
from legal principles, divorce procedures and marriage guidance services to include 
'the consequences of divorce and the effects of divorce on children', has been 
identified as creating 'much wider scope for the use of value. 
-based persuasion' 
(Eekelaar 1999: 389). Indeed it is suggested that, in view of the way in which the 
Law Commission's original proposals were subsequently developed, it is difficult to 
resist the conclusion that a desire 'to use the device of providing 'objective' 
information as a means of influencing behaviour' is at work (ibid.: 390). 
The main purpose of the period of reflection and consideration was, in the opinion 
of the Law Commission, to ensure that a marriage had broken down irretrievably. 
However, within the 1996 Act, the function of that period was constructed 
somewhat differently. Eekelaar makes the point that the effect of legislating on the 
basis envisaged by the Law Commission, would have been to signal that the state 
was willing to simply stand by and accept the situation as it was resolved between 
the parties. This, he suggests, was not the kind of message that the Government 
wished to convey. The end result was therefore a structure: 
'avowedly viewed primarily as giving the parties an opportunity to explore 
the possibility of holding back from divorce, and making them aware that 
they are expected to use it in this way. ' (1999: 389) 
The duality of personal responsibility and regulation is particularly evident in the 
mediation arena. Within the reform process, mediation was often constructed in 
terms of party control and agreement - indeed this was frequently articulated as 
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constituting one of its main advantages (see, for example, Law Commission 1990: 
para. 5.30(iii); Lord Chancellor's Department 1993: para. 7.7; Lord Chancellor's 
Department 1995: para. 5.6). However, in certain quarters it is argued that this 
apparent privatisation of family law actually cloaks a continued intervention in, and 
supervision of families. In effect therefore one form of regulation is being 
exchanged for another (Bottomley 1985). 
Eekelaar suggests that it could be argued that the very concept of mediation is a, 
6manifestation of the phenomenon of government by persuasion' (1999: 391). 
Mediation was envisaged (at least by the Government) as a process that might save 
marr iages, enable spouses to take responsibility for marriage breakdown, and 
encourage them to look forward to their future responsibilities. However, these do 
not necessarily constitute features that the mediators themselves would associate 
with mediation. Indeed the Government perception was of a process that would 
underline to parties just what their obligations were: 
'Mediation was not simply a method of bringing parties to agreement; it was 
a further way of informing people about how they should have behaved, and 
should behave, and, through informing them about these matters, bringing 
pressure to bear on them to act in a 'responsible' manner. ' (loc. cit. ) 
Studies of mediation have concluded that the agenda is often strictly controlled For 
example, mediators may create opportunities for certain options to be explored 
whilst disregarding others (Dingwall and Greatbach 1991). As a forum it may not 
always allow people to have their say in a manner that fits their own sense of justice 
(Richards 1994). Furthermore mediators are not invariably objective or neutral, in 
the sense that they may be operating with their own set of values. One example of 
this is provided by Piper's (1993) study of divorce mediation and parental 
responsibility. In this instance, mediator interventions were found to be guided by a 
very particular construction of parental responsibility held by mediators. This 
concept had the effect of limiting the agenda for discussion. Furthermore, mediator 
perceptions of both the 'problem' and the 'solution' were found to be of far greater 
significance than the opinions that were actually held by the parties themselves. 
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The 'efficacy' of regulation 
This approach to regulation does prompt the question as to whether it is possible to 
either imbue people with legal principles to such an extent, or to present them with 
the requisite incentives to adopt them, that they will choose to constrain their 
actions in the required way (Dingwall et al 1984). The issue of whether the law 
actually has any direct impact upon behaviour has been the subject of considerable 
debate (for a summary, see Lewis 1999). Certainly one theme characterising 
Parliamentary debates on the Family Law Bill, was a belief in the ability of' law to 
send messages to the members of society. Paul Boateng, Labour's legal affairs 
spokesman, provided one example of this view during the course of the Bill's 
Second Reading in the House of Commons: 
'We cannot legislate for domestic virtue 
... 
What we can do, however, is 
to send important messages about what is valued in our society. We value 
families 
- 
the domestic relationship and the safety and security provided for 
children by families 
- 
and we must make it clear that we are not prepared to 
see the family continually eroded. ' (House of Commons, 25 March 1996, c. 757) 
It has been suggested that whether divorce law does, or indeed should be expected 
to convey any messages to the married, is something that actually far from clear 
(Schuz: 1993). Several commentators do, however, seem to assume that this is the 
case. For example, both Brown (1991) and Mears (1991) are of the opinion that 
law should be acting to stem the tide of divorce. According to Brown, the need is 
to, 'strengthen the moral base, not to erode it' (1991: 129). In a similar vein, Mears 
criticised the Law Commission's apparent move to make divorce 'easier', 
suggesting that this was 'the opposite of what was wanted' (1991: 237). 
It is extremely difficult to establish the existence of any simple causal link between 
law and behavioural change. However, it is argued that a greater degree of 
agreement surrounds the proposition that the law does facilitate and legitimate 
particular types of behaviour (Lewis 1999). One view is that law provides a 
framework within which relationships and responsibilities are negotiated, and as 
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such possesses the potential to influence behaviour. With regards to children, it is 
argued that law sets the parameters of what is considered to be 'normal' in the way 
that they are cared for. Rather than merely representing something to which 
recourse is had at times of duress, the law affects daily lives. It is not possible 
either simply to 'opt out' of these legal parameters by adopting an unconventional 
lifestyle, or to assert law's irrelevance by choosing to ignore it (Smart and Brophy 
1985). 
In a similar vein, it has been asserted that law does affect how people think about 
their own relationships (Finch 1989). Again, with regards to the parent-child 
relationship, Piper argues that social concept of 'responsibility' underpinned by law, 
has become a 'strong normative tool for delineating socially acceptable behaviour' 
(1993: 5). Edwards and Halpern (1992) also suggest that the concept of 'parental 
responsibility' (which was introduced in the Children Act 1989, and is discussed 
later in the chapter) actually operates as a 'psychological device', to restructure 
thinking on family functioning. They argue that the perception is thus encouraged, 
both within the public mind and internalised by individuals, that it is the parents 
who are fundamentally responsible for the support and welfare of their children. 
At what might be termed the more 'practical' level, questions as to the efficacy of 
6regulation' centre largely on the conceptual isation of the good divorce, vis a vis the 
reality. As Collier observes: 
'it does raise a number of questions about how a 'good divorcing' subject is 
being conceptualised and how, importantly, this relates in turn to what might 
be termed the 'lived experience' of divorce. ' (1999: 261) 
One set of questions surround the issue as to whether the reforms actually overlook 
the psychological realities of divorce. For example, it is suggested that the Act fails 
to address the need to revisit the past which divorcing people seem to have, in order 
to make sense of their experience: "Looking to the future' may not be possible 
without first looking back, and the emotions associated with divorce are likely to 
continue to demand expression' (Day Sclater 1997: 424). Collier (1999) makes a 
similar point with specific reference to the information meeting. Indeed he argues 
78 
that pilots of the new procedure have indicated that a looking forward is encouraged 
just at a moment when many couples appear to be looking back to what went, or 
was going wrong with their relationship. 
Collier also goes on to argue more generally that the changes that have taken place 
within both society and people's relationships do not fit with the vision of divorcing 
behaviour encapsulated in the legislation: 
'The social process of individualisation, and the dominance of what we might 
call a form of 'rational, self-seeking confluent love' would appear to run counter 
to, if they do not fly in the face of, the normative model of the 'good divorce' in 
this regard. ' (1999: 263) 
Adopting a similar perspective, Mansfield et al emphasise the necessity for policies 
to be 'in tune with changing social attitudes'. Those attitudes are 'individualistic', 
and are 'characterised by independence and freedom of choice" (1999: 33). They 
argue that the evidence suggests that changes in social values and the material 
environment have resulted both in an increased acceptance of divorce, and an 
increased readiness to leave marital relationships that prove to be unsatisfactory. 
As the scope for policy intervention is largely determined by these social changes, 
that intervention is thus likely to be limited to providing information and accessible 
support to couples experiencing difficulties, rather than using legal barriers and 
financial penalties in an attempt to protect marriage. This view is reinforced by 
Maclean and Eekelaar, who argued that the 1996 Act was likely to make little 
difference to the drift of marriage into the private domain of individuals: 
'At most, the procedural obstacles to divorce, in particular, the delay, can be 
viewed as an attempt to encourage, or create, for married people, a social 
obligation to live together for life which the legislators think they have, or 
ought to have, the legal obligation having been removed. ' (1997: 11) 
It is also suggested that the law cannot make individuals consider and reflect 
- 
indeed the most that it can do, is to provide the time and the institutional framework 
to encourage them to do so (Schuz 1993). Cretney arguably goes a stage further, 
describing the White Paper as 'seriously naive' about what is likely to happen 
during the period of reflection: 'some, at least, of those concerned are likely to 
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spend the time in the far more pleasurable activity of conceiving 
- 
necessarily 
illegitimate 
- 
babies. Some will spend the time exploiting their emotional or 
financial advantage; others will brood on their grievances' (1995: 303). Indeed in a 
subsequent work he suggests that what is happening, is actually the concealment of 
the reality that divorce is to be available at the unilateral wish of either party, 
'behind a comforting faqade of consideration, reflection and counselling' (Cretney 
1996: 52). 
The requirement that ancillary matters be resolved prior to granting an order for 
divorce, is also questioned as a mechanism for enforcing or regulating individual 
responsibility. As Cretney (1995) argues, an ongoing assumption within divorce 
legislation, is that the main issue to be decided is whether or not the marriage 
should be dissolved. This, he suggests, is 'completely false'. Similarly, Davis 
asserts that the view of divorce reflected in the 1995 White Paper presumes that the 
divorce decree is sufficiently important, 'to provide both stick and carrot to ensure 
that everything else falls into place' (1995: 564). However, he goes on to argue that 
this is not in fact the case 
- 
in essence the decree no longer possesses that central 
importance. The reality is that the status of being married or not married is no 
longer of such importance 
- 
it is certainly not as important as the practicalities of 
having somewhere to live and sufficient resources to live on: 'The decree is still 
important symbolically, but that is all it is, a symbol' (ibid.: 565). 
Regulating parents 
Within the family law framework it has been suggested that the parental 
relationship is taking over from marriage and divorce as the focus for legal and 
other forms of regulation (Maclean and Richards 1999). For example, Lewis (1999, 
2001) argues that the effect of the process of law reform since 1969 has been to 
assume a degree of individualisation with regards to the parties in their capacity as 
husbands and wives, whilst at the same time increasingly putting in place measures 
that seek to regulate them in their capacity as parents: 'the focus [of regulation] 
switched from the relationship between adults as husband and wife, which had 
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become much more fluid, to their roles as fathers and mothers' (Lewis 2001: 94). 
The result has thus been a shift towards parenthood as a significant legal status 
(Maclean and Eekelaar 1997). 
The Children Act 1989 represents a key development in this shift. The Act 
effectively re-defined the relationship between the state and the family with regards 
to child-care, welfare and parenting issues. Central to this redefinition, was the 
introduction of the concept of 'parental responsibility', which was defined as: 'All 
the rights, duties, responsibilities and authority which by law a parent of a child has 
in relation to the child and his property' (section 30)). 
Parental responsibility has been described as representing the 'fundamental status' 
of parents (Bainham 1990: 208). Once acquired, either through motherhood or the 
procreation of a child within marriage (Children Act 1989: section 2), it cannot be 
simply lost or abdicated. Indeed it survives parental separation and divorce, and 
even the taking of the child into local authority care. In the words of Mrs Thatcher, 
'parenthood is for life' (The Independent, 19 July 1990). The dominant message 
thus conveyed by the concept, is that the responsibility for children lies firmly with 
the parents (Eekelaar 1991a). The state is relegated to a residual role, dealing 
principally with irresponsibility. Indeed Eekelaar and Dingwall (1990) suggest that 
parental responsibility essentially represents a 're-packaging' of the commitment to 
the traditional authority of the family. 
The concept of parental responsibility thus provides a 'space' in which parents are 
expected to exercise individual responsibility 
- 
indeed this 'space' is reinforced by 
the 'no order' principle in divorce. Following implementation of the Children Act, 
courts in divorce proceedings were no longer required to pass judgement on the 
arrangements proposed for children. Instead no order would be made, unless the 
court was positively convinced that it would be 'better' for the child to do so 
(section 1 (5)). The emphasis is therefore on the parents to reach agreement between 
themselves. Indeed it is suggested that the assumption is that the interests of 
children on divorce are best served by facilitating and supporting parental 
agreements 
- 
although the legislation takes no position as to the nature and content 
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of those agreements (Bainham 1990). As Dingwall (1992) observes, what we have 
witnessed is thus the imposition of parental autonomy in the belief that this will be 
exercised for the benefit of children, combined with a circumscription of public 
powers to investigate and intervene. 
This principle of parental responsibility has been identified as consonant with the 
then Conservative Government's general emphasis on self-reliance and 
responsibility (Douglas 1990). Inherent within this 'privatisation' of family life is 
also the belief that less regulation encourages more responsible behaviour (Eekelaar 
1991a). This reflects the underlying psychological theory that the more freedom 
individuals are given, the greater the likelihood that it will be used wisely. As 
Kaganas (1995) observes, the liberal construction of parental responsibility is made 
possible by the assumption that parents are dutiful and responsible. 
The faith placed in parents, reflects a particular set of beliefs that surround the 
biological fact of parenthood. Dingwall et al argue that what they term, 'the rule of 
optimism', is explicitly underwritten by the Children Act and the concept of 
parental responsibility. Their study of social work practice in child protection, 
reveals how the assessment of parents' moral character is conducted under this rule, 
which effectively requires staff to think the best of parents wherever possible. 
Social workers investigating incidents of child abuse and neglect, were found to 
employ the concept of 'natural love' to excuse parental behaviour, and consequently 
not to intervene in families. Parent-child love was constructed as an 'instinctual 
phenomenon, grounded in human nature' (1995: 87). As the authors observe, if it is 
assumed that all parents love their children as a matter of nature, it inevitably 
becomes extremely difficult to interpret evidence in a way that is inconsistent with 
that assumption. The rule of optimism effectively underpins the reading of parental 
behaviour as, 'honest, competent and caring' (ibid.: 89). In essence the fact of 
parenthood is taken as sufficient assurance that parents will naturally care for 
children (Freeman: 1992). 
The Family Law Act was thus enacted against a (legal) backdrop where the nature 
of the relationship between parents, children and the state might best be captured by 
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employing the theory of trusteeship (Eekelaar 1987; 1989; Dingwall and Eekelaar 
1984). This theory is explained by Dingwall, who asserts that the privacy of the 
family rests on the condition that the practice of its members will promote the 
general values and goals of a society. Where, however, this trust is breached, the 
family may properly become the object of intervention (Dingwall: 1994: 64). 
Although the 1996 Act does not violate the non-intervention principle contained in 
the Children Act, it does arguably provide 'guidance' to the parent-trustees as to 
how that trusteeship should be exercised when marriages breakdown. Thus in 
essence parental autonomy is being subjected to a form of regulation 
- 
the 'nature' 
of that regulation is discussed in the following section. 
The post-divorce 'family' 
One regulatory 'aspect' of the Family Law Act has been identified in the image of 
family and family life that underpins the model divorce. Assumptions incorporated 
into policy reflect and reinforce underlying ideologies of family life and 
functioning. The power of family imagery is underlined by Gubrium and Holstein's 
argument that family discourse and usage both creates and controls the social order 
that it purports to describe. The reality is that a family image may recommend 
particular social arrangements as 'normal' or 'expectable', whilst proscribing others 
(1990: 132). The fact that the use of 'family' not only describes what exists, but 
also promotes a sense of what 'ought' to be, renders it 'an important and ubiquitous 
social control rhetoric' (ibid.: 143). Consequently whilst the internalisation of 
family ideology may constitute a less overt strategy of regulation, it may 
nonetheless be an effective one. Indeed Rose (1990) recognises the 'permeability' 
of family to such normalisation and moralisation from outside 
- 
personalities, 
subjectivities and relationships are 'intensely governed' by social conventions, 
community scrutiny and legal norms. 
One image of 'family' enshrined within the 1996 model of the 'good' divorce 
relates to the post-divorce family, in particular to the parent-child relationship. 
Indeed it has been suggested that policy developments, of which the Family Law 
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Act forms a part, invoke a strong normative order for family life post-divorce 
(Smart and Neale 1999). A number of commentators have noted that, since the 
1980s, there is evidence within family law of an attempt to strengthen family ties 
across households after separation. Indeed it is further suggested that this attempt to 
preserve family ties after the household in which they were formed has ceased to 
exist, might actually be called, 'a new form of 'institutionalism" (Dewar and Parker 
2000: 133). 
One element of this 'institutionalism' can be found in the Child Support Act's 
requirement that parents pay maintenance to children with whom they no longer 
reside. However, it is also necessary to look to the Children Act of 1989. The 1989 
Act constructs a standard or expectation that (married) parents will remain jointly 
responsible for their children (Piper 1995). It is thus argued that the ethos of the 
Act effectively maps children's welfare onto the concept of the intact parental unit 
(Smart and Neale 1999). As discussed earlier, the Act created a situation where 
divorce no longer altered the legal relationship of parents to their children. In 
addition, the no order presumption on divorce was based on the assumption that 
mothers and fathers simply retained all the parental responsibility that they enjoyed 
during marriage (Smart 1999). The philosophy of the Family Law Act 
subsequently builds upon this ongoing and joint model of parenting. For example, 
section 1Q (iii) sets out the general principle that marriages are to be brought to an 
end, 'in a manner designed to promote as good a continuing relationship between 
the parties and any children affected as is possible in the circumstances'. In a 
similar vein, section 11 (4) states that when deciding whether to exercise its powers 
with regards any child of the family, the court should have regard to the general 
principle that a child's best interest will usually be best served by his having 
6regular contact' with parents, and by 'the maintenance of as good a continuing 
relationship with his parents as is possible'. 
Smart and Neale regard the Children Act as constituting, 'a clear attempt at social 
engineering 
... 
based on a vision of ideal post-divorce relationships' (1999: 31). The 
fact that parental responsibility survives divorce, is regarded as encouraging the 
extension of 'marriage-type' commitments beyond the duration of the marriage 
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itself. Indeed in an earlier work, Smart argues that what the law is actually 
attempting to do, is to effectively change marriage into an 'ongoing parenting 
arrangement' (1997: 318). Family law is thus taking a lead in promoting change, 
the direction of that change being a return to the so-called traditional (patriarchal) 
family of the 1950s. 
Day Sclater and Piper (1999) suggest that rather than attempting to reverse social 
change and thus create a 'new' post-divorce family, the focus on life after divorce 
actually represents an attempt by the law to constrain and contain those changes that 
are regarded as threatening. By constructing a concept of 'family' that coheres 
around the child, the 1996 Act represents divorce as an opportunity for the re- 
organisation of the family 
- 
divorce is thus effectively 'normalised'. It is argued 
that the image that emerges from the Act is that of divorce as a transition in the life 
cycle of the family (Day Sclater: 1999). The concept of family is broadened so as 
to incorporate those who have experienced divorce, thus denying the presence of 
any kind of crisis within the family. In effect the construction of an image of a 
'separated-but-continuing family' re-conceptualises or re-packages the family as a 
stable entity (Day Sclater and Piper 2000: 144). The Act can therefore be seen as 
responding to social and demographic change, and as attempting to contain the 
anxieties engendered by that change, through the utilisation of discourses that 
reconstruct the post-divorce family 'in a new non-threatening form' (Day Sclater 
1999: 15). 
As with the divorce process, the ability of law to enforce this kind of post-divorce 
family is also subject to some interrogation. One aspect that is remarked upon 
relates to the law itself, and to the apparent absence of any real mechanism by 
which to enforce the policy vision of continued parental responsibility. For 
example, Piper notes that the Children Act assumes the existence of some form of 
parental partnership, yet fails to provide the necessary 'legal nuts and bolts' to 
reinforce it (1995: 38). 
In a similar vein, Bainham also argues that the 1989 Act fails to back up the 
philosophy of dual parenting - indeed the pre-existing parental veto under the 
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Children Act 1975 was removed in 1989, thereby allowing parental responsibility to 
be exercised independently. It is therefore argued that the resulting implication is 
that, 'joint independent rather than co-operative parenting, is the normative standard 
approved by society and reflected in the law' (1990a : 212). This argument sits 
somewhat uncomfortably with the stated aims of the reforms, which were ostensibly 
to encourage the practical involvement of two parents where possible. At the time 
of its enactment, Bainham suggested that the practical result of the Children Act 
would be to perpetuate the sole custody paradigm, albeit in a slightly different form. 
As demonstrated by Maidement's (2001) recent review of the relevant case law, it 
would seem that this suggestion has in fact come to pass. Conducted almost a 
decade after the Act's implementation, the study reveals that except in a small set of 
judicially created instances 
- 
involving exceptional or important decisions, such as 
changing a child's surname or school 
- 
decisions can be made by one parent acting 
alone. 
A second aspect of the ability of law to achieve its 'ideal', relates more to the reality 
of the parenting experience. For example, Piper's (1993) study of divorce 
mediation revealed that the concept of 'parental responsibility' (in the context of 
custody and access post-separation) was founded on a particular construction of 
responsibility as joint. Yet this construction was rarely viewed, or easily accepted 
as joint by parents. Indeed she concludes that the Children Act does not support a 
form of continuing parenting that comprises parenthood in the sense of shared 
physical care. Instead what is provided is described as, 'a concept of parental 
responsibility which is divorced from actual care'. The law thus stands accused of 
ignoring the 'importance' of care(Piper 1993: 196). 
The concept of 'care' is broken down by Tronto (1989), who draws a distinction 
between 'caring about' (intellectual concern), and 'caring for' (actual physical work 
of caring). Studies have suggested the existence of a divergence between the social 
reality of the parenting task, namely caring 'for' children, and the concept of 
parental responsibility constructed around the idea of 'caring about' them. One 
example of this, is provided by Maclean and Eekelaar's (1997) study of parenting 
across households. Here it was found that, amongst one hundred and fifty-two 
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formerly married parents, some form of parenthood continued to be exercised in 
over two-thirds of cases. In fact the authors remark that the continued exercise of 
parenthood showed a 'surprising resilience '. However, despite this, relatively little 
evidence was found of widespread 'joint' parenting or joint decision-making. 
Indeed only ten percent of those parents who remained in contact reported joint 
decision-making on some issues. 
A subsequent study conducted by Smart and Neale (1999) also revealed a relative 
paucity of 'joint' parenting. In this case, the parenting practices of sixty divorced or 
separated parents were explored. Of those parents, eleven were 'solo-parenting', 
whilst thirty-seven were engaging in 'custodial parenting arrangements'. This was 
defined as a pattern of shared care where children lived primarily with one parent, 
and had a visiting relationship with the other. Decision-making, however, was 
vested in the residential parent alone. The remaining eleven parents could be 
described as 'co-parenting' 
- 
an arrangement that involved the sharing of both care 
and parental authority. 
The study findings may partly reflect the pattern of parenting that existed prior to 
divorce. For example, the Maclean and Eekelaar study also found little evidence of 
widespread joint parenting whilst parents were living together. One reason for this 
may lie in the 'positioning' of fathers in the family. For example, an earlier study 
conducted by Backett (1987) found that fatherhood was mediated through the 
behaviour of the mother, and generally did not operate as an independent 
relationship with children. As mothers took the greatest share of responsibility for 
children, fathers effectively adopted a largely supportive role. 
It is argued that the adoption of such a role is likely to have major implications for 
the way in which fatherhood can be enacted after divorce. If the father has relied on 
the mother in order to have relationship with his children, then the removal of that 
mediating element after divorce necessitates a re-negotiation of his relationship both 
with the children, and with their mother. Indeed as Smart argues: 'We might 
therefore argue that pre-divorce fatherhood is usually a poor training for post- 
divorce parenthood' (1999: 103). 
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Neale and Smart also question how, in the light of the diversity of post-divorce 
parenting and the complexity and fluidity of parenting arrangements, this sense of 
'family' based on a collaborative, joint parenting project, can be preserved beyond 
the end of a couple9s personal partnership or marriage. Their study revealed that a 
range of significant factors influence how parents negotiate parenting 
- 
from socio- 
economic to interpersonal relations, and from different narrative expectations about 
post-divorce life to shifting gender expectations about parenting abilities: 
'This diversity and fluidity is 
... 
increasingly at odds with the model of 
post divorce family life that is promoted through the operations of the 
Children Act' (1997: 213). 
The language of parental partnership also implies the existence of common goals 
- 
however, once divorced parents have separate lives, experience different 
opportunities and are faced with different problems (Kaganas 1995). In addition, 
Lamb et al (1987) observe that the impact upon mothers 
- 
namely the increased 
involvement of fathers with their children 
- 
may threaten the woman's prerogative 
in an area where her domination and power had previously been assured. A number 
of feminist writers also make the argument that 'family' is not a neutral term 
- 
that 
it in fact entails relationships of power, dominance and dependency (Brophy 1987). 
For example, Smart suggests that children represent an implicit site of power 
relationships linked to gender, in the sense that a father's relationship with his child 
necessarily entails a power relationship with the mother. The exercise of contact 
post-divorce will continue this power relationship or, at least, the possibility of it. 
Furthermore, and in a related vein, Brod (1987) questions to extent to which the 
new fathering 'ethos' actually represents an attempt to re-establish male power in 
the face of feminist gains by women. 
The extent to which the gender-neutral parent enshrined within the legislation 
actually reflects the reality, is also the subject of some discussion. Mitchell and 
Goody (1999) suggest that this image is created and sustained both in demands that 
mothers should participate in the labour market, and in the hope that fathers will 
care for and nurture children. However, they question the extent to which the de- 
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gendering of parenthood fits with the experience of parenting: 'The realities of 
family life and the vicissitudes of parenting for most people remain, however, 
several steps removed from any such idea' (1999: 107). The majority of couples 
follow traditional child-care arrangements. The result is that for most fathers, 
fathering is thus something that they have to fit into a schedule dominated by paid 
employment (Smart and Neale 1999a). Even in dual earner families it is suggested 
that fathers generally remain peripheral as carers for children (Brannen and Moss 
1987). 
It is argued that the influence of gender in divorce is 'pervasive' (Carbone 1996: 
181). Men and women approach 'family' in very different ways 
- 
mothers have a 
greater and qualitatively different attachment to their children 
- 
which has 
implications for divorce policy. Also the expectation that women will bear the 
primary responsibility for child rearing is identified as exerting a powerful influence 
on roles within marriage. 
A slightly different perspective is advanced by Woollett et al 0991) who suggest 
that the interest in fathers parallels changes in the portrayal of men within the media 
- 
for example the 'New Man' presented by advertising as caring, tender, and 
involved with his children. However, whilst it may be said that the role of fathers in 
family life has changed over recent years (see, for example, James and Richards 
1999), it is also argued that discussion of the 'new father' far outweighs evidence of 
his actual existence (Lewis and O'Brien 1987). 
As Collier observes, 'the rhetoric and realities of paternal responsibility are by no 
means the same thing' (1999a: 946). It has been argued that research has 
demonstrated that children do better after divorce where they are able to have 
continuing and conflict-free contact with both parents , and indeed that this has 
necessitated a reconstruction of fatherhood (James and Richards 1999). However, 
the point is also advanced that it is beyond the scope of family law to radically 
transform structural differences in child-care (Brophy 1989). With regards to the 
legislative presumption in favour of contact, Maclean and Eekelaar argue that the 
evidence from their study reveals that the exercise of contact is related to the time 
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the parent in question had lived with the child before separating: 'In other words, it 
is an extension of an existing social obligation' (1997: 148). They express 
significant doubt as to whether social parenthood can thus be created by legal 
obligation. For example, the study also revealed how strongly the strand of parental 
responsibility comprised in the support obligation is resisted, when the liable parent 
is not acting as the social parent of the child in question. They argue that this 
suggests that any attempt to enforce 'personal relations' by legal means is unlikely 
to succeed. 
Concluding comments 
Whilst the regulation of parties in their capacity as parents is an important aspect of 
the Family Law Act, it is important not to overstate the nature of the shift towards 
the status and governance of parenthood. As the discussion has demonstrated, 
marriage continues to be an extremely central focus of the legislation. In addition, 
marriage remains important as both a legal status, and in terms of the obligations 
that it generates beyond the immediate divorce 'context'. For example the recent 
Law Commission Discussion Paper, 'Sharing Homes' (July 2002), identifies the 
need for law to recognise and respond to the increasing diversity of modern living 
arrangements. Nevertheless, marriage remains 'a status deserving of special 
treatment' (Law Commission: iv). Furthermore, with regards to the parties in their 
capacity as parents, the 1996 Act does continue to be subject to the non- intervention 
principle contained with in the Children Act (section 1(5)). Consequently in the 
absence of any dispute or problem, the courts will not intervene in the arrangements 
parents make for their children. The end result is that the situation is perhaps 
therefore best described in terms of parenthood representing an additional axis of 
regulation. 
As this chapter has demonstrated, much of the debate that surrounded the Family 
Law Act was concerned with the issue of whether legislation should seek to directly 
impose a moral code of behaviour on divorcing spouses. Lewis (2001) argues that 
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ultimately the decision was taken in the negative. However, it is arguable that the 
1996 Act did represent an attempt to regulate more directly what had previously 
become primarily private decisions about the state of ones marriage. Indeed this 
regulation took an external form through the imposition of a framework of 
procedural 'hoops' through which spouses were required to pass in order to obtain 
their divorce. 
In addition to this greater scrutiny and direction of the divorce decision and 
consequent behaviour, the 1996 reforms also utilise a more indirect or 'internal' 
form of regulation. The model of the 'good' divorce enshrined within the legislation 
effectively offersa guide or set of performance indicators for divorcing behaviour 
- 
the hope being that parties will exercise personal responsibility and choice in order 
to attempt to match up to that ideal model. 
Underpinning both the support accorded to marriage, and the model of the 'good' 
divorce, is arguably a re-emergence of Devlin's (1965) enforcement of common 
morality 
- 
albeit that that morality now has both an ideal and a 'default' standard. 
Furthermore, the paternalistic orientation of the legislation 
- 
in the sense that it both 
involves setting standards, and seeks to help parties to function better as spouses 
and parents 
- 
also represents something of a violation of Mill's 'harm principle'. 
Whilst this has arguably long been the case when it comes to children, inherent 
within the new divorce process is the idea that the government knows what is best 
for spouses. To utilise Raz's perspective, the legislation goes beyond the simple 
provision of options to positively coerce people into choosing particular ones. 
As the historical review has demonstrated, the task of formulating law and policy to 
deal with the breakdown of intimate relationships is always going to be a difficult 
one. Indeed Lewis has argued that because the institution of marriage has long been 
viewed as the 'basic unit' or 'bedrock' of society that effectively imposes 'rational 
bonds on irrational sexual urges', the relaxation of divorce law has proved be both 
difficult and controversial throughout the twentieth century. 
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In view of its history, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Family Law Act ultimately 
took the form that it did 
- 
namely a combination of moral regulation and family 
policy, of correctional and appreciative perspectives, and of saving and ending 
marriage. As O'Donovan notes, having developed from an 'authoritarian, 
patriarchal and religious base', family law is inevitably 'faced with its tradition' 
(1993: 106). However, both the lessons of history and the assertions contained with 
academic commentary, suggest that it is difficult for law to achieve objectives that 
are more ambitious that simply ending marriages and dealing with the 
consequences. In view of this, one aspect of the empirical study therefore goes on 
to explore, in more detail, how the final form of the Family Law Act of 1996 came 
about. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodology 
The research project 
As noted in the previous chapter, one aim of the empirical study was to explore how 
the complex policy approach adopted by the 1996 Family Law Act was reached. 
An examination of the policy process would, it was also felt, provide an 
illuminating snapshot of the state of current thinking at national level 
- 
in particular 
the different ideas, values, aims and objectives that are effectively 'in play' when it 
comes to formulating policy in the context of relationship breakdown and divorce. 
My approach to the 'policy' question was, however, underpinned by the basic belief 
that the nature and content of policy cannot be understood purely through an 
examination of policy-making at the national level. Indeed, my own experience of 
legal practice brought home the extent to which those who work with law and 
policy effectively 'mediate' it for their 'clients'. Law is not simply about those 
rules that are 'on the books', but is also about the decisions and actions of those 
who work within them. This perspective derives support from Gewirtz and Ozga 
(1993) who argue that policy is about what individual groups do and say, within the 
areas of influence in which they move. Policy frameworks established by central 
government inevitably provide 'space' for those charged with delivering policy to 
engage in a process of negotiation, and to exercise discretion (Davis 1969). 
Consequently policy is not 'made' only by the centre, but also in the daily activities 
of those working on the ground. As Lipsky argues: 
'public policy is not best understood as made in legislatures or top-floor suites 
of high-ranking administrators, because in important ways it is actually made 
in the crowded offices and daily encounters of street-level workers. ' 
(1990: xvi) 
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The research project thus adopted a 'two-phase' exploration of policy-making. 
Whilst the first phase explored the debates and negotiations that surrounded the 
1996 Act, the second phase went on to investigate the work that was being done on 
the ground with families and individuals who were either experiencing relationship 
breakdown, or who were at risk of so doing. One key aim of this second phase was 
to explore the extent to which the work being done at street-level actually meshed 
with the kinds of thinking and ideas that were framing national policy debates, and 
then to address any implications that the findings might have for the task of policy- 
making. 
It is true to say that this national 
- 
local comparison is not a direct 'like-for-like' 
one. For most of the local workers, individuals and families experiencing 
relationship breakdown or divorce represented just one constituent part of a broader 
client base. Nevertheless, I would argue that the framework remains both a valid, 
and indeed a useful one to employ. At one 'level', street-level workers do deal with 
the reality of divorce, separation and relationship breakdown. Furthermore, at a 
'second' level, they all have to operate within the broad arena of 'family policy'. 
The parameters and priorities of that family policy are largely drawn by the debates 
conducted at national level, of which the Family Law Act process constitutes an 
integral part. 
The methodology employed by the project was that of qualitative interviews, 
conducted with selected individuals involved in the formulation and delivery of 
policy at the national and local levels respectively. It has been suggested that 'the 
most fundamental characteristic' of qualitative research lies in its express 
commitment to viewing events, actions, norms and values from the perspective of 
those people who are being studied (Bryman 1988: 61). Whilst there are 
undoubtedly issues surrounding the extent to which it is possible to really access the 
perspective of another individual, qualitative interviews were felt to offer the most 
appropriate method of exploring the experiences and ideas of the various policy 
actors. 
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The Family Law Act process is evidenced by a variety of documents. These 
include official reports, proposal documents and records of Parliamentary debates 
and committees. In addition, a range of promotional literature, mission statements 
and progress reports also provide evidence of local activities and policy. Whilst 
these undoubtedly provide an important resource for any study conducted in this 
area, I was keen for the project to try to 'get behind' the language and rhetoric 
employed by such documents. Interviewing was seen to provide the best forum for 
an in-depth exploration of the kind of thinking that underpins law and policy. This 
choice can, as Murphy et al have noted, be interpreted as: ' "If you want to 
understand what people do, believe and think, ask them". ' (1998: 112) 
The project was influenced by the grounded theory approach propounded by Glaser 
and Strauss (1967). It should be emphasised that the study does not make any 
claims to utilise grounded theory as a full research methodology. It does, however, 
draw upon some of the ideas and thinking that underpin the grounded theory 
approach 
- 
in particular the idea that research is best approached with an open 
mind, and that theory is generated from data 
- 
in order to provide a general 
torientation' to the research venture. 
Selection 
National policy-makers 
The sample of national policy-makers chosen for interview was compiled through 
snowballing. At the outset of the project, and following personal introductions from 
one of my supervisors, three individuals who had been identified as key actors 
within the Family Law Act process were initially approached and asked if they 
would be willing to participate. At the end of these initial interviews, each 
participant was asked to suggest the names of any individuals who he or she thought 
it would be useful to approach for inclusion in the study. This process was then 
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repeated at the end of all subsequent interviews, thereby enabling the study sample 
to be gradually compiled. 
The snowball technique, which essentially employs the use of what have been 
called 'experienced and knowledgeable experts' (Lincoln and Guba 1985) to help 
decide who should be included in the study, proved to be particularly useful in a 
situation where it was not easy to identify the members of the study population. 
Indeed the make-up of the family policy-making 'community' was not always 
evident from the various documentary sources. In addition, and as the study got 
underway, a further advantage of this approach to sampling also emerged. In 
addition to making suggestions as to who else could be included, several 
participants also offered to facilitate introductions, thereby easing access to what 
was effectively an 'elite' group of potential informants. 
Snowball sampling has been criticised for the fact that the representativeness of the 
data collected, does depend upon the extent to which all of those individuals who 
should be studied exist in a complete social network (Burgess 1984: 57). The 
potential therefore exists for the opinions of those who do not form part of that 
network, to be omitted from the study. It is recognised that by employing this 
approach, the study has inherited the decisions of each individual participant as to 
who constitutes the next suitable interviewee (May 1993). It is, however, argued 
that this has not ultimately created a problem with the data collected. 
There are two main reasons for having confidence in the study data. The first 
relates to the fact that although the chain of suggested informants did initially 
diverge to a degree 
- 
largely as a result of the particular 'interests' of participants, 
and their different positions within the policy process - as the study progressed what 
might be labelled a 'core' of names were repeatedly mentioned. Access was 
subsequently gained to the majority of these individuals. Secondly, it became 
evident during the course of the project that, in addition to those actors who 
occupied positions within the formal state 'apparatus', there were also a range of 
relatively defined interest 'groups' or constituencies who were inputting into the 
policy process. Examples of these interest groups included lawyers, mediators, 
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6marriage support' organisations and groups representing and working with 
children. In the light of this finding, steps were taken to ensure that representatives 
from each such group were also incorporated into the study sample. 
The study sample thus included the majority of the 'key' actors within the Family 
Law Act process, and was broadly representative of 'make-up' of the national 
policy-making community. It can be argued that one potential 'gap' within the 
sample relates to the absence of any representatives from the Labour party. During 
the parliamentary stages of the process, the Conservative Government's small 
majority did mean that it was reliant upon the support of the Labour Opposition in 
order to get the legislation passed. As a result, the Opposition was thus provided 
with the opportunity to have a real input into the final form of the Act. Although 
approaches were made to the relevant individuals, access did not ultimately prove to 
be forthcoming. It is felt that this lack of access was probably attributable largely to 
the fact that these individuals are now holding ministerial posts. However, in view 
of the fact that Parliamentary records provide a good source of Opposition views, 
this absence is not regarded as problematic for the project as a whole. 
Local workers 
As a pre-requisite to making any selection decisions, a census was first conducted 
of those groups and organisations within the Greater Nottingham area, who were 
working with families and individuals experiencing or at risk of relationship 
breakdown. The choice of location was a partly pragmatic one. Firstly it was local 
to me, meaning that that it was convenient to access. Secondly, it is also a 
relatively compact area, resulting in less pressure being placed upon the limited 
resources of a PhD project. However, in addition, it also constitutes an ideal site 
for study in that its ethnic, socio-economic and demographic profiles almost exactly 
match the nation as a whole. It also has the further advantage of a long tradition of 
civic activity, with the result that there are a variety of different initiatives within 
the city which are working with families under a range of different circumstances. 
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A number of different sources were employed in the compilation of this local 
census. These included contacts within the School of Sociology and Social Policy, 
and the Centre for Social Work at the University of Nottingham; personal contacts 
within the local legal community; the directory of Marriage Support Services 
compiled by the Lord Chancellor's Department; local volunteer bureaux; local 
directories, and the internet. 
The census revealed the existence of a range of groups and organisations that 
spanned the voluntary, statutory and private sectors. Some were operating within 
what may be termed the formal divorce process, whilst for others relevant services 
represented just one aspect of a broader programme of family-oriented work. 
Decisions were then made as to which organisations would be approached for 
inclusion within the study, with the underlying aim of attempting to access the 
range of different groups revealed by the census. The resulting sample can thus be 
described as a purposive one (Robson 2002: 265). 
It did not ultimately prove possible to secure access to either the local judiciary, or 
to the specialist groups catering purely to non-Christian communities and ethnic 
minorities. However, subject to these exceptions, it is argued the sample was 
largely successful in securing its representative aim. Where access was successful, 
the selection of individual interviewees was then made on the basis of their ability 
to provide an overall perspective on their organisation, to be reflexive about its 
activities, and to assess the approach and thinking of the organisation within the 
context of the broader framework of national policy. 
Data collection 
The 'mechanics' of collection 
Interviews with the national policy-makers were conducted between January and 
September of 2000, whilst those with street-level workers were conducted between 
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November 2000 and June 2001. In total thirty-one interviews were conducted 
- 
fifteen at 'national' level, and sixteen at the 'local' level. The interviews ranged in 
duration from forty-five minutes to two hours. 
Gaining access to participants proved to be largely unproblematic. Indeed subject 
to the exceptions noted in the previous section, those individuals who were 
approached were generally very willing to participate. In the majority of instances 
potential participants were approached directly, although in some cases it was first 
necessary to approach a 'gate-keeper' in order to gain permission to access the 
particular informant. At the local level it was also not always immediately possible 
to identify the most appropriate individual to approach, with the result that it was 
again necessary to initially contact a senior gatekeeper in order to seek both advice 
on potential participants, and permission to proceed. Individual participants and 
gatekeepers (where relevant) were both provided, in writing, with brief details of 
the research project, an explanation as to why they and / or their organisation had 
been selected, what participation would involve, and some details about myself as 
the researcher. 
The interviews themselves were conducted in a variety of different 'situations'. 
The original intention had been that all interviews would be conducted on a 'face- 
to-face' basis. However due to certain circumstances, which in one instance 
involved illness on the part of a participant, it proved necessary to conduct two of 
the 'national' interviews by telephone. The majority of the remaining interviews 
were conducted in private rooms at the interviewees' place of work. However, four 
participants (one national, three local) requested that the interview take place at 
their home. In addition, of the three national interviews conducted with 'political' 
constituents, two were conducted in tearooms within the Houses of Parliament, 
whilst one took place in the corridor outside the room in which a Select Committee 
of which the informant was a member was meeting. 
At the start of each interview the participant was again given details of both the 
project, and how the interview data might subsequently be 'used'. They were also 
assured of confidentiality, and were asked for their consent for the interview to be 
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recorded. Recording did not prove to be an issue for the local participants however, 
in contrast, there was some notable reticence amongst a proportion of the national 
sample. The situation was generally resolved by offering respondents the 
opportunity to see the interview transcripts, and to make amendments to them. It 
was recognised that this surrender of control opened up an additional possibility of 
data 'management' on the part of the participants. In the event, however, only three 
participants actually chose to make any changes. The nature of those changes 
primarily involved grammatical amendments, and 'filling in the gaps' where the 
tape had proved to be inaudible. Consequently it is not felt that this ultimately had 
an adverse impact on the quality or status of the data collected. 
One particular (national) participant steadfastly refused permission for the interview 
to be recorded. Notes were therefore taken during the course of the interview, and 
were then written up immediately afterwards. Note-taking in the interview situation 
is inevitably restricted both by the desire that it should not become intrusive, and by 
the interviewer's need to actively listen to the informant. It is thus inevitable that 
such a method cannot result in a full reconstruction of the interview. The necessity 
of taking more detailed notes also has the potential to impact adversely on the 
interviewer's ability to follow up issues arising during the course of the interview. 
However, from a pragmatic point of view, this was felt to be the only way to secure 
the participation of an individual who was clearly an important actor in the policy 
process. A similar approach, based on detailed note taking was also adopted for the 
two telephone interviews. 
The interview 
The interviews were semi-structured, and were supported by the use of an interview 
schedule. The schedule used during the 'national' interviews was initially compiled 
following a review of documents generated during the Family Law Act process. 
'Local' interviews were supported by a schedule that was initially compiled in the 
light of the early analysis conducted with regards to the national data. Both 
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schedules were continually modified in small ways as the data collection 
progressed, and in the light of the resulting findings. 
The rationale for choosing a semi-structured approach was that this allowed for the 
exploration of the topics and issues that were of interest to me as the researcher, 
whilst also retaining the flexibility to incorporate and probe those issues regarded as 
important by the interviewee. This flexibility is, it is suggested, essential if the 
researcher is concerned to explore the perspective of her interviewee. In addition, 
such an approach also supported a research design whereby the same questions 
were not asked of all the interviewees in each sample. Due to the range of different 
positions occupied by the participants, a more universal set of questions was 
deemed inappropriate. It was also felt that in order to achieve data that was 
comparable in key ways, it was sometimes necessary to ask different questions of 
the various interviewees. 
The interviews were conducted in the manner of Burgess' (1984) purposeful 
conversation, rather than as an interrogative process. This ensured that sufficient 
flexibility was retained to enable the complexity and depth of issues to be 
uncovered. It also provided the opportunity to develop a dialogue about issues that 
were of particular interest to the individual participants. The topics covered during 
national interviews included questions about the participant's role in the Family 
Law Act 'process'; the connections between divorce law and marriage; the 
connections between divorce law and parenting; and what an 'ideal' divorce law 
might look like. Local interviews included questions about the nature of the work 
being done by local organisations; the methods that they were using; their 
assessments of outcomes; and what they thought about current national policy and 
thinking. 
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Data analysis 
The 'status' of interview data 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, fundamental questions do surround the extent 
to which interviews really enable the researcher to access the perspective of his or 
her interviewee. Indeed, as Silverman (2000) notes, an important methodological 
issue concerns whether interviews are to be treated as giving direct access to 
6experience', or rather as actively constructed 'narratives'. 
Although the study did seek to access the experiences and views of its participants, 
the reality is that those experiences can only ever be 'recounted' in the interview 
situation (Mason 1996). Access is thus restricted to those interpretations and 
understandings that participants choose to reveal. The study is also underpinned by 
a perspective that regards the research interview as social interaction. As Murphy et 
al have observed, interview data should not therefore be regarded as 'more or less 
accurate reports of some external reality', but rather as 'occasions' when individuals 
are called to give 'accounts' of their actions, feelings or experiences etcetera (1988: 
120). It is therefore suggested that rather than treating what is said in interviews as 
a literal description to be evaluated in terms of the likelihood that the respondent is 
telling the truth, they should in fact be regarded as accounts that are embedded in 
the circumstances of production. 
It must therefore be recognised that the data produced by the study is inevitably 
subject to some very real limitations. The particular 'circumstances of production' 
faced by the project included the fact that it was dealing with national policy- 
makers 
- 
experienced policy practitioners, skilled in the art of presentation. 
Similarly, the local workers were frequently experienced in the art of 'selling' their 
services, albeit primarily in the context of pitching for funds. 
The majority of participants were interviewed in a 'representational' capacity, thus 
creating the potential for resulting data to represent the 'official line'. In one sense 
this was unproblernatic, as one purpose of conducting the interviews was to access 
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the views of the organisation or group represented. However, a further aim of the 
project was also to attempt to probe beyond the 'safe' official view. An additional 
'circumstance' was the fact that at national level, the issue of divorce law reform is 
a highly politicised one. Where participants were 'in post', the potential thus 
existed for the safeguarding of future prospects to operate as restraint on the 
information that they chose to impart. Thus while the use of an interview based 
methodology did provide a valuable opportunity to probe behind the policy 'veil', 
this must be tempered by an awareness that the data generated remains something 
of a 'presentation'. The end result was therefore that analysis was ultimately 
conducted, to adopt Silverman's (2000) terminology, on the basis of data as 
narrative. 
The 'process' of analysis 
All the national interviews were transcribed in full prior to commencing analysis. 
Due to time constraints the tape recordings of the local interviews were listened to 
in full, and then selectively transcribed. Where a decision was made not to 
transcribe a certain section, notes were made on the transcript providing brief 
details of what had been omitted. This process ensured that it was always possible 
to return to those sections, if it was deemed necessary in the light of subsequent 
analysis. 
The process of data analysis was conducted alongside those of data collection and 
interview transcription. In addition to assisting in the practical task of data 
management, it was felt that this would also allow for a more genuinely ongoing, 
reflexive and dynamic process. In particular, it enabled those findings that emerged 
from the initial stages of analysis to be used in order to review and refine the 
schedules utilised in subsequent interviews. 
The mode of analysis that was used to examine the interview transcripts is perhaps 
best described as a variation on the 'thematic content analysis' outlined by Burnard 
(1991), and which is itself adapted from grounded theory and content analysis. The 
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process of analysis commenced with the national interviews, although a similar 
approach was adopted with regards to the local data 'set'. The first three transcripts 
were read, during the course of which notes were made on the general topics and 
themes within them. These transcripts were then re-read as part of a process of 
'immersion' in the data 
- 
described by Burnard as the attempt to become more fully 
aware of the 'life world' or 'frame of reference' of the interviewee (ibid: 462). 
Categories representing different topics and themes generated from this initial 
analysis, were then used as the basis for coding the transcripts. Each transcript was 
worked through, with coloured highlighter pens used to distinguish between each 
piece of the transcript that was allocated to a category. These categories were then 
subsequently used as the basis for coding all further transcripts. As the analysis 
progressed, the categories were kept under constant review, with amendments being 
made where subsequent transcripts revealed additional topics and themes. 
Once all of the transcripts within the data set had been coded, a second copy of each 
transcript was generated. Each coded section of the interview was cut from this 
second copy, pasted onto index cards, and filed under the relevant category. To 
assist with identification, the cards were marked with the reference number or letter 
of the participant. Complete copies of all the transcripts were kept alongside the 
index cards, in order to ensure that the original context of the coded sections was 
maintained. Upon completion of the coding process, each category of coded data 
was reviewed. All of the sections were then filed together for reference when 
writing up the findings. During the writing up stage copies of the complete 
transcripts were kept to hand, in order to ensure that the process remained as close 
as possible to original meanings and contexts. 
This process of manual coding was chosen in preference to a computer-based 
qualitative data analysis package for several reasons. Firstly, the relatively small 
number of interviews conducted within each phase of the project, meant that the 
data generated was physically manageable without the necessity of resorting to a 
computer package. Secondly, it was felt that a manual approach maintained 
6 closeness' to the data. The process of physically handling the interview transcripts 
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meant that both immersion in the data was quickly achieved, and that 'theoretical 
sensitivity' was maximised. Thirdly, the fact that each data excerpt was both 
highlighted on the transcript and available on an individual index card, greatly 
assisted in the exploration of the 'make-up' or 'content' of each conceptual 
category, and thus in the analysis process as a whole. 
The 'position' of the researcher 
Grounded theory is apparently based upon the belief that it is possible to approach 
the research task without any 'a priori assumptions' (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 3). 
This suggestion that it is possible for the researcher to operate in a completely idea 
or value 'free' way is, however, rejected. To some extent, the values of the 
researcher are present within all research (Weber 1946). For example, it is only as a 
result of those values that certain problems or issues are initially identified as the 
subject for research, and are then studied in various ways. Furthermore, the 
conclusions and implications drawn from a research study are also unavoidably 
grounded, to some extent, in the moral and political beliefs of the researcher 
(Silverman 2000). 
The perception of interview data as essentially interactional in nature, in addition to 
the interpretative nature of the analysis process itself, has the effect of requiring that 
my own position as researcher be factored into the analysis. The role of researcher 
is not that of a neutral data collector, but rather that of an active agent in the process 
of data generation and analysis. Data was inevitably shaped by how I was 
perceived by the study participants, by how I in turn perceived them, and by my 
own personal history, prejudices and biases. 
I inevitably approached the study with a set of pre-existing ideas and assumptions. 
My personal experience of the professional legal practice of divorce, did mean that I 
regarded the idea of divorce being accorded a role in supporting marriage with 
some scepticism. However, despite these personal views, the belief that the 
researcher should be as open-minded as possible remained central throughout the 
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course of the study. An acceptance that interviews are always social interactions, 
carries with it the recognition that it is not possible to completely eradicate the 
influence of the researcher (Dingwall 1997). However, during the various 
interviews, I sought to adopt a position that can perhaps be best described as one of 
'sympathetic self-presentation' (Gewirtz and Ozga 1993). This was found to 
represent a useful research tactic in that it both encouraged constructive dialogue, 
and minimised the extent to which my personal views were articulated within the 
interview forum. 
There were, however, occasions on which my personal views were specifically 
sought by study participants. This created something of a dilemma. Textbook 
interviewing is presented as a one-way process of gaining answers from people, 
which is not supposed to include answering their questions (May 1993). However, 
such disengagement on the part of the interviewer cannot always be regarded as a 
'realistic' description of what actually occurs in the interview scenario, but rather as 
follows: 
'an idealized and wishful set of statements and prescriptions which we 
construct after the event and around our account of this. In other words 
what we present is a 'doctored' account 
... 
a researcher who behaves in 
textbook ways 
... 
would render them immediately noticeable because it 
would be so unnatural. ' 
(Stanley and Wise 1983: 155-7, quoted in May 1993: 102) 
A number of feminist researchers arguably go a stage 'further', suggesting that the 
researcher's self and views actually constitute an integral part of the research 
interview (for example, Oakley 1981, Cotterill 1992, Finch 1993). Although not 
dealing solely with female respondents, it was felt that aspects of the perspective 
adopted by these researchers were relevant and applicable to the present study. 
Whilst it was not felt that, as an interviewer, my own personal identity should be 
actively or positively invested in the interview 'relationship', the view was taken 
that to fail to answer respondents' questions or share knowledge and experience 
when asked was not realistic. Such failure would not be conducive to the aim of 
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establishing rapport, and ran the risk of damaging the interviewer- interviewee 
relationship. 
During the course of this study I have not set myself up as an objective and 
scientific researcher out to uncover some kind of fundamental 'truth'. The 
interviews that form the basis of the project were social interactions, involving 
negotiation between the participants and myself. The accounts that they chose to 
share were inevitably selective, and were dependent upon both their perceptions of 
the situation, and indeed of me. It is also inevitable that the researcher cannot 
simply reproduce a participant's meanings. The process of selection and 
interpretation inevitably intervenes between the interview conversation, and the 
account that is subsequently given of that conversation. I have, however, made 
every effort to treat what was told to me in an even-handed way, and it is hoped that 
the study provides an account with which the participants would identify. 
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Chapter 5 
The 'Problem' of Divorce 
Introduction 
Together with the next two chapters, this chapter presents the findings from the 
national phase of the empirical study. The purpose of this first 'data chapter' is to 
explore how the national policy-making community talk about divorce as a 
'problem'. At one 'level', problem 'talk' was something that featured strongly 
across the interviews. However, the whole issue of problem atis ation does also 
represent a fundamentally important 'factor' in the policy process. Indeed the way 
in which the divorce 'problem' is constructed inevitably operates to structure the 
nature and content of the perceived solution, and thus the policy response that is 
ultimately proposed. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the national policy 'community' spanned what might be 
ten-ned a 'spectrum' of opinion. Situated firmly at one 'end' of the spectrum are 
what can be described as the 'Idealists'. For this constituency, divorce itself was 
considered to be something of a problem. On the issue of the divorce 'problem', 
the remainder of the policy community occupied what might be regarded more as 
the 'middle-ground'. This broad-based constituency 
- 
the members of which are 
termed the 'Progressives' 
- 
embraces a range of positions from those vested with 
idealist tendencies, through to policy-makers whose disposition can be characterised 
as relatively pragmatic. What, however, they all have in common is both a 
preparedness to engage with the reality of marriage breakdown, and a concern for 
the situation and welfare of the family post-divorce. 
The third policy constituency discussed, is that of the 'Child Advocates'. Although 
situated within the broad umbrella of the Progressive constituency, with the result 
that some of their comments are included within the examination of that 
constituency, this group of policy-makers are also differentiated from the remainder 
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of the policy community by virtue of their child-focussed approach to the whole 
issue of divorce and divorce law reform. 
The 'Idealists' 
The Idealists constitute a clearly differentiated constituency within the policy- 
making community. They also represent a very vocal faction, who ultimately 
proved to be extremely influential during the Family Law Act process. Within the 
study sample the constituency comprised two politicians, both of whom can be 
described as being positioned on the political and moral 'right'. 
Failure to implement the law 
At the centre of the claims articulated by this faction about the state of current 
divorce law, is the gap that has developed between the law on the books and law in 
practice. For these constituents, one key problem lies in the fact that 'nobody 
bothers to implement' the 1969 legislation [111. The judicial role apparently 
accorded to law in the Divorce Reform Act has, following the implementation of 
the Special Procedure, evolved into an administrative function that permits 'divorce 
by post' [12]. The end result is, in the words of one constituent, a 'farce'- but only 
in the sense in which it is practised: 
'The present law is not a farce on the face of the Act, it's a farce in the way 
it's carried out. ' [ 111 
The perception within this group, is that this failure to investigate the circumstances 
of marital breakdown has led to, 'divorce on demand 
... 
because people make up 
these unreasonable behaviours, or adultery or anything else' [ 111. As has been 
demonstrated by the historical review of divorce law provided in Chapters 2 and 3, 
few would actually argue with this assessment. However, what is of interest, is the 
fact that implicit within this claim is, firstly, the belief that the decision to divorce 
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should not lie solely within the province of the individual parties. The marital 
relationship is constituted as a unique kind of intimate relationship, which 
effectively represents legitimate terrain for state scrutiny. Indeed as this constituent 
argues: 
'You never had to get married. You don't have to now, you can just live 
with somebody. But if you choose to get married 
... 
by the state, the state 
has a right to say this is how you get unmarried, you know 
... 
you've 
chosen to come to us to get married, we have the right to tell you how 
to get unmarried. ' [ 111 
However, within this constituency, there is also a pervasive unhappiness that the 
current lack of state scrutiny facilitates the manipulation of the legal process. The 
implication is thus that people are divorcing for no reason, or at least for no genuine 
one. 
Underlying one constituent's unhappiness with the administrative function of 
divorce is the belief, 'that when people want to get divorced they should provide a 
reason for it' [111. This is reflective of a particular, and indeed what is arguably an 
overly simplistic view of marriage and the reasons for its failure. Echoing the kinds 
of views that were articulated by the Morton Report back in 1965 (Report of the 
Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce), the implicit assumption is that the 
reasons for such failure can be located and detailed. As this constituent goes on to 
assert: 
'Well you just have to tell the truth you know, if you can't live together 
you say 'we've been separated for two years. ' If you can't live together 
because your husband's beating you up, you say that. or vice versa. If you 
say you can't live with your husband or wife because they're having affairs 
you say that. I mean that's just the truth, you know you get over it 
... 
I 
suppose it's something we have honesty about. ' [ 111 
For this constituent, one reason for holding individuals to public account as to the 
state of their intimate relationships lies in the belief that such public location and 
allocation of the causes of, and responsibility for marriage breakdown serves a valid 
psychological function. As he goes on to claim, there are those who 'feel very 
aggrieved' when it comes to divorce: 
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'I mean they may be quite difficult people, but they may think that they've 
behaved perfectly properly and their wife, or husband goes off, has masses 
of affairs you know, and then wants everything 
... 
leaves them 
... 
and they 
feel very bitter about it, because they feel they haven't had their day in 
court, they say nobody's interested, nobody's interested that I was trying 
to make this work, and that he or she ran off 
... 
and left me holding the 
baby literally. ' 
As marital failure is constructed in terms of guilt and innocence, the law is thus 
accorded a role in providing some psychological satisfaction to the 'innocent' party. 
Law encourages divorce 
The second constituent adopts a somewhat broader perspective in her construction 
of the divorce problem. For this constituent, the central issue is that the law has 
actually encouraged divorce. The fact that people are not required to provide a 
reason for divorce means that they 'just give up' [121. The implication is that 
divorce has become the easy option, and has effectively undermined the marital 
commitment. The law thus encourages irresponsible behaviour in personal 
relationships, particularly it would seem on the part of women: 
'I think it is quite wrong that a couple is married and 
... 
the man, or the 
woman, and it seems to be more often nowadays it's the woman who brings 
the divorce, you know simply says 'I'm absolutely fed up with you, I won't 
see you any more', and that's it. ' [ 12] 
This perspective is echoed by her fellow constituent who also makes the following 
claim: 
,I think that 
... 
there is a bit of a feeling that, A god I'll kick the old man 
out he's just a crashing bore you know, and 
... 
kick him out, and of 
course 
... 
I'll get the house, I'll get the children. ' [P 11 ] 
Within these discourses, women are thus beginning to emerge almost as the villains 
of the piece. The suggestion is that divorce law and ancillary relief provisions have 
actually operated as a perverse incentive - encouraging divorce on the part of 
women, by providing an easy 'out' of marriage and a route to economic 
ill 
independence from men. In essence divorce law has, in effect, exacerbated 
women's move towards individualism, and away from what might be termed 
'familism'. 
The impact on marriage 
The second constituent also talks very explicitly about how divorce law, 
'undermines the principle of marriage' [121. At one 'level', part of the problem 
appears to be located in the fact that marriage is perceived to have effectively 
become little more than a low-status contract. For example, adopting a comparative 
perspective she argues, 'if you break the law, and if you break your promises on 
anything else, the law does investigate'. Although this is not in fact true as a matter 
of law, this claim is illustrative of a pervasive uneasiness with how marriage has 
evolved in modem society. One aspect of this uneasiness would appear to be 
located in the perception that the contractual structure of commercial and 
bureaucratic life is also increasingly becoming an ideology for personal life. 
At another level, divorce law is also seen to undermine marriage in the sense that it 
is viewed as part of a wider system of law that is trying to equate marriage and 
cohabitation. Indeed it is alleged that the law is basically saying: 
'okay well you know you've lived together for whatever it is, 
and it says you can inherit, you know you can adopt children, you 
can do everything as if you were married. ' [121 
This constituent clearly believes that marriage and cohabitation are not the same, 
and indeed should not be treated as such. For her, an important aspect of the 
problem is that law is simply following social behaviour - in effect it is merely 
reflecting the fact that the way people form personal relationships is changing: 'The 
law is now moving further and further to blur the distinction between marriage and 
cohabitation, and they're saying 
... 
because everybody's doing it, it must be alright' 
[121. Part of the problem is thus that law has simply become another consumer 
product, which is just responding to the demands of its market. 
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The constituent then continues to emphasise the point, arguing: 'the whole of the 
time what the law is doing is sending out a sequence of signals that-marriage is 
just one of a series of alternative options 
... 
and equally good. ' As with the 
perception that divorce law has positively encouraged divorce, this claim reflects a 
belief in the symbolic power and function of law and its ability to actively shape 
social values. In addition it also reflects a very particular valuation of marriage as 
the 'proper' form of intimacy. 
The impact on children 
Another aspect of the divorce problem for this constituency, lies in the impact that 
divorce is believed to have on children. Strong, and indeed quite emotive 
statements are made by the constituents, alleging that 'society doesn't care at all 
about children' [121. It is also suggested that, 'people have had a very casual 
attitude to becoming parents, to having children, and not looking after them' [ 11 
Divorce is therefore constructed as just one example of that casual attitude and lack 
of care. 
The theme of irresponsibility, initially applied to the parties in their capacity as 
spouses, is thus similarly applied to the parties in their capacity as parents. Once 
again, the implication is that those parents who choose to divorce are acting 
irresponsibly. For example, one constituent makes the following statement: 
'Now when I say parents don't care, the two parents get together and 
sort of say... 'of course darling we both of us love you as much as we 
can, but we can't live together'. Now if they really loved the child, they 
would stay together. ' [121 
The good or responsible parent is therefore regarded as the one that stays married. 
For this constituency the ethic of care of the adult self, in the form of leaving an 
unsatisfactory marriage, is thus constructed as being incompatible with the ethic of 
care for children. 
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Of course these discourses reflect a very particular view of the ethic of care for 
dependent children 
- 
or what might perhaps be termed their 'best interests'. Central 
to the claims made by this constituency, are constructions of children as the 
vulnerable victims of divorce: 
'It's children who've suffered I think, they've suffered more than 
anybody else, because more and more children over the last thirty or 
forty years have been living away from their parents. ' [111 
The welfare of children is equated with or, to use Smart and Neale's (1999) 
terminology, is 'mapped' onto the married parental unit. The end result is that 
divorce becomes effectively constructed as a bad thing for children per se. 
Central to the construction of the divorce problem in this context, is the issue of 
father absence. Indeed divorced fathers are effectively constructed as absent 
fathers. One example of this is provided by a constituent who links the 'devastating 
impact' of divorce, to the following fact: 
6a very large number of men who get divorced lose contact with their 
children, or have virtually no contact 
... 
particularly in the modern world 
where people live often in very mobile labour forces, people move apart 
you know. ' [ 111 
It might be argued that the empirical reality does not invariably accord with this 
claim. However, both constituents were extremely dismissive of the suggestion that 
in some circumstances it might be better for the child to have two 'happy' parents 
who did not live together. Indeed one constituent specifically referred to research, 
claiming that it demonstrated: 'that in fact it was better 
... 
for children, even when 
the parents quarrelled all the time, for the parents to stay together 
... 
rather than to 
divorce' [12]. It is the fact of two parents, rather than the quality of parenting, that 
would therefore seem to be regarded as serving the child's best interests. 
The problem of absent fathers is perceived, by both constituents, to be particularly 
acute where boys are concerned. For example, one constituent talks of, 'young 
boys particularly not having father figures about to provide 
... 
some kind of role 
model and authority' [11 In a similar vein, the second constituent makes the 
assertion: 
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'When a divorce happens children almost certainly go to the mother 
... 
and 
the father, you know first of all does have access, and then you know gets 
less and less frequent 
... 
and there is a very real correlation 
... 
between the 
rise in crime and the rise in divorce, and I'm certain the reason is that there 
aren't fathers in the home. Boys need fathers. Well girls need fathers too, 
but boys particularly through a role model, and now you've got a whole lot 
of boys growing up, and they never meet a man doing a responsible job until 
they get to secondary school, about two or three years into that, and then they 
meet a schoolmaster. ' 
The argument is then continued: 
'Boys play differently you know, and they've got to, you know rush about 
with them, and pummel one another and all that kind of thing, which I 
mean mothers up to a point could do, but 
... 
they don't do it naturally 
... 
And 
they enjoy it boys 
... 
horseplay and that kind of thing, and especially sports 
and things which I think is so good, and I think not to have that 
... 
is an 
absolute deprivation. ' [121 
These discourses position children in a welfarist and protectionist framework. 
Divorce is essentially constructed as something that is done to children, and in 
which they are not perceived to be moral 'players'. It is also interesting to note that 
welfare is not constructed positively or concretely, in the sense of children's caring 
needs on a daily basis. Rather it is defined in negative or hypothetical terms 
- 
in 
essence as some kind of 'lack' (Neale and Smart 1998: 8). That lack is presented in 
terms of the absence of a male role model, playmate, and stabilising influence. 
Arguably what can be seen within these discourses is therefore a mixture of both 
traditional and non-traditional views. The advent of the Child Support Act of 1991 
has been identified as marking an ideological shift in the perception of the public 
interest in fathers taking responsibility for their children (Pickford 1999). This can, 
however, be regarded as the legal 'solidification' of the father's traditional role - 
namely that of providing financial support. For the Idealist constituency, fathers are 
no longer confined to the role of economic provider. As one constituent puts it: 
'Children don't want money, they want fathers' [121. 
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The centrality that is accorded to the child's need for his or her father in this 
construction of welfare echoes Smart's (1991) observation that fatherhood has 
become central to the emotional and psychological welfare of the family. Fathers 
are identified as having emerged as a loving and nurturing force, as the producer of 
'normal' children, and as the 'stabilising anti-delinquency agent' (1991: 485-486). 
In a similar vein, Collier (1995) refers to the new paternal masculinity as a presence 
that children 'need', and without which they will suffer. 
What is thus being articulated within this constituency is almost the mirror image of 
Bowlby's (1951) 'maternal deprivation thesis'. It is interesting that this non- 
traditional role for fathers is emerging from an ideologically conservative 
constituency, although it could be argued that this simply represents another attempt 
to reassert the traditional, heterosexual, gender-neutral family. Indeed Segal argues 
that the 'new' fatherhood actually operates to serve the 'old' pro-family rhetoric. 
That rhetoric is one that, 'denies legitimacy to the choices or circumstances that 
have led people to live outside nuclear families', and which has been under attack 
from rising divorce rates (1997: 53). 
It is also notable that fathers are not being blamed for their absence, nor indeed is 
that absence constructed in terms of irresponsibility. Whilst the woman who leaves 
her marriage is often cast as irresponsible, it would appear that the same cannot be 
said of divorced men who leave their children. Furthermore, and in stark contrast to 
this focus on fathers, mothers seem to have become somewhat invisible. This 
prompts the question as to whether this relative invisibility might be attributable to 
the fact that the caring role of mothers is something that constituents simply take for 
granted. 
Underlying the 'reconstruction' of fathers and fatherhood is a pervasive anxiety 
about the state of masculinity in modem society. For example, Heam (1998) makes 
reference to a school of thought that lone parent families fail to produce adequate 
sons and fathers. Certainly the views articulated by this constituency do seem to 
reflect the concerns advanced by commentators such as Murray (1990), Etzioni 
(1995; 1997) and Dennis and Erdos (1992) for whom lone motherhood is held 
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responsible for at best irresponsibility, and at worst for criminal behaviour in the 
next generation. One example of the latter can be found in the case of the James 
Bulger murder. Here significant emphasis was placed upon the fact that the two 
ten-year-old perpetrators both came from female-headed households 
- 
the 
implication being that they lacked the male role models necessary for development, 
and / or the discipline necessary to enforce responsible behaviour (Freeman 1997). 
For these constituents, part of the problem with divorce lies in its potential for 
generating mate irresponsibility. The implication is that family breakdown leads to 
the emergence of young men who are weakly socialised, and who are weakly 
socially controlled when it comes to the responsibilities of spouse and fatherhood. 
Indeed the claims made by this section of the policy community, do seem to echo 
Dennis and Erdos' concept of the 'anomie of fatherlessness'. This concept is 
explained in the following terms: 
'Families without fathers produce egoists. We become a society of 
fatherless families, of men temporarily attached to households of a 
woman and her children, and not an integral and permanent part of 
them. ' (1992: 71). 
Divorce is thus held partially responsible for the production of a generation of 
young men who no longer feel the pressure to be responsible adults and fathers. 
The 'Progressives' 
As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the 'Progressives' are a much less well- 
defined group than their Idealist counterparts. A range of perspectives are 
incorporated within the constituency, from the practical through to the more 
ideological. The reason for grouping these perspectives together for the purposes of 
the current discussion, can be located in the fact that a number of the claims made 
about the problematic state the divorce law were actually found to cut across the 
various orientations of the different policy-makers. The composition of the 
constituency was thus made up of policy-makers from various 'interest9 groups, 
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practitioners with the practical experience of dealing 'in' divorce, and also 
individuals who occupied positions within the formal (state) policy-making 
apparatus. 
The divergence of law and practice 
For the various 'legal' constituents, and indeed for several other constituents who 
possessed a legal background, one key problem with current divorce law is again 
seen to lie in the gap that exists between the letter and practice of the law. 
However, in sharp contrast to the Idealists, the problem for this group is not that 
divorce has become an administrative function. For them the problem lies in the 
basic fact of divergence. As one constituent remarks: 
'In effect the law says one thing and does another. It says that it is about 
reasons, but no-one is interested in looking at them. ' [11 
The language used by this group to describe the state of the law, is highly critical. 
Indeed one constituent makes the claim: 'The present law was nonsense 
... 
We had a 
universal Special Procedure, and the present ground for divorce didn't exist' [1]. 
In a similar vein, a second constituent refers to the current law as 'a shambles' [61, 
whilst yet another comments on its 'artificiality' [8]. 
The failure to really look at the reasons people give for the breakdown of their 
marriages is also perceived to have had an adverse impact on the integrity of 
divorce process and practice. For example, one constituent who is a professional 
working within the divorce process, talks of the practice of sending the particulars 
of unreasonable behaviour petitions to the other side for the following reason: 'to 
see if you could make them as anodyne as possible 
... 
for the sensitivities of the 
parties, but sufficiently strong to get them through the court' [6]. He then 
continues: 
'The District Judges don't throw out unreasonable behaviour petitions 
because they're not strong enough generally 
... 
they recognise it's a game, 
it's a means to an end, which is just a sham really. ' 
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Other constituents also refer to the fictional character that divorce petitions can 
assume, describing the process as 'hypocritical', 'intellectually very dishonest' [21 
and 'a charade' [1]. The divorce process is thus perceived to have become a stage- 
managed performance in which all the players knowingly collude in order to 
achieve the required result. 
There is no implicit suggestion within these discourses that the law should re- 
assume the judicial role originally accorded to it by statute. For this group, the 
problem is constructed from a more pragmatic and practical perspective, in terms of 
what are perceived to be adverse implications for the credibility of law and its 
practice. For one (non-legal) constituent, this construction was regarded as 
reflecting a perception that whether or not a marriage had come to an end, was 
something, 'that you could safely leave to the hands of the partners concerned, and 
take seriously what they're saying' [141. However, for another more idealistically 
orientated constituent, it reflects the recognition of the limits of law when it comes 
to dealing with intimate relationships: 'no human tribunal is really in a position 
even after elaborate investigations, to know fully what's gone on' [8]. 
The problem of 'fault' 
A Redundant Provision 
Within this broad constituency, several participants claim that fault no longer serves 
any real purpose 
- 
in effect that it has become meaningless. For example, one 
constituent remarks of the current divorce process: 
'People say A yeah but you've got to have grounds, well everybody's 
got unreasonable behaviour. Show me a marriage where you can't 
allege unreasonable behaviour 
... 
everybody's been unreasonable, whether 
it's he doesn't do the washing up as regularly as I want or, whether it's 
violence. ' [61 
This view is echoed by a second constituent, recalling conversations with lawyers 
whose approach to fault he essentially describes as: 'tell me the twenty worst things 
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he's done in the last ten years and I'll turn it into a divorce petition' [3]. Thus in 
one sense fault simply reflects the reality of normal married life, rather than some 
kind of exceptional circumstance that goes to the root of a marriage. In a second 
sense, however, it can also become a fiction employed by the parties, and which 
may therefore have no real meaning for them. 
The requirement to detail behaviour is not believed to operate as a deterrent to those 
considering divorce. Indeed one constituent specifically talks about what he 
describes as, 'the pointless stuff on fault which doesn't act as a deterrent in this 
society' [3]. As he goes on to observe, the reality now is that there is actually a 
perverse incentive to adopting the fault-based route to divorce: 
'One of the curiosities of the present system you see, is that you actually 
get rewarded for fault 
... 
I mean fault actually acts as, I mean maybe in a 
society where it was regarded as shameful to be divorced, and if you go 
a hundred years ago it was a shame to be divorced and be named for 
adultery, maybe fault acted as a deterrent 
... 
where if You were named 
as 
... 
co-respondent, it affected your social standing and all this sort of 
stuff 
... 
but I mean that's long gone. We're now in a position where fault 
actually acts as a passport to a quick divorce. ' 
The underlying problem thus lies in what has been termed the 'social alienation' of 
law (Van Houtte 1998). The fact that law has become detached from modem social 
values has created an effect that was not originally anticipated by legislators. The 
resulting implication is therefore that the law should have some regard for society's 
current value system. 
In addition to discussing the failure of the matrimonial fault doctrine to reflect the 
reality of married life and marriage breakdown in the context of the alleged 
redundancy of fault, this 'gap' between law and reality is also identified as having a 
further problematic aspect. For example, one constituent makes reference to the 
fact that 'matrimonial law' has its root in ecclesiastical law: 
'And I think that's one of the fundamental problems 
... 
that people's 
interpersonal relationships 
... 
really don't fit well within an ecclesiastical 
framework, the requirement to 
... 
detail the errors omissions and faults of 
one party, in order to prove irretrievable breakdown is damaging, to both 
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adults and children and one could say, unnecessary. If you were coming 
at it from an informed point of view that said, people do not walk in and 
out of marriages thoughtlessly 
... 
when people marry they believed it's for 
life. Life is such that things go wrong. ' [101 
Another constituent makes a similar point, stating: 'Usually in a marriage both sides 
are at fault or maybe they're just incompatible, maybe they haven't done anything 
wrong. ' [151 
A further, very practical construction regarding the loss of function of fault is 
offered by one of the legal constituents, who remarks: 'if you're looking at fault in 
divorce 
... 
it really doesn't get you anywhere' [151. The process of allegation and 
counter allegation simply becomes a circular one that does nothing to progress the 
situation. As she continues: 'It's like peeling off the layers of an onion 
... 
you say 
that 
... 
Bloggs was at fault and then you say well that was because of what you 
did-it doesn't get you anywhere'. Furthermore, fault has no constructive impact 
on ancillary matters: 
'Fault is redundant in the sense that 
... 
the fact that you use to prove the 
ground for divorce doesn't have any impact on anything else 
... 
and so 
you can plead adultery or unreasonable behaviour, except in the very 
unusual circumstances where it's been absolutely dreadful 
... 
it's not going 
to affect the way in which the disputes about the children and the finances 
are dealt with. So what's the point of iff 
The 'Impact' of Fault 
One clear point of consensus within this broad-based constituency is that the 
doctrine of matrimonial fault, and the impact that it can have, constitutes a very real 
problem. At a general level, fault is problematic in that it is 'damaging', 'crude', 
6 cruel', makes people 'unhappy', and leaves them feeling 'dissatisfied' [2]. The 
language used by some of the constituents when talking about the impact of fault is, 
once again, quite emotive. Some referred to their experiences of working with 
couples going through divorce, whilst one constituent talked of his own personal 
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experience. Generally, however, what is articulated across the different discourses, 
is a sense that the mere fact of marital breakdown is a distressing and painful 
business 
- 
the implication arguably being that current law has the potential to make 
matters even more unpleasant, and that this is not what the law should be about. 
A 'Barrier' to Reconciliation 
Some constituents construct the impact of fault as additionally problematic in that it 
does nothing to aid reconciliation. For example, one of the legal constituents 
asserts: 
'If I receive a divorce petition from my husband saying that I've done all 
these awful things, it isn't very helpful because I can probably think of all 
sorts of things he's done 
... 
And so it doesn't 
... 
help, it doesn't help any prospect 
of reconciliation. ' [151 
Similarly one of the more ideological constituents argues that the current legislation 
does nothing, 'to save the saveable marriage' although it should, however, be noted 
that this comment was made in the light of the terminology that was ultimately 
incorporated into the 1996 Act [7]. 
One particular constituent, who was representing what can be described as a 
6marriage support organisation', spoke at some length on this issue. The 
observation is made that one of the criticisms frequently levelled at the current 
system is that, 'processes could be started in the heat of the moment and gather a 
momentum on their own'. Indeed this criticism is believed to have some validity: 
'I think people sometimes go to a solicitor before they've decided whether 
they want the marriage to end or not, and something can happen which 
makes things worse rather than better 
... 
it may mean that something gets 
kind of solidified then 
... 
it's part of the old adversarial argument you know, 
that something develops from that contact which wasn't necessarily what 
was intended at the outset 
... 
but you know, if the other partner then gets to 
hear of or receive some correspondence from the solicitor, that can have 
an intensely alienating effect and can feel like a major betrayal and ... so all 
I'm saying is that there can be a dynamic in that process, and I do think that 
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people sometimes go to a solicitor to sound out whether their marriage is 
over or not. ' [141 
The analogy is drawn between the divorce process and a 'complicated railway 
crossing' that can switch people on to a variety of different points: 'and you might 
end up at a particular destination as a result of a myriad of small influences, 
decisions along the way, and sometimes the points can be switched in another 
direction' [141. It is recognised that there are marriages where the situation is clear- 
cut and, as this constituent observes, 'the trajectory is well defined from the outset' 
[141. However, this type of claim does reflect the perception, or at least the hope, 
that divorce proceedings may be commenced by parties who have not finally 
decided that their marriage is really over 
- 
with the result that the divorce process 
does have a role to play here. Evidence to support this hope is located in the 
following fact provided by a second constituent: 
6quite a high proportion of cases don't proceed to decree absolute after they 
get the decree nisi 
... 
Quite a high proportion of petitions are withdrawn 
... 
Quite 
a lot of people say that they regret having done what they did 
... 
A lot of them 
say 'if only I'd sought help sooner" [2]. 
Another participant quantifies this proportion as 'one quarter' of all divorce 
petitions that are filed with the courts [3]. 
The Effect on Relationships 
For some constituents 
- 
in particular the practitioner constituents 
- 
another 
particular aspect of the problem of fault is seen to lie in its impact on the 
relationship between the parties with regards to both the divorce process itself, and 
to the resolution of practicalities. For example, one participant argues that even 
where the particulars of a divorce petition are agreed, and parties understand that 
those particulars are merely being used as a device to obtain a quicker divorce, 
problems still remain: 
'There is nevertheless a minority of people for whom the ground for 
divorce is actually a bar to acting reasonably within the negotiations that 
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follow 
... 
It really does matter to them if they've been accused of something, 
and they can't get beyond that 
... 
and it's not helpful. ' [61 
This particular constituent doubted whether it would ever really be possible to foster 
cool and rational behaviour within the divorce arena. However he did, nevertheless, 
regard the retention of fault as causing significant difficulties. Underlying this 
discourse is the implication that consensus and co-operation between the parties 
constitutes an a priori good 
- 
in effect the good divorce is constructed as being 
about co-operation and negotiation, rather than adversarial argument. 
Another set of discourses adopt a more forward-looking perspective, constructing 
the 'problem' in terms of the impact that allegations of fault can have on post- 
divorce life. The quality of relationships is key to these constructions. For 
example, one of the constituents who occupied a position within the formal policy- 
making apparatus makes the claim: 
'We continue to have a divorce law which because of its retention of fault, 
and the recycle of those faults, genuine or not 
... 
A divorce law which is 
calculated to inflame, I mean in what is already 
... 
they're getting divorced 
so already you know their relationship has broken down, and what is 
necessarily a set of poor relationships, the current divorce process actually 
inflames that situation, and can only be calculated to make their proper 
carrying out of their subsequent parental responsibilities that much worse, 
that much less likely. ' [31 
Included within those parental responsibilities are, 'the ongoing relationships 
between parents' [3]. In a similar vein, another practitioner constituent makes the 
point that a lot of time is spent explaining to people that they remain parents, 
despite the fact of divorce: 
'And of course one of the main reasons for no-fault divorce, is [fault] 
does actually get in the way of the way people feel they can co-operate. 
If you're slagging somebody off in a petition to get what you want, you 
feel badly about it, it does actually make it more difficult to be nice to 
each other when you pick up the children. ' [61 
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One of the constituents who represented a 'children's organisation', similarly 
describes the requirement that the parties, 'put everything negative that they can 
think of, or that their lawyers can manage to embellish on a bit of paper' as creating 
fundamental difficulties for parents [10]. Indeed she argues that the resulting 
'flack' can actually have the effect of dis-empowering parents: 
'If you acknowledge that the vast majority of people 
... 
say that children 
are best brought up with two parents that live as family, and that people 
should be empowered to exercise parental responsibility because that's 
what their kids need, they don't need the state minding them, they 
need their parents minding them, then surely we should take steps to 
make that possible, and not punish families. ' [101 
The figures for those parents who lose contact with their children within five years 
of divorce are then cited as evidence of the fact that the current system makes it 
'almost impossible' for parents to exercise parental responsibility, 'in any real way'. 
Another constituent constructs the problem specifically in terms of the impact that 
fault has on the parent-child relationship. It is argued that, after divorce, the 
relationship that parents have with their children, 'is the most important thing' [8]. 
What is interesting here, is that this particular constituent utilises what he perceives 
to be the child's perspective in the construction of his claims. For example, 
reference is made to the tendency to 'exaggerate accusations' when seeking a quick, 
fault-based divorce: 
'that has the effect, children get to know it actually, it has the effect of 
denigrating the parent attacked in the estimation of their own children, 
or sometimes damaging the attacker if they know the attack is exaggerated 
or unfounded. ' [81 
This concern derives support from one of the 'children's organisation' 
representatives, who makes the point that one of the things that children want is for 
their parents to have what she terms 'respectful relationships', both during and post- 
divorce [ 101. 
It should be noted that underlying these constructions, albeit to varying degrees, is 
an acceptance of the reality of divorcing behaviour. The 'problem' is now located 
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principally in the impact that divorce has on parents and parenting, rather than on 
marr iage and the relationship between the parties in their capacity as spouses. As 
with the Idealists, the ethic of care for children is central to the claims articulated by 
the Progressive constituents. However, in contrast to the Idealist position, this 
particular ethic of care is not necessarily deemed to be incompatible with divorce. 
The problem of 'speed I 
Amongst some of the Progressive constituents there is a sense of unhappiness, at the 
6general' level, that current divorce law allows for the possibility of obtaining a 
very quick divorce. For example, one of the more pragmatically orientated 
constituents makes the claim: 'Part of the awfulness of the present scheme is that 
you can get divorced very fast' [1]. Although she does not provide any further 
elaboration as to exactly why this is problematic, the implication would seem to be 
that parties should not be able to obtain a divorce as quickly as they are currently 
able to do. 
A discourse that emerges from some constituents occupying positions within the 
formal policy-making apparatus, is that the speed of the process mitigates against a 
proper appreciation of the consequences of divorce. As one constituent remarks: 
'One of the problems with the present system is that people divorce terribly quickly, 
and did not realise the consequences financially and practically of what they'd done 
until afterwards' [2]. The implication is that parties are generally not well informed 
about what divorce will actually mean for them, and that ideally the formal process 
should be doing something to provide that information. In addition, the hope that 
parties might change their minds once that information is provided is also implicit 
within this type of claim. 
This particular constituent also argues that the divorce process does not reflect the 
reality of divorcing behaviour: 'divorce is not a single process in time ... and-to 
have that provision in the legislation can actually be quite harmful, and quite 
misleading. ' The reality of divorce is viewed as a process over time -a process that 
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is described as being, 'legal, social, emotional, psychological and practical. ' The 
belief is that, in an ideal situation, the divorce process would be all of these: 
'and it must recognise that the parties will need to go through all of these 
stages before divorce in the sort of psychological, social and financial sense, 
not just the legal dissolution bit of paper can take place. ' [21 
The speed of the current process is thus regarded as failing both to take into account 
the complexity of divorce for the individuals involved, and to recognise that both 
parties are not necessarily always at the same 'stage' psychologically. 
The problem of 'irresponsibility' 
A further set of claims constructs an additional aspect of the divorce problem in 
terms of the length of time that it can potentially take to resolve the ancillary 
matters of property and money. As one constituent observes, these issues 'can drag 
on for years' [ 11. It is interesting to note that, as with the problem of 'speed', these 
claims are articulated principally by constituents residing within the formal policy- 
making apparatus. Amongst practitioners it was generally not considered to be a 
problem. 
The resolution of ancillaries is constructed primarily in terms of 'responsibility': 
'This responsibility involves responsibility to children and responsibility to 
spouses' [1]. Indeed the question is asked by another constituent: 'Why should you 
be allowed to divorce and remarry, to take a new partner and new children before 
you have discharged your responsibilities to the firstT [2]. The implication is 
therefore that the current system allows irresponsibility, particularly it would seem 
on the part of men. For example, a third participant makes the comment: 'There is 
evidence that, particularly men get divorced and remarried very quickly' [3]. He 
then goes on to expand on this point: 
'The average divorce now takes about six and a half, seven months to 
process through the courts. The ancillaries if you're going to have a fight 
about them, can run on if you really want for four or five years ... Well 
maybe if you're a businessman, you get divorced quickly and you remarry 
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and you then have a fight with your ex-wife for a few years, or at any rate 
you can drag it out, there's no incentive to settle the arrangements. Usually 
men are the economically dominant partner so they've got every incentive 
to keep stringing the thing out. ' 
This construction provides an interesting comparison with the analyses offered by 
the Idealists. Here responsibility, and indeed irresponsibility, is constructed in 
material economic terms, rather than in terms of morality. Problem construction is 
also gendered to some extent, although in this instance 'irresponsibility' is primarily 
attributable to men rather than women. 
A further, and slightly different perspective on this problem is offered by another 
constituent, who provides what can arguably be described as the more 'self- 
interested' view: 
'Once somebody's married 
... 
the last thing they want is to get new 
obligations, arising from a previous partnership, suddenly thrust upon 
them. It causes great resentment by the new partner as well. I mean very 
often 
... 
to take the case of a man who remarries, the relationship between 
the two wives, the ex and the new wife, is not usually very good. ' [P81 
Here the failure to resolve ancillaries is not presented as a problem of 
irresponsibility, but rather as having an adverse impact on the quality of adult 
relationships. What is, however, also interesting about this comment, is that it 
arguably contains echoes of the 'position' in the 1960s. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
some commentators have argued that the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 effectively 
'dealt with' divorce by channelling people towards remarriage. Whilst this 
constituent certainly does not go that far, there is a sense that divorce law should not 
prejudice the chances of success of any marriage that the (divorcing) parties might 
choose to enter into at some point in the future. 
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The 'Child Advocates' 
This third constituency is differentiated from the remainder of the policy 
community by virtue of its child-centred constructions of the problematic nature of 
current divorce law. Whilst it is true to say that constituents do share a number of 
the concerns articulated by the Progressives 
- 
the 'Child Advocates' are actually 
best described as occupying a 'space' within the broader progressive perspective 
- 
it is felt that their focus on children justifies their treatment as a distinct group. 
The constituency is comprised of three individuals who represent organisations that 
work with, and are involved in lobbying on behalf of children. In contrast to the 
other members of the policy community, the key to the 'problematisation' of 
divorce for this group is located in, 'the part of children in the breaking of 
relationships' [101. From this perspective, children are effectively viewed as 
players in the divorce process. Indeed their 'part' is constructed as follows: 'in 
terms of what opportunity or not within such situations they have not to be the 
decision makers, but to have a voice in this whole process' [101. 
For this group, one key aspect of the divorce 'problem' lies in the failure of the state 
to really scrutinise the arrangements that are made with regards to children, 
particularly in uncontentious situations. Constituents were generally scathing when 
talking about section 41 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which effectively 
places a duty upon the court look at those arrangements, and to consider whether it 
is in the interests of any children for it to exercise its powers to alter them. For 
example, one constituent argues: 'there is nothing in there for children whatsoever. 
One person puts down what's going to happen, the court rubber stamps it, and you 
get a decree' [101. Indeed the belief that the provision, in effect, operates as little 
more than a 'rubber stamp' is articulated by all of the constituents - and indeed is 
one that is supported by recent research into the practical operation of section 41 
(see for example, Murch et al 1999, Douglas et al 2000). 
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For another constituent, part of the problem lies in the perceived inadequacy of the 
6welfare checklist'. Contained in section 10 of the Children Act 1989, this 
checklist sets out a range of factors to which the court must have regard when faced 
(amongst other circumstances) with a dispute regarding the residence or contact 
arrangements for children. The argument articulated here is that this checklist is not 
sufficiently meaningful: 'It provides clues to intervene regarding some children, in 
some cases it is very obvious, we felt it should be looking much more' [4]. For this 
constituent, the general reluctance to intervene in private proceedings is also 
problematic, a fact which inevitably results in the failure to pick up 'what is a very 
hidden group of children' who constitute problem cases. Indeed one of the other 
constituents makes the following observation: 
'The court has the power to intervene, but in reality it doesn't. Nobody 
looks, what district judges look for five seconds at a statement of 
arrangements, they know the form tells them nothing, so they don't 
interfere and everything goes through on the nod. So children in 
uncontested divorce have no possibility, unless there's a section 8 
application under the Children Act, and stuff starts coming out in the 
wash there. The Court may have the power, but it certainly doesn't 
exercise it. It's purely tokenistic, and needs a desperate look at. ' [10] 
These discourses articulated by the Child Advocates represent a very real challenge 
to the 'rule of optimism' (Dingwall et al 1995) which, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
can be said to largely underwrite the non-interventionary stance adopted towards 
divorce by virtue of the 1989 Children Act. For example one constituent, who also 
works as a mediator, makes the following point: 
6 some Schools of Mediation deem parents always to be competent. Without 
for a moment wishing to undermine parents, the question is at the time of 
separation are people actually able, when they are distracted by predominantly 
adult agendas of survival, are they able to consider children's perspectives? 
And what is the consequence of that if they are notT [101 
It is important to note that these claims do not attach any element of blame or 
criticism to parents. Rather they reflect a recognition that 'family' comprises a set 
of relationships and individuals with different interests - parents and children are 
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thus not constituted as some kind of undifferentiated whole. As has been discussed 
previously, the assignment of responsibility presupposes the capacity for rational 
action (Hayek 1960). However, within this constituency it is recognised that 
parents are not always in the position to exercise that rationality. Indeed one 
constituent talks specifically of the difficulty of being objective 
- 
reference is made 
to friends who are described as normally, 'sensible and rational', but who have been 
known to 'lose it' whilst going through divorce [4]. Thus the mere fact of 
parenthood does not constitute sufficient assurance that parents will naturally do the 
best for their children. 
Another problem with the current system, lies in its failure to really involve 
children. For example, one constituent makes the assertion: 'children want 
information'. She then goes on to argue that, at no point, does the current divorce 
process encourage parents to talk to their children: 'We know from parents that they 
don't tell their children because they feel unable' [101. Also within the process 
itself, there are no mechanisms by which the children themselves are able to make 
their views known. The no-order presumption presumes that if parents are agreed, 
then all the arrangements are satisfactory: 'there is no mechanism through which the 
child can access that' [131. Even where issues are contested, children are not 
always given the opportunity to express a view: 'Family Court Welfare Officers in 
the course of their report writing often do not see children. Judges don't see 
children' [10]. The question is then posed: 'What is it about us as adults that makes 
us unable to have these dialogues? ' [101. 
One constituent also makes the additional point that arrangements for children will 
inevitably need to change as they get older. However, once again, there is no route 
by which children can formally state their opinions: 
'Another problem is that a contact arrangement made when the child is 
three, may not be appropriate when the child is nine. There is no mechanism 
for the child to have their say. They may be anxious to raise the issue for fear 
of upsetting their parents - they have nowhere to go with that. ' [ 13] 
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The perception amongst constituents that the divorce process is problematic in its 
failure to afford children the opportunity to comment on the arrangements that 
parents make for their future, is rooted in practical experience. It is also one that is 
supported by research, which has revealed that children do actually have a lot to say 
both about parenting, and the process of divorce (for example, Neale and Smart 
1998, Neale et al 1998). For example, one constituent talks of working with 
children experiencing difficulties following the separation or divorce of their 
parents. Indeed particular reference is made to the fact that her organisation 
6routinely' sees, 'kids who actually want to smash the stuffing out of teddy bears 
because they're so angry. Because what happens, is thousands of children go up 
and down motorways the whole weekend, and seldom get to do things which give 
them some space' [101. One aspect of the problem is thus that children almost 
become subsumed in the process. By way of illustration reference is made to the 
recent 'trend' towards what is effectively 'split residence', and the effect that this 
has on children: 
'every second of the child's life is accounted for by its parents' requirement 
to have more time than the other parent, or to fit in with the parents' work or 
social activities, which is all okay except 
... 
for the person who doesn't get 
a say about how that would be for them. ' [101 
The discourses articulated by the Child Advocate constituency thus reflect a very 
different conception of what constitutes the child's 'best interests'. Implicit within 
them is a reconstruction of those best interests to include a responsibility on the part 
of adults 
- 
in this case both the parents and the other 'players' within the divorce 
process 
- 
to consider the child's wishes and feelings, and indeed to act on them 
where appropriate. This arguably reflects an ideal vision that comprises both the 
greater democratisation of family life, and the recognition of children as subjective 
individuals rather than some kind of amorphous category. 
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Discussion 
The Idealists 
For the Idealist constituents divorce appears to present a 'problem' primarily 
because it violates notions of 'family'. In essence, at one 'level', divorce violates 
constituents' conceptions of what categories of people should actually be allowed to 
call themselves 'family'. 
The discourses articulated by the Idealists reflect a very particular view of 'family' 
- 
namely the traditional two-parent unit based on marriage. This constituency thus 
provides an example of the tendency observed by Ribbens (1994) to conceptualise 
family as some kind of natural and concrete unit. Indeed 'family' is constructed 
primarily in terms of its physical characteristics and as an institution that, ideally, 
stands aloof from social change. This essentially passive notion of family, which is 
judged principally in terms of the residence of its members within a pre-given 
structure, is blown apart by divorce. For the Idealists divorce thus effectively 
signals the death knell for the family. 
At another 'level', divorce is a problem in that the Idealists adhere to a morality that 
asserts that the collection of people called family, is more important than the 
individuals that make up that family. Divorce, with its prioritisation of the interests 
of individual spouses, thus represents a violation of this morality. This type of 
construction is apparent in the recurring suggestions that the behaviour of those who 
choose to exit from their marriages is not only individualistic, but is also selfish. 
An example of such a construction can be found in the claim articulated by one of 
the constituents who asserts: 'we're now in a consumer society in which everybody 
thinks that their own happiness in the only thing that matters' [12]. Divorce is thus 
presented as an example of the selfish individualism that is believed to be 
increasingly populating modem society. 
For this constituency, part of the problem would seem to be attributable to the fact 
that modem marriage is now perceived to be defined in primarily hedonistic terms. 
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At this point it is useful to briefly consider Giddens' concept of the 'pure 
relationship', which is defined as a relationship: 
'entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person 
from a sustained association with another; and which is continued only in 
so far as it is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for 
each individual to stay within it' (1992: 58) 
Underpinning the pure relationship is the concept of 'confluent love'. This, in turn, 
is described as 'active, contingent love'. Its contingent nature is thus somewhat at 
odds with, 'the for-ever', 'one-and-only' qualities of the romantic love complex that 
tends to underpin 'traditional' views of marriage Gbid.: 61). 
Giddens regards confluent love as having being dominant since the nineteenth 
century, at which point people began to marry for love rather than for reasons of 
finance or family. However, this more negotiated and individualistic framework in 
which relationships are no longer permanently sealed by marriage, is rejected by the 
Idealists. Marriage is not only regarded as being 'for life', but is also constructed in 
broader terms that go beyond the immediate parties. Whilst marriage does, of 
course, essentially constitute a relationship between two spouses, it is additionally 
viewed in terms of: 'providing people with stable, committed relationships that tie 
them into larger society' (Bellah et al 1985: 85). 
This broader conception of marriage facilitates a further construction of divorce as a 
social problem. Indeed divorce is presented as problematic in that it violates the 
organisational morality of family (Loseke 1999). One theme that emerges through 
the discourses, is the assertion that the 'family' is central to how social life should 
be organised on a day-to-day basis. For example, the family is presented as being 
essential for the raising of socially adjusted, responsible future members of society, 
and as the bedrock for the wider social structures of society. 
Divorce is also constructed as a problem in that it violates a more fundamental 
(apparently religious) morality. Implicit within the discourses - and indeed echoing 
the kinds of discourses that were being articulated during the first half of the 
twentieth century 
- 
is the idea that social change has actually brought about moral 
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decline. Divorce is viewed as an index of fundamental deterioration both in the 
family, and in the wider society. The Utopian society implicit within these analyses 
would thus appear to be a morally absolute one, in which fundamental values are 
there to be recognised, rather than to be simply made-up as one goes along. Indeed 
for one constituent in particular, these values are to be 'recognised' in the Bible 
[121. Morality is thus constructed as being derived from external sources. In 
addition, moral codes are also seen as the foundation of human well-being 
- 
with 
deviation resulting in unhappiness, as well as a growth in immorality and a lack of 
care. As one constituent claims, one result of the shift towards cohabitation has 
been that, 'the sum total of human happiness has decreased' [121. 
Morgan notes that, 'ideological constructions of marriage and the family are bound 
up with ideas of stability and change, with comparisons between the way we were 
and the way we live now' (1991: 115). To some extent all ideologies address 
themselves to the question of time 
- 
in family ideology one such deployment of 
time is to look back to a golden age, and thus to talk in terms of decline and loss. 
Pearson's (1983) study of hooliganism and street crime provides an interesting 
illustration of just such a deployment of time in action. Indeed the study reveals 
how successive generations have voiced identical fears that hooliganism and crime 
are the result of social breakdown and moral degeneration - in essence they are 
regarded as the product of rapid decline from the stable traditions of the past. 
Whilst it is recognised that historians have increasingly challenged the idea that 
families were stronger and more trusted in times past, the myth of relentless decline 
has nevertheless remained a potent one. According to Pearson, it is nostalgia that 
constitutes the key to this enduring, but fundamentally flawed construction of 
history. 
What Pearson terms a 'history of respectable fears', is similarly present within the 
divorce 'context'. For example, what is marked about the discourses articulated by 
the Idealists is not only the degree to which they echo those of the early twentieth 
century, but the way in which those earlier discourses also talk of decline and 
demoralisation in the light of some previous golden age of family and society. One 
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illustration is provided by the post-war situation discussed in Chapter 2, in which 
the golden age that policy sought to recapture was accorded a pre-war location. 
The claims made by the Idealist constituency certainly appear to be infused with 
nostalgia 
- 
for a 'golden age' where families were characterised by universality and 
certainty, and for a consensus model of society united by a shared culture, and by 
agreement as to its fundamental norms and values. Indeed an explicit example of 
this sense of yearning for a society based on a common social bond is provided by 
one of the constituents, who was interviewed around the time of the Dunkirk 
anniversary. This constituent stated that, at the time of Dunkirk, 'everybody felt a 
responsibility ', and 'everybody stood shoulder to shoulder' [12]. She then went on 
to compare this to what she believed would be the situation if the country went to 
war today: 'Now of course if you went to war, I mean the television would be 
saying, well I wonder if we should have gone to war at all'. The (regrettable) 
difference in modem society is apparently therefore that, 'there isn't any sort of 
cohesiveness'. Divorce thus constitutes merely one example of the fragmentation 
of societal values and ideals that is inherently problematic for the Idealists. 
The Progressives 
In contrast to their Idealist counterparts, the Progressives do not construct the fact of 
divorce itself as a problem. For this constituency, the 'problem' of divorce is 
presented as primarily arising out of the workings of current divorce law - with 
particular emphasis being placed upon the 'operation' of the matrimonial fault 
doctrine. 
Unlike the Idealists, this constituency does not regard 'family' as necessarily ending 
with divorce. For example, one practitioner constituent makes the following 
observation with regards to the debate that surrounded the 1996 reforms: 
'It was as if divorce did actually blow everybody apart, and so then you 
fought for each 
... 
individual 
... 
rather than seeing that it's still 
... 
there are 
still bonds between these people, even though the, the married relationship 
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has ended. ' [91 
In a similar vein, one of the 'marriage support' participants articulates the view that 
law is currently not doing the 'best' for families, and that she would like to see it 
contributing to, 'better outcomes for families' [5]. For this group 'family is thus not 
regarded as a unitary concept with some kind of single meaning. Arguably the fact 
that much of the focus is on the quality of future relationships (see, for example, 
participants 3 and 8), is reflective of some of the more recent sociological work 
discussed in Chapter One, and which constructs 'family' primarily in terms of 
family activities and 'practices'. Implicit within these discourses is also the idea 
that divorce is primarily about the reorganisation of family and family life 
- 
it is that 
reorganisation that needs to be managed in a better way. 
It is therefore argued that, inherent within the discourses articulated by this group, is 
both a recognition and an acceptance of a more internal 'negotiated' morality. 
Whilst the Idealists talk in terms of an external, 'top-down' morality, the position 
adopted here is somewhat different 
- 
indeed it might be said that Giddens' concept 
of the 'pure relationship' would be received somewhat differently by a Progressive 
audience. For example, one of the more pragmatic constituents talks of 
commitment that is 'individual', and of the 'private definition of responsibilities' 
[1]. In addition, neither family nor social change is discussed in terms of 
deterioration and demise. Indeed taking Morgan's (1991) idea that all ideologies 
address themselves to the question of time, it can be argued that the Progressives 
actually look forwards 
- 
in particular to creating a system that deals 'better' with 
the reality of marriage breakdown. 
Whilst the issue of morality is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is 
worth noting at this stage that it is perhaps unsurprising that this type of perspective 
is articulated by a constituency comprised of a number of individuals who have 
experience of the reality of divorce. Certainly it is a stance that is reflective of 
recent empirical findings. For example, Smart et al's investigation of post-divorce 
life explored the possibility that rather than bringing about moral decline, divorce 
actually heralds moral 'change'. Indeed what they found was that divorce does not 
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simply pitch individuals into a 'moral abyss'. Instead the experience was actually 
found to have the effect of pushing people in the following ways: 
'to negotiate new moral terrains on which they have to make decisions 
about how to act, how to relate, how to prioritise, how to safeguard the 
welfare of their children, how to balance their own needs against those of 
others, an ultimately how to reconstruct family living. ' (1999: 2) 
The effect of divorce was thus to provide the stimulus to building a new, more 
individual morality. These findings are further supported by Lewis et al's (1999, 
see also Lewis 1999a) study of commitment and cohabitation, which revealed that 
the removal of prescriptive frameworks in the form of marriage vows has most 
certainly not heralded the end of moral responsibility in intimate relationships. 
The 'problem' of children 
Children feature prominently in the 'problem talk' that is articulated across the 
different constituencies. Again this is perhaps unsurprising in view of the fact that 
both the importance of children to the future of society, and the moral imperative of 
caring for them is indisputable. Indeed one result of the importance accorded by 
society to its children, is that the language and rhetoric of children's welfare is thus 
rendered an extremely powerful (and useful) tool in the construction of the divorce 
problem. 
The Western cultural concept of parenting has been described as essentially adult- 
centric and welfarist 
- 
parenting is broadly viewed as something that is primarily 
'done' to children, whilst little account is taken of children's own subjectivity 
(James 1999). The result thus tends to be a construction of children as dependent, 
vulnerable and in need of protection. Just one example of this kind of perspective is 
provided by Parsons and Fox (1952), who compare the situation of the child within 
the family to an adult who is sick. Just like the child, a sick individual is unable to 
fulfil an adult role within society, with the result that care is therefore required. 
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Dominant conceptions of childhood demonstrate something of a tendency to 
juxtapose adult and child. The result, as Jenks observes, is that alongside the 
apparently rational adult the child is viewed as, 'less than fully human, unfinished, 
or incomplete' (1996: 21). This developmental model in which childhood is 
perceived as a state of 'becoming', and children are effectively constructed as units 
of socialisation, is evident within the discourses articulated by both the Idealists, 
and a number of the Progressives. Indeed the perception of the vulnerable child 
who may potentially be damaged by the divorce experience 
- 
whether that damage 
is caused by father absence (Idealists), or poor parental or parent-child relationships 
post-divorce (Progressives) 
- 
is very clearly evident. 
Implicit within the Idealist concerns about father absence, is also the idea that the 
children of divorce pose a potential threat to society. This, in turn, arguably reflects 
the assumption that evil represents a key element in the constitution of the child. 
This image of the evil child can, it is argued, be located in the doctrine of Adamic 
original sin. As James et al observe: 
'Children, it is supposed, enter the world as a wilful material energy; 
but in that their wilfulness is held to be both universal and essential it is 
not seen as intentional. Rather, children are demonic, harbourers of 
potentially dark forces which risk being mobilised if, by dereliction of 
inattention, the adult world allows them to veer away from the 
'straight and narrow' path that civilisation has bequeathed to them. ' 
(1998: 10) 
Idealist discourse thus represents an example of a claims-making strategy that 
constructs its claims to fit in with what Loseke (1999) terms 'cultural worries!. 
These cultural worries are defined as more general worries, which are shared by a 
large number of people at any particular time. Certainly the idea that children are 
potentially troublesome or even evil can be seen in contemporary understandings of 
children's capacity to commit crime, to engage in bullying, and even to commit 
murder. For example, much of the (popular) discussion surrounding the James 
Bulger murder centred on whether the two young perpetrators were inherently evil, 
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what this said about the state of childhood in modern society, and indeed the 
resulting threat that was posed to the wider collectivity. 
For the Child Advocates, the view is a very different one. Here the underlying 
6problem' with the divorce process is actually located in the belief that it reflects 
society's view of children as essentially innocent. In contrast to most of the 
remainder of the policy community, this constituency does not construct children as 
unaware objects who are vested with the innocence of ignorance. For example, one 
constituent makes the statement: 'I don't think there can be any child over three in 
the UK that really doesn't know what divorce is. ' Reference is then made to the 
latest television series of '7-UP' in order to illustrate the point: 
'Without exception all the children knew about it, because they all talked 
about it, every child 
... 
there were Muslim children, there were Caribbean 
children, a boy on the Isle of Mull, a boy in Ulster, they all talked about 
love, and they were being asked about love, they all talked about 
divorce. At seven. ' [P101 
Part of the problem would therefore seem to lie in the perception within wider 
society that childhood is a time of innocence, and is thus something to be protected. 
As this constituent observes: 'I suppose it's divorce is a bit like sex, we don't like to 
think that children and young people know about it, let alone do it' [101. 
As this constituent points out, the reality is that children are 'bombarded 
... 
by the 
media' about divorce, and 'are living in a society where not only do they know 
about it, they either live it personally or their best mate does, and no-one wants to 
tell them anything about it'. The problem thus appears to lie both in the general 
perceptions of children within society, and in the actualisation of those perceptions 
within the divorce process. For example, she then goes on to highlight the need to 
recognise that things have changed: 'You have to look at your own perceptions of 
childhood 
... 
And you have to look at the way childhood is today'. 
It has been suggested that the dividing line between childhood and adulthood is 
rapidly eroding (Postman 1994). It is true to say that children's rights and the 
language of citizenship have gained purchase in certain areas of social life. 
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However, this would not yet appear to be the case within the family. Certainly a 
tension does exist between participatory rights for children, and parental 
responsibility and the need to protect children's welfare. As one constituent 
observes: 
'I think it's society that treats children as the chattels of their parents. 
You only have to took at the great debate that we have at the moment. 
We, are living in a society which deems it right to put children in penal 
institutions at a fairly young age 
... 
and that holds them criminally liable. 
What do we want from childhood? Do we want children to be culpable 
little adults when it suits us? What do we mean by childhood? And in 
effect children are the chattels of their parents as our society functions. 
Whether they should be or not is a different issue. ' [101 
The Child Advocates regard children as active players within the divorce process 
who both have their own opinions, and are deserving of a voice. This stance can 
perhaps be best described as reflecting the paradigm outlined by James et al. in 
which the child is understood not as a unit of 'becoming', but very much in terms of 
'being'. As the authors explain: 
'The child is conceived of as a person, a status, a course of action, a set 
of needs, rights or differences 
- 
in sum as a social actor 
... 
this new 
phenomenon, the 'being' child, can be understood in its own right. It 
does not have to be approached from the shortfall of competence, 
reason or significance. ' (1998: 207) 
Instead of passive objects in need of protection, children are thus constructed as 
genuine sociological agents, with the ability to shape their own situations and 
circumstances. Such a construction also facilitates their conceptualisation as 
individuals in their own right, with their own perspectives on the social world, and 
whose interests require separate consideration from those of their parents. 
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Concluding comments 
This chapter has explored how the various different constituencies who comprise 
the national policy-making community construct the 'problem' of divorce. This 
exploration has provided an effective 'snapshot' of the range of different, and 
indeed frequently competing ideas, thinking and values that were in play during the 
Family Law Act process. 
One factor that clearly emerges through the discussion, is the very fundamental 
'division' that lies at the heart of the policy community. Amongst the Idealists a 
Devlin-type perspective is evident, in the sense that the divorce 'problem' is 
underpinned by a universal and absolutist vision of family life and morality. In 
effect problems are therefore constructed primarily in terms of what the law 'ought' 
to do. This approach is, however, juxtaposed with a Progressive view largely 
focussed on what is actually 'going on' with current law. Echoing the legal realist 
perspective, the 'problem' of divorce for this group is constructed largely in terms 
of the impact and effect of law and process on individuals and families. 
As mentioned at the outset of the discussion, the perceptions of a problem will 
operate to shape and construct its proposed solution. The next chapter therefore 
goes on to consider one aspect of that solution 
- 
namely the construction of the role 
of divorce law with particular regard to the 'issue' of marriage. 
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Chapter 6 
The'Role'of Divorce Law 
Introduction 
Significant debate surrounds the question as to what the law should, and indeed can 
do when intimate relationships break down. As has already been observed, the 
Family Law Act 1996 was notable for (among other things) its express declaration 
of support for the 'institution of marriage' (section 1 (a)), and for the fact that it 
imposed a framework that was designed to facilitate marriage 'saving'. As revealed 
by the historical review of divorce law in England, the perception that law does 
have a 'role' beyond simply ending marriage is not a new one. However, it is 
interesting that one hundred and fifty years after emerging from ecclesiastical law, 
the feeling that divorce law should have some 'positive' function with regards to 
marriage continues to persist. 
During the course of the interviews, study participants were asked whether they 
thought that there was a 'connection' between debates about divorce law and 
debates about marriage. Of course divorce law will always be 'about' marriage in 
the sense that it is not possible to have divorce without it. However, this chapter 
explores 
- 
in the light of the thinking and value systems that were revealed in the 
previous chapter 
- 
the nature of the connections that were made by the various 
national policy-makers, and how those connections feed into different constructions 
of the 'proper' role for divorce law. 
When talking about the 'problem' of divorce, the policy community was broadly 
divided into three constituencies comprising the Idealists, the Progressives and the 
Child Advocates. When, however, it came to the question of divorce law and 
marriage, the various factions within the broad-based Progressive constituency 
became more clearly defined. Within this chapter the Progressive constituency is 
thus further broken down into three 'sub-constituencies' 
- 
the 'Idealist 
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Progressives', the 'Pragmatic Progressives' and the 'Middle Ground'. The views of 
the 'Child Advocates' are, for the purposes of this particular discussion, 
incorporated into these sub 
-constituencies where appropriate. 
The Idealists 
The Idealist constituency is characterised by very clear views about what the law 
should be doing when relationships break down. Indeed as one constituent 
explicitly states: 'I think the function of law should be to set a standard, others say it 
should be to follow behaviour' [111. As discussed in the previous chapter, this view 
reflects a general unhappiness on the part of this constituency that modern divorce 
has evolved into a primarily administrative function. As the second constituent 
remarks of the diverse nature of modem relationships: 'The law has said-this is 
really what people want, we should regulate the law to enable them to have it' [121. 
For the Idealists, conceptions of marriage are central to the construction of the role 
or function of divorce law. As revealed by their construction of the 'fact' of divorce 
as problematic, those conceptions are of marriage as both ideological and 
functional. Indeed for this group, marriage is constructed both as the 'proper' form 
of intimacy, and as central to constituents' ideas of 'family'. 
Marriage is perceived, firstly, to almost be the 'epitome' of a religious morality. 
This reflects a very confident Christian morality on the part of the individual 
constituents. For example, one of the constituents makes the following observation 
with regards to the 'state' of society today: 
'I think now we're in a state of transition, and society doesn't know 
whether it wants to have the Judaeo- Christian tradition, or become secular, 
and the huge debate that's going on 
... 
is about the type of society we want, 
and the choices before us. ' [121 
Implicit within Idealist discourse is the idea that society becomes demoralised when 
the links between law and religion are severed (Ahdar 2000). However, despite 
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societal fragmentation and uncertainty, the position of this particular constituent is 
unquestioned. Indeed she makes the following declaration: 'I stand by the Judaeo- 
Christian tradition' [ 121. 
In addition to its religious 'base', marriage is also defined in collective terms. 
Indeed for this group it is constructed as central to the basic organisation of social 
life 
- 
in essence as providing some kind of familial and societal 'cement'. As one 
constituent argues: 
'Society is in free-fall 
... 
and marriage is at the centre of it, because marriage 
gave a cohesive whole to the family, it commits you whether you like it or 
not to your in-laws, to all sorts of relatives, half of whom you probably 
don't particularly like, but nevertheless you've got this commitment to 
them 
... 
and also commitment to the upbringing of children. ' [121. 
This constituent then also goes on to make the slightly different point that what 
many people want, in her view, is 'certainty' or a 'framework'. Although this does 
not involve outlawing divorce, on the basis that 'life isn't like that', it does involve 
the making of 'long term commitments'. As an example of just such a 
commitment, marriage is thus constructed in terms of providing much needed 
certainty and security within modem society. 
'Defining' marriage 
For the Idealists, the role of divorce law appears to include that of 'defining' 
marriage, or perhaps more accurately, of defining the nature of marital obligations. 
Indeed as one of the Progressive constituents actually observes, the current rules of 
divorce may be seen as effectively creating 'norms' for marriage: 
'We define marriage through how you get out of it, I mean we have 
up to now 
... 
correct marital behaviour is defined in terms of the reasons 
why you can get divorced. ' [51 
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An example of just such a view is provided by one of the Idealist constituents. For 
this particular constituent, it is regarded as self-evident that the law (through the 
mechanism of the divorce process) should be about placing 'moral expectations' on 
the parties to a marriage. Indeed this is believed to represent the fundamental basis 
for state involvement in the ending of marriage: 
'I mean after all why do we, otherwise you say 'oh well the state shouldn't 
be involved at all'... have no divorce law at all, just say have a completely 
laissez faire system, if people want to get married 
... 
well that's their affair, 
nothing to do with the state. ' [ 111 
The second constituent discusses the issue in a slightly different way 
- 
here 
connections are made between matrimonial 'fault', and the status of the marriage 
contract. For example, it is argued that a system of divorce law which is not based 
upon fault, has the effect of undermining both marriage and the marriage contract: 
'It suggested that the promises we make at a wedding service before God, 
and 
... 
the civil contract we make with the state, could be broken. And it 
reduced marriage to something less than say buying a television licence, 
where if you fail to buy it not only can you be fined, but you could even 
end up in prison, whereas on something infinitely more important, both 
church and state were saying it didn't matter. ' [121 
The role accorded to divorce law is thus constructed in terms of both 'injecting' the 
basic moral content into marriage, and of 'enforcing' 
- 
and indeed it would seem 
signalling 
- 
the importance of marriage and the marital commitment. 
'Supporting' marriage 
The faith that is placed in marriage by the Idealists, together with their 'public' 
construction of marriage and its organisational benefits, provides the basis for an 
extension of the role of divorce law to include the task of 'supporting' marriage. 
At the practical instrumental 'level', constituents suggest that the law should 
operate to discourage parties from proceeding with a divorce. For example, one 
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constituent says of the divorce process: 'My view is that 
... 
we should be making it 
more difficult. ' He then continues: 
'You've got to accept that some people simply can't live together 
... 
I'm 
not suggesting that we should go back to the pre 1930 legislation where 
you had to get an Act of Parliament to get divorced 
... 
but I do think 
that the legislation we had 
... 
was about right, if it had been implemented 
properly. ' [111 
One solution to the problem of divorce is thus regarded as the retention of 
matrimonial 'fault', enforced by a proper investigation of the circumstances of 
marriage breakdown. 
For this particular constituent, that 'difficulty' is also constructed in terms of 
making 'divorce expensive for both parties', and of making it clear to them 'that 
this is really going to be an unpleasant process'. One example of how the divorce 
process may be made more 'expensive' and 'unpleasant', is located in the removal 
of the economic incentives that are perceived to be currently surrounding divorce. 
Indeed it is suggested that the following should be made clear at the outset of the 
divorce process: 
'Everything you've accumulated 
... 
during your marriage is going to be 
divided in half. Judgement of Solomon you know, you've got to accept 
that 
... 
Everything you came into the marriage with, you keep. Everything 
you have after your marriage, you keep. Everything that you accumulate 
during your marriage, the equity on the house, the pension, you know the 
three piece suite, that's divided in half. ' [11] 
It might be argued that this actually represents a stance that is more accurately 
described as 'extremist' than idealist. Certainly what is advocated here, is 
effectively the re-imposition of the 'correctional' code or framework favoured 
during the first half of the twentieth century. Once again divorce is defined as some 
kind of pathology that requires a corrective response. The result is that the 'proper' 
role of divorce law is thus constructed in negative terms 
- 
as a mechanism that both 
seeks to deter parties from seeking a divorce in the first place, and that punishes 
those who ultimately choose to proceed. 
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What is interesting is that for this constituency, marriage 'support' appears to be 
defined in terms of divorce prevention 
- 
effectively in restricting the route out of 
marriage. An 'unpleasant' divorce process is also presented as a legitimate price to 
pay in order to preserve marriage. It might be argued that the construction of 
4support' in terms of restriction and punishment is perhaps unsurprising within a 
constituency that values structure and certainty 
- 
that essentially constructs both the 
individual and the collective 'good', and indeed morality in absolutist terms. 
However, in view of the fact that similarly punitive approaches adopted in the past 
have not been adjudged successful in preventing the exit from marriage, it is not 
clear how the Idealist 'vision' is likely to function in a society whose value system 
has arguably become even more fragmented. 
The idea of supporting marriage by making divorce more difficult is, nevertheless, 
also echoed by the second constituent. Once again she argues in favour of af ault- 
based divorce law, together with a proper examination of the circumstances of 
marital breakdown. However, in addition, this constituent also goes on to adopt a 
somewhat broader perspective. A fault based divorce law is thus constructed as part 
of a broader framework of law and policy that makes it clear that cohabitation 
should not be equated with marriage. For example, specific reference is made to 
stopping social assistance for teenage mothers, and to altering the tax system in 
order to provide financial support to married couples. 
Discussion 
The public constructions of marriage offered by the Idealists, have the effect of 
reconstituting the morality of personal relationships in public terms. That morality 
is thus re-defined as legitimate terrain for the law. What can thus be seen within the 
discourses articulated by this constituency, are some of the ideas that were 
advanced by Devlin (1965) - namely that it is legitimate for society to use the law 
in order to preserve a morality that is essential to its existence. Certainly there is a 
clear sense amongst the Idealists that 'immorality', as evidenced by the movement 
away from marriage, is capable of (and indeed has been) damaging society. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 1 it is interesting that Devlin's (1965) ideas, which are 
generally out of favour within jurisprudence, do continue to have relevance here. 
However, whilst the extent to which Devlin's vision of common morality as an 
essential bonding element within society accorded with social reality during the 
1960s is open to question, it undoubtedly represents something of a contrast with 
the morally fragmented society of today. It might therefore be argued that the 
Idealist 'vision' is thus actually engaged in taking the role of law one 'stage further' 
- 
rather than simply preserving morality, law is actually accorded an additional role 
of positively injecting morality into society. 
The Idealist constituency is also characterised by a faith in what might be termed, 
the 'symbolic' function of law. Indeed both constituents make several references to 
the 'message' [111 or 'signal' [121 that they believe law sends to the wider society. 
For example, one constituent argues: 'I think law is terribly important. All law 
sends a signal'. She then goes on to reiterate the point: 'I think law does send a 
signal 
... 
and I think this has influenced people' [121. Neither constituent actually 
provides evidence as to the existence of this apparently causal connection between 
law and behaviour. However, the basic belief in its existence does provide some 
explanation for the constituency's position that law should be setting a standard for 
behaviour. 
Some faith is also placed in the ability of law to influence behaviour at a more 
6practical' level. For example one constituent argues that a fault-based divorce law, 
where that fault is enforced through investigation, does have the ability to change an 
individual's behaviour: 
'There's a lot of people who argue that the state can do nothing, they say 
it's all hopeless, you know everything's changed, this is all ridiculous, the 
state can't set standards. I don't accept that. But you know, I'm realistic, 
I mean there's only so much the state can do, to imagine that even if I got 
my way and divorce law was changed in the way I've suggested 
... 
that we 
could suddenly change people's behaviour to a significant extent is probably 
an illusion, but it might have an impact in a small number of cases ... And in 
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my view even if it saves 
... 
a thousand marriages year in a population of 
fifty-eight million 
... 
that's a thousand marriages a year saved 
... 
it's worth 
a try. ' [111 
This belief is echoed by the second constituent, who makes the following 
observation: 
'The law did save marriages for hundreds of years 
... 
Now I wouldn't want 
to go back to what we were in the year 1900 
... 
because I think that a lot of 
people were living in very considerable unhappiness, but a lot of people are 
living in very considerable unhappiness today 
... 
But certainly the law 
upheld marriage, I think. ' 
She then continues: 
'You can't turn the clock back by having one Act of Parliament which 
would say 
... 
as from next year 
... 
no-one would get divorced. That would 
be impossible, and ridiculous 
... 
you can only do it bit by bit. It takes 
... 
well 
not so long to fall down, but a very long time to build up. ' [121 
Despite this apparently positive view of what can be achieved by reforming the law, 
another observation made by this second constituent does raise a question mark 
about the justification for such a belief. Referring to the situation when she was a 
child, this constituent describes how she was brought up both to respect her parents, 
and to recognise the responsibilities that she had towards them: 
'I can hear my father saying it now, and of course you have responsibilities 
towards the school that you go to, and the country in which you live, and 
etcetera, etcetera. Now this is not the message that children are getting 
today 
... 
but this message I had as a child, was in a way reinforced by the 
law. ' [121 
Although the context is not a marital one, the comment is useful in that the 
constituent is describing how she regards law as operating to 'reinforce' more 
general 'messages' within society. Once again the issue of causality is not made 
clear. However, the fact that law is constructed as effectively reiterating existing 
social values, does raise questions as to its efficacy when faced with the task of 
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actually changing those values. This in turn raises questions about the social basis, 
and indeed the 'image' of law that is constructed by the constituents. 
At this point it is useful to make reference to Ewick and Silbey's work exploring the 
different ways in which people use and experience law. Indeed their study 
identifies three narratives that are common to the 'stories' that people tell about 
law: the first describes law as distant and removed from ordinary life; the second 
views law as a game involving the manipulation of rules for one's own advantage; 
whilst the third describes law as an arbitrary product of power that can be resisted 
(1998: 28). Within these three different narratives people respectively describe 
their relationships with law as something: (1) 'before which they stand'; (2) 'with 
which they engage'; and (3) 'against which they struggle' (ibid: 47). 
For the Idealists, law would seem to be constructed as something 'before' which 
one stands. The picture of law painted by the constituents, is of something that 
should ideally occupy a sphere that is separate from ordinary social life. Indeed as 
has already been discussed, a central aspect of the divorce 'problem' is perceived in 
terms of the current law having become so embedded alongside people that it is 
actually responding to their changing behaviour and value systems. This type of 
6vision' is similarly present within Ewick and Silbey's first narrative of law: 
'Law is experienced as a space outside of everyday life. Law and 
everyday life are seen in juxtaposition and possible opposition, 
rather than connected and entwined. ' (ibid.: 76). 
This fits with the relatively inert, and indeed ahistorical view of law that is held by 
the Idealists. The nature of the relationship between law and society is regarded as 
being largely one-way, namely 'top-down'. Law is essentially constructed as an 
'independent variable' 
- 
framing personal life, yet arguably without any real base or 
6 presence' within it. 
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The 'Idealist Progressives' 
Situated slightly further along the spectrum of opinion from the Idealists, are what 
can be termed the 'Idealist Progressives'. This is a small constituency comprising 
two individuals 
- 
one had been part of the formal state policy-making apparatus [81, 
whilst the other represented a Church body [7]. 
Both constituents can be firmly located under the broader Progressive umbrella in 
that they were perfectly willing to engage with reality of marriage breakdown, and 
were not seeking to somehow 'turn back the clock' to recapture a former vision of 
society. However despite this, several parallels can be drawn between these more 
idealist-oriented members of the Progressive constituency, and the Idealists 
themselves. For example, there is a similar belief that divorce law does have a role 
in setting standards of behaviour. As one of the constituents observes: 'I think the 
law ought to set 
... 
standards and encourage the best' [8]. In addition, although 
willing to 'deal' with divorce, there was a lingering sense of what might be 
described as 'discomfort' with regards to it. Indeed as the second constituent 
remarks: 'divorce is, it's a problem for us, precisely because we believe in 
marriage' [7]. 
Commonalities also exist between the two groups when it comes to the issue of 
marriage. Indeed for these more Progressive constituents, ideas of what is 'best' 
continue to centre very firmly around marriage. For example, one constituent 
expresses the following very clear views about its values and merits: 
'I'm very conscious of the fact that not every marriage is perfect, but on 
the whole I think that the public commitment that is involved in marriage 
is a good thing, and 
... 
has good effects for children and their upbringing. 
There's a sense of security that they have in the public commitment. ' [81 
Marriage is thus constructed as an institution with a 'public character' [7]. The 
nature of that character is, in turn, constructed in terms of the 'security', 
6 commitment' and 'stability' that marriage brings [8]. It is recognised that there are 
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other, 'more private' forms of commitment, but marriage is believed to provide 
additional benefits. As this constituent argues: 
'I think that 
... 
the kind of structure marriage gives 
... 
is something 
that provides 
... 
stability which is not easily attained in other 
relationships. ' [8] 
For these constituents marriage is not, however, constructed purely in public terms. 
Fundamentally it is also regarded as a private relationship, 'that gives satisfaction 
and mutual support for men and women' [8]. Marriage is thus effectively 
constituted as the 'best' form of intimate relationship both for the individuals 
directly involved, and also for the wider community. Indeed not only does it 
provide benefits for the individual spouses and their children, but a broader 
6organisational' benefit is also conferred on society. 
'Defining' marriage? 
Differences do begin to emerge between this constituency and the Idealists when it 
comes to the connections that are made between marriage and divorce law. For 
example, one constituent talking specifically about the connection between debates 
about divorce law and debates about marriage, makes the following point: 
'There are connections between the two 
... 
but not exactly about the 
desirability of people entering into [marriage]. ' [81 
This provides an interesting comparison with the position adopted by the Idealists. 
For this group no connection is made between divorce law and, 'questions like 
... 
the 
status of partnerships that aren't marriage' [8]. The implication would thus appear 
to be that divorce law is not about shoring-up the status of the marital relationship, 
not is it concerned with providing a clear delineation between the married and the 
non-married. 
This particular constituent does, however, talk about the link between debates about 
divorce law and, 'the fundamentals of marriage, and what they should be and so 
on'. However, once again in contrast to the Idealists, divorce law is not constructed 
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as having a role in setting out details of the marital obligation. Indeed this 
constituent makes the following observation with regards to the idea that divorce 
law has a role when it comes to defining marriage: 
'Now getting out of it in a sense is 
... 
the sort of pathology of marriage. 
It's like saying that, you know, you describe life by reference to 
death 
... 
how you get out of it. I don't think that's right myself. ' [81 
'Supporting' marriage 
The faith that the constituents have in marriage, together with the 'dual' private 
- 
public constructions of marriage, do legitimate a broader supportive role for divorce 
law. However, unlike the Idealists, that role is not presented in terms of either 
preventing or deterring divorce. 
Amongst the constituents themselves there does appear to be some concern to draw 
a distinction between their perspective, and the position that is articulated by the 
Idealists. For example, one of the constituents talks of the Idealist discomfort with 
the changes that society has witnessed in social and personal relationships over 
recent decades. Indeed this is referred to as a, 'conservative 
... 
unhappiness with all 
this change', which has manifested itself in a variety of ways: 
'And of course, there was a slightly circular element to the argument that, 
that people would say they didn't much care for the modem world, and the 
modern world kept getting more like the modern world, and so they cared 
for it even less and so on and so forth, and somebody ought to do something, 
and all this, you know, you've gone too far, and it should be stopped. ' [71 
This constituent then goes on to make the following observation with regards to this 
conservative constituency, and the question of divorce law reform: jthey] really 
had only one speech which was, 'we think marriage is very important', which was 
not in dispute'. However, what was in dispute according to this constituent, was the 
way in which that belief in marriage was demonstrated. As he then goes on to 
explain: 
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'But you know, the way you were 
... 
supposed to show you believed 
in marriage was what? I mean to say that divorce should be illegal? 
I mean it was quite extraordinary. ' [71 
For both of these constituents there was a debate to be had about whether any form 
of divorce law could be satisfactory. As one constituent states: 'you might sort of 
say, by definition if you believe that marriage is for life, then 
... 
anything that 
acknowledges that it isn't 
... 
is bad law' [7]. However, both also recognise the 
reality of divorce, and the inevitable limitations of the law when it comes to 
intimate relationships. For example, one participant talks of the difficulty to 'know 
fully what's gone on' in a marriage [8]. However, his fellow constituent also makes 
the following additional observation: 
'Prevention 
... 
doesn't necessarily mean that marriages always 
succeeded 
... 
you can have marriage break-up without 
... 
as it were 
any legal 
... 
implications of what you can do about it. ' [71 
Another interesting comparison with the Idealists lies in the connections that are 
made between law and religious values. Like the Idealists, both of these more 
Progressive constituents hold strong Christian beliefs. Those beliefs 'feed into' 
constructions of marr iage as both the 'ideal' to which one might aspire, and as 
'best' in moral terms. For example, one of the constituents actually defines 
marriage in accordance with religious doctrine: 
'I say that marriage is defined really by 
... 
the 
... 
articles that define it in 
the Prayer Book, and 
... 
I think these are, although they were written a 
long time ago, are very apt still to my mind. ' [81 
However, for these constituents, Christianity is constructed as more flexible and 
tolerant than the version articulated by their Idealist counterparts. Indeed one 
constituent argues explicitly against the idea that, 'the way in which you stand up 
for Christian principles is by saying 'no" [7]. This particular constituent then goes 
on to talk specifically about the Christian tradition from which he comes. He 
contrasts this with the 'magisterial' authority, qnd 'authoritative tradition' of the 
Catholic Church, saying instead: 
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'You tend to want to get alongside the people who've got the issue, 
or the problem. So whether it's in relation to marriage and sexual 
ethics, or business 
... 
or the law and penal policy 
... 
the first instinct of 
the tradition I represent is 
... 
to sit down with the people who are grappling 
with the problem, and say 'tell me what's going on here'... You then try 
and reflect in the light of your Christian faith and tradition 
... 
and 
come to 
... 
a judgement. ' 
This more flexible, and indeed reflexive view of 'Christianity' is not one that is 
universally accepted across the Christian community. Indeed the participant goes 
on to describe how one almost invariably has to struggle with what he describes as 
'Conservative Christians', who are defined in the following terms: 
6people who don't think any change could be for the better 
... 
or who 
don't think that there are any questions to be asked because everything 
is 
... 
clear and in the Bible. What we always struggle with, is the idea 
that in some sense by even discussing questions of this kind, we are 
selling out. ' [71 
This, it would appear, represents just the kind of position that is articulated by the 
Idealists. 
One result of this more flexible 'world view' on the part of the Idealist 
Progressives, is that their faith in marriage and its various merits is tempered by an 
acceptance of the reality of divorce. The task of divorce law is thus, in turn, 
constructed much more in terms of dealing with that reality. As one participant 
remarks: 
'We certainly can't say 
... 
marriages could be dissolved on demand, but 
we ought to be able to have some mechanism for recognising that despite 
every good intention and so on 
... 
they can fail, and then recommending 
a procedure 
... 
for how you might actually deal with the notion of 
irretrievable breakdown. ' [71 
In a similar vein, the second participant argues that if people are 'irreconcilable', 
then 'something' has to be done about it. Although not 'the ideal', this is regarded 
as something that simply has to be done: 
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'I think that when you recognise that marriages can fail, and they can fail 
in a way that's impossible to put together again, then it's right to have a 
system which deals with that in as humane and orderly a fashion as 
possible. '[81 
Although 'dealing' in reality, this dealing does therefore continue to be framed by 
the constituency's belief in marriage. For example, whilst recognising that divorce 
law brings marriages to an end, one constituent also goes on to argue that, 'it ought 
not to encourage that to happen'. This perspective is underpinned by the following 
belief: 
'it ought not to be easy to go in and out of marriage, it's only when 
marriage has really broken down in a way that can't be put together. ' [81 
The end result is that divorce is set within what is described as: 'a better context 
than just divorce on it's own'. The nature of that better context is one of 'saving 
marriages' [8]. This construction of divorce law is similarly echoed by his fellow 
constituent, who also advances the argument: 'The whole point of this exercise 
ought to be to save the saveable marriage, to strengthen and support the institution' 
[7]. 
Discussion 
What can be seen within this constituency is a very real shifting away from the 
intractable absolutist position advocated by the Idealists. Law does arguably retain 
a role in governing morality 
- 
for example, divorce is not constructed as an 'easy' 
option 
- 
whilst its role remains underpinned by a strong faith in marriage and its 
attendant benefits. This perspective is, however, tempered in two very important 
ways. 
One 'tempering' factor can be found in the acceptance of a more flexible and 
individual morality. For example one constituent provides the following, very 
illuminating explanation: 
'The latest Social Trends says that 
... 
the percentage of people who 
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believe 
... 
what is you know, the formal position of the Churches 
on sexual relations, that all sexual relations outside marriage are 
always wrong, is now seven or eight percent. I mean 
... 
it is a very 
remarkable figure, given 
... 
the history, and what it is assumed everyone 
thought only recently. Now, I mean, maybe those seven or eight 
percent are already in church, but whether or not they are, there must 
be a huge number of people, who I don't think are totally amoral and 
promiscuous, but who actually believe that these things are more 
complicated. And 
... 
in some sense that must apply to divorce law as 
well, I mean we have to find some way of 
... 
trying to balance two things 
that are very difficult to balance. ' [7] 
In addition to a greater degree of tolerance for individualism, a second factor is 
located in constituents' greater awareness of societal 'reality'. It would be true to 
say that the 'image' of law that is presented by this constituency remains one in 
which law continues to retain a degree of 'distance' from society. However, it is 
similarly true that it is no longer the magisterial inflexible creature envisaged by the 
Idealists. Implicit within constituents' discourses is the belief that if it is to be 
effective, then law needs to be more aware of societal values and behaviour 
- 
in 
essence it is a more 'dynamic' model of law that is required. 
The 'Pragmatic Progressives' 
If attention is now shifted to the opposite end of the spectrum of opinion spanned by 
the national policy-makers, it is possible to locate a group of individuals who can be 
described as the 'Pragmatic Progressives'. In the study sample this group 
comprised three members, all of whom were drawn from what might be termed the 
legal 'field 9. 
In contrast to the two constituencies already discussed, the Pragmatic Progressives 
regard the divorce 6problem' principally in terms of the lack of credibility possessed 
by the current law. This is primarily attributed to, as discussed in the previous 
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chapter, the 'gap' that exists between law and practice. Fault, and the adverse 
impact that it is perceived to have on the divorce process and those who use it, is 
also considered to be particularly problematic. 
This practical problematisation of divorce 'feeds into' a more practical, and indeed 
a more administrative approach to the construction of law's role. One example of 
such an approach is provided by one of the constituents who starts by asking the 
question: 'What is law for? ' She then goes on to offer the following answer: 'It is 
to make the rules that govern disputes, and to resolve those disputes' [1]. Whether 
divorce law actually has any broader kind of role beyond this is, for this particular 
constituent, open to some question: 
'Can we use the law for more socially desirable goals, to give information, 
to encourage negotiation, to reflect? I am much more sceptical about this in 
terms of practicality and appropriateness. ' [11 
In a similar vein, a second constituent makes the statement that: 'A divorce law is 
about divorce, it's about efficiently ending a marriage' [ 151. This particular 
constituent does offer her own personal opinion regarding the form that such a 
divorce law should take: 
'In a sense 
... 
the best system to have is a system where somebody could 
just say 'I want a divorce', and they're given a divorce straight away. ' 
The following reason is given for the adoption of such a position: 'If you're looking 
at 
... 
a law which is designed to end marriages in an efficient manner, well that's the 
most efficient manner to end them in isn't it? ' Thus in an ideal world, law would 
indeed be a true consumer product, simply responding to what people want. 
However, as the constituent is keen to stress, this position was never actually 
advocated during the divorce reform process on the basis that it, 'just isn't a 
politically and socially acceptable position to have'. 
The Pragmatic Progressives are distinguished from the remainder of the policy 
community by their primarily individualistic constructions of marriage. For 
example, one of the constituents talks very explicitly about the nature of personal 
relationships in modem society: 'Some would say that relationships are about 
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choice and individual commitment, and that responsibilities are defined privately' 
[1]. A comparison is drawn with the situation in the past: 'Older generations were 
brought up under a system where there was only one way to commit, i. e. marriage. 
That is set, and is hard to get out of. ' For this particular constituent, however, 
marriage in today's society is effectively something that one can 'contract into' or, 
alternatively that one can choose to 'reject 
. 
A pragmatic, or indeed what might arguably be described as a somewhat cynical 
view of marriage, is also advanced by one of the other constituents. Having made 
reference to the continuing popularity of marriage, he then goes on to remark: 
'The research seems to suggest that it's the idea of the wedding 
rather than the marriage that's particularly popular. People like a nice 
day. ' [61 
Within this constituency marriage is thus constructed primarily as a relationship 
between the two parties. Alongside this more private and individualistic 
construction 
- 
and indeed reflecting a recognition of a more private and 
individualistic morality 
- 
is also a much greater acceptance that marriage today 
actually constitutes just one of a range of 'options' for forming intimate 
relationships. 
'Defining' marriage? 
For this constituency, the role of divorce law most definitely does not include 
defining the nature of the marital contract. Indeed one of the constituents says of 
divorce law: 
'People think that it's a question of breaching the marital contract. If you 
separate without consent that's a breach 
... 
and arguably if you do it with 
consent 
... 
If you commit adultery, that's a breach, if you behave 
unreasonably 
... 
But for divorce to define the obligations of the contract is 
pie in the sky if only because divorce is seen as a punishment, when it is 
usually what everyone wants. ' [11 
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This view is reinforced by the claim that, rather than representing damages for 
breach of contract, financial orders are more accurately described as, 6 compensation 
for marriage related losses' [1]. 
The idea implicit within the claims advanced by the Idealists, namely that fault is 
necessary in order to inject a sense of responsibility and morality into marriage, is 
rejected. For these constituents divorce law is not constructed as the vehicle for 
somehow shoring-up the moral content of marriage. Furthermore, and in stark 
contrast to some of the more idealist-oriented participants, the Pragmatic 
Progressives do not make the connection between divorce law and the status of the 
marital contract. Rather the connections that are made between marriage and 
divorce law, are primarily of a practical nature. For example, one constituent states: 
'of course you can't divorce the divorce process from the fact that people have to be 
married in the first place' [6]. For a second constituent the question is, however, a 
more complex one. Indeed with regards to the connection between debates about 
divorce law and debates about marriage she remarks: 'This was something which I 
wrestled with at the time and I could never get my head round it to be honest' [151. 
The third constituent is, however, more certain of her position: 
'My view is that any relationship brings responsibilities, unless you 
contract out of them 
... 
and possibly even then. But you can't foresee 
what those compromises are going to be. You have to judge on the 
circumstances at the end of the relationship. That has to be the basis for 
sorting it all out, not the situation at the start. ' [11 
'Supporting' marriage? 
The question of whether divorce law should be about supporting, or indeed saving 
marriage does create something of a dilemma for the Pragmatic Progressives. The 
instinctive reaction of constituents does, however, appear to be that this is really not 
an appropriate task for divorce law. For example when asked about 'supporting' 
marriage, one constituent actually frames her reply in terms of, 'stopping people 
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getting divorced'. She then goes on to make the assertion: 'that to me is not the 
point of a divorce law' [151. 
In a similar vein, this constituent also observes that most of the participants in the 
Parliamentary debates on the Family Law Bill, 'were commenting on a saving 
marriages Bill, they weren't commenting on a divorce reform Bill at all'. In her 
opinion this is 'completely illogical' 
-a 'divorce Bill' is simply not the place to be 
attempting to save marriage. For this constituent there is no question that marriage 
is something to be supported: 'It's a very worthy objective to want to 
... 
make 
marriages longer and happier. ' However, using the law to reduce the divorce rate is 
not regarded as the way to achieve that objective, 'because what you might end up 
doing is trapping people in desperately unhappy marriages' [151. 
It is important to note, however, that this constituent's position is tempered 
somewhat by the following caveat: 
'Obviously you don't want to do anything within the law which could 
possibly hinder reconciliation 
... 
you never ever want to get in the situation 
where you've managed to draft a law which actually positively prevents 
people from reconciling. [151 
This comment might be interpreted as representing a genuine faith in marriage and 
its merits. However, one possible alternative interpretation is that constituents were 
actually unwilling to speak out against the normative resonance of marriage, or 
indeed to really challenge traditional ideas of family based on marriage. 
Whatever the explanation, the idea of marriage as somehow 'best' is one that is 
articulated across the constituency. For example, another constituent remarks: 'I do 
think that marriage provides a better framework' [1]. Specific reference is also 
made to the general principals of saving and supporting marriage that were 
ultimately incorporated into the 1996 Act. As a second constituent observes: 
'In a sense there was no point arguing about those principals because 
although, you know you might look at them and think well they don't 
really fit with a divorce law in some ways, at the same time 
... 
you know, 
yes everybody would say that 
... 
saving a marriage that can be saved is 
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something which should be done. ' [ 15] 
This view is reiterated by the third member of the constituency, who suggests that 
6 nobody could actually take issue' with these principles 
- 
the reason for this being 
that they were, as he puts it, 'terribly reasonable' [6]. 
Discussion 
The views articulated by the Pragmatic Progressives are framed by a very clear 
awareness of what they perceive to be the limits of law. As one constituent 
remarks: 'People expect a lot from divorce law. ' This is, however, followed by the 
assertion that such expectations are 'idealistic' [1]. For this particular individual, 
the primary function of divorce law is that of dispute resolution. This prompts the 
question of whether those disputes should include, 'whether the marriage should be 
rescued'. The answer to this question takes the form of the following observation: 
4 provided there has been sufficient lapse of time, and at least one 
party is saying [the marriage] is at an end, then it's over. Of course the 
law could pretend that it's not, that the obligations continue and should be 
enforced. '[11 
The clear implication is that policy makers need to recognise the limitations of the 
law when dealing in intimate relationships. The question as to whether a marriage 
has broken down is thus a primarily private matter for the parties involved, rather 
than something to be resolved within the public arena. 
The limitations of divorce law are, to some extent, proscribed by the way in which 
divorce is now perceived within today's society. As previously mentioned, society's 
value system is such that divorce is no longer seen as a 'punishment' 
- 
the fact of 
divorce thus no longer constitutes any real form of deterrent. Indeed as one 
constituent observes: 'The reality is that all divorce is, is permission to remarry. ' 
Although she does go on to note that, 'people want the symbol of being divorced, 
just as they want the symbol of being married' [1]. 
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Another constituent makes the comment: 'I don't know what government can do to 
strengthen marriage' [151. The perception that little can in fact be done, is also 
echoed by a second fellow constituent. Indeed this constituent describes the Act's 
general principles as, 'a bit anodyne'. Specific reference is made to the provision 
requiring both courts and individuals 'exercising functions' under the Act to have 
regard to the general principle, 'that the institution of marriage is supported'. 
However, he then goes on to make the following observation: 'Well 
... 
what's a 
court official got to do with the institution of marriage being supported? I mean it's 
just nonsense' [6]. 
In contrast to his more Ideal ist-oriented counterparts within the policy community, 
this constituent constructs law in terms of its practical functions. Here the talk is 
not of law sending a signal, or somehow symbolically supporting marriage. Instead 
law is viewed in terms of its practical impact 'on the ground' 
- 
essentially in terms 
of its direct effect on behaviour. With regards to the principle of saving individual 
marriages, this particular constituent comments: 'Social engineering isn't it? But 
because it's so anodyne it doesn't make any difference if you put it in or not'. 
Whether the law should be attempting to operate as some kind of social engineer is 
open to question, however the clear implication is that it actually has very little 
capacity to do so successfully. 
If Ewick and Silbey's (1998) typology of legal narratives is adopted, then the image 
of law presented by this pragmatic constituency is arguably best described as falling 
within the second category. Constituents paint a picture of law that is much more 
closely situated 'alongside' people. Law is something with which individuals can 
engage (and in certain instances manipulate), and which is ideally rooted in the 
dynamics of everyday social life. Law is thus constructed as a dynamic creature, 
framed by daily life, and responding to the society in which it operates. For 
example, as one constituent says with regards to the 'shift' that she observes in the 
way that people form relationships: 'My view is that we have to devise a law that 
recognises this shift' [1]. 
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The 'Middle-G round' 
The remaining policy makers articulate a position that is situated in the 'space' that 
exists between the poles of opinion occupied by the Idealist and Pragmatic 
Progressives. The participants that make up this 'Middle-Ground' constituency, are 
drawn primarily from professional and interest groups (other than 'legal' groups), 
and from within the formal policy-making apparatus. For these individuals the 
'problem' of divorce centres on the fact that law is based upon matrimonial 'fault', 
and the adverse impact that this is perceived to have. 
Commonalities do exist between the views of the Idealist and Pragmatic 
Progressives, and this central group. For example, some constituents talk about 
divorce law in very practical terms. As one remarked: 'I think that 
... 
a good divorce 
law would be just that' [5]. Another constituent asks of the law: 'Well what is it 
for? 
... 
I suppose it's to regulate you know the break up of this relationship, to make 
sure the break up is fair to both parties, and 
... 
sufficient support is provided for the 
children' [3]. In a similar vein, yet another constituent states: 'very largely people 
wanted the divorce as a practical way of sorting out where they lived, money, 
children, things like that' [2]. As with the Pragmatic Progressives, the suggestion is 
therefore that the law should be responding to the society with which it deals, and 
indeed should be concerning itself with the practical aspect of marriage breakdown. 
However, despite these apparently pragmatic views, the 'overall' image of law that 
is constructed by these participants is one that actually occupies a more centralist 
position. Indeed some of those constituents who seemed to articulate a pragmatic 
approach to divorce law, at the same time also appear to accord it a somewhat 
6 wider' role. For example, the constituent who expressed the opinion that divorce 
law 'should be just that', subsequently goes on to argue that the process should also, 
'be about dealing with people who were clear that they wanted a divorce' [5]. 
Several constituents talk about law primarily in terms of the consequences of 
divorce. Here the focus is on, 'what the consequences might be' [14]. The 
problems 
- 
namely, unhappiness, hostility, conflict etc. 
- 
created by a process that is 
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based upon matrimonial fault, has the effect of legitimating a broader 
'humanitarian' role for divorce law. For example, one constituent expresses the 
view: 'I would like to see the law, where it could, contributing to better outcomes 
for families' [5]. In a similar vein, another constituent makes the following 
argument: 
'It's the life of the family after divorce that is important 
... 
a divorce law 
ought to set, if it can 
... 
the basis for 
... 
constructive post divorce life. ' [91 
The conceptions of marriage articulated by this constituency, straddle the 
individualistic and the collective. At one end of the continuum, links can be drawn 
with the pragmatic perception of modern relationships as being more about choice 
and privacy. One example of this type of perspective, is provided by a constituent 
who comments: 'I've met people who say 
... 
we've lived together for eleven years, 
and you know 
... 
I buy 
... 
the Christmas presents for his parents sort of thing, but oh 
no I wouldn't dream of getting married' [3]. What should be emphasised here, is 
the perception that marriage means different things to different people. As this 
constituent goes on to observe: 
'There's 
... 
the very narrow legal view that marriage is a system for 
regulating the onward transmission of property 
... 
It's all about inheritance, 
and it's all about who gets the family estate, you know that's one 
extreme 
... 
And the other extreme is 
... 
marriage is a holy estate signifying 
the unity between Christ and the Church 
... 
and everything else 
in-between' [31 
This particular constituent also asks about the 'added value' that is gained from 
getting married 
- 
indeed he questions whether it is about 'economic protection for 
women9, a 'secure home or 'public commitment'. The conclusion reached is that 
whilst 'individuals may give a personal answer to that', there does not appear to be 
a 6collective' view that is prevalent within society [3]. In a related vein, a second 
constituent articulates what can be described as a more 'dual' conception of 
marriage. Whilst marriage is recognised as possessing some 'collective' character, 
this is also juxtaposed with the lack of a firm collective (societal) view. As she 
remarks: 
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'I would accept [marriage] is an institution but I think that institutions 
change, and this particular one is now very much sort of a diverse kind of 
entity. ' [51 
Moving slightly further along the continuum of opinion, other constituents within 
this group articulate a more collective, institutional, and arguably more confident 
view of marriage. An example of this perspective is provided by one of the 
constituents occupying a position within the formal policy-making framework. 
Here marriage is constructed in what she describes as more 'holistic' terms: 
'It's not just a simple contract, it's more than that, it's a contract between 
two people and the state 
... 
and if they have children, it's a contract that 
involves their children and their wider family. ' [21 
This position is subsequently reiterated as she then goes on to argue: 'This isn't just 
a broken relationship, this is an institution. ' 
'Supporting' marriage? 
As was the case with the Pragmatic Progressives, the Middle-Ground constituents 
also question the capacity of divorce law to save and support marriage. For 
example, one particular constituent questions the Idealist belief that legislation 
effects the rate at which relationships break down: 
'that can't possibly be the case 
... 
what it does do is either make it easier 
or harder, or more or less timely for people to proceed to the legal process. ' 
[21 
However, despite the existence of some scepticism, this constituency is also 
characterised by a greater willingness to actually accept a role for the law in 
supporting (and saving) marriage. Indeed several constituents were particularly 
keen to incorporate statutory support for marriage support services 
- 
i. e. marriage 
support, but at an earlier 'stage' in the life of a marriage. 
An example of this greater willingness to support marriage within the divorce 
process itself is provided by one constituent who, despite confessing that she was, 
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6not a great one for supporting the institution of marriage', then goes on to make the 
assertion that she would rather 'support marriages' [5]. Another constituent states: 
'Now one could say, validly, that what we should do is be focussing on preparing 
people for marriage and supporting marriage, I mean I'd go along with that' [101. 
A third constituent also talks of saving marriages as a 'good' thing. This particular 
participant makes reference to the fact that one of the 'counter arguments' is the fact 
that by the time people file for divorce, it is actually too late to save the marriage. It 
is accepted that this will be true in 'some', but not all cases: 
'the thinking is that if you can do anything to increase the proportion and 
save the relationship, you know, all well and good. ' [31 
An interesting position is adopted by one of the constituents from within the formal 
policy-making apparatus. In this instance, the talk is of the importance of divorce 
law being, 'sensitive to marriage' [2]. This 'sensitivity' is constructed in the 
following terms: 
6 switching over to a system which wasn't just concerned immediately 
with dissolving the legal bond and getting it done as quickly and as 
cheaply as possible, it moved over to a process which recognised the 
reality. ' [21 
What is of particular note here is the 'nature' of the relationship that is constructed 
between law and reality 
- 
in this particular instance, the 'reality' that people 
experience when relationships break down. Indeed underpinning this position is the 
very basic view that divorce is not some kind of 'single event', nor indeed is it a 
4 single process in time'. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the process is 
actually regarded as 'legal, social, emotional, psychological and practical'. A 
divorce process that is truly sensitive to marriage is therefore one that is similarly 
multifaceted, and which is reflective of 'what was going on in people's lives' [2]. 
Discussion 
In common with- their more pragmatic colleagues, the views articulated by this 
constituency are framed by a recognition that the law is subject to limitations. 
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Certainly several of the constituents are sceptical about the ability of a divorce law 
to genuinely save and support marriage. For example, one constituent observes: 
'the thing is the more you look at it with the law, the more you think well what the 
hell can it do? ' This constituent, who has a background in marriage counselling, 
then goes on to make the following argument: 
'true marriage support is not divorce prevention. If your starting point is 
to prevent people getting divorced, you are probably doing it too late, and 
then you end up bringing in measures which delay people getting divorced, 
which in some instances might actually be quite helpful, but generally 
speaking if you look at evidence 
... 
I think 
... 
you can really only defend it 
at an earlier stage because you get caught up in this thing about really 
... 
are 
you supporting marriage, or are you just wanting to stop people getting 
divorced. ' [51 
This idea that marriage support can actually turn into divorce prevention, is echoed 
by a second constituent who makes reference to, 'holding people back from 
divorce' [9]. The key for this constituent lies not in a focus on divorce law, but 
rather in providing much broader marriage support within society. It is only this 
broader kind of approach that can facilitate a change in 'culture' 
- 
namely where it 
is recognised that marital difficulties are 'normal', and that seeking help is felt to be 
' acceptable'. 
Although this constituent would rather the 1996 Act was 'a straightforward divorce 
act', she does not repudiate the need to 'strengthen and 
... 
assist marriages that are 
saveable'. However, the question of whether law can actually do anything positive 
in this area is questionable. The constituent's background is in mediation, and her 
perspective is firmly grounded in the experience of working with people whose 
relationships are breaking down. As she observes: 
'We'd kept national statistics for years 
... 
on who was using mediation, 
and most of them were living apart by the time they got to mediation. 
There weren't may who were living together whose marriages were 
saveable, although we did think that if the law did really 
... 
front load 
the divorce process, then you might have more people uncertain, whose 
marriages could be saved. ' [91 
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Despite a real awareness of the limitations of law in this context, what seems to 
distinguish this constituency from the pragmatists, is thus a 'hope' that law can save 
marriages, together with a stronger belief that marriage is in fact worth supporting. 
It should, however, be noted that some members of the constituency are more 
positive about the ability of the law to save marriages. For example, one constituent 
makes reference to the fact that 'quite a high proportion' of divorce petitions do not 
proceed through to decree absolute. She then goes on to argue: 'Quite a lot of 
people say that they regret having done what they did 
... 
a lot of them say 'if only I'd 
sought help sooner' [2]. This position is subsequently echoed by a second 
constituent: 
'At the moment there are 200,000 petitions for divorce every year. 
There are 150,000 decrees 
... 
so one quarter drop out of the system, do 
not proceed to a divorce right now, that's without 
... 
anything. So I mean, 
no doubt there is a substantial proportion of divorces where by the time 
people file for divorce it is too late, but equally there's a whole chunk, 
a quarter where it manifestly isn't too late because they do not proceed 
to divorce. ' [31 
This observation reflects the underlying construction 
- 
or perhaps it might be 
argued a hope 
- 
that those parties who commence divorce proceedings have not 
necessarily reached a final decision as to whether their marriage is over. Such a 
construction in turn opens up the possibility that law does in fact have a positive 
role to play when it comes to the issue of supporting marriage. 
The support accorded to marriage by this constituency arguably suggests that the 
terrain of intimate relationships is not constituted as a purely private matter. The 
role that is played by the state when it comes to morality is explicitly discussed by 
one of the participants who, firstly, makes the following observation: 
6 either you have a nanny state or you have a laissez-faire kind of 
community where 
... 
everybody lets it hang out really and who's to worry. 
And in a way I think one's got to hold the tension between those two 
because 
... 
as in any marriage in fact there are private and collective 
interests that need to be balanced out 
... 
and 
... 
you've got the kind of 
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two extremes of narcissm on the one hand, and 
... 
a kind of collective 
imposition on the other. ' [ 141 
In view of the fact that modern society is not a morally absolute one, the 
observation is made that there is, 'an intense value question underpinning all this'. 
Indeed the question is then posed: 
'If you have a prescriptive body, if not the church, the state 
- 
that tries 
to uphold some agreed standards 
... 
and if so, are they agreed and by whom? 
Or do you 
... 
allow individuals as it were to be experts in their own fields, 
and support them in making their own choicesT [141 
He then continues: 
'I mean the latter one sounds more attractive, 'cos actually that's in a 
sense 
... 
the best way, it's about internalising a moral code rather than 
having it exterrialised, and that's more likely to result in personal integrity, 
which I suppose is the goal, that's the 'gold standard'. ' 
For this particular constituent, an internal morality is thus deemed to constitute the 
preferable option. 
For some of the other constituents, however, it is arguable that marriage actually 
represents the 'gold standard'. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Idealists, that 
perception does not feed into the belief that law should seek to deter people from 
seeking a divorce. For example, one constituent refers to divorce as a 'life event', 
and suggests that the proper role of divorce law is to find 'a more humane way of 
managing what was a fact of life' [101. This is echoed by a fellow constituent, who 
makes the following statement: 
'The more we move away from seeing divorce as offending behaviour to 
seeing it as, you know, an ordinary life transition so to speak, I think the 
more one ought to think about transitions as times when people need 
resources to manage change. ' [141 
As with the Pragmatic Progressives, the 'image' constructed by this middle group, 
is of a law largely based in social reality. For example, one constituent argues, 'law 
must be cognisant of society 
... 
at its time' [101. This position is, however, also 
'influenced' both by a very genuine (and indeed arguably 'idealist') belief in 
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marriage. The end result is thus what can arguably be described as a 'dual' role for 
law 
- 
namely that of attempting to provide some support for marriage, whilst at the 
same time working to bring marriages to an end. 
Concluding comments 
These last few comments from the Middle-Ground constituents would almost seem 
to represent the wider debate in microcosm. For the Idealists, a confident ideology 
over which constituents are not prepared to compromise, feeds into a clear vision of 
law as a prescriptive (and indeed a corrective) framework upholding the marital 
'ideal'. Law is thus effectively constructed as a mechanism for achieving 
constituents' Utopian vision of a society united by shared norms and values. 
For the Idealist Progressives, the ideology enshrined within the idea that law should 
'set the standard' of marriage is framed by the recognition that it is neither possible, 
nor is it arguably desirable, to return to a morally absolute society. Inherent within 
the discourses articulated by this constituency, would seem to be a recognition as to 
the limits of law when faced with a 'real movement' in family life. As Rodger 
argues: 
'Political rhetoric which ignores the fundamental institutional and 
cultural movements of the times may accomplish short-run legislative 
change which will retard those movements, but at the risk of creating 
legal frameworks which are essentially ignored at the social level. ' 
(1995: 14). 
For this constituency, reform thus requires that ideals be compromised to some 
extent. Indeed as one constituent observes: 'we mustn't allow the best to be the 
enemy of the good' [7]. 
Amongst the Pragmatic Progressives the view of law is very different. The 
discourses articulated by these constituents present a picture of law that might be 
best described as a 'dependent variable' - in essence law is constructed both as 
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responsive to societal change, and as dealing primarily in the practicalities of 
relationship breakdown. The relationship between law and society is thus much 
more 'bottom-up', with individuals granted a greater degree of autonomy to make 
their own choices and decisions with regards to their intimate relationships. 
The policy-making community is thus characterised by a fundamental division of 
opinion as to whether law should reflect the reality of social behaviour and simply 
administer what people do, or whether it should reflect some kind of standard. As 
this chapter has revealed, the division that was evident when constructing the 
divorce 'problem', crystallises into competing 'visions' as to the broad role or 
function of divorce law 
- 
namely as a mechanism for both supporting marriage, and 
for bringing marriages to an end. The next chapter therefore goes on to explore 
how these competing visions were effectively 'worked out' when it came down to 
the practical issue of the divorce process itself. 
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Chapter 7 
The Divorce 'Process' 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the national policy-making community's thinking when it 
comes to the mechanics of the divorce process itself. This is the point at which the 
values, interests, ideals and policy 'visions' of the various constituents effectively 
solidify into substantive proposals for reform. 
At this more practical or 'instrumental', level both the Idealists and the Pragmatic 
Progressives remain distinctive constituents within the policy community. 
However, across the more 'middle-ground', there is once again something of a shift 
in constituency boundaries. When discussing the role of divorce law at the more 
esoteric level, participants divided along what might be best described as 
ideologically oriented lines. However, when it comes down to the mechanics of the 
divorce process, those ideological divisions effectively 'collapse' back into what is 
essentially a division along the lines of positions occupied within the policy 
process. The main division within this middle group is thus between those 
participants who formed part of the fon-nal policy-making apparatus (the 'Formal' 
policy-makers) and those representing interest and pressure groups who were 
involved in consultation and lobbying (the 'Interest Groups'). In view of their 
child-focussed 'take' on the divorce process, the Child Advocates are also primarily 
treated as a distinct faction. However, where they have more general (i. e. non 
child-centred) comments to make, their perspective falls within that of the broader 
'Interest Group' constituency. 
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The Idealists 
Marital 'conduct' 
For the Idealists, the central task of the divorce process is constructed in terms of 
investigating the circumstances of marriage breakdown. Indeed one constituent, in 
particular, argues strongly in favour of such an investigation. The 'problems' raised 
by some of the other constituencies as being inherent in such a procedure, are 
regarded as perfectly surmountable: 
'It's very easy to moralise about this, I haven't got divorced, I don't 
know, but obviously I think parents who start criticising their former 
partner in front of the children and things are doing enormous 
damage 
... 
But of course the proponents of this divorce law say, 'oh 
well that's precisely what the old law did', but not necessarily, it can 
be done in private you know. It could be done in private in a family court 
in front of a registrar, in a very humane, sensible way, sitting round a 
table. ' [111 
The cost element of conducting an investigation in every case, is dealt with in a 
similar fashion: 
'And then you would say, 'oh we couldn't possibly afford this because 
they'd be saying this allegation, that allegation it'd go on for weeks you 
know'... 1 don't know if it would actually. I think that probably arises from 
the old divorce courts where these sort of vast and public affairs were 
sort of producing titbits for the newspapers and things. ' [ 111 
This constituent does recognise that such a procedure may cause difficulties in some 
instances: 'no doubt in some cases it would be very difficult, perhaps it would be 
impossible, perhaps some couples would just be shouting at each other the whole 
time'. However, his overall view remains an optimistic, although indeed some 
might argue a naive, one: 'But I 
... 
suspectthat 
... 
most people can be encouraged to 
talk through the process, it might help a bit'. 
For this constituency, marital conduct is also regarded as a factor that should have a 
positive impact on the outcome of divorce proceedings. As one participant states: 
'I 
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think conduct should impact on for instance custody, and things like that, which it 
doesn't really at the moment 
... 
to any great extent' [111. Constituents did ultimately 
succeed in ensuring that the 1996 Act, despite removing 'fault' as a basis for the 
divorce itself, actually incorporated a provision ensuring that conduct be considered 
when dealing with the ancillary matters of finance and children. Matrimonial 
conduct in the form of fault was thus transformed from a primarily symbolic role, 
into an active function within the new procedure. Indeed as one constituent 
remarked: 'That was quite a concession we got out of the government. We were 
quite pleased with that' [ 11 ]. 
This raises several issues for consideration. Firstly, this kind of view reflects the 
perception held by Idealists, that marital failure can be constructed in terms of 
conduct 
- 
essentially in terms of guilt and innocence. Secondly, it also reflects their 
belief that the role of divorce law includes defining the nature of the marital 
obligation. Whilst the Idealists ultimately had to concede the issue with regards to 
the ground for divorce itself, this provision allows for the law to retain a role in 
injecting the moral content into marriage. Indeed that role will arguably have much 
more of a practical impact as the 'guilty' party is punished in very real, rather than 
merely symbolic terms. Thirdly, it provides some indication as to how this 
constituency views children. The introduction of conduct as a factor in deciding 
arrangements for children arguably implies that children effectively constitute 
property to be 'won' by the more worthy spouse. When asked whether such an 
approach was in the best interests of children, one constituent did confess that he 
would have to give the matter further thought. He did, however, continue: 'I think 
every case is different, and it's got to be judged on its merits 
... 
And the only way to 
judge on the merits, is to hear what people have to say' [111. Arguably implicit 
within this comment is the idea that those 'meritsý are constructed, at least to some 
extent, in terms of guilt and innocence. 
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Information 
The Idealists are generally quite sceptical as to the merits of incorporating some 
form of information into the divorce process. One participant talks in very general 
terms about the 'need to educate people', linking it to a need for 'a national debate 
about the kind of society that we want to see' [121. The efficacy of an information 
element remains, however, subject to question: 
'the law can't make people responsible, but it can help to make them 
responsible, by stopping them from being irresponsible. ' [121 
Her fellow constituent also considers the issue of whether information can be used 
to stimulate more responsible behaviour. In this instance, the concept of 
responsibility is placed specifically in the context of the situation regarding the 
children of divorced parents, and the arguments that were advanced by the 
'proponents' of incorporating information into the Family Law Bill: 
'They say that oh it's all about, that it's not divorce itself that's 
wrong 
... 
what's wrong is that people are not educated to stay together 
with their children. ' [111 
This concept of parental education is, however, dismissed. In the opinion of this 
participant, 'however much people go to these information sessions' saying that 
they are going to be responsible, 'when it comes to it 
... 
it often doesn't work'. 
Therefore the end result is that children still lose contact with the non-resident 
parent post-divorce, with what are described as 'devastating' effects. For this 
participant the solution to the problem of divorce is not therefore located in 
educating parents about how to manage post-divorce life. 
Reflecting their construction of the divorce problem, 'responsibility' for these 
constituents does appear to be ideally constructed in terms of remaining married. 
However, the ability of information sessions to actually save marriages is also 
subject to questioning: 
'I suppose the proponents of the Bill would say their Bill is more likely 
to save marriages because 
... 
people will 
... 
have to go along to these 
information sessions, but the trouble with these information sessions is 
they were sort of undertaking, rather undertakers of marriages, not saviours 
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of marriages, there was no mechanism to make people go along to have 
sessions with the old Marriage Guidance Council, or Relate or whatever, 
and say, look do you really want to get divorced? Have you really thought 
this through? This is how we could help you, there's all sorts of experience 
we have, experienced people who can tell you how to get over your problems. 
I mean there was never any suggestion of that. ' [ 111 
For this constituent, a central task of the divorce process is clearly constructed in 
terms of saving marriages. In addition, the faith that is placed in professional 
6expertise' also appears to reflect something of a lack of trust in the judgement of 
the individual parties to a marriage. Certainly present within this comment, is a 
sense of reluctance to allow the parties to really take, and indeed to exercise, 
personal responsibility about the state of their marital relationship. Arguably what 
is thus being envisaged here is a variation on Donzelot's (1977) tutelary relationship 
between the expert and the (private) individual. 
Mediation 
As with information, little enthusiasm is also displayed within this constituency for 
the concept of mediation. For example, one constituent remarks: 
'I'm not against mediation, I mean I think that's a very good thing, and 
if it can help, and if it can bring people together 
... 
And what I was told 
constantly by people, was that by the time you've actually got to the point 
of going to do a divorce, you're not prepared to listen to anybody at all. 
Now whether that's true or not, I don't know. ' [ 121 
This lack of enthusiasm does, once again, appear to be largely attributable to its 
perceived inability to save marriages. Certainly the Idealists do tend to construct 
mediation primarily in terms of reconciliation - an interpretation that is at odds with 
both the mediators, and indeed the majority of the policy community. However, the 
implicit criticism of mediation that is articulated here does also raise some 
interesting questions about the emphasis placed by the Idealists on the role of 
divorce law in supporting and saving marriage more generally. If it is accepted that 
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relationships have deteriorated to such an extent by the time parties file for divorce, 
then law's ability to save those marriages is fundamentally questionable. In 
addition, the result of attempts to discourage divorce via the more 'difficult' process 
advocated by constituents, is arguably a process primarily engaged in holding 
people back from divorce rather than positively saving marriages. Although, it may 
of course be further observed that such a result is perhaps not overly problematic for 
a constituency that, as previously discussed, prioritises the institution of marriage 
over the quality of the marital relationship. 
Children 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the language of children and their 'best interests' 
features prominently in the social problems 'work' of this Idealist constituency. It 
is, however, notable that in contrast relatively little is said about the actual 
'relationship' between children and the divorce process itself. This raises the issue 
that was briefly mentioned regarding the impact of conduct on arrangements for 
children 
- 
namely whether the underlying perception is actually of children as 
parental property or 'chattels'. 
Constituents certainly display some 'difficulty' with the concept of children's 
rights. For example, one constituent says of such rights: 
'Well I mean any sensible person knows that children have rights. I 
mean you know, children have a right to be loved, looked after, cared 
for, not beaten up, not abused, I mean everybody's known that for the 
last two thousand years. ' [ 111 
Echoing Idealist constructions of the divorce 'problem', it is the child as passive 
object of welfare that appears to be present once again within this concept of 
rights'. Indeed this kind of construction is reinforced further by the second 
constituent's comment: 'I'm not very keen on children's rights, because I believe in 
parents' responsibilities' [121. 
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In a similar vein, the first constituent also talks about the success of securing an 
extended 'waiting period' 
- 
increased from twelve to eighteen months 
- 
where 
children are involved. The justification given for this, is that 'divorce is more 
important' where there are children. This greater importance is, in turn, attributable 
to the 'great implications' that divorce is believed to have for children. One 
consequence is therefore that, 'people should 
... 
think about it even more carefully' 
[11]. Furthermore, when asked about whether children have any right to be 
informed about, or to participate in the divorce process, this constituent gave the 
following response: 
'How can you? I suppose, I don't know, I mean maybe if they're over 
sixteen or something maybe, I suppose, it's not an argument which we 
ever covered really. ' [ 111 
In view of the Parliamentary and Committee debates that were held on these very 
issues, this latter comment is an interesting one. It may, however, simply be 
reflective of the fact that constituents did not consider such children-related issues 
to be of particular importance. 
Discussion 
The Idealist constituents were extremely vocal when discussing both the 'problem' 
of divorce, and the 'role' that law should play when marriages break down. 
However, whilst constituents are both happy and comfortable talking in 'symbolic' 
terms, they do appear to display less of a willingness (particularly on the part of 
participant 12) to similarly engage at the more basic instrumental level. A key 
factor in framing this perspective is arguably the 'position' that they occupy within 
the policy community. Membership of the political 'elite' creates a distance 
between the Idealists, and the everyday reality and experience of divorce. 
Constituents are thus effectively allowed the luxury of conducting the debate 
primarily in terms of conviction and principle, rather than in terms of procedural 
detail and practicalities. 
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The argument in favour of investigating marriage breakdown reflects constituents' 
perceptions that the state of the marital relationship does constitute legitimate 
terrain for public scrutiny. However, what is interesting is the juxtaposition 
between the attitude to public involvement in the marital relationship, and that 
displayed towards state intervention in the parent-child relationship. For example, 
one constituent makes the following observation regarding the suggestion of 
providing a 'Children's Officer' as an independent source of information for 
children to access: 
'Well in theory that's alright, but it could be devastating 
... 
I mean the 
thought you're going to have some sort of social security officer, 
sort of summoning the children into some office... [asking] what their 
parents are doing and not doing, that's really perhaps taking the 
involvement of the state a step too far maybe. ' [111 
Whilst the involvement of experts is advocated with regards to the marital 
relationship, the situation is somewhat different when it comes to the relationship 
between parent and child. Constituents do appear to be prepared to trust the parties 
in their capacity as parents and in the exercise of parental responsibilities, however 
the same does not appear to be the case for parties in their capacity as spouses. 
Whereas the parent-child relationship is defined in more private terms, constituents' 
(ideological) commitment to marriage appears to justify a much more pro-active 
and interventionist policy response when it comes to matters of the spousal 
relationship. 
The Pragmatic Progressives 
Information 
In principle, the Pragmatic Progressives do accept that providing information to 
parties does constitute a legitimate part of the divorce process. However, 
constituents are less comfortable with the idea of a meeting as the mechanism for 
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delivering that information. For example, one constituent talks of envisaging, 'a set 
of simple leaflets' M. She then continues: 
'There would be a leaflet with information about what you had to do, 
what had to be sorted out 
- 
in other words home and money, about 
children, and about the help and support that was available. ' 
What seems implicit within this comment is that information is regarded, at least by 
this particular constituent, as being about just that 
- 
namely information in order to 
inform and educate. Certainly this type of thinking does seem to be further 
indicated by the constituent's comments about what she saw as the much more 
directive ideas about information emerging from government: 
'If there is a hidden agenda, this is because of the link with mediation. 
There was a very strong push to stop people using lawyers. The whole 
idea of gatekeepers as a way of pushing people towards mediation. 
The information meeting may have been a filter like that. ' [11 
The other two participants comprising this pragmatic constituency are both 
extremely vocal in their opposition to the whole concept of information meetings. 
For example, one constituent says of the original Green Paper proposals: 
'the idea of this kind of CSA equivalent 'information gateway', 
whereby 
... 
some undefined and un-specifically trained clerk was going 
to actually have the whole power over whether you got legal aid or 
whether it was stopped, and direct you to where you were going, 
was just so horrible it was untrue. ' [61 
It should, however, be recognised that one of the factors in this opposition, does 
appear to be the self-interest (in the sense of self-preservation) of the legal 
profession, from which both of these constituents are drawn. Indeed as the second 
constituent explicitly states: 
'we feared that the divorce information proposals, you know that whoever 
provided divorce information was going to be a gatekeeper to the divorce 
process and 
... 
we were afraid that solicitors wouldn't be able to undertake 
that role 
... 
so we thought that solicitors might get cut out there. ' [ 151 
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Reflecting the over-arching practical, practitioner-based perspective of this group, 
constituents construct the 'problem' of information meetings in very practical 
terms. For example, lack of confidentiality is articulated as a major objection to the 
group meeting concept originally advanced in the government Green Paper. As one 
constituent remarks: 
'the original thing was a group meeting where 
... 
you had an information 
meeting day, and I remember 
... 
you know 
... 
sort of trying, to 
... 
give 
extreme examples of Princess Diana sitting next to her dustman, both 
talking about their own divorce 
... 
at the information day at the Principal 
Registry in London, it's just a nightmare. ' [61 
For a second constituent, the group meeting 'issue' is articulated primarily in terms 
of intrusion: 
'it's actually quite intrusive to have to go to it, and it was very difficult 
you know, to see how some people were going to get to these meetings 
... 
in 
terms of you know, how is a mum who lives out in the sticks with two 
toddlers going to get herself to an information meeting? I mean equally a 
victim of domestic violence, she's going to put herself at great risk by 
going to an information meeting 'cos people will know where they are, 
and particularly in rural communities people will see you going into that 
building and think 'ooh look at her, I know what she's up to. ' And before 
you know it, everybody in the community will know what's going on. ' [151 
It is noted that in a large city such as London a 'certain amount' of anonymity might 
be possible. However, the observation is then made: 'but in any smaller community 
you haven't got a hope'. The implication is thus that the 'top-down' perspective of 
policy-makers based in Whitehall, gives insufficient consideration as to how 
policies will actually impact real people on the ground. 
The cost implications of information meetings also constitute a cause for concern. 
As one constituent notes: 'Hundred and fifty thousand divorces, three hundred 
thousand people, possibly 
... 
linked to the process which is much too late for a lot of 
people, much too late' [6]. A second constituent also questions whether the money 
involved in setting up an information process is actually being used in the most 
effective way: 
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6there was always a threat hanging around that... if the budget was used 
up on divorce information meetings, then there wouldn't be any money 
left for actually providing people with the services you'd just told them 
about 
... 
mediation or solicitor's services. ' [151 
Constituents also express significant unhappiness with the idea that attendance at an 
information meeting should be compulsory. Indeed one participant in particular, 
talks in terms of compulsory attendance as almost an anathema to British culture: 
'You can make people go to information meetings, in Australia it works, 
but I think we've got a different culture here, we're not quite, we're not in 
Australia yet, we're not in America 
... 
It never ceases to amaze me who 
goes on Ricky Lake or whatever and talks about their personal problems, 
but we're still a fairly sort of anally retentive society here in terms of talking 
about personal stuff, and the idea of going into a room with lots of other 
people in a group meeting and talking about your divorce you know, I don't 
think is particularly attractive to most people. ' [61 
The law is thus not perceived with any real confidence as constituting an effective 
tool, at least when operating in isolation, with which the societal culture can be 
changed. 
This sense of 'discomfort' with a process that involves compulsion also reflects a 
very particular construction, on the part of constituents, of those parties who choose 
to enter the Ivorce process. As one participant argues: 
'We were dreadfully concerned about what the Government was proposing 
because it was so prescriptive. You know there are lots and lots of people 
who don't need divorce information, you know, they know what happens 
in the divorce process already, whether it's because they've been through it 
already or because they're family law solicitors or for whatever reason 
... 
and 
we were concerned that people should get divorce information at a time and 
in a way which suited them 
... 
You know some people are perfectly capable 
of sitting down with a load of leaflets and reading them. Other people might 
want to see a video, you know, some people might want it to be sent to them 
by the court, some people might want their solicitors to give it to thern. ' [151 
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This observation raises several issues. Firstly the choice to divorce is not perceived 
as ill-considered, nor are the parties believed to be irresponsible or necessarily 
poorly informed. Indeed one constituent expressed particular concern about the fact 
that the Government appeared to think that people did not take their marriages 
6 seriously', a fact that she found 'very offensive'. She then goes on to expand on 
this position in the following terms: 
'I think all solicitors would tell you that most of their clients that turn 
up at their door thought long and hard for many, many years, and there has 
been research into it, not looking at solicitors' clients, but looking at the 
divorcing public, some years ago you know, which just backs that up, to say 
that people don't wake up one morning and think 'yeah divorce today! ' You 
know, they've suffered through years of unhappiness before they actually dare 
to even step into a solicitor's office, so 
... 
it's not something which 
... 
people 
just wake up one morning and think yes that would be a good idea for today. ' 
[151 
This view is similarly echoed by another constituent, who observes that by the time 
people approach solicitors, 'quite frequently they've spent two years agonising over 
it'. To be given information about counselling, at a stage where many have already 
actually utilised that option, is thus regarded as both unnecessary and 'patronising' 
[6]. 
A second aspect of the compulsion 'problem' is located in the idea that 'one-size- 
fits-all'. As one constituent observes: 'Everybody's at a different time scale, and to 
have one system which tries to accurately reflect all those different time scales is... 
impossible' [6]. In stark contrast to the more collective constructions offered by the 
Idealists, the discourses articulated by this group are underpinned by a construction 
of parties primarily as individuals. The task of then tailoring information to those 
individuals and to their needs is regarded as a difficult one: 
4 some people need different information at different stages. To be blunt 
some people are more intelligent than others, are better able to assimilate 
the information that's been given to them. Some people might 
need 
... 
information about their children 
... 
some people might not have 
children so they don't need any information on that. ' [15] 
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This perception that information does not necessarily constitute the appropriate 
policy response, is reinforced by a second constituent. Here the argument is that 
what people actually want is information 'tailored' to their particular circumstances. 
Such information is, however, 'effectively advice': 
'information meetings are not about advice, they're about giving neutral 
prescribed information, and everybody says, I've had lots of people 
coming in to me and saying 'I don't want advice, I just want to know 
where I stand. ' So you start off the appointment and within about ten 
minutes the first question that comes out is 'what does that mean for meT 
And as soon as you try to answer that question, then you're into advice. ' 
[61 
The position adopted by this pragmatic constituency is thus in favour of information 
in the 'pure' sense 
- 
namely information to inform, for it's own sake, and with no 
connection to any other kind of agenda. Within that, the preference of all 
constituents is for paper information rather than some form of meeting. As one 
constituent sums up the position: 
'There should be nationally prescribed locally targeted information 
available, but through different gateways. So if somebody chooses to go 
in to a solicitor first of all, there should be an obligation on the solicitor to 
provide the prescribed information, probably by means of a pack. If you 
go into the CAB it should be available, if you go into your doctor's 
surgery you should have an information pack. ' [61 
Mediation 
A number of the issues that surround information are similarly evident in the 
discourses relating to mediation. The concept of mediation receives support, 
although once again there is a perception that it is being somewhat subordinated to a 
different government agenda. As one constituent argues: 'the Government sees 
mediation as a cheap alternative and a way of keeping lawyers out of the process'. 
He does, however, then go on to remark that there is no reason not to put money 
into mediation, 'because it can be very valuable' [6]. 
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As with information, the vested interests of the legal profession appear to be a key 
element in the position adopted by this constituency. Indeed one constituent who 
was particularly vocal on this issue describes the tendency amongst 'formal' policy- 
makers to view mediation as, 'a universal panacea': 
'All you have to do is have mediation, and everybody's going to go off 
hand in hand, despite the fact that they've been beating each other senseless 
for the last three years, they're going to go off hand in hand to the mediator 
and sort things out, it's only the nasty lawyers that get in the way and turn 
them against each other. Well everybody knew that this was just 
rubbish. ' [61 
The argument advanced was thus for the provision of mediation 'in partnership' 
with legal advice. Mediation is promoted as working best when supported by 
independent advice: 'People should have access to legal advice before, during and 
after mediation as well as when mediation is inappropriate or breaks down' [6]. 
There are several points to be made with regards to this argument. Once again, as 
I 
with information, the individuality of parties is recognised. Indeed one constituent 
argues quite strongly that mediation is not a 'majority activity' [6]. Instead it is 
suggested that mediation can be good, 'when people are being honest with each 
other 
... 
they're both roughly at the same time-scale 
... 
in terms of where they are in 
relation to their acceptance of the breakdown'. However, it is suggested that 'even 
with everything going right', mediation will probably not be relevant to more that 
about 'a quarter' of the divorcing population. 
Constituents were generally of the opinion that for mediation to become more 
6 popular', then a very real culture change would be required. As one remarks: 
'There's still this feeling that it's sort of leather patches and sandals 
... 
you 
know it's popular in Cambridge, it's popular in Islington with the Guardian 
reading middle-class white people, it's almost completely useless in ethnic 
minority situations. ' [61 
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This perception is reinforced by a second constituent, who really questions the 
rational 'people like us' model that she believes is underpinning the emphasis on 
mediation: 
'The Government seemed to think that 
... 
everybody that was getting a 
divorce was just as 
... 
you know, intelligent, and well informed. and 
wealthy as they were. They didn't seem to have the capacity to 
understand what it was like 
... 
to be 
... 
a mother with two small children, 
on benefits, in a council house 
... 
with maybe a smattering of GCSEs and 
nothing else. ' [151 
A further issue that feeds into the constituency's approach to mediation is the 
focussed construction of divorce as a 'legal' process. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
given the position that constituents occupy within the policy community. It does, 
however, provide a very real contrast with the more 'holistic' constructions offered 
by some participants within other constituencies. For example, one of the 
constituents articulates her concern about how mediated settlements are reached: 
'And again that's no criticism of mediation, but it was a fact that the 
Government didn't seem to think that there was a role for solicitors in 
giving advice and assistance to their clients while the mediation process 
was going on 
... 
And I mean, you know, divorce is a legal process, it has 
pretty 
... 
draconian legal consequences on 
... 
your status, and your financial 
affairs, your children 
... 
you need to know about the legal background and 
get some advice before you get into mediation, otherwise you know, you're 
potentially going to sell yourself down the river. ' [ 15] 
The law, in the form of solicitors and legal advice (and indeed the courts), is thus 
presented as offering a security and protection not necessarily present in mediation. 
Constituents regard it as vitally important that mediated settlements are subject to 
legal scrutiny and approval. This ensures that 'something fundamental' [61 is not 
missed, and that agreements are not 'unfair' or 'unworkable' [151. As one 
constituent says of the court's role in the checking of consent orders: 
'it's an argument which you can have about you know, what is the state's 
role in society? And how does the state fulfil that role? And we thought 
that, you know, the state had a responsibility to make sure that people, to 
188 
put it bluntly, weren't being ripped off when they got. divorced, and that 
the way you do that is by delegating that job to the courts so the courts 
can check. ' [ 151 
Receiving the legal stamp of approval is also viewed as having the additional 
benefit of facilitating the ability to move on with one's life. In the words of one 
constituent: 'psychologically it gives people a feeling of finality, because 
... 
the 
court has said 'Yes this is okay" [15]. 
When it comes to mediation in principle, as with the provision of information, 
constituents are generally in favour. A typical example of the group's stance is 
provided by the following statement: 
'We have always supported mediation 
... 
We think that 
... 
it's right that 
people should have a range of methods for resolving their disputes, 
and 
... 
you know if mediation works in any particular dispute, well that's 
fantastic. ' [151 
Mediation is regarded as having a legitimate role within the divorce process. 
However, in common with the view of information, it is valued on the basis of its 
own merits rather than for its ability to further other agendas. Mediation is thus 
constructed as an option for people to access where they feel that this is appropriate. 
It is most definitely not regarded as a substitute for legal practitioners and the law. 
Process over time 
Constituents' practical and legalistic perspective is also evident in the approach 
adopted towards the concept of divorce over a period of time. For example, no 
justification is seen for extending the waiting period either where children are 
involved, or in the event that one party raises an objection to the divorce. As one 
constituent observes: 'it's meant to be no-fault divorce, but one party doesn't want 
it, you give them an extra six months' [151. In a similar vein, a second constituent 
argues that to start imposing different time periods in different instances is, 'like 
snakes and ladders' [6]. 
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Although opposed to the concept of extending the process both legal representatives 
do, however, argue for a power of abridgement in exceptional circumstances: 
'we didn't 
... 
want a coach and horses to be driven through the one year 
period because if you do that then 
... 
you've got a law which says one 
thing but appears to operate in a completely different way, which is one 
of the criticisms people have got of the present law 
... 
but we did think-if 
there's terminal illness or some other, you know, dreadful event that's 
about to occur, that you should have the power to abridge the one year 
period. ' [151 
The question of resolving the ancillary matters of children and property is similarly 
approached in practical terms. One constituent does suggest that: 'You can use the 
delay of a remedy to prompt someone to fulfil their responsibilities' [1]. In 
contrast, however, the remaining two constituents discuss the issue in language that 
is free from ideological overtones. For example, one comments on the 'logic' of 
not allowing people to remarry until finances are resolved, but then goes on to 
express concern about the inherent, 'blackmailing potential'. This anxiety is 
similarly shared by the second constituent: 
'What we were concerned about was that, you know, the statistics 
demonstrate that it is usually women who want the divorce, and they 
are usually poorer than the man, and if you have 
... 
a provision like 
that, then the man can say well okay you can have your divorce, but 
only if you agree to my completely unreasonable proposals on what 
we should do about our finances. So, you know we thought it was a 
real weapon for a bully 
...... 
we feared that people were going to end 
up having 
... 
settlements which were unfair to them and 
unreasonable 
... 
as a result of it. ' [ 151 
Children 
Although the pragmatic constituents do have quite a lot to say about children the 
underlying suggestion does, nevertheless, appear to be that it this is not an entirely 
appropriate debate to be conducted within the context of divorce law reform. For 
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example, one constituent refers back to the fact that there was 'nothing' about 
children in the Bill as originally published: 
'They hardly got a mention to be honest. And 
... 
you know, in a way 
... 
there 
was no need for them to have a mention, because they were already dealt 
with by the Children Act. You know there is an act called the Children Act, 
it deals with children. This is a Family Law Bill, which deals with divorce. 
But of course you know, nobody in Parliament could stomach that, there had 
to be some mention of children in the Bill for them to be happy 
... 
because, 
you know, it's the children who come off worst when there's a divorce. ' [151 
The question as to what the law can (and indeed should) do with regards to parents 
and children, is something of a vexed one. As one constituent observes: 'You can't 
use divorce law to tell people how they should look 
-after children' [P 11. The 
general principle, namely that it is in the best interests of children to maintain 
contact with both parents, is the subject of general approval within the group. For 
example, one constituent states: 'You can't really complain about the general 
principle 
... 
that generally speaking children are best served by having continuing 
contact with both parents' [151. Another constituent echoes this perspective: 'We 
know that if there is an established relationship, it is more likely to benefit the child' 
[1]. It is, however, interesting to note that the third constituent justifies this 
provision in terms of recent global developments in the law: 'I mean it's reflected in 
the Human Rights Act '99, the right to family life, it's 
... 
nobody's going to disagree 
with that' [6]. 
This general acceptance of an effective continuation of the traditional two-parent 
model is, once again, partially underpinned by pragmatism. For example, one 
constituent refers to the sheer scale of divorce in modern society: 'the numbers are 
so large, and they are extremely large, that we need rules of thumb' [1]. There is 
thus a very clear recognition within this group that the law has to operate, and 
indeed has to get the job done effectively, in the real world. Indeed, another 
constituent makes this point in a slightly different way: 
'You can get very bogged down when you start looking at things line by 
line, into everything. Sometimes you need to stand back from that, and say 
is that a sensible statement? Yes generally it is, or let's just treat it at that 
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level 
... 
and stating a general objective or principle isn't going to stop the 
court doing what it wants to do in every individual case. ' [61 
In the same way that the limitations of the law shape constituents' constructions of 
the role of law at a general level, this awareness also frames perceptions as to what 
the law can do at the more basic level. For example, the language articulated by 
some of the other constituencies, tends to present the whole issue of parent-child 
contact in terms of 'responsibility'. This type of presentation does, however, appear 
to be questioned by this more pragmatic section of the policy community. For 
example one constituent describes what, in her opinion, constitutes real parental 
responsibility: 'The primary responsibility is to feed, clothe, house, wash and 
socialise and supervise them. It's a twenty-four hour responsibility that can't be 
ducked' [1]. Such a conception of 'responsibility' is not, however, what actually 
underpins the legislation. Indeed as this constituent continues: 
'What men want is a relationship with their child, to see him, to dangle him 
at their knee, but not responsibility. Parental responsibility, the basic 
responsibilities, is not really what most want in my experience. It's potty 
to say they do, because they don't. ' 
This particular constituent also raises the possibility of incorporating 'parenting 
plans' into the divorce process, describing them as good, 'tools for negotiation 
between parents' [1]. However she then goes on to make the point: 'But what 
children are going to be living on should be stressed more than who will pay for 
visits. We are so far away from thinking that'. This provides something of a 
juxtaposition with the perspective articulated by the Idealists 
- 
here the focus is on 
the day-to-day practical 'responsibilities' regarding children, rather than some 
ideologically framed vision of both parents fully involved in the post-divorce 
parenting 'task'. 
As with their more idealist-oriented counterparts, some 'difficulty' is similarly 
evident when constituents discuss both how children fit into the divorce process, 
and the possibility of incorporating some kind of rights-based model into that 
process. An example of this is provided by one constituent, who observes: 
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'There is a view that children ought to have a voice. I'm sympathetic to 
that view, but the question is how to do it without raising their expectations 
or saying to them that you will get what you want. In a great majority of 
cases there is no realistic alternative to what emerges. ' [1] 
This observation raises several issues. Firstly, there is once again a fundamental 
recognition of the limits that restrict what law can do when dealing in families. In 
this particular instance, the family does not appear to be constructed as 'private' in 
ideological terms. However, it is arguable that greater autonomy, and thus 'private' 
decision-making at least on the part of adults, is perceived as inevitable. As this 
constituent goes on to remark: 'The reality is that people make their own 
arrangements, and then go through the legal hoops required' [1]. 
Secondly, the discourses articulated by this group are also underpinned by the 
implication that if given a voice, the reality is that children will then use it to make 
unrealistic demands. Indeed when asked for their views about children's 
participation in the divorce process, constituents tended to frame their responses in 
terms of giving children the ability to 'veto' the divorce itself. For example, one 
constituent remarked: 'Generally it's not thought that divorce should be denied in 
the interests of children, that's not realistic' [1]. In a similar vein, another 
constituent replies: 'You can't have your children telling you whether you can get 
divorced' [6]. Constituents' perspectives thus appear to be informed by an 
underlying developmental model of childhood 
- 
that developmental model being 
characterised by emotion and irrationality. 
One constituent also makes the connection between the position of the child in the 
divorce process, and the position of children in society. Discussing whether 
children should have more of a say in the arrangements made for them, it is argued: 
'Not more than they've got under the Children Act. It's an adult world. 
I mean you can't 
... 
where do you stop and draw the line? A five year old 
say, you can't ask a five year old where he wants to go, he wants to be 
told, he doesn't want to make a decision. What you do, is you 
independently look at them, you take 
... 
the Children Act checklist is 
fine, you take their wishes and feelings into account in accordance with 
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their age and understanding. The older they are, you know 
... 
fine. But 
you can't 
...... 
start wheeling children into court. ' [61 
The position of children within wider society is thus used as part of the justification 
for their position within the divorce process. This provides an interesting 
comparison with the Child Advocates, for whom children's position in society is 
actually part of the 'problem'. 
In addition, this argument also appears to reflect a very particular view of family 
life. Indeed when discussing whether the divorce process should allow for the 
provision of information directly to children, this constituent asserts: 
'In the same way that you've got parents who object to sex education, 
I mean you've 
... 
you've got to work in 
... 
a society run by adults who 
have the right to, to privacy, and to run their family life for their children 
as they wish, without 
... 
breaching children's rights. ' [61 
This assertion carries connotations of both parental autonomy, and indeed of 
parental 'rights' over children. It should, however, be noted that there is some 
divergence between this participant and the views of his two fellow constituents, 
both of whom were in favour of providing information direct to children. For 
example, one constituent was 'quite keen' on the idea of having a contact at the 
Family Court Welfare Service, who could be used as a 'support and advice point' 
for children when requested [1]. In a similar vein, the second participant also 
supported the provision of 'freely available' information, tailored to children's ages: 
'Children 
... 
appear to want information, and I don't think anybody could 
responsibly say that they shouldn't have it' [151. 
The end result is that, for this constituency, the role of the divorce process with 
regards to children is constructed in relatively limited terms. Children thus remain 
predominantly within the province of their parents. One constituent does make the 
suggestion that: 'Theoretically it might be a good idea if the divorce process was 
used to enable some external professional check on children's wishes' [1]. Indeed 
she argues that this 'would be a better use of resources than the information 
meeting', but does recognise that it would probably not be practical: 'we can't get 
the welfare reports that we need now for disputed cases. They're often delayed, or 
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incomplete. ' In contrast, however, a fellow constituent describes such a check as, 
'a bit 1984ish' [6]. One possible, and arguably limited solution to the issue is 
therefore seen to lie in changing the paperwork involved: 'We could have better 
forms. We could have joint forms 
... 
We could have forms that ask whether you 
have discussed the situation with your child, what children think etcetera' [1]. 
The courts are similarly accorded a limited role regarding the scrutiny of post- 
divorce arrangements for children. As one constituent argues: 'The judicial role is 
to try and pick up cases that need judicial intervention' [I]. Another suggests that 
the system is 'about risks'. He then continues: 
'Divorce obviously has to check that there isn't a problem, as part of that 
process, I'm quite happy with the section 41 equivalent here 
... 
you know 
the checking 
... 
of 
... 
the arrangements. But 
... 
I don't think it should be any 
more prescriptive than that, I think that would be 
... 
a nightmare. ' [61 
Discussion 
Like their Idealist counterparts, the Pragmatic Progressives have very clear ideas 
about the problems that exist with regards to the current divorce law, and the 
functions that the process 'should' be fulfilling. However, in stark contrast to the 
Idealist constituency, their experience of working with the everyday reality of 
divorce and divorce law means that the debate is conducted at a much more 
practical or 'basic' level 
- 
essentially in terms of process rather than principle. 
The legal practitioner perspective of the three constituents also means that the 
different aspects of the divorce process are evaluated primarily in terms of how they 
are perceived to operate on the ground. What is important for this group is not how 
the process measures up against some kind of ideal standard, but whether it is able 
to provide 'workable solutions' [1]. 
It has been suggested that the favouring of non-compulsory information and 
mediation as options that divorcing parties can either choose or not, reflects a sense 
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of self-preservation on the part of the legal constituency that participants represent. 
However, in addition to that, it is also arguably reflective of a broader view that the 
divorce process should be providing what people think that they need 
- 
in essence 
that it should be providing some kind of service. 
This stance is underpinned by the construction of marriage primarily as a private 
relationship. In contrast to the Idealist view, the personal life of parties in their 
spousal capacity is much more strongly 'bounded', with the state of personal 
relationships becoming a matter primarily for the individuals involved. The end 
result is thus the construction of a divorce process that is situated much more 
alongside the people with which it deals. Faith is placed in individual choice and 
personal responsibility, with parties trusted to make their own decisions about the 
state of their personal relationships. 
The Middle Ground 
As outlined in the introduction, when discussing the mechanics of the divorce 
process, the Middle Ground is divided primarily along 'positional' lines. Situated 
on one side are the 'Formal' policy-makers. Within the study sample this group 
comprised three individuals, whose position within the state policy-making 
apparatus appears to be reflected in an adherence to what might be termed the 
4 official line'. On the other side are the 'Interest Groups' 
- 
representatives from 
organisations dealing 'in' mediation, children, marriage 'support' and religion 
- 
whose engagement with the policy process was principally in a consultative or 
lobbying role. 
Both constituencies can, however, be distinguished from their more Idealist and 
Pragmatic counterparts. In contrast to the Idealists, the recognition that divorce is a 
life event, combined with the desire to make the situation 'better', engenders a 
willingness to really engage with the divorce process and the issue of reform. 
Whilst this willingness to engage with reform is a characteristic shared with the 
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Pragmatic Progressives, these constituents can be distinguished from this second 
constituency by their broader perspective on the divorce process. For example, the 
perception that divorce law is not purely about ending marriages is an important 
factor feeding into their constructions of that process. 
'Formal' policy-makers 
Information 
This sub 
-constituency is characterised both by the belief that the provision of 
information should be formally incorporated into the divorce process, and Lh ' at such 
provision should take the form of a meeting. However, when it comes issue of what 
function that information actually serves, then the picture presented has something 
of a 'dual' nature. One 'picture' offered by constituents does possess some 
similarities with the idea of information advanced by their more pragmatic 
counterparts 
- 
namely information to inform and educate. This image of 
information as an essentially neutral resource is reflected in the comments of one 
constituent who draws an analogy with what is currently available through solicitors 
and the Citizens Advice Bureau, but without the 'legal emphasis': 
'there would be the possibility for those who needed help, they would be 
caught at the right moment, and not told what to do there and then but 
given a map 
... 
this is the sort of thing you might want to think about, this is 
the sort of person you might want to go and talk to, these are the leaflets, this 
is an address list. ' [21 
A similar position is articulated by a second constituent, who talks in terms of the 
new legislation providing, 'self-help for people' [8]. This constituent also makes 
specific reference to the information pilots, criticising the fact that the decision not 
to implement Part 11 of the 1996 Act was framed in terms of the failure of those 
pilots to direct people into mediation. Of the Lord Chancellor's decision, this 
constituent says: 'He seemed to think that, at least I read into that statement, that the 
information meetings had been 
... 
to send people to mediation. ' He argues that this 
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was not the original intention, the objective actually being to enable parties, 'to 
make the choice in the light of the information they got, about what was best for 
them'. 
This presentation of the process as providing a neutral framework for decision- 
making does, however, contrast with a second, more directive picture of 
information. Interestingly, one example this more directive agenda is actually 
provided by the same constituent, who also talks of wanting the information 
meeting: 
'to provide all the information necessary, to enable a person to come to 
a good judgement of whether their marriage was saveable, including 
the consequences of going ahead with divorce, and then if they thought 
the marriage was saveable, information about what to do, who to go to 
and what help was available, and 
... 
if not, what the procedures were for 
dissolution, and what the best way of doing that was. ' [81 
The implication would thus arguably appear to be, that the primary objective of 
information is actually marriage saving. Indeed, as the constituent continues, this 
objective becomes more explicit: 'I thought that the information meeting, and 
... 
the 
things that could flow from that, were a very important part of keeping saveable 
marriages in place' [8]. What is, however interesting, is the way in which that 
information is actually seen to achieve this: 
'I felt sure that information was quite an important part of the thing, 
and when people realise what their responsibilities may be after divorce, 
they may see 
... 
their position as not so wonderful 
... 
as it looks when 
they're doing it. So I was anxious to discourage unnecessary divorce, 
or to save saveable marriages. ' [81 
Information thus appears to be constructed almost in terms of deterrence, or at least 
in terms of discouraging divorce. 
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Mediation 
For this group, the role of mediation is very clearly constructed as not involving 
marriage saving. As one constituent explicitly states: 'it's not marriage guidance, 
it's not reconciliation' [3]. It is acknowledged that there are 'a whole set of separate 
issues' surrounding the extent to which the relationships of those people who file 
for divorce can be saved through 'therapeutic intervention' in the form of marriage 
guidance counselling. However, this constituent goes on to make the following 
statement: 
'But mediation in a sense kicks in at the point where it has been decided, 
or you know the parties have reached the conclusion that the relationship 
cannot be saved, and therefore it is about making 
... 
arrangements as 
amicably as possible for the future, for a life apart. ' [3] 
As with infon-nation, the mediation option is also constructed in terms of an 
educative tool. An example of this is provided by one constituent, who advances 
the following argument: 'In many cases, the mediation, I would say 
... 
has the 
advantage of ultimately producing the solution for the parties themselves' [8]. A 
similar view is articulated by a fellow constituent, who observes: 'the parties learn 
to negotiate with one another and can then go on doing it for themselves' [3]. Law 
is thus presented as facilitating individual empowerment although it is arguable that, 
in view of its limited appeal, such empowerment is inevitably somewhat selective. 
The support for mediation within this constituency reflects both the adverse impact 
that litigation is perceived to have on those involved in the divorce process, and the 
importance that constituents place upon the quality of 'family' relationships post- 
divorce. For example, one constituent argues: 
'I believed that mediation on the whole was the best way of solving many 
of these problems. Litigation is long, complicated, expensive, and again 
tends to set people against one another. The mediation process, which is 
quite complicated too sometimes, depending on the nature of the assets in 
question and the problems between the two, children and so on 
... 
It's a 
more reconciling process. ' [81 
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A second constituent echoes this view, suggesting that mediation is 'peculiarly 
appropriate' in the family context. This is particularly the case where children are 
involved: 'because the parties are going to have to go on having... significant 
contact with one another, when the litigation's over' [3]. Mediation thus appears to 
represent part of the practical manifestation of constituents' more humanitarian 
perspective 
- 
divorce law reform involves not only engaging with reality, but also 
seeking to 'improve' it. 
Ancillary Matters 
One 'aspect' of this constituency that is somewhat unique within the policy 
community can be located in its belief that the absence of any provision requiring 
the resolution of ancillary financial matters within a given period, is problematic. 
The result is strong support amongst constituents for: 'the need to settle these 
matters between the parties before they go on to the next relationship' [8]. In 
practice, the resolution of ancillaries thus becomes a precondition for obtaining the 
divorce decree. 
What is interesting to note, are the various discourses that surround this provision. 
When constructing the divorce 'problem', the failure to require ancillaries to be 
resolved was presented primarily in terms of 'irresponsibility'. However, as with 
the provision of information, there does appear to be evidence of another agenda at 
work. For example, one constituent appears to place a more directive or 
instrumental interpretation upon the incorporation of such a provision: 
'there are people 
... 
one very eminent silk told me that you know, this is 
sort of the top end of the market, you get the business man in there, and 
when you've told him that he will lose his house, and he will lose two-thirds 
of his assets and his wife and children will take it 
... 
and he's come in with 
the new girlfriend 
... 
and he says 'I've seen them, face going white, they've 
never realised how much they'll lose'. ' [31 
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At another 'level', resolving ancillaries is perceived to reflect the more collective 
views of marriage articulated by this constituency. An example of this thinking is 
provided by one constituent, who questions why one should be allowed to remarry 
and take on a new partner and children before responsibilities towards the first have 
been resolved. She then continues: 
Therefore you do not get a licence to remarry until you have laid the first 
to rest 
... 
and that was, it was interesting because therefore it was taking a 
sort of holistic view of marriage 
... 
It was saying that it's not just a simple 
contract, it's more than that, it's a contract between two people and the 
state 
... 
and if they have children, it's a contract that involves their children 
and their wider family 
... 
And so it was trying to broaden the understanding, 
and that actually was quite a clever way of introducing the whole issue of 
marriage 
... 
This isn't just a broken relationship, this is an institution. ' [21 
For this constituency the resolution of ancillaries is thus believed to serve both a 
practical, and indeed an ideological function. 
Children 
The importance accorded to children, and in particular to their relationship with 
parents in the 'problematisation' of divorce by this constituency, is strongly 
reflected in their subsequent construction of the divorce process. For example, a 
central objective of the reforms is expressed in terms of producing, 'a system that 
would benefit the children' and which would give them, 'the best life' possible [8]. 
Children, together with conceptions of their best interests, once again feature 
prominently in the justifications offered by constituents for various aspects of the 
divorce process. For example, the concept of information meetings, particularly 
during the early stages of the reform process, does appear to have been primarily 
aimed at parents. As one constituent remarks, one aim was to provide parents with, 
6 good information about children, about the effects of separation and divorce on 
children, how some children react, and for parents to be given as much support in 
that way' [2]. This view is echoed by a second constituent who refers to the giving 
of information as emphasising the following issues: 
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'how important it is that you 
... 
don't fight in front of the kids, don't treat 
the kids as pawns, don't get the kids to carry messages between you and 
all that sort of stuff. ' [31 
This second constituent also talks about the influence that the group 'parent 
education meetings' currently operating in North America and Australia, actually 
had on initial thinking: 
'the normal provision is on the lines that within twenty-eight, if you're a 
parent within twenty-eight days of filing for divorce you're required to 
attend a parental information meeting 
... 
and they teach you about mediation, 
they teach you about on-going parenting, they teach you about not using your 
child as a pawn to get at the other partner and all that sort of thing 
... 
And 
they've been very successful. Certainly in the US, the typical outcome is, 
you know people don't want to go to them, they resent being made to go to 
them, but after they've been they think they're jolly good and everybody else 
should be made to go 
... 
So it was very much drawing on other countries' 
experience. ' [31 
Children are also employed as, 'part of the reason for wanting mediation' [8]. One 
constituent observes that lawyers currently stress to parents the necessity of learning 
to, 'co-operate in a way that they never did as spouses' over the upbringing of their 
children. He then continues: 
4 of course the needs of children change so, a contact pattern which is 
appropriate you know when the child is four, is not going to be appropriate 
when the child is nine 
... 
So in a sense 
... 
the advantage of mediation, is that 
if couples learn to negotiate for themselves and you know reach agreements 
themselves, especially about the upbringing of the children that's much 
better, because they're going to have to go on doing this for the next fifteen 
years. ' [31 
A key justification for mediation is therefore located in the perception that it is able 
to facilitate a better continuing relationship between parents, which in turn benefits 
the children. 
The 'best interests' of children are thus constructed primarily in terms of both 
educating parents, and of enhancing the quality of the ongoing parental relationship. 
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Reflecting constructions of children as 'victims' of the adversarial system 
- 
and 
indeed in common with both the Idealists and the Pragmatic Progressives 
- 
is an 
underlying image of children as the passive 'objects' of welfare. That welfare is, in 
turn, constructed as dependent upon parents. The link made between parents and 
the welfare of children is arguably a self-evident one, after all it is a fact that parents 
are the primary deliverers of 'welfare'. However, what is interesting is the 
constituency's perception of parents' ability to actually deliver that welfare. 
One implication is that parents do require assistance 
- 
in the form of information 
and mediation 
- 
in order to do the 'best' for children. However, when discussing 
the role of the court regarding arrangements for children, constituents display a 
much greater faith or 'optimism' in parents. It was accepted that the existing power 
of scrutiny, contained in section 41 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 'didn't work 
very well' [2]. However, constituents question the need for a more pro-active, 
substantive provision. In common with their pragmatic counterparts, the court's 
role is constructed in the limited terms of identifying 'risk factors' requiring judicial 
intervention. As one constituent argues: 
6 all we're doing is ensuring that the divorce procedure, at this very crucial 
moment in time, is adequate to enable the judge to hear warning bells. ' [21 
Another constituent does, however, go somewhat further. In this instance, the 
suggestion is that court intervention can be positively detrimental: 
'other things being equal, it's better that the court doesn't intervene if 
it doesn't need to 
... 
Because if you have a family that's splitting up and 
they've sorted it out for themselves, and everybody's happy with the 
arrangements, that actually having the court in there just makes matters 
worse, that you can create acrimony where none exists. ' [31 
This constituent does recognise that parents will not invariably come to 
arrangements that are in the 'best interests' of the child. However, the belief is 
clearly that the circumstances justifying intervention are limited: 'if there's things 
going seriously wrong, the court may need to intervene to change those, but you 
need evidence to go in' [3]. The appropriate response is thus viewed in terms of 
building 'appropriate triggers for intervention' into the divorce process. 
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Within this constituency there is some appreciation that children do constitute 
separate individuals in their own right, however the predominant view does appear 
to be that the interests of those individuals are generally in sympathy with those of 
their parents. Indeed an example of this 'dual' vision is provided by one 
constituent, who refers to the 'diverse interests' involved when marriages 
breakdown. With regards to children vis a vis parents, he then goes on to observe: 
'it's hard to say they have no distinct interest, on the other hand it's easy to magnify 
the distinction of that interest' [8]. 
This perception of the parent-child relationship, and the predominant underlying 
image of children as requiring protection, also emerges during discussions 
surrounding the 'rights' of children to participate in the divorce process. For 
example, one constituent appears to place those rights firmly in a protectionist 
framework, arguing for the necessity of ensuring that 'too much responsibility' is 
not placed on children: 
'I mean it's fight 
... 
that their views should be listened to and heard, but 
the last thing you want to do is to make the children the arbiters between 
parents and parents' disputes, and there's a terrific risk of doing that. ' [81 
The balance is thus regarded as a difficult one to achieve. Indeed this particular 
constituent suggests that it would be certainly be 'quite difficult' to involve 'young 
children' in their parents' disputes. He also makes the point that 'one of the 
emphases' of the Family Law Act was actually to try, so far as possible, to keep 
children out of the disputes between their parents. However, he then goes on to 
make the following observation: 
'It's difficult to get the right balance. I think it's important that their views 
are taken into account, they're not shunted about 
... 
as if they were pieces of 
property. ' [81 
At a slightly different 'level', a second constituent presents the dilemma in more 
practical terms. Describing it as 'important' and 'necessary' that children's views 
are taken into account when settling arrangements, he then goes on to question the 
practicalities: 'you could do it 
... 
but you know, it's really a sledgehammer to crack a 
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nut. I mean there'll be a vast number of cases where it won't make any practical 
difference' [3]. For this constituent the key factor is thus located in the limits with 
which law is inevitably faced when it comes to the task of dealing with children. 
Discussion 
The position that is articulated by this constituency almost bisects the respective 
stances adopted by the Idealist and Pragmatic members of the policy community. 
Underpinning the group's approach to the divorce process, is a desire to replace the 
current fault-based system of ending marriages with something better. However 
one aspect of making that system better, does appear to involve the incorporation of 
an ideological element into the process 
- 
namely the view of one particularly 
influential individual that divorce, 'ought to be set in the context of saving 
marriages' [8]. 
The issue of what actually constitutes a 'saveable' marriage is an interesting one. 
The 'deterrent' element, which emerges in the discussions surrounding the 
provision of information and the resolution of ancillaries, arguably constructs the 
saveable marriage as one where the parties fail to realise the material consequences 
of divorce. The implication is that an appreciation of the material realities may 
prompt a change in behaviour. This view would arguably appear to be underpinned 
by a rational model of behaviour, with that rationality constructed in the sense of 
what might be termed 'hard-headed' materialism. As one constituent observes: 
'there are some people who actually when brought face to face with what 
the realities of divorce will mean, alright look in terms of losing material 
assets, will think well, do I really want to marry the new girlfriend or will 
I try to go on 
... 
?I mean there'll be some, I mean it'll be as crude as that. 
So in that sense, partly that the system was designed to bring people to face 
the real consequences of divorce, before they happened. ' [31 
This comment is an interesting one for several reasons. Firstly, it does appear to 
echo the underlying position of the Idealists, in the sense that the institution of 
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marriage almost appears to be accorded greater importance than the quality of the 
marital relationship. Secondly, it is somewhat at odds with the position adopted 
with regards to the role of law at a more general level 
- 
namely that divorce law is 
not about difficulty or deterrence. Thirdly, the idea of deterring parties from 
proceeding with a divorce, arguably provides an interesting point of comparison 
with the faith previously displayed by some of the constituents in marr iage and its 
intrinsic merits. 
The introduction of a marriage-saving role into the process also reflects a 
fundamental 'duality' within this constituency. At the explicit level, a duality exists 
between saving and ending marriages. However, at a more implicit level, there is 
arguably a further duality between the divorce process as the framework for 
individual decision-making and empowerment, and as the directive framework 
actively shaping behaviour. 
One constituent in particular, talks at length about attempting to create a divorce 
process that genuinely reflects the reality of divorce. She argues that the aim was to 
create a 'space' or 'process' that recognised what was, 'going on in the minds, and 
the hearts, and the emotions of people'. Indeed this is explained in the following 
terms: 
'But within that you had the opportunity to look back, and this is where 
marriage counselling came in, and the opportunity to talk to somebody, 
at the interview, to say that 'I don't know what's happened and I can't 
understand it, and I can't think about the future and I can't think about 
selling the house because I'm so mixed up about all this'... so you needed 
a process that would allow one party to look back if that's wanted, but at 
some point look forward 
... 
So we thought if you brought this together under 
the umbrella of the new legal process, you were perhaps more likely than 
not to mirror what actually happens. ' [21 
Question marks do, however, arguably surround this idea that such a process does 
reflect behaviour. Indeed this particular constituent does go on to raise some initial 
questions herself: 
'I know some of my colleagues even said to me... 'people do not behave 
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rationally at this time in their lives, so why try to set up a rational systemT 
So I said 'the fact that they don't think and behave rationally, and behave 
in a chaotic manner, doesn't mean you have to have a chaotic system". [2] 
It is therefore arguable that although much of the rhetoric is about reflecting 
behaviour, the divorce process is actually engaged in the positive provision of some 
kind of lead or performance indicator for good divorcing behaviour. This, in turn, 
is underpinned by the assumption that it is indeed possible for the divorce process to 
engender good or 'rational' behaviour. Such a view would seem to be reflected in 
another constituent's optimism that mediation does have the potential to offer a 
6solution' for the majority of the divorcing population [8]. 
The 'Interest Groups I 
Information 
This sub 
-constituency is characterised by its strong support for the incorporation of 
information into the divorce process. For example one constituent states, 'I'm all 
for 
... 
having information' [141, whilst a second describes her position as, ýcertainly 
in favour of information' [9]. A third constituent adopts what she terms the, 
6 research point of view' from which, 'clearly there is reason to give people 
information. ' She then goes on to argue: 
'if you look at what people say, people say they want more information. 
People say that there are lots of things they don't know, and the evidence 
is that in many areas, there is a lot they don't know. ' [51 
The law is thus accorded a legitimate role in bridging the information 'gap' that is 
believed to exist within the divorcing population. The task of bridging that gap is 
also regarded, in the opinion of this third constituent, as having a beneficial effect 
on all those involved in the process: 
'I know that from my experience of giving information to people 
... 
that 
people do value information, and it does give them time to come up for air 
and reflect, and importantly it gives them time to 
... 
make thoughtful and 
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joint arrangements for their children. ' [5] 
The form that such information should take is, however, the subject of some debate. 
In contrast to the Pragmatic Progressives, there is general support for the idea of a 
meeting. For example, one constituent recalls that there was, 'very 
little 
... 
enthusiasm for the paper material' within her particular organisation. The 
'logic' for adopting this position is located in the fact that although written 
information, 'doesn't invade your privacy' research does suggest that many people 
simply choose not to read it [9]. 
Some constituents did consider whether the information should take the form of an 
individual or a group meeting. Interestingly two constituents, both of whom have a 
background in mediation, actually express a preference for group meetings. The 
first constituent argues that the individual format simply provides too much 
information for people to absorb in detail. In addition, she then goes on to suggest: 
'I think the groups were more meaningful, because people felt they were with 
'people like us" [101. The experience of this particular constituent, who had been 
personally involved in the information pilots, was that group meetings were 
generally well attended. Also, in contrast to the Pragmatic Progressives, no real 
problem was perceived to exist regarding the issue of anonymity: 
'if you give people a choice of venues where they go, in the same way as 
you could file a petition in any county court in the jurisdiction 
... 
if you want 
to go out of your area, then you know, you get on a bus. ' [101 
Of course this view may well reflect the fact that this particular constituent's work 
was actually based in a large city. 
For the second constituent, the group format is perceived to be a less pressurised 
one. Making reference to her previous experience of working to find foster homes 
for children, she makes the following suggestion: 
'if you interviewed people individually it was very difficult for them 
to 
... 
listen, because they were always thinking, are they going to select 
me or not? Whereas if we did you know, anybody interested in fostering, 
we've got a night on Tuesday 
... 
come and find out about it, people could 
be anonymous 
... 
they could sit at the back, the could think 'ooh blimey 
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I'm not going to do this', and scarper 
... 
because there was no pressure 
on them. ' [91 
There were thus felt to be advantages attached to having a forum where it was 
possible for people to receive information and learn, 'without 
... 
having to be visual 
individually, or be judged, or make decisions or anything' [9]. 
The question of whether attendance at information meetings should be compulsory 
is one issue over which there is clear departure from the position articulated by their 
more 'Formal' counterparts. As one constituent observes: 
twe thought, yes there are benefits in people having some kind of 
preparation 
... 
about what they were going into 
... 
short of compulsory, 
6cos you know good old mediators, compulsory is not our ideology. ' [91 
This unhappiness with requiring parties to attend meetings is echoed by several 
other participants. Indeed one appears to sum up what is essentially the broad 
position of the group: 
'I'm not at all sure about compulsory information meetings, although I do 
think that there should be information available for everybody going 
through this process. ' [141 
Several issues underpin this preference for a voluntary system of information. 
Firstly, as with the Pragmatic Progressives, information is constructed principally in 
terms of education. For example, one constituent talks in terms of the following as 
an ideal situation: 
6 ensuring that people starting on their journey thinking about divorce, had 
the same information whoever they happened to turn up on, and that they got 
to the right destination, so that they got the service they needed. ' [91 
This more 'pure' concept of information is similarly reiterated by a second 
constituent. Here a degree of discomfort is clearly evident regarding the more 
directive vision of information that emerged from the 'Formal' constituency during 
the reform process: 
'I don't think it should be trying to save marriages, I think it should giving 
good information about 
... 
the process of separation and divorce, about 
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what 
... 
the procedures are and about what resources are available, which 
would include you know, marriage counselling, and 
... 
some kind of 
consultative help so to speak, mediation and so forth. But I would go for 
much more neutral information message so to speak, and 
... 
anything that 
pitches one way or the other actually, I don't think is helpful. ' [141 
A third constituent arguably goes a stage further, effectively constructing that 
unhelpfulness in terms of 'hurdles'. Indeed, she talks about the more directive form 
of information provision in terms of putting people, 'through hurdles that were not 
necessarily going to be helpful and would act as a disincentive. ' These hurdles are 
defined as the requirement to meet with a marriage counsellor, and the imposition 
of an information meeting 'heavily weighted' towards marriage 'in the first 
instance' [5]. 
A second factor that appears to underpin support for non-compulsory information is 
a more individualistic construction of the divorcing parties themselves. Once again, 
as with the Pragmatic Progressives, there is some scepticism as to whether the 
divorce process can (and indeed should) employ a 'one-size-fits-all' approach. An 
example of this is provided by one constituent, who makes the following 
observation with reference to the information meeting as it was ultimately enacted: 
'it's first part, is in a sense to provide people with an opportunity to decide 
whether they are heading straight for the divorce process, or they want to 
linger a little and think about the issue of whether they want it. Now if it 
was an effective gateway for that 
... 
then maybe it would be possible, so 
that in a sense you would be able to, in the course of a very clear focussed 
interview, be able to distinguish the people who're saying 'I'm absolutely, 
look you know I've not lived with my husband for five years and we know 
exactly what we're doing, we just want a divorce', from the woman who 
breaks down in tears and says you know, 'I don't know what else to do 
... 
I've 
just found out that he's having an affair ....... Now they're very different 
scenarios, but I mean I'm not sure how easy it is to be able to do that as part 
of a legal process. ' [51 
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Marriage Counselling 
The issue of marriage counselling featured strongly across the discourses articulated 
by constituents. As hinted at in the previous section, the question of whether a 
6marriage counselling' element should be incorporated into the divorce process, did 
create some difficulties for the group. One interesting factor in this apparent 
'difficulty' is that participants advanced their arguments against a background that 
was broadly favourable to the concept of supporting marriage 
- 
indeed several 
participants actually represented 'marriage support' organisations. Nevertheless, 
constituents do question both the appropriateness, and indeed the efficacy of 
including this type of 'support' mechanism into a process that deals in the ending of 
marriages. 
The suggestion made by the Labour Party during the latter Parliamentary stages of 
the Family Law Bill, namely that marriage counselling should be a compulsory 
element of the process, receives considerable opposition within this group. As one 
constituent comments: 
'I mean how could you prove someone had been, I mean do they get a 
ticket and a certificate to say they've attended? And what if they sat there 
for half an hour and didn't say anything? ' [71 
Another constituent also argues that, if such counselling is going to work, then 
attendance must actually be voluntary. However, she then goes on to raise a 
question mark about the basic efficacy of marriage counselling itself. Indeed the 
suggestion is made that, 'personally from an evidence point of view' it is not 
'terribly effective'. She then continues the argument: 
'So you know; (a) it wouldn't be successful; but (b) if you put resources 
into offering something to a group of people where you know probably at 
most fifteen or twenty percent of them are going to actually value it and 
use it, that seemed to be potty. ' [51 
This more practical, 'bottom-up' perspective, is similarly echoed by another 
constituent. This particular individual argues in favour of using, 'a more neutral 
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phrase like consultation 
... 
which didn't imply kind of outcome'. The reasons for 
adopting this position are explained in the following terms: 
'Meeting with a marriage counsellor implies actually 
... 
that you know 
whatever the intentions of the counsellor, and I know that the intentions 
from the counselling point of view aren't to try and stick people back 
together, but I think from the punters' perspective that's what will be 
read into it. So that, you know, those who really want to save the marriage 
will use it, the dilemma is of course one party often does and the other 
party doesn't, and then 
... 
it's hard to get both partners to come together, 
and if you do it's hard to know whether you can really make much inroad 
at that point. ' [141 
For this constituent, the solution is not perceived to lie in providing a model of the 
'right' way to approach divorce. Indeed outcomes are not constructed as something 
to be measured against some kind of ideal. Instead the process is constructed much 
more in terms of following or responding both to the parties, and to their various 
needs: 
'I would argue for something that's a bit more open ended, i. e. where the 
agenda is set by the couple, rather than shaped by the counsellor, because 
I think part of the danger is that then the meeting with the marriage 
counsellor becomes a sort of subsidiary information meeting 
... 
rather than 
actually allowing for the couple, or whoever uses that session just to have 
a chance to talk and to be listened to. ' [141 
Mediation 
The concept of mediation does receive broad support within the constituency. For 
example, one of the constituents remarks: 
'I suppose mediation as a general principle seems to speak to 
... 
at least that 
part of the Church which, you know doesn't want unpleasantness and fighting, 
and says 'can't we sort of sort things ouff I mean that's slightly sort of middle 
Anglican approach. So I think in those very general terms, our-prejudices 
would be in favour. ' [71 
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Mediation also receives support from constituents whose essentially practice-based 
perspective allows them to engage with the debate at a more practical and detailed 
level. For this group, mediation is clearly constructed as an effective dispute 
resolution service, 'which assisted communication and benefited children' [9]. 
Once again, however, it should be noted that there was a clear feeling that 
mediation should be voluntary 
- 
indeed this particular constituent lobbied strongly 
during the Parliamentary stages of the Bill against tying the availability of legal aid 
to participation in mediation. 
A great deal of concern surrounds the marriage saving function apparently accorded 
to mediation by both the Idealists, and some of the 'Formal' policy-makers. Indeed 
one constituent refers to what she terms the, 'emotional extravagance' surrounding 
mediation and marriage saving. Concern is expressed about how mediation was 
effectively presented as, 'the answer to everything'. The end result for this 
constituent was the constant need to 'correct misunderstandings' about mediation, 
and to 'rescue' it from becoming part of the 'marriage saving agenda'. The 
essential task was thus described as, 'trying to get it recognised for what it was' 
- 
namely a mechanism that seeks principally to set the basis for constructive post- 
divorce life [9]. 
Another constituent argues that, in reality, mediation can be a 'complicated' 
process. She recognises that mediation is 'probably' not as acrimonious as the 
traditional legal approach to resolving disputes. It is further accepted that it can 
result in parties shifting their position, and thus acting more 'realistically. ' 
However, she then goes on to make reference to the experience of a friend who had 
recently opted to mediate: 'when he talks about it, it's tactics in terms of mediation' 
[5]. It is thus suggested that mediation is not simply a forum for what might be 
described as 'pure' discussion 
-a picture that represents something of a challenge 
to the more neutral co-operative picture presented by the 'Formal' policy-makers. 
Another aspect of mediation's complexity, relates to the position of women. Indeed 
this particular constituent also argues that the situation of women within the 
mediation process, does constitute a very real issue: 
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'You see that many women often don't voice their own needs, because 
they've decided in their heads what's going to be possible, and what isn't. 
So in a sense they may come in and give 
... 
way on things that even maybe 
the mediator isn't aware of, because that's the way it works. ' [51 
Links can thus be made between this constituency, and the more pragmatic 
assertion that mediation does not constitute a 'universal panacea'. However, in 
something of a contrast to the Pragmatic Progressives, there is a very genuine belief 
in the merits of mediation 
- 
particularly amongst those constituents with a 
mediation background. There is also, however, a recognition that it is neither 
suitable for all, nor does it represent some kind of 'magic' solution. The overall 
perspective may arguably therefore be summed up in a conversation which one of 
the constituents [51 had about mediation, in the course of which the following 
suggestion was made to her: 'people wanted to believe in [mediation] 
... 
and the 
feeling was if only we had more of it, and it was managed better and [was] more 
professional. ' 
Process Over Time 
Reflecting the concern of constituents as to the damaging effects of a fault-based 
divorce system, the principle of divorce over a period of time receives strong 
support. As one constituent remarks, the result of combining that process with a 
requirement that ancillaries be resolved prior to the granting of the divorce decree, 
was a shift in focus. The nature of that shift was away from proving whether there 
were actually grounds for divorce, 'to attending to what the consequences might be 
and removing the litigative adversarial element from the process' [141. 
Reflecting a general concern amongst constituents that divorce law should seek to 
contribute to better outcomes for all concerned, the process over time is valued for 
its ability to slow the divorce process down and thereby allow parties time to think. 
As this particular constituent continues: 
'I think that's a helpful kind of influence really, and also it's very helpful 
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particularly when there are children involved, to refocus concerns away 
from perhaps some of the marital battle to the parenting relationship between 
them, to get the couple to think about what the implications will be, what 
plans they've got in mind for how those parenting questions are going to 
be addressed after a divorce. ' [141 
One of the more ideal ist-oriented members of the constituency adopts a somewhat 
different approach to this issue. For this constituent, one central concern is the 
6general principle' that the divorce process should preserve, 'the public character of 
marriage'. This, he explains, can be achieved in the following way: 
'by saying 
... 
it can only be dissolved by some reasonably objective, and 
public 
... 
Not just statement actually, but 
... 
evidence of breakdown. Now 
admittedly that then became not much 
... 
more than the passage of the 
time, but 
...... 
could you do much better with available resources. I mean if, 
if somebody has said, 'I'm leaving, I want to leave you 
... 
and the dog, and 
the children'... and they've been through these various stages of having to 
think of the implications, and having the financial settlement, and however 
many months by then it was had passed, and they're still saying you know, 
I still think 
... 
was there actually going to be a much better testT [71 
The waiting period is thus regarded as the best way to reflect the 'collective' aspect 
of marriage when faced with the inherently difficult arena of intimate relationships. 
The length of the process is also the subject of some discussion amongst 
constituents. One constituent is highly critical of 'giving loads and loads more 
time' in certain situations, arguing that this, 'flew in the face of what reality we 
thought we were faced with' [9]. It was accepted that people should not be allowed 
to, as she puts it, 'breeze off in three months if they haven't done their work 
properly'. In addition, support is also articulated for the idea of settling ancillary 
issues before the divorce can be finalised. However, the idea of a longer waiting 
period where children are involved is firmly rejected. Reflecting the practically- 
based criticisms of the Pragmatic Progressives, it is suggested the imposition of 
different time periods creates the potential for litigation: 
'we don't want more litigation, and more children 
... 
issues sort of being 
thought up, in order to try and delay a divorce, because that's totally 
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counter productive, and what you've been trying to resolve with one 
hand, you've gone and set fire to with the other. ' [9] 
A second constituent does, however, recognise the appeal of extending the period 
where there are children: 
'if your belief is and I think some people genuinely believed, and still 
believe, that there are people who go into divorce and regret it, then you 
might say it's because you care about the children that you want to delay 
it, because you want to give the couple the chance to think it through and 
change their mind. Now I think that's a completely defensible position. ' [51 
This constituent does, however, then go on to question whether there is evidence 
that people really do re-think their position if given the opportunity. Indeed she 
suggests that, in her opinion, there 'isn't very much'. She elaborates as follows: 
'from what I've picked up from various things, people make judgements of the sort 
of round about maybe fifteen percent' [5]. 
Children 
The image presented by constituents both of children, and of their place within the 
divorce process, is something of a dual one. On the one hand, children are 
constructed as the 'objects' of welfare situated within a protectionist framework. 
For example, this type of construction is evident in one 'mediator' constituent's 
argument in favour of mediation: 'we are a child-centred process. We are there to 
help adults talk about and address the needs of their children' [9]. As demonstrated 
in the previous section, constituents also adopt a similar stance when talking about 
the benefits of divorce as a process over time. 
Another constituent makes reference to: 'the concern of the law to ensure that child 
welfare issues are properly addressed'. He then goes on to assert that there will be 
instances in which children, 'need protecting against the arrangements that the 
parents may come up with privately'. The result is therefore that it may be 
necessary to have, 'some kind of mediating public influence ... in terms of what 
happens subsequently' [141. This comment is an interesting one as it represents 
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both a very real questioning of the idea that parents will always do the best for their 
children, and the recognition that children are individuals existing separately from 
their parents. Indeed as the constituent goes on to argue: 
'the notion that if you just leave people to their own devices they can 
arrive at solutions which will be the best for all concerned 'ain't true, 
because the interests of children and parents are often quite different at 
the point of separation and divorce. ' [141 
The law is thus cast as a, 'mediating presence' in family life [14]. That presence is, 
however, very much a background one. Although parental capacity is subjected to 
questioning, a basic faith in parents does remain. For example, this constituent then 
goes on to suggest that, with regards to the issue of keeping children informed, 'it's 
clearly very helpful if parents can take this on as a parental task themselves and 
manage that well, with the kids and listen to what the children have to say'. 
Similarly with regards to the post-divorce arrangements themselves, state 
intervention is only deemed necessary in a 'small proportion' of cases. The 
encouragement of 'private ordering' is constructed as preferable, with the state 
operating very much as a 'safety net' [141. 
However, in contrast to these more protectionist constructions of children, there is 
also evidence of a recognition that children do actually constitute subjects in their 
own right. An example of this second perspective is provided by one participant, 
who talks of the 'worthwhile' nature of providing information to children about 
separation and divorce [5]. This constituent recognises that, in reality, parents often 
withhold information from their children: 'either because they feel it will upset 
them, or because they think that their kids don't need it because basically it upsets 
them as parents'. However, reflecting an underlying construction of children as 
individuals with their own needs and interests, she then goes on to talk of the need 
to look at both how information is disseminated to children, and how to 'make sure' 
that they are kept informed about what is happening. One suggested solution is to 
make that information available to, 'the kinds of people that kids will turn to': 
4 so it might be that you produce material that's available for pastoral 
teachers in school, or for teachers generally, so they've got a sense of 
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how to handle kids when they're going through these things. ' [5] 
In common with the majority of constituencies comprised within the policy 
community, the issue of children's 'rights' again creates some difficulties for this 
group. An example of the confusion is perhaps best summed up by the following 
comment articulated by one of the constituents. When discussing whether children 
have any 'right' to information, this particular participant states: 
'I think they need to know about what they need to know about. There's 
things that they don't need to know about, and probably shouldn't know 
about. ' [141 
A second constituent recognises that, 'some of us have a problem with children's 
rights'. The reasons for this 'problem' are explained in the following terms: 
'children's rights 
... 
are as good as their parents' ability to be able to deliver 
them, and even if the law said that children should, in the end in a way we 
rely very heavily on their parents' ability to be able to 
... 
provide what it is 
that children need. ' [51 
This constituent describes it as 'dreadful' that children do not have the ability to 
determine some aspects of their lives that are affected by the decision of their 
parents to separate. However, the reality of the situation is described as being, 'one 
ofthose 
... 
obvious paradoxes'. The nature of this paradox is then explained: 
6 children are completely dependent on their parents, that's part of being 
dependent, the parents' decisions, all you can hope to do, is to influence 
those decisions, and manage those decisions with the best interests of the 
children in mind 
... 
and I'm not sure how you can enforce the children's 
views. ' [51 
The reality of children's position within the family is thus regarded as inevitably 
hindering their ability to become genuinely 'active' subjects within the divorce 
context. 
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Discussion 
The discourses advanced by this constituency are articulated against a background 
of both the desire for 'a straightforward divorce act', and a recognition of the 6 need 
to strengthen and assist marriages' [9]. One strong theme that does, however, come 
through the various discussions, is a very real scepticism about the ability or 
appropriateness of a divorce process that seeks to provide a directive model of 
behaviour. 
The arguments advanced in favour of a voluntary framework of information, 
marriage counselling and mediation arguably reflect a divorce process that is 
constructed primarily in terms of providing 'resources to manage change' [141. 
This, in turn, would seem to reflect the general perception held by constituents that 
divorce constitutes an ordinary life event. As one constituent suggests: 
'I think there's a strong argument for you know, providing the kind of 
resources that people can use and that they may find helpful, which isn't 
taking over from them but is actually 
... 
making available something 
helpful in terms of information, in terms of a listening ear, in terms of 
expertise really in, in thinking about how change is managed and helping 
people just to distil their feelings at these times. ' [141 
As with the Idealists, experts are accorded a role within the process. However, in 
this instance, that role is underpinned by a basic trust in the capacity of the parties 
themselves to make the decision as to whether or not to access that expertise in the 
first instance. 
This perspective does, in turn, reflect a particular underlying construction of 
divorcing parties. At one 'level', the rejection of a one-size-fits-all process reflects 
the individuality of those who choose to divorce. For example, one constituent 
argues that a particular process will only be of benefit when that individual is in a 
position to utilise it: 
'You only absorb things when they have relevance to your life. You only 
notice how many Volkswagens there are when you are interested in buying 
one. It is the same for everything. You don't tap into the word "information", 
or "mediation" or anything, unless you need it. ' [101 
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In support of her argument, this constituent then goes on to describe the process of 
finding volunteers to participate in an information pilot scheme that she had been 
involved in running: 
'The place that brought the most people to us, was advertising on Heart FM. 
That's the broken hearts station, it's your Tammy Wynettes, and you know, 
your love songs. Now what sort of music do you listen to when you're 
broken hearted? Seriously, we got droves of people. I mean we really had 
to think this one through, but I was fixated on getting to where people 
would be open to it, so we hit on that. ' [ 101 
At another 'level', constituents also recognise the 'emotional turmoil' that divorce 
can generate [141. In contrast to their more 'Formal' counterparts, constituents are 
somewhat sceptical about the ability of a rational process to induce rational 
behaviour. For example, one constituent describes the following 'issue' that she 
had with information meetings 
- 
namely the expectation that someone, 'at the 
height of family breakdown crisis' should attend a meeting at which 'totally 
impartial information' was given, but no questions would be answered. Indeed 
from her own experience of operating such meetings, she found that attendees were 
generally 'desperate' to ask questions that were relevant to their particular situation 
- 
yet this was one thing that she had not been able to do. 
A second constituent articulates a similar argument with regards to the issue of 
mediation: 
'it's going back to the reality of what it's like you know, in the 
end 
... 
we're talking about people who are getting divorced because they 
have difficulties with their relationship. I mean it's a bit like post-divorce 
parenting when people say, you know, this is what you do, and part of me 
thinks well of course, but the fact is, you've got two people who've found 
it quite difficult to co-operate, so you know we 
... 
have to recognise that we 
may be limited here. ' [51 
Within this constituency the 'rational' model of behaviour that appears to underpin 
'Formal' constructions of the divorce process is thus subjected to some serious 
questioning. 
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The Child Advocates 
The 'mechanics' of divorce 
Reflecting their construction of the divorce 'problem' in terms of the dependency 
status accorded to children within both society and family, the Child Advocates 
argue for the central positioning of children within the divorce process. Indeed as 
one constituent remarks, there was significant concern about the fact that the Family 
Law Bill did not actually mention children. As she observes: 
'although the rhetoric and posturing was about protecting children... 
children were not visible on the face of the Bill. ' [131 
The provision of information within the divorce process is seen by some 
constituents to represent an opportunity to contribute to this repositioning of 
children. For example, one constituent makes the following comment with regards 
to the incorporation of an information element: 'One good thing is that it is an 
opportunity to talk to parents about what is best for children' [4]. However, it 
should be noted that providing information, at least in the form of a compulsory 
information meeting, does not command the support of the whole constituency. For 
example, a second constituent remarks: 
'I was never convinced by the information giving session. The research 
confirmed that parents don't talk to their children, and have a set of excuses 
for not doing so. ' [ 131 
The third constituent does articulate a more positive outlook when it comes to the 
basic concept of information meetings. This constituent, who actually was involved 
in piloting such meetings for parents, advances the following argument in favour: 
'people did get the message, it helped them to stop and think, they got 
information, and it was seen as part of a process rather than a big deal. 
It was sort of 
... 
going down the educational road, but not in a preachy 
way. ' [101 
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The concept of incorporating a mediation element into the divorce process also 
receives general support within the constituency. For example, one constituent 
regards mediation as being very much in the 'best interests' of children [4]. It is 
interesting to note that, in contrast to the rest of the policy community, the Child 
Advocates construct mediation very much in child-centred terms. Indeed whilst one 
constituent talks of the important work currently being done around giving access to 
children and allowing them to express their concerns as part of the overall 
mediation process [ 131, a second talks of the importance of makitig children 
'present' in the process 
- 
even though they may not be physically present in the 
mediation room [101. 
For this second constituent, good practice is thus viewed very much in terms of 
making children visible from the outset. This is achieved through the mechanism of 
asking a lot of 'child focussed' questions. For example, parents can be asked the 
following questions at the beginning of mediation: 'What do children understand, 
and how would you and your partner envisage their views, wishes and feelings 
being reflected in the outcome of mediation? ' This can then be followed up by the 
offer of information for the child: 'That could be seeing a specialist children's 
worker, could be letting them watch the CD-ROM. They can click in and out and 
follow the bits that they want to'. If it is revealed that parents have not really 
spoken to their children, then the mediation process can also work with them in 
order to consider how they might do that, 'because they're the best people to do it' 
[10]. 
Whilst strongly supporting the concept of divorce over a process of time, some 
disagreement is evident as to both the length of that process, and to the question of 
whether resolving ancillaries should be a pre-condition of granting the divorce 
decree. For example, one constituent expresses strong disagreement with the idea 
of extending the time period where children are involved. Referring to research into 
the effects of divorce on children, she argues: 
'Children suffer from their parents' depression, anxiety and conflict 
And requiring people to stay together until the finances and the 
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arrangements are sorted out, is not the way to protect children. ' [131 
In stark contrast to this position, a second constituent actually regards the 
requirement to resolve ancillaries as, 6 extremely sound'. It is recognised that such a 
provision cannot prevent people from actually going off and forming new 
relationships. Nevertheless, it is felt that the requirement can have several 
beneficial 'knock on effects'. In essence children would be rendered more visible 
to the various adult actors within the divorce process: 
'It will cause the Court to look more carefully at the exercise of its 
powers and duties, and it will cause parents I think to separate children 
out from the house, the car... ' [101 
This particular constituent also supports an extended waiting period where the 
parties have minor children. Reflecting the more individualistic constructions of 
divorcing parties offered by certain of the other constituencies, the belief is that a 
longer waiting period can actually 'facilitate' the use of mediation: 
'Many people when they come to mediation, are not able to use it when 
they first encounter it. Some people use it well before they separate, to 
work on how they might manage their children. Some people use it better 
when they've had the initial sharp shock of being in the court, and realise 
how bloody all that experience is, and at various stages in-between. ' [10] 
Underpinning this stance is the belief that the provision of 'space and time' can 
enable two individuals, who are often at very different stages 'psychologically and 
emotionally', to effectively be 'pulled together' [101. This perspective arguably 
reflects the constituent's mediation background. However, she does go on to then 
address the argument that a longer time period creates uncertainty and distress for 
children. She does not accept that the waiting period prevents people from 'getting 
on with their own lives'. This is underlined by drawing a comparison with children 
who are, 'drifting in care', and whose future cannot be determined until a care order 
is made. In contrast, children within the divorce context remain, 'within their 
families, and getting on with their lives' [101. Such a view arguably reflects a more 
robust view of children 
- 
rather than passively waiting for parents to resolve matters 
children are, in effect, active subjects positively getting on with things. 
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Reflecting both constituents' more limited faith in the ability of parents to always 
do the 'best' for children, and their clear construction of children as individuals 
separate from their parents, the court's role regarding arrangements for children 
commands a much greater degree of unanimity. For example, one constituent 
argues that the courts should be vested with, 'greater ability to scrutinise 
arrangements for children'. Indeed she suggests that an 'onus' should be placed 
upon the court, 'to seek to ensure that children have been properly consulted, and 
offered the opportunity to talk 
... 
to parents' [13]. The necessity for a 'different' 
mechanism for court intervention is also supported by a second constituent: 
'there needs to be a mechanism in every single case for the court to 
scrutinise, to have the opportunity to scrutinise the arrangements for 
the children, and to dig further behind it if it feels it needs to. ' [10] 
This constituent goes on to suggest that any failure of both parties to sign the 
statement of arrangements should result in a court appointment to look at the 
reasons why. The 'welfare' of children is thus regarded as justifying an expanded 
role for the state, with the concomitant reduction in family privacy and parental 
autonomy. 
Children's 'rights' 
The concept of children's 'rights' is, unsurprisingly, embraced much more strongly 
by the Child Advocate constituency. Indeed it is the case that a number of the 
arguments in favour of children's participation in the divorce process are actually 
framed in language of rights. For example, with regards to information, one 
constituent advances the argument that children have, 'the right to access 
information' [10]. 
The provision of information about divorce to children, is something that receives 
strong support amongst constituents. As one constituent observes, research 
demonstrates that children both 'want information', and 'are particularly concerned 
about the law, what happens when mum goes into the solicitor's office, because 
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they equate it with Crown Court and crime and punishment' [101. That 'want' on 
children's part is deemed to be a perfectly legitimate one. Law is thus perceived to 
have an equally legitimate role in its satisfaction. A second constituent supports 
this position, arguing that research also demonstrates that children do, ' get a sense 
that something is going on', but that the whole process is more frightening if they 
are excluded from it. The argument is therefore advanced that: 'Children need 
somewhere to go, and someone to talk to' [131. 
The question of circumventing parents by providing information directly to children 
is the subject of some discussion. One constituent makes the observation that: 'A 
lot of people might be threatened by having children going to third parties' [131. 
Indeed it is arguable that this fear is present in some of the discourses articulated by 
both the Pragmatic Progressives and the 'Formal' policy-makers 
- 
particularly in 
the sense that the provision of information is discussed in terms of children 
dictating to adults, and undermining parents' 'rights' to run their family life as they 
see fit. 
In a similar vein, another constituent refers to the balancing act involved in such 
provision: 'it's a fine balance 
... 
between 
... 
letting children access information and 
undermining parents, and that's quite a big thing' [101. This particular constituent 
was working on the development of a web site for children experiencing divorce, 
and had been partially responsible for a CD-ROM that provides similar information 
and is now available in schools. Reflecting the belief discussed in Chapter 5, 
namely the fact that children in modem society are very aware of divorce, it is 
argued that a 'duty' is actually owed to children in this context: 
'I believe that we actually have a duty to give children information, or 
facilitate their access to information that is simple and non-judgemental, 
but also 
... 
helps them to find people to talk to about it. ' [101 
Children are also regarded as having a substantive role within the mediation 
process. As one constituent argues: 
'What's important is not that parents do that business, but that children have 
the opportunity (if they wanted it) to contribute their thoughts. That children 
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have the opportunity (if they wanted it) to meet with their parents and the 
mediator to discuss the plans. Mum and dad could tell them what they thought 
the arrangements might be, and see how that would be for them. ' [101 
It is clearly recognised that some children will not want to take up this opportunity. 
This is, however, balanced by the fact that there will be those who do. Mediation is 
thus not constructed as an adult negotiating process in which parents exercise 
parental responsibility, and the children have no part. 
All three constituents are also in favour of divorce legislation with improved rights 
of (legal) representation and access to advocacy for children. An example of this is 
provided by one participant, who makes the following observation: 'We wanted a 
recognition that children ought to have independent and best legal advice' [4]. In a 
similar vein, a second constituent suggests that, 'children should have the right to be 
represented', although it is recognised that this should not automatically be the case 
in all proceedings [P13]. The third constituent also explains how, during the 
lobbying process, children's organisations pushed hard for the child's 'right to be 
independently represented' in all contested proceedings. One constituent also 
advanced an additional argument in favour of a 'Children's Rights Advocate'. It 
was envisaged that such an individual would be based primarily at court, but would 
also visit schools and raise awareness amongst pupils. He or she would thus 
effectively constitute: 
'Someone to whom children could go to if their parents were divorcing, 
who could perhaps try to set up some kind of mediation with parents, 
and then if necessary the child could then get representation. ' [131 
Discussion 
It should be emphasised that the Child Advocates do share a number of the views 
articulated by their counterparts who comprise the Interest Groups constituency. 
For example, all three were extremely keen to see fault removed from the process. 
In addition, some potential benefit to adult spouses was seen in the incorporation of 
non-compulsory marriage counselling and mediation elements. However, the 
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central concern for the Child Advocates is very much the interests of children. As 
one constituent states: 'We were very clear that our interest was promoting the best 
interests of children' [4]. Amongst the participants there is a sense that one way of 
promoting those interests, is to make children 'visible' or 'present' to the various 
adult actors within the divorce process. As one remarks, a central question for her 
organisation was how to incorporate the 'carrots and sticks' to help parents to really 
think about their children. 
Although generally supportive of both information and mediation for the adults, 
constituents do stress that more is required if children's interests are to be truly 
served. For example, one constituent draws the comparison between the English 
experience and the situation that exists in Australia. With reference to the provision 
of information, she describes how parties attending the Australian divorce court are 
automatically given an appointment to join a group information meeting. The 
message that is imparted at such meetings, is described as follows: it's your family, 
it's your case, we're here to help you, here's all the steps and the legal process'. 
The point emphasised by this participant is not only is the Australian information 
'heavily weighted' about children, its provision is also part of system in which 'the 
messages 9 are constantly reinforced through various different mechanisms [101. 
This constituent then goes on to also compare the situation with regards to 
mediation in the two countries: 
'The difference is, that in the Australian Court there are far superior 
facilities for children, and there are court counselling services and things, 
so they have the buttressing that makes people who are unable to negotiate 
say in mediation, have the space in which they can get themselves to a 
place where they could negotiate. ' [101 
The implication is therefore that both information and mediation do constitute a 
fundamentally good thing. Indeed they are mechanisms that operate to provide an 
aid to communication and negotiation, both of which are inherently beneficial to 
children. However, the suggestion is also that if the 'best' is really going to be 
achieved for children, then an integrated system of support for families is required. 
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Stand-alone information meetings or mediation sessions for adults are not viewed as 
sufficient to achieve the genuinely child-centred process that is sought. 
What also comes very strongly through the discourses articulated by this group, is 
the very clear perception that children do have a legitimate opinion when it comes 
to post-divorce relationships. In contrast to a number of other constituents within 
the broader policy community, this voice is not constructed as either irrational or 
unrealistic 
- 
constructions that are often used by those other constituents to justify 
the failure to accord a more active role to children. Indeed the competency of 
children is specifically underlined by one constituent who talks about how adults 
can get, 'all stewed up' about the 'logistics' of post-divorce arrangements. In 
contrast, however, children are described as 'wonderful' at problem solving, and 
can on many occasions 'fairly soon sort it out' [101. 
It is also important to note that, unlike some of the other constituencies, the Child 
Advocates do not construct the child's role in terms of actually making a 'decision'. 
An example of this (re)orientation is provided by the following statement made by 
one of the constituents of the need for what she terms 'different conversations' to be 
held with children at 'different times': 
6 we shouldn't view it as consulting with children, but affording children 
and young people an opportunity to comment upon the arrangements that 
their parents make for their future parenting. ' [101 
This stance removes one of the further objections cited within other constituencies - 
namely that it is wrong to place children in the position of having to decide between 
parents or, indeed, to decide about the divorce itself. As a second constituent 
argues, it is not 'down to children' to determine whether their parents' marriage is 
6 viable' 
- 
that is a matter for the two individuals directly involved. She does, 
however, then go on to make the following statement: 'But the children do have an 
absolute right to be taken seriously, and to have their views considered' [131. 
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Concluding comments 
This discussion clearly reveals how the values and perspectives of the various 
members of the national policy-making community crystallised into very different, 
and in many instances fundamentally opposing, demands upon the divorce process. 
At one end of the spectrum of opinion is the Idealist vision of a divorce law 
engaged in what might be described as the 'practical' subordination of individuals 
to the values of marriage and family. However, within the reform process this was 
juxtaposed with the starkly contrasting perspective of the Pragmatic Progressives, 
for whom the divorce process is constructed in terms of bringing marriages to an 
end in the 'best' and most effective way. A further set of demands is also 
introduced by the Child Advocates, for whom divorce law is cast into the additional 
role of actively engaging with and serving the interests of children. 
In view of the fundamental divisions of opinion amongst constituents it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the divorce process ultimately contained within the Family Law 
Act of 1996, was something of a mixture of saving and ending marriages. It does, 
however raise a further set of questions about divorce 'policy' more generally - in 
particular whether this dual vision is unique to the national policy community, or is 
something that is shared with those who are actually working directly with families 
at street level. Indeed in view of the 'problems' experienced by the Act subsequent 
to its enactment, the additional question as to whether the street-level perspective 
actually has any lessons for national policy-makers is also prompted. These are 
issues that will therefore be explored in course of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 8 
The 'Local' Perspective 
Introduction 
At the local level, family breakdown represents a dynamic area of policy. Indeed 
local groups and organisations offer a wide variety of services and programmes to 
families and children that span the voluntary, statutory, and in some instances the 
private sectors. Whilst the focus for some of these stakeholders is separation and 
divorce, for the majority, families in such situations do not constitute key client 
groups. Rather they tend to represent part of a broader client base that comprises 
families who are deemed to be experiencing more acute problems and difficulties 
requiring help and support. This suggests that, at least with regards to more 
comprehensive traditional 'social' services type provision requiring some kind of 
referral, that the fact of divorce itself is not regarded as problematic and 
automatically needing assistance. 
The street-level 'approach' 
One theme that runs through the discourses articulated by a number of participants, 
highlights the degree of similarity in the way that local organisations perceive their 
role vis a vis the individuals and families who constitute their 'clientele'. 
Participants frequently describe their work in terms of 'support', although in 
practice that support actually ranges from being at the end of a telephone line, to 
quite intensive one-to-one work and the provision of a comprehensive range of 
4 social' services and programmes. 
The type of support provided locally, can take the form of either the practical or the 
emotional / relational. For example, one participant describes the 'support service' 
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for families provided by his organisation as involving a 'huge variety of work'. 
That work covers both practical parenting skills, and work relating to 'social 
relationships 
.... 
and dynamics within the family'. The latter is explained in the 
following terms: 
'that could work on 
-levels of ... 
helping communication within the 
family. It could help in kind of looking at behaviour management in 
the family, and looking at the consequences of why certain behaviour 
happens. ' [A] 
Similarly Participant K, whose 'support work in families' involves visiting them in 
their own homes, also describes that support in dual terms. In some instances her 
work might involve providing 'practical help', such as providing assistance with 
regards to a child's nursery place. Alternatively, however, it might be described as 
follows: 'just emotional support really, having somebody else to talk to'. 
Another central ethos of local work is that it is very much about 'involving' families 
and individuals. Participant F provides one example of this orientation. The 
philosophy of her organisation, which concentrates much of its work on families 
who are on the verge of breakdown, is that of working 'in partnership' with parents. 
Indeed the literature explaining the various procedures to parents, reiterates the aim 
of achieving just such a relationship: 
'We want to work in partnership with you in sorting out the problems that 
you are having in caring for your child / children. ' 
For this particular participant, the key to putting together a 'support plan' aimed at 
keeping a child with his or her family is to, 'involve parents and children in the 
process'. Involvement is thus constructed very much in terms of active 
participation. 
The importance of actively involving people in the various services offered is 
reflected in the methods of working that are employed by local organisations and 
workers. For example, group work, or indeed the group 'format' is utilised by a 
number of participants. In some instances this work might simply involve talking in 
the presence of a group of people who are in a similar situation. For example, 
Participant L describes his organisation as follows: 'It's basically what we call 
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'walk-in', 'talk-in'. So people come in with a problem 
... 
and we try and talk it 
through'. He then continues: 'So we act as a 
... 
you know, like Alcoholics 
Anonymous or something, somewhere to sit and just blow it all off'. For others, 
however, the group approach appears to assume what might be described as a more 
pro-active form. For example, Participant A uses 'group work' to deal with 
'specific issues' such as parenting skills and behaviour management. The 
methodology employed is primarily discuss ion-based: 
'We try to get group members to feed into the group 
... 
to create a kind of 
learning environment for people. ' 
This type of approach is echoed by several of the other participants. For example, 
Participant D also utilises group work in order to explore issues of race and 
parenting. The experiences and issues of the parents themselves constitute a central 
focus of that work. Indeed this participant describes her role as being there 
primarily, 'to facilitate'. As she explains: 
'Yes we had information and background, but really the group based on 
what they knew, would help a woman come up with her issue. So it 
ended up problem solving for the group. ' 
Similarly, a second participant talks about parenting courses provided by his 
organisation as being, 'very participative'. He then expands on this, describing 
them as involving: 'kind of sharing of difficulties and then arriving at solutions, you 
know how you might go forward with it' [C]. 
The involvement of service users also underpins some of the more individually 
, 
focussed work that is done by participants. For example, Participant F talks about 
some of the more intensive work that is done with parents and children who are 
experiencing relational and behavioural difficulties. One approach adopted, is to 
use what is termed, 'brief solution focussed therapy'. This is described as follows: 
'It's a talking therapy, but it works with parents and children 
...... 
and it's 
trying to get them to re-frame their way of looking at the problems. ' 
Alternatively, where parents and children are 'in conflict', work might be done with 
parents 'on setting up a behaviour management programme', and with teenagers 'on 
family contracts, so what's allowed behaviour and what isn't allowed'. The result 
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is that, as with the group-based approaches, the focus is once again on the 
experiences, feelings and wishes of the particular individuals involved. 
In a similar vein, Participant K describes how the involvement of parents is also 
central to the way in which she works: 
4 what I tend to do is I write my records in the house so they don't feel 
that anything's being written about them, because it won't be, and 
... 
But 
I just think if I do it in the house, they actually understand. They don't 
read what I've written, but I usually run through it with them, what I've 
written. And if good or bad, if it's something bad that you've to write, I 
say I have to record this, I have no choice but to record this, so I have to 
write it down somewhere, and how do you think we should phrase it, and 
try to get them to negotiate that. ' 
If the situation is such that it is deemed necessary to bring in another organisation, 
then every referral is discussed, 'and they have to be 
... 
in agreement'. In the event 
that parents do not agree then, once again, negotiation is emphasised as the 
mechanism utilised in order to progress the situation. 
Conceptions of 'family' 
All the local participants talk about 'family' in a non-prescriptive sense. 'Family' is 
used to describe a variety of situations and living arrangements, including instances 
where there has been a divorce. For example, the 'Volunteer Induction Training' 
literature produced by Participant J's organisation highlights the fact that 'families' 
are 'different', and 'diverse'. Examples of these different families include, 
'families from ethnic backgrounds, mixed heritage families, step-families, same sex 
families'. 
The general 'taken-for-grantedness' that underpins this perspective is perhaps 
unsurprising, as it is articulated by individuals who deal with the diversity and 
fluidity of family life on a daily basis. However, this 'local view' does provide a 
very real contrast to the extremely restricted conceptions of family displayed 
by the 
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Idealists at national level. For example Participant P, who is a solicitor-mediator, 
describes an occasion on which she met a (court-based) mediator whose motivation 
was apparently 'to stop the rot'. In her opinion 'too many' families were breaking 
up, and this 'absolutely' had to stop. However, as this participant observes, the 
reality is that 'families do split up, and that's what it's about'. In addition it is 
arguable that the local 'world view' also provides an interesting comparison to the 
efforts of elements within the broad Progressive constituency to venerate the 
biological nuclear family 
- 
albeit, in the post-divorce context, with parenthood 
rather than the marital bond at its centre. 
The valuing of individual experiences of family life is a theme articulated by a 
number of the participants. Indeed this is the case even amongst those who may at 
first appear to articulate ideas that mirror those displayed at national level. For 
example, one participant who represents a Christian-based organisation, makes the 
following point: 
'Obviously from a Christian point of view, we do believe in marriage 
and family life, the sanctity of marriage and family life. However, you 
know we don't exclude anyone, and 
... 
all of our centres and all of our 
services will accept 
... 
a couple, an unmarried couple in a stable 
relationship, whether it be straight or gay, or whatever. I think stability 
and love is 
... 
as important as a marriage certificate- it's not the be all 
and end all. ' [H] 
This participant then expands on this point, arguing that 'we all know' of many 
people who have cohabited for years, 'just because they don't have a bit of paper, 
doesn't mean they don't provide good family life'. The important thing, for both 
this participant and his organisation is thus not to be, as he puts it, 'narrow-minded'. 
In a similar vein Participant E, although not actually representing a church 
organisation, makes the following statement regarding her organisation's work with 
divorced and separated families: 'it is driven for a large number of us ... by our 
religious faith 
... 
and we're doing it because we are Christians'. Participant C also 
talks of both 'human values' and 'Christian values' running through his 
organisation, and fundamentally shaping its approach. 
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This interpretation of Christianity represents something of a contrast to the 
'Christian' view of family life articulated by the Idealists within the national debate. 
For the Idealist constituency, a personal Christian morality constitutes the key 
element in constructing a definition of family that is based upon marriage. 
However, at street-level, religious beliefs inform perspectives and policy responses 
in a very different way. Some parallels can arguably be drawn with the more 
reflexive beliefs articulated by the Idealist Progressives although, here at the 'sharp 
end' of policy delivery, work is characterised by a high degree of flexibility. 
This acceptance of families, and in particular the way in which they 'do' family life, 
is reinforced by Participant 1. For example, she talks about how the training given 
to her organisation's volunteer workers, who provide 'support' to parents with very 
young children, includes a session on what is termed 'family values'. In stark 
contrast to the way in which this terminology is utilised within the political context, 
family values are essentially defined as: 'looking at what you value in a family'. 
This includes a consideration of the following questions: 'What is it from your 
childhood that you've brought to your children? What values? 
... 
And why? ' This 
reflexive approach to training, which also employs a group-based format, is 
believed to facilitate an understanding of the diversity of modern family practices: 
'It's a brilliant way, because people have got so many different 
experiences of looking and thinking 
- 
well I didn't do it that way, but 
they're still an alright person. ' 
Accepting difference is incorporated into the formal training offered by several of 
the local organisations. For example, Participant J refers to a training session that 
deals specifically with 'family diversity'. The training literature explains how this 
involves individuals reflecting, firstly, 'on their own attitudes, stereotypes and 
assumptions'. They are then asked to consider how these might, 'get in the way' of 
their work. The underlying philosophy is thus very much about valuing the range 
of skills and experiences that different individuals possess, and respecting their 
different approaches and opinions. Indeed a key aspect of the training is expressed 
in the following terms 
- 
namely: 'to emphasise, enjoy and highlight the value of 
difference and diversity'. An appreciation of that value is deemed essential if 
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volunteers are to provide effective help and support to families. As Participant I 
observes: 
'You can go out and visit a family who's got very different ground rules 
and outlook on life than you have, but it doesn't matter. You know, we're 
all aiming to do the best for our children, but we haven't always got 
... 
the 
same information 
...... 
I think if somebody comes to you as you are, where 
you are, accepting of everything, then you build a bond, and I think people 
move on from that because they learn to trust You. ' 
This experiential focus, and indeed the value that is placed upon that experience, is 
also carried over into the work that is done with families themselves. One example 
of this can be found in the presence that it clearly has in the 'positive parenting' 
work that is done by several of the organisations. As one participant explains, the 
philosophy employed by positive parenting can be described in the following terms: 
'Trying to understand how 
... 
your actual parenting and your upbringing 
has 
... 
impacted on your beliefs and how you 
... 
raise your own children. 
Some of that can be very positive and very strong, some of it may be very 
negative, and it's trying to enable the parent to 
... 
evaluate their strengths 
and what they feel they're good at, and also try to evaluate well maybe 
this isn't quite right, and maybe this isn't quite right because I don't really 
know any better, I've never really been educated into something different. ' 
[A] 
This type of approach is also echoed by Participant M, who makes the following 
observation with regards to the parenting courses offered by her organisation: 'A lot 
of it's working from your own experience of being parented 
... 
so that you get the 
feeling of what we're talking about. ' 
The'social basis'of policy 
Connected to the acceptance of family diversity is a belief amongst local 
participants in the need to work alongside families, and for support and services to 
be rooted in the social reality and experiences of those families and their various 
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members. One participant provides a very explicit example, describing her role in 
the following terms: 'being where somebody is, wherever that is in their life' [1]. In 
a similar vein, the training literature produced by J's organisation highlights the 
importance of 'empathy' with families. This is defined as: 'the ability to enter 
another person's world and understand from the heart what it is like to be that 
person 
For Participant 1, the key to working effectively with parents, lies in listening to 
what the parents themselves have to say: 
'Whatever the circumstances, it's just about being where they are at 
that minute, and listening to how they're feeling about what's happening 
to them. And 
... 
I think once you start listening to how they feel about 
what's happening to them, you get to know them, and then 
...... 
you can 
help them look at the situation they're in a different way, so that they can 
deal with it. ' 
The importance accorded to really listening to people, is similarly emphasised by a 
number of the other participants. For example, Participant J explains, 'you try to 
explore with them, because like I said before we're basically a listening service, you 
try to explore and get to the bottom of what it is that really worries them, or really 
upset them, so that they then can take steps'. In a similar vein, Participant M 
describes 'the spirit' in which her organisation works in terms of, 'listening and 
supporting people'. For this particular participant, listening constitutes an essential 
pre-condition to enabling people to, 'really explore for themselves what they're 
feeling ý. 
At the local level, 'support' is thus constructed as operating alongside families, 
rather than as setting some kind of standard or performance indicator for them. As 
Participant I observes: 'it's about helping people through'. That help does certainly 
not involve saying to people, 'well 
... 
there is this perfect parent'. This type of 
perspective is again echoed by Participant K, who asserts that when it comes to 
parenting, 'there is no black and white way 
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The philosophy underpinning much of the work done locally thus appears to be that 
of supporting people in doing the best that they can. For example, the core values 
of J's organisation include the belief that, 'people are doing their best, given their 
backgrounds, upbringing, opportunities or lack of opportunities in life, to cope with 
what is happening to them'. A similar view is articulated by Participant M, who 
talks of the importance of concluding each session of her parenting courses with a 
brief discussion. The nature of this discussion is described as follows: 
4everybody going round saying what they appreciate about themselves, 
or what they've done this week, because that's so difficult for us to do 
in our society, and it's so important 
... 
And really, really support the 
feeling that, that you're doing the best you can with where you are, and 
that, and that's fine 
... 
And just support and encourage people with what 
they're doing. You know, and it might be a tiny thing. Somebody might 
be feeling totally overwhelmed and totally depressed, and feel that they're 
absolutely hopeless parents, but they manage to get their children to school 
that week, you know, which at times can feel like an absolute miracle. Or 
they manage to have a bath or something, and we really try and celebrate, 
you know, the positive, not be always looking for the negative. ' 
This concept of building on the positives is echoed by Participant A, who describes 
his organisation's approach as being about: 'valuing each parent as an individual, 
valuing each family as an individual structure with positives and negatives within 
that. ' Participant K, whose work is done primarily with parents in their own homes, 
similarly stresses the following fact: 'you have to be careful you don't 
... 
give other 
people your values'. She does, however, go on to observe that this kind of approach 
can be extremely difficult: 
6you go in now and you have this negative view, and you have to really 
search hard to look for positives. And once you 
...... 
build on those 
positives, then you can address the negatives. ' 
Once again this perspective represents something of a discontinuity with much of 
the thinking at national level. It is particularly interesting to note the comments of 
Participant H, who represents a Christian organisation. For this participant, the 
success of his organisation is discussed in terms of the 'development' of the 
238 
individuals with whom it works. He remarks that this development, 'may never be 
to our standard, but we're not there to judge, just to try to enable and encourage'. 
He also makes the following observation regarding the organisation's philosophy 
- 
an observation that provides a stark contrast to the ideological tones and relative 
intransigence evidenced by the Idealists at national level: 
'A Christian response, which we feel if you profess to be a Christian, 
that must be demonstrated in practical ways. It's no good talking up in 
the air and staying there, you must live down here and help fellow man. 
It's very, as simple as that. If we profess 
... 
to love God, we must show 
it by the way we treat other people. ' 
This philosophy is described by Participant H as being, 'very basic'. However it 
can, to an extent, be applied across the organisations operating locally. At street 
level, neither morality nor merit (in the sense of 'good' parenting or family life), is 
deemed to be the preserve of any particular family form. Rather they are 
'individual' qualities both in the sense of being 'internal' and (to some extent), 
being exclusive to that particular service-user. Local work is thus informed not by a 
tendency to measure people against some kind of idealised standard, but rather by 
an appreciation of the reality of family life and a fundamental respect for the ways 
in which people are actually managing that reality. 
The location of 'expertise 9 
The non-prescriptive, and indeed the non-judgemental stance adopted by local 
participants, reflects a particular conception of 'expertise' when it comes to the task 
of 'doing' family. For example, one of the core values outlined in the literature 
produced by J's organisation is set out as follows: 'People know what is best for 
them, even though sometimes that information is buried so deep inside them they 
cannot reach it without help'. Similarly, the literature given to parents by 
Participant F, contains the following assertion: 'You know best what is happening 
in your family and how you would like things to be'. Participant K also 
describes 
how, at the outset, she makes the point of outlining her role to parents with the 
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statement: 'I'm not here to boss you around and tell you how to bring up your child, 
because you're the experts as far as your child is concerned'. She then continues: 
'You have to be calm, and you have to admit that you don't know 
everything, and I don't think you should, you know... well I don't 
think any of us do, we'd never go, you know, and say we are the 
experts, you're not. ' 
Expertise is not constructed in terms of qualifications or training, and is 
consequently not regarded as the exclusive preserve of the professional. Instead it 
is perceived to be primarily about both experience, and the individual. Indeed as 
Participant A explicitly argues: 
'I think 
... 
again that parents in their family with their children, they 
are kind of experts in their situation, they know everything about that 
situation, and we just kind of look from the outside looking in. So they 
bring an awful lot of knowledge and skills with them 
... 
We've got to 
kind of acknowledge that, and acknowledge, yes you've done, you've 
been, you know people that've looked after children to teenagers, they've 
had all that experience, all those years of knowledge to get to that point, and 
if they can do that, the little hurdles and barriers that they face in here can be 
quickly overcome with appropriate 
... 
intervention and appropriate support 
really. ' 
For the local participants, education is thus not seen simply as some kind of one- 
way, top-down experience. For example, the 'learning environment' that 
Participant A seeks to create through the use of group work, is described as one in 
which, 'people aren't just learning from us as professionals, but they're actually 
learning from 
... 
other people, their peer groups really'. Professionals are not 
perceived as being invariably vested with the right answer - indeed for these 
providers there generally is no right answer, but rather a range of different possible 
ones. For example, Participant M dismisses the idea that there is, 'a right way or a 
wrong way to parent'. Instead, it is argued, 'there's the way that feels right to you 
as an individual parent'. The approach employed in her parenting courses is not 
therefore about saying that something is 'right' or 'wrong': 'it's like suggesting that 
you try this, we find it works for lots of people-see if it fits for you'. Participant 
A 
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echoes this approach, describing the 'professional' worker's role in the following 
terms: 
6we can give them different models, different information, different ways 
of doing things, and they can actually select one that they feel comfortable 
with, that fits 
... 
their needs. ' 
This more dynamic, two-way, and indeed more equal relationship between service 
providers and users, also clearly underpins the parenting courses provided by 
Participant M: 
'I very much 
... 
don't see it as 
... 
me being a teacher, and other people 
learning. I see it as I see everything in life, as we're all on aj oumey 
together and we're all at particular stages, we've all got particular skills 
and 
... 
griefs, and hurts and joys and sorrows that we can share and learn 
from each other 
... 
And I get as much from it as other people, I just see 
myself as 
... 
as someone who 
... 
has a particular thing to offer, which I'm 
working on myself at the same time, so we're totally as equals. ' 
In a similar vein, Participant A is critical of parenting programmes that fail to utilise 
this type of interactional approach. Such programmes are believed to effectively 
deny the 'strength' of parents: 'it's like saying we know best, we know everything, 
and 
... 
we are all knowledgeable and we are all powerful, and I don't think that's the 
case really. I think we can learn a lot from the parents themselves. ' 
'Empowerment' of service users 
A 'connected' theme that also informs the work of local organisations is the concept 
of 'empowerment '. For example, Participant J describes the aim of the telephone 
help-line provided by her organisation in the following terms: 
'It's basically to help people 
... 
clarify their problem, and sort of empower 
them to take the next step to get out of their problems. So what we try to 
do, is listen to them. We don't give advice although we help them, you 
know, maybe with suggestions. ' 
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This approach reflects one of the core values of the organisation, namely the belief 
that, 'most people like to feel in control of their lives'. Similarly Participant N, who 
represents a support organisation for lone parents, states that her role is neither 
about telling people what to do, nor providing them with a solution: 'the idea is all 
self-help and mutual aid. So I'm not here to do things for people'. Even amongst 
those participants who provide what can be termed more educational services, the 
approach is very similar. For example, Participant M talks of 'guiding' people to 
look for the solution, 'rather than at any time suggesting' one. Participant H also 
makes reference to what he describes as, 'gentle intervention'. Such intervention 
takes the form of asking what people think, or making suggestions 
- 
the intention 
being to, 'try and help them learn and achieve, rather than do[ing] for them'. 
The concept of empowerment is also present within the mediation context. For 
example Participant 0, who is a solicitor mediator, describes a key part of her role 
in the following terms: 'you've got to empower them, and enable them to take 
charge and take responsibility'. Indeed she goes on to argue that 'responsibility' for 
the success or otherwise of mediation, lies with the parties themselves: 'if they want 
to make it work, it will work. And if they don't want to make it work, that's their 
problem really'. The mediator's task is to 'facilitate', 'assist', and suggest 
'proposals and options' for consideration. It does not, however, include coming up 
with 'a solution'. This type of stance is reiterated by Participant P, although she 
does admit to being 'fairly directive' in the event that the parties find themselves 
unable to speak either to each other, or indeed to her. 
Arguably a more practical approach to empowerment is offered by Participant K, 
who describes a central element of her work as follows: 
'to encourage them to do things for themselves, because we're not ... able 
to take on everything for them, so if they do have a problem, perhaps you 
know, the first step might be to give them the advice about where to go to 
try and sort it out for themselves depending on what the problem is. ' 
This participant does regard the provision of advice as a legitimate part of her role. 
She does, however, also stress the importance of clients actually helping 
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themselves: 'they have to 
... 
realise that you will help them, but you're not going to 
do it every single time'. 
This particular participant also raises a slightly different perspective on 
empowerment, making the point that although one might want to do more, the 
decision to accept help is ultimately up to the individual: 'You kind of learn I think, 
that you offer as much support, and it's up to them whether they take it'. She then 
continues: 
'you want to make everything better, but as time goes on you've learnt 
that you offer it, and if they refuse it 
... 
you just continue to offer it next 
time you have contact with them again, but you can't make them accept 
anything. ' [K] 
For national policy-makers, the empowerment of parents does seem to be 
constructed primarily in terms of the provision of information, and the mediation 
option. As revealed in the preceding chapters, constructions of both information 
and mediation are the subject of some discussion amongst the national policy- 
making community. What can, however, be broadly said for present purposes is 
that within the context of information, empowerment (such as it is) is constructed 
largely in terms of enabling 'choice'. With regards to mediation, proponents 
construct the process in terms of providing both the requisite tools for negotiation, 
and enhanced control over the agenda for discussion. 
For the local participants empowerment appears, in comparison, to constitute a 
much more active and dynamic concept. For example, one participant talks about 
helping parents to 'own' their problems, thereby enabling them to really take 
control of the situation [1]. This particular participant explains how she stresses to 
the organisation's volunteer workers, that problems belong firmly to their clients: 
'It's their problem, they own it. We do our best. If you start taking it away from 
them, then it diminishes what you're giving'. In a similar vein, J's training 
literature highlights the following: 
'We cannot solve caller's problems and we are not responsible for their 
problems. Giving them time and space may help the caller to feel more 
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in control and therefore more able to manage their own fife. ' 
Another participant also talks about involving parents in service provision: 
'If you can actually get parents to run groups for parents, and to look at 
issues that they feel they need to look at, then they can empower 
themselves and enable real change to happen. ' [A] 
For this participant, the philosophy underlying his organisation's work can be 
summed up in the phrase: 'to enable people to reach their full potential 
... 
to work in 
a positive way with people'. This philosophy is informed by both a fundamentally 
positive construction of parents, and a belief in their abilities and personal 
resources. 
Linked to the concept of empowerment, is the objective articulated by several of the 
participants 
- 
namely that service users are able to achieve independence. One 
example of this perspective is provided by Participant 1, who states that a central 
objective of her organisation is: 'to make people independent of any support, so 
they don't need other agencies to give them support, you know that they can stand 
on their own two feet'. Echoing this idea that empowerment facilitates 
independence, Participant H sets out the aims of the various work undertaken by his 
organisation: 
'Essentially to achieve a level of awareness and skill in, within the 
family setting 
... 
of what it means, or what it takes to live in an acceptable 
way. I don't mean that in a judgemental way. To live in an acceptable 
way, bringing children up 
... 
which is like, basically acceptable so as not to 
get into trouble, not to harm 
... 
and giving the necessary teaching, training, 
skills, love, care, in order to try and achieve just a little of independent living 
where they can cope, and bring up a child without any, you know, negative 
worries and stuff like that. ' 
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'Perceptions' of children 
Children, constructions of children, and conceptions of their 'best interests' feature 
prominently across the different discourses articulated by local workers. It is 
perhaps unsurprising that one feature of the discourses articulated by those 
participants whose work brings them into contact with 'older' children, is a general 
perception of children as active subjects. For example the 'mission' of Participant 
B's organisation, which works with children of varying ages, 'is very much to do 
things on children's and young people's terms'. Similarly Participant C, who also 
represents a children's organisation, discusses the aim of operating, 'with children 
at the centre' very much in active terms. For example, he talks about ongoing work 
with children around the 'New Deal for Communities' initiative. Whilst this 
project, the aim of which is 'to promote children's participation in determining what 
happens to that money' does fall outside the family policy arena, it is illustrative of 
the perceptions of children that generally inform the organisation's work. Indeed 
the approach utilised in this project is described as the, 'economic enfranchisement' 
of children: 'it's about promoting 
... 
their voice in the development of policy'. 
In comparison to the constructions articulated by a proportion of the national 
policy-making community, children are not vested with the innocence of ignorance. 
Nor indeed is there the perception that such childhood innocence constitutes a 
desirable state of affairs. However, it is also the case that children are generally not 
constructed 
- 
as they are by the Idealists 
- 
as essentially 'evil' or in some way 
inherently problematic. For example, Participant D refutes the idea that in families 
experiencing difficulties, 'young people are the problem'. Similarly Participant E 
talks of the tendency, where parents are separating, for 'the system' to focus on the 
child. For this participant the 'problem' is not the child or his behaviour: 'it was 
that the parents had lost all trust and respect for each other'. 
Participant B talks in detail about children who contact his organisation regarding 
parental separation and divorce. Several of the points that he makes, reflect the 
concerns articulated by the Child Advocates within the national forum: 
'We have 
... 
young people whose parents might take a very over protective 
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role, and think it's not good to tell them anything, must protect the children. 
And so we get bewildered young people 
... 
They know what's going on, in 
terms of things aren't right. They may have their own version of why it 
happened, and really feet they're unable to approach parents who are 
struggling themselves through problems. ' 
This participant also stresses both the individuality of children, and the variety of 
scenarios about which they contact the organisation. This view of children is 
echoed by a number of the participants including Participant G, who describes them 
as, 6a very varied commodity'. However, Participant B goes on to make the 
following general point: 
'What is very clear is a generalist thing about what children and young 
people are saying, is that they do need to know what's going on, or they 
create their own wild fantasies about it 
... 
And there'll be lots of people out 
there as adults 
... 
who still don't know why their parents got divorced, 
and may never be able to answer that. ' 
A lack of information is thus regarded as potentially more harmful than involving 
children in the family situation, however uncomfortable that might be. 
The importance of both communicating with children, and keeping them informed 
of the situation, is a theme that is echoed by several participants. For example, 
Participant G remarks that when it comes to separation or divorce, 'we would 
always push towards the telling rather than the family secrets'. However, the 
difficulties that exist for parents when it comes to actually communicating with 
their children, are considered by Participant J: 
'Parents find it difficult, and they especially find it difficult because a 
lot of them have not been used to that approach themselves. They've 
come from families where things like that weren't talked through, or 
weren't talked about. They've come maybe from very strict schools 
where again they've been treated like children rather than growing adults 
with their own right and their own view. ' 
This comment is an interesting one in that it does contain echoes of the argument 
articulated by the Pragmatic Progressives at national level - namely the difficulties 
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faced by law and policy that seeks to change the dominant culture. However, this 
participant also goes on to advance the following argument: 
'I think a lot of the problems now are there because on the one hand 
schools and society demand from young children an awful lot of 
responsibility, and on the other hand they're not given that responsibility 
by their parents, or their grandparents, or their teachers, so that's where 
the conflict starts. And again it comes down to lack of communication... 
and we feel that if you make that clear to people, that being honest about 
things, at the right level, is very often much better than trying to protect 
or hide 
... 
we find that a lot in divorce problems 
...... 
Or simply, yeah, not 
discussing anything at all, and just set strict rules 
... 
And then of course you 
get, you know, people rebel against it, or get upset about it. ' [J] 
Echoing the discourses articulated by the Child Advocates, this observation reflects 
the somewhat confused and 'dual image of children in modern society 
- 
namely 
that despite developments in various areas of social life, the family remains one site 
in society where children are simply not accorded responsibility. 
The promotional literature produced by Fs organisation, talks of children as 
possessing, 'a mind of their own'. The parent-child relationship is thus regarded in 
the following terms: 'always complicated and developing 
- 
it is a two-way street'. 
This concept provides a stark contrast to the more one-way, parent-as -trustee type 
model that informs much of the national debate. However, the literature is also 
interesting in that it suggests that parents should make the effort both to try to see 
things from their child's point of view, and to give children opportunities to talk 
about their feelings. Indeed the basic philosophy is articulated in terms of, 'talking 
and listening to children'. This philosophy is operationalised through the following 
exhortations: 'try to be honest and straightforward with your child' and, 'ask your 
child about their point of view on key decisions'. 
The language of 'children's rights' is specifically used, in the divorce context, by 
Participant B. He recognises that the 'age thing' does constitute an issue, however, 
the organisation mainly deals with children aged ten and upwards: 'so they've got a 
reasonable comprehension usually of what's going on around them'. There 
is an 
acknowledgement 
- 
and this was a concern highlighted by several of the national 
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policy-makers 
- 
that children may have unrealistic wishes, such as wanting their 
parents stay to stay together. However, what clearly comes through the various 
discourses is the construction of children as social actors, whose views and feelings 
should be taken seriously. This can be seen in the following description of his 
organisation's role: 'The most valuable thing we do is we listen in an unbiased way, 
and perhaps a way that 
... 
they don't get from other adults'. 
Again this reflects the kind of perspective articulated by the Child Advocates 
- 
namely the reluctance of adult society to both 'involve' children, and to accord their 
views sufficient respect. As Participant B continues: 
'We're not a problem-solving organisation. We don't give them smart 
Alec answers. Our approach very much is to help them tell their stories 
so that both they and we get a nice wide view of what's going on 
... 
it' s 
enabling them to tell it in a way that allows them to get a much wider 
look at what's going on you know, about where they fit in and where other 
people's behaviour fits in it 
... 
What's going on for mum? What's going on 
for dad? What's going on for them? What's going on for siblings? And to 
have a look about what's probably a quite complex family system that's 
going on 
... 
And trying to acknowledge and understand how they're feeling. ' 
For this participant, the role of his organisation is thus to look at ways forward, and 
to give children some kind of practical idea as to how they might proceed. 
However, the next step is always rooted in the ideas that the child herself may have. 
The counsellor's role is constructed very much in terms of possibly providing some 
additional ideas, but primarily helping the child to, 'go away with a better 
understanding of what's happening to them'. This is interesting in that such a role 
effectively mirrors that of those organisations who work primarily with adults. 
Once again the implication is that professionals do not invariably know best. The 
approach is informed by a basic respect both for children, and for their capacity as 
rational subjects. The counsellor may help children to think about the options, but 
an ultimate aim of the process does appear to be the empowerment of children. 
The perception articulated by Participant B, namely that children lack a real voice 
within adult society, is echoed by several of the participants. An example is 
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provided by Participant D, who argues, 'children haven't got enough status'. In a 
similar vein Participant C talks, in general terms, about how children and young 
people are, 'disenfranchised from decision-making processes'. Indeed for this 
participant, one of the 'problems' within society is that fact that, 'we've got 
profound ageism in respect of kids. Nobody ever listens to what they've got to 
say 
In stark contrast to this societal 'view' of children, the work of a number of the 
local participants is based very much on their involvement. The theme of 
'involvement' evident in work with adults is thus similarly extended to children. 
For example, Participant F states that a child would generally be included in those 
meetings held with his family and relevant professional workers, with the aim of 
exploring possible ways forward for them: 
'It's difficult about the stage at which you say children can participate. 
Generally I would expect any child over ten to be part of the meeting'. 
In a similar vein, Participant D also talks of her current involvement in developing 
programmes for children aged nine and upwards, that explore issues of race and 
parenting. In addition Participant G, who occupies a position within the formal 
legal 'process' dealing with separation and divorce, states that children will 
generally be seen from the age of four: 'where you can actually have some kind of 
interaction or interview with them 
... 
albeit limited in the case of the younger ones'. 
Thus what appears to be articulated by these different participants is what might be 
described as a general principle of inclusivity. Children are constructed as 
individuals, with their own views about the problems and issues that impact upon 
them. Those views are regarded as deserving of consideration -a perspective that, 
in turn, would appear to reflect an underlying respect for the children who articulate 
them. 
Within the divorce process itself, the situation regarding children does become what 
might be described as somewhat less clear. Participant G states that where 
separation or divorce involves a dispute regarding children, then the children will 
be 
seen, 6 unless there are very good reasons why not'. She explains that this approach 
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contrasts sharply with the situation that existed prior to the introduction of the 
Children Act 1989, when the focus of work was actually the 'dispute' itself. Before 
the 1989 Act a, 'sort of systemic family therapy type approach' was utilised, 6 where 
you might or might not involve the children, but you were actually trying to work 
with parents on their conflicts'. The result was that, in a number of cases, children 
were simply not seen at all. The Children Act would thus appear to be an example 
of legislation that has actually had a very real, and indeed fundamental impact on 
the work being done at street-level. 
It is, however, interesting to note that one of the apparently 'good' reasons for not 
seeing the children might be, 'that neither parent wants us to see the children' 
- 
although it should by noted that a court order may be sought if it was felt that seeing 
them was 'really' necessary [G]. This appears to reflect a perception of the sanctity 
of family boundaries and parental authority. Similarly, where an agreement is 
reached between the parties, 'it isn't necessary to see the children, you've 
... 
sorted it 
really'. The implication would thus appear to be that where there is no longer any 
dispute, there is also no 'welfare issue' with regards to the children. Arguably 
therefore in the absence of any dispute, there is almost a blurring of the interests of 
children and their parents. It may be that this view simply reflects the reality of the 
children's position in the family, and indeed the pressures on Participant G and her 
organisation. Nevertheless, this situation does appear to represent something of a 
crystallisation of the concerns articulated by the Child Advocates during the Family 
Law Act debates. 
When it comes to mediation, neither of the solicitor-mediators within the study 
sample saw, or indeed felt equipped to deal with children. This is particularly 
interesting in view of the fact that Participant 0 also worked regularly with children 
in care proceedings. Although such 'public' law work involved asking children 
what they would like her to tell the judge, and ensuring that they had an appropriate 
understanding of the legal process, the divorce situation is regarded very differently: 
'this would be looking at wishes, feelings and emotions of a child, it's a very 
different area% 
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For Participant P, the incorporation of children into the mediation process is very 
much a matter of 'last resort'. Indeed it is generally felt not to be 'appropriate' to 
discuss the issues with children, and to involve putting 'pressure' on them. In 
contrast, however, Participant 0 describes the inability to include children's wishes 
as making her feel 'a bit powerless'. Although believing that in the 'vast majority 
of cases' it is fine for parents to make the decisions, she suggests that this will not 
work in every instance: 'the children should have some route for their views and 
feelings to be taken into account'. 
The picture that is presented within this context does provide something of an 
interesting contrast with the views articulated by Participant B. For this latter 
participant, children and young people are very clearly constructed as 'separate' 
from their parents, with their own needs and interests. For example, he makes the 
following statement: 
'I think particularly with sort of mid-adolescents and getting to that stage, 
and kids getting very much into being able to organise their own activities 
and their own social life, not needing to be accompanied by a parent to go 
and do things and having boyfriends and girlfriends. There's a real kind 
of dilemma there about kids wanting to be home based, wanting to be able 
to do their own thing and be around their mates. And if two divorced or 
separated parents don't live on the same patch, creates real adolescent 
headaches. ' 
This view that children have their own lives to lead, and do not simply constitute 
some kind of chattel to be shared between parents, once again represents a clear 
continuity with the position adopted by the Child Advocates. 
Participant G describes her role as that of obtaining an 'independent' view of 
children's wishes and feelings. Some of the practical issues articulated by this 
participant, again reflect concerns that came through the national debate. For 
example, reference is made to children who do not want to be held responsible for 
decision-making: 
'they don't want to be put in a conflict of loyalties, so they either don't 
say anything at all and just look at you and ... keep changing the subject, 
orthey 
... 
say things that make it impossible. So they'll say things like 
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they want to spend half the time with one, and half the time with the 
other 
... 
or they love both of them equally. And 
... 
so there's some very 
sensible children really, 'cos then they don't get to be blamed for anything. ' 
This observation echoes anxieties articulated particularly by the 'Formal' national 
policy-makers 
- 
namely that allowing children to express an opinion places too 
much responsibility on them. In a similar vein, Participant B talks of children with, 
4real split loyalties sometimes if 
... 
they view both their parents as good parents'. 
It is also interesting to note what is said about the weight that is accorded to 
children's views. Participant G highlights the subjectivity of the legal 'process', 
particularly in view of the difficult balancing act that it has to perform between 
hearing the children 'and trying to understand where they're coming from', and not 
making them 'inappropriately responsible' for what happens. Courts may disagree 
with the front-line professionals as to the weight to be given to children's views, 
however a central issue appears to be the essential variability of the system: 
'I think it's just so variable from court to court, and judge to 
judge 
... 
children have been known to change residence on the strength 
of their views, from about seven. But on the other hand, other children's 
wishes have been totally ignored. And sometimes children who've been 
talking about fairly abusive situations, have actually been ordered to 
have supervised contact 
... 
Sometimes, even in the face of a child who's 
adamantly hostile to the notion of contact, the court can actually expect 
some contact to be tried out. ' 
Participant G argues that the presumption in favour of contact is not now as strong 
as it has been in the past. The domestic violence lobby, in particular, is perceived to 
have really made people question whether contact is invariably best for children. 
She also says of the presumption: 'we have been questioning it for years, but it was 
sometimes difficult to convince a court'. However she then goes on to make the 
following observation: 
'You might have big question marks about the quality of contact, or 
whether it's really such a good idea, but on the other hand you perhaps 
haven't got enough evidence. And 
... 
it is quite a draconian thing to say 
a parent shouldn't actually see children, so ... you'd have to 
be slow to 
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reach that conclusion really. ' 
This observation can arguably be interpreted as reflecting a belief in the parent's 
'right' to have contact with his or her child 
- 
which raises the question of whether 
parental 'responsibilities' have effectively been reconstructed as parental rights. 
However, this participant talks about the philosophy underlying her work in terms 
of both, 'protecting the best interests of the child', and of children's 'rights'. Indeed 
she goes on to state: 
'We believe that it's the child's right to have a relationship with both 
parents 
... 
And you would do everything possible to keep doors open, 
and allow a child to grow with the knowledge 
... 
and 
... 
if everything's 
okay, a relationship with the absent parent. But even if it isn't 
... 
the sort 
of absent parent that you could have a relationship with, I think we would 
still want children to grow up with an identity about their natural parentage, 
and we would want to keep doors open, and keep choices available for 
them to make when they're of an age to make them freely. ' 
Interestingly there is no corresponding right for children not to have a relationship 
with a parent. Overall therefore, something of a mixed picture is presented as to 
who knows what is 'best' for children, what indeed is 'best' for them, how to treat 
children's views, and thus implicitly how to actually constitute children themselves. 
When it comes specifically to the divorce context, work does appear to be 
influenced by preconceived ideas about the nature and merits of the parent-child 
relationship, and what parents 'should' be doing vis a vis their children post- 
divorce. Also there is a hint here that the professionals know best 
- 
in the sense that 
they know better than the children themselves. In this instance, expertise is thus 
constructed largely in terms of professionalism and qualifications. 
The literature produced by Participant E's organisation, also constructs contact in 
terms of children's rights. Indeed the organisation is described as frequently acting 
as a: 'bridge between no contact at all, and the restoration of a child's right to keep 
in touch with both parents'. For this particular participant, contact is constructed in 
terms of something that children want. Arguably, however, this construction 
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reflects the fact that this organisation both 'supports' existing contact arrangements 
made elsewhere, and deals predominantly with young children. 
For Participant E, the parent-child relationship is perceived to be of central 
importance. Implicit throughout the discussion, is the belief that it is the 
6 responsibility' of parents to ensure that this relationship is maintained. This, in 
turn, has implications for the parental relationship 
- 
indeed there is some 
recognition of the difficulties that, according to various academic commentators, 
this entails. For example, the following statement is made with regards to contact: 
'We see it time and time again, if parents can only bring themselves 
... 
and 
I know it's very difficult, I really do know it's difficult 
... 
If parents can only 
bring themselves to see, as long as children want to, and I mean not all 
children want to and that's fair enough 
... 
But if they can only accept that, 
and brace themselves to let that be part of the child's routine without being 
snide about the other parent, then at the end of the day they have a better 
relationship. ' 
The difficult situation in which parents are placed is recognised by several 
participants. However, it is interesting to note that, as a general rule, parents are not 
accorded any blame for failing to communicate with or really listen to their 
children. For example, Participant B makes reference to the difficulty of 
acknowledging young people's feelings about family breakdown: 
'It's hard to find from a parent who's perhaps dealing with their own 
needs as well. It's a complex dynamic, it's a family system, all those 
things going on. ' 
Another participant makes reference to the 'hostility 9, 'aggression', 'mud-slinging' 
and 'attempts to discredit the other side' that can characterise separation and 
divorce. The divorce 'situation' is summed up as one in which there is, 'a lot of 
unhelpful stuff' that is not in the interests of children: 
'But parents that are hurting, sometimes find it difficult to think how 
taking revenge on their other half might just actually end up ... you know 
the people who are going to count the cost are actually the kids. 
But they 
can't always see that, the need for revenge is too strong. ' 
[G] 
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This participant talks about children being, as she describes it, 'triangulated in the 
conflict'. As she goes on to explain: 
'Children will have been told all sorts of totally inappropriate stuff about 
finance, and the house, and 
... 
they've been interrogated as to 
... 
say what 
mummy's doing, and who's in bed with her and night 
... 
and all manner 
of very abusive things. ' 
However, once again parents are not condemned for this. The point is made that 
where parents are hurting or feel aggrieved, it is 'probably unrealistic' to think that 
some of that is not going to get transmitted to the children: 'Inevitably it does, and 
you see children 
... 
allying themselves with the party that they feel is the victim'. 
Assessing 'outcomes. 
For local participants, the issue of assessing the outcomes of their work is 
something of a vexed one. A number of participants talk of the difficulty that 
surrounds this task, and indeed some organisations do not actually carry out any real 
form of assessment at all. Participant E provides an example of this stance, 
explaining that although her organisation used to produce a feedback form for 
parents to complete, they ultimately found that it 'wasn't helpful'. This participant, 
who provides a forum for parents to have contact with their children, argues: 
'We've always felt that what we're there for is the basic, to be a neutral, 
relaxed venue, and if you're into forms and questionnaires it destroys some 
of that feeling 
... 
and we feel that is our advantage really. ' 
Participant B also conducts no 'formal' assessment, articulating the belief that 
weýre getting something right', based upon the fact that children and young people 
consistently use the service provided. Participant J who, like B, represents an 
organisation providing a telephone-based service, describes how volunteers 
complete forms detailing their own feelings about each call. However, all that they 
really have to go on are their own impressions, in addition to anything that the caller 
may say to them at the end of the call. Such 'assessment' cannot therefore really be 
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tested. Some participants do talk about formal evaluation in terms of targets and 
figures. However, such evaluation does appear to be produced primarily for 
funders, in order to provide evidence that agreed work has in fact been carried out. 
Assessment is made more difficult by the nature of the work done by several of the 
participants. For example, Participant K talks of the 'huge problems' that surround 
any attempts to measure the success of her work: 'A lot of advice we give is 
preventative, and how can you prove that you've prevented something from 
happening? ' Participant M adopts a slightly different perspective, highlighting the 
ongoing influence of the parenting courses that she provides. Indeed when asked as 
to the possibility of assessing the outcomes of her work, she remarks that this is 
possible 'to a point'. She then continues on to make the following point: 
'but something like this is ongoing for the rest of people's lives, and I 
know that from my own experience. You know, there are things that 
... 
I 
dimly picked up on one or the other of the courses, that later on suddenly 
click into place, so I don't think you can say. ' 
This relative fluidity of outcomes is also raised by participant E, who states: 'I mean 
what today is a success, tomorrow might be a disaster because some families 
actually come back. So it was a success last year and now we're back to square 
one. Was it a success? ' 
Much of the difficulty that surrounds the assessment of outcomes also reflects the 
variety and individuality of the parents and children with whom the local 
participants work. For example, Participant A makes the following observation: 
'A good outcome is 
... 
I suppose on different levels. I suppose if it's 
a 
... 
child and a parent 
... 
being able to communicate their own needs to 
one another, and to be able to live in a more harmonious way. I would say 
that's a big success 
... 
because it's preventing family break-up, it's 
preventing 
... 
lots of other kind of sideline issues that could happen in that 
family 
... 
To enable 
... 
parents to question authority, to question the support 
they get, to actually ask for support, I would say that's a big success. To 
provide a safe environment for children and families to come and talk to 
professionals without being stigmatised, judged or labelled, I would say 
that's a big success. Also looking at 
... 
new projects 
... 
trying to enable 
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parents to run their own groups and educate themselves, to access 
information, they're successes. ' 
Similarly for Participant 1, 'success' is also individual rather than something that 
can be judged by the 'outside world'. This participant quotes the example of one 
woman who, with the support of her organisation, has now gained professional 
qualifications and is building a career. This is then contrasted with a second woman 
who, when she first became involved with the organisation, was 'not really 
interested' in her children. She has now progressed to the stage where she gets 
them to school on time, appreciates the importance of education, and keeps all 
school and hospital appointments. Participant I then remarks: 'And I think those 
two women have moved just as far. But to the outside world, who's the successT 
For this participant, the outcome of her organisation's work is assessed in terms of, 
'the fact that we make people aware of children's needs', and 'we encourage very 
slow steps... very small steps with families'. For Participant H, work is also 
assessed in terms of 'development in the person'. However once again, that 
'development' is an individual, and consequently a somewhat intangible concept. 
Participant 0 makes the observation that she does not look at mediation in terms of 
6 success or failure'. Instead it is regarded as part of the overall process: 'it fits into 
the continuum of the divorce and the financial settlement process'. Even though the 
parties may get no further than discussing basic financial information, that can still 
be 'valuable'. Indeed as Participant P notes, if mediation does break down at that 
stage, they have all the information necessary to take the matter to court and get it 
finally resolved. 
This local approach to assessment, and to the construction of 'good' outcomes, 
contrasts with the much more fixed models that tend to underpin policy at the 
national level. Indeed Participant N provides an explicit example of this, outlining 
how her definitions of 'success' are somewhat different to the measures employed 
by her national office. This participant, whose work is conducted with lone parents, 
describes her 'measurement of success' in terms of bringing parents together: 
'If they start a group, then that's against my targets, that's a different 
257 
type of success. But I don't go out and say, ooh you've got to start a 
group otherwise I don't want anything to do with you, and 
... 
you know, 
to me anybody that meets anybody through [organisation], and if I've in 
someway supported that relationship, that new friendship, that to me is a 
success. You can't measure it, it's intangible 
... 
But the tangible stuff is a 
new group. That's a measure of success. That keeps my national office 
happy, that keeps the national office board happy. What I would say, is 
if they actually came out and saw the work that we did in the regions, and 
saw the friendships that formed between people, that should be a stronger 
measure of success than any amount of groups that are set up. ' 
This observation also suggests that the nature of street-level work and the inherent 
individuality of its outcomes, does not fit well within the national arena 
- 
namely 
where there is a tendency to require something that is both tangible and measurable 
to show for one's efforts. 
Perspectives on national policy 
Social Reality 
The views of local participants regarding family policy at the national level are 
strongly reflective of both their flexible constructions of 'family', and their general 
belief in the need for policy responses to be rooted in the reality and experiences of 
those families. As Participant A observes, family life is changing in fundamental 
ways: 'People 
... 
are changing, their views have changed and we've got to kind of 
respect that and 
... 
value that'. The result is that policy therefore needs to move 
away from trying to: 'stick [people] back again in a two parent family with one 
child that's married and white middle class'. 
A theme that underpins the different discourses is that 'family' is essentially active. 
Rather than adopting the Idealist view of family as some kind of passive 
institution 
that stands outside and above social change, it is actually regarded as a 
fundamental 
part of that change. Policy, it is therefore suggested, needs to take note of this. 
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Indeed one participant makes the following argument with regards to what he 
describes as, 'the political stuff regarding 
... 
divorce and keeping families together': 
, They're trying to sell, you need to be a happily married couple. You 
know, you've only got to look at the divorce rates and family break-ups 
, 
and the trend is not like that any more 
...... 
We're prehistoric aren't we? 
We're fossilised in our views of what parents are really doing to this 
country, and what they should be 
... 
We need to be looking forward, 
we need to be kind of embracing that as much as we can, not trying to harp 
back to old beliefs and old structures because they just don't apply any more, 
they just don't apply. I'm not saying that we should disrespect them, we 
should try to 
... 
value them and learn from them, but we can't hold onto the 
past, it's not going to work, we can't. ' [A] 
Marriage 
At national level, a belief in the value and merits of marriage resonates right across 
the various constituencies that comprise the policy-making community. Even 
amongst the more pragmatic constituents, there is a marked reluctance to be seen to 
be contradicting the idea that marriage is somehow 'best'. The presentation of 
marriage as the ideal, and consequently as a state of affairs to be encouraged, is 
therefore largely unquestioned. However, at the local level, this assumption that 
tends almost to 'sit' at the centre of national debate and policy, is subjected to very 
serious challenge. 
Participants question the idea that marriage is invariably better than alternative 
family forms. For example, Participant N talks of the need to 'smash the 
stereotypes' that surround lone parenthood, and to challenge negative perceptions 
by presenting an alternative 'positive image'. This task is, however, a difficult one 
when polices are geared towards the family unit based on marriage: 
'family units are great if they work, but it doesn't have to be a mother 
and father 
... 
and two point two children. It can be two women, it can be 
two men, it can be you know 
...... 
it can be a mother bringing up the 
children. At the root of everything it's got to be a stable home to 
bring 
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a child up, or children up in. ' 
A second participant adopts a slightly different perspective towards the issue of 
marriage. However, once again, the feeling is that separation and divorce can be 
viewed in positive terms. As he argues: 
'I think that's good, because females don't need to rely on men to keep 
them any more, there's a whole structure that's enabling females to say 
6 well I can stand up on my own now as a female, and I can be a good 
parent'. ' [A] 
Again this approach represents a very real contrast to the discourses articulated 
particularly by the Idealists at national level. The law and policy, condemned by 
Idealist constituents for equating marr iage with other forms of intimate relationships 
and family life, actually finds support here. In addition, the behaviour of women 
who choose to leave men is constructed in terms of liberation, rather than the 
language of irresponsibility or bad parenting. Indeed the quality of parenting is not 
perceived to be dependent upon the presence of two parents. As this participant 
observes, there is a general perception within society that, 'there's something going 
wrong with parenting'. However, this is a view with which this participant begs to 
differ: 
'I think there's a lot going right with parenting, I think it's just going 
through massive changes. The structure of parenting is changing, 
because the structure of society's changing, and we just don't react 
to that in a positive way. ' [A] 
Another participant highlights the 'implication' within much of national policy, that 
problems simply do not occur if one conforms to the traditional two-parent family 
model. As this participant observes, this is simply not the reality - even for those 
who publicly advocate the merits of marriage: 'Tony Blair's son drunk, Straw's 
smoking dope 
... 
serves them right for their piety really. It's kind of what happens to 
people' [C]. In a similar vein, a second participant makes the following remark: 
'I actually feel puzzled still by this government's approach towards family, 
because more and more it's clear that there isn't such a thing as a nuclear 
family, that more people actually live in completely different circumstances, 
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and that also within the nuclear family which are still the majority of calls 
we get are mega, mega problems. So on paper it might look as 
...... 
you 
know, mum, dad and two point four children, but, a lot of the problems 
people call us about, are actually taking part in that so-called wonderful 
unit that should be, you know, the basis of our society, so 
... 
it is interesting 
to see. ' [J] 
Parenting 
When it comes to the issue of parenting, some clear continuities do exist between 
national priorities and local approaches. For example, there is a concern amongst 
several local participants that parents 'should' remain in contact with their children. 
The implication that continuing contact is generally in the best interests of children, 
does suggest that there may be some merit in the recent focus of policy (as 
highlighted by several academic commentators) on the rebuilding of the family 
around the parent-child bond. However, despite being generally in favour, it is 
important to recognise that local participants do not regard parent-child contact as 
an unconditional good. 
Participant L suggests that experience shows that if parents are willing, then the 
'best' situation for children 'is to see as much as possible of both parents'. 
Participant N describes access to the 'other' parent, as something that is 'very much 
supported' by her organisation. She then continues: 
4 we don't say, 'oh gawd the man's left you 
... 
never see him again, and you 
should keep your children'. Contact should always be retained with the 
absent parent if it's a good, and it's a positive experience for the child and, 
you know, and for the whole family. ' 
In a similar vein, Participant E makes the following statement - although it is 
interesting to note that this is phrased in terms of the children's wishes: 'parents 
should at least give the children the chance to stay in touch if they wanted to'. 
Within some of the local discourses there is, however, the implication that this 
reconstitution of the family post-separation or divorce may be somewhat simplistic. 
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As Participant E states with reference to her organisation: 'the purpose is to provide 
the parents and children opportunity to spend time together'. She then continues: 
'People come to us 
... 
while they sort themselves out'. It is therefore recognised that 
maintaining contact with children after the adult relationship has broken down, can 
often be an extremely difficult task. 
Managing the actual contact itself, is also not always easy. For example, as 
Participant E remarks: 
'Now 
... 
we do get particularly fathers, we do get some parents who just 
haven't got a clue what to do with the children at all 
... 
now if a volunteer 
spots that well then we'll go and sort of, 'shall we build some Lego', 'hey 
have you read him this story this week', kind of approach. ' 
This observation reflects the arguments advanced by academic commentators such 
as Backett (1987), Smart (1999) and Neale and Smart (1997), namely that fathers 
often lack both the base, and indeed the basic skills to enable them to fulfil the 
parenting role after separation or divorce. A second participant makes a similar 
point, providing a recent example of how her organisation supported a father and 
his relationship with his children, following the breakdown of his marriage. In this 
instance support consisted of the following: 
'Looking at what he could be doing when he'd got the children, and sort 
of generally helping him through that initial period of not being in the 
home. Wanting to care for the children, but basically having no 
... 
sort 
of foundation or ground of what to do. ' 
Participant G raises a slightly different point, referring to the difficulties involved in 
ongoing work with parents post-separation - in particular the fact that most people 
really do not want any outside assistance. Indeed she makes the observation: 
'Most people really wish their other half to drop dead, or move off and 
stop causing them any aggro. So even if they don't wish them dead, they 
just want to be left alone to get on with their lives ... to put their lives back 
together without the constant need to accommodate the other person. 
' 
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These observations all highlight the fact that the rhetoric and theory that underpins 
family policy (including the Family Law Act), is not always easy to put into 
practice. or some parents, the basis for some kind of joint parenting may simply 
not be there 
- 
they may lack the basic emotional and practical resources required. 
For others, the change in circumstances resulting from the breakdown in the 
parental relationship may have effectively 'shifted the goalposts', with the result 
that any pre-existing foundation is effectively removed. Local workers also 
recognise the difficult reality of moving forward with one's life, whilst at the same 
time having to deal with the continued presence of an ex-partner. 
External 'pressures' 
Some local participants also articulate concerns about the potential impact that the 
focus within national policy on marriage and models of 'good' parenting, can 
actually have on individual parents. Policy priorities and directions are regarded 
almost as an external 'pressure' impacting on parents and their perceptions of 
parenting and family life. For example, Participant M describes how her parenting 
courses include a session that, 'looks at what it's like to be a parent, what it means 
to us, what our expectations of ourselves and others are as parents, what we feel are 
the expectations of society on us'. In a similar vein, the groups run by A's 
organisation explore 'identity' issues. These issues are described in the following 
terms: 
, it's exploring 
... 
issues of stereotypes, issues of how the media impacts on 
how you feel, and your identity within, within social frameworks really. 
So it's just exploring how identity can change and be moulded. ' 
A third participant advances the argument that parents often feel a pressure to 
conform to some kind of 'standard': 
'I think a lot of the people do phone because they either feel, whether it is 
the government policy or the strict way they were brought up themselves, 
they feel that they've failed if they, if they do split up, or if they don't know 
how to handle, you know, aggressive behaviour in their teenage children 
or something like that. I 
... 
do feel that there is a lot of pressure of not doing 
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it right 
... 
and getting the blame for something 
... 
I do feel that that is a 
tendency that's there. ' [J] 
This particular participant also raises the possibility that parents who deviate from 
the family models approved by society often feel that their deviation is responsible 
for any resulting 'problems'. Indeed she makes reference to the fact that parents 
may blame their divorce for the subsequent behaviour of their children: 
'And sometimes it really helps to separate for instance the difficulties they 
feel, the experiences, and they put down to divorce, whereas you think, you 
know, that's just a normal fourteen year old behaviour, yeah? Might not be 
pleasant, but you know, any teenager that age has got that tendency. So it's 
not because you divorced your husband three years ago, it's simply because 
he or she is now fourteen, and more than likely if you would still be together 
they would show the same behaviour, because you know, it's the hormones, 
or it's the peer pressure or whatever 
... 
And it can help that people, that people 
find out that you know, they're not alone in it, and that it is, it's normal 
although not pleasant. ' [J] 
Sections of the national policy community do see divorce as the source of many 
problems for children. Whilst not totally denying this, the local view is that 
causation cannot always be simply attributed to family breakdown. 
Participant J also makes the additional point that parents often find it difficult to ask 
for help. She remarks that many people telephone her organisation either because 
they have tried everything else, or that they simply want to talk to someone they do 
not know. As she observes, if you do have a problem, 'to admit it to your sister or 
your neighbour is much more difficult than to phone someone that you can't see, 
that doesn't know you, but you just need 
... 
to unload it'. This view receives strong 
support from Participant A, who suggests that a 'huge stigma' surrounds the whole 
education issue. A comparison is drawn with going on a computer course, which he 
suggests people 'wouldn't think twice about'. When, however, it comes to 
parenting, there is a general sense that 'you should know how to do it by now'. He 
therefore makes the following assertion: ' 
'I feel that any parent that, that can come here and say I need some support, 
I think that's a very big step for any parent to take, to actually identify 'hang 
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on a minute I'm struggling here', because I don't think in society that it's 
acceptable for parents to do that. So I've got a lot of respect for parents that 
can actually ask for help. ' 
Gender 
An interesting issue that is raised by one of the local participants relates to gender 
roles within the family. As the only male child-care worker based at his 
organisation's centre of operations, this participant expressed quite strongly his 
opinion that society generally, 'doesn't promote masculinity in parenting' [A]. 
Both society, and organisations such as his own, are viewed as having tended to 
'stick' with traditional gender roles and divides. Indeed he remarks that his 
organisation no longer conducts work that is specifically focussed on fathers. The 
predominant feeling is therefore that both masculinity, and the importance of fathers 
are issues requiring promotion within the media and legislation. 
This view is mirrored to an extent in the discourses articulated by Participant L. 
Coming from an organisation that represents fathers, this participant's views may be 
described as somewhat extreme. For example, it is argued that it should constitute a 
criminal offence for one parent to stop the other from seeing the child - unless that 
other parent is 'an unsuitable person'. However, this participant goes on to suggest 
that even where the father has been doing 'most of the caring', courts still tend to 
resolve disputes in favour of the mother. This is particularly the case where the 
child is very young, the dominant view being that the man, 'can't look after this 
child without someone else being there'. 
It is arguable that the perception that fatherhood is not currently being promoted is a 
surprising one 
- 
particularly in view of legislative developments (of which the 
Family Law Act is a part) and policy statements attempting to promote forms of 
joint and co-operative parenting. As discussed in Chapter 3, it is certainly the view 
of a number of academic commentators that developments over the 
last decade are 
essentially aimed at fathers and enhancing the paternal role. Although 
Participant L 
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suggests that rather than saying that the father should 'Stay involved with the 
children', legislation actually sends the message that he 'should continue to pay' for 
them. 
It is, however, also arguable that the kind of view articulated by Participant A 
merely reflects the pretence 
- 
'created' by the gender neutral, jointly responsible 
6parent' that inhabits recent legislation 
- 
that fatherhood is actually an active 
relationship, rather than a passive status. This fiction of active fatherhood also 
receives some support from an observation made by participant E who makes the 
following remark: 
'We do get, particularly fathers, we do get some parents who just haven't 
got a clue what to do with the children at all. ' 
Participant A also makes reference to the ferninisation of parenting and its taken- 
for-granted nature. Indeed it is argued that parenting has always been both seen and 
judged in the following way: 
6a natural skill that women should have, and 
... 
it's not important, it's not 
valued in society, it's not given the credit it deserves 
... 
the kind of skills 
that you need to be a parent, to be an effective parent are huge, it's one 
of the hardest jobs that anybody could do. ' 
It was suggested in the discussion of the Idealist focus on fathers that this might be 
a factor in the relative invisibility of motherhood within the national debate. This 
idea is certainly reiterated here 
- 
namely that women's assumed role of 'caring for' 
(Tronto, 1989) children effectively renders them not worth discussing. 
The 'approach'to divorce 
Three of the local participants, all of whom operate within the formal divorce 
6 process', do make reference to the reforms contained within the 1996 Family Law 
Act. In the opinion of both Participants G and 0, the concept of no-fault divorce 
is 
regarded as a fundamentally good thing. For Participant 0, the debates surrounding 
who should issue the divorce petition, whether the behaviour detailed 
in the petition 
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is accepted or not, and questions about whether allegations of adultery can actually 
be proved, are described as 'nonsense' and 'ridiculous'. In addition, fault is 
regarded as having a potentially adverse impact on attempts to mediate: 
, the other thing that comes through when you're doing [divorce] as a mediator 
is 
... 
the sort of fault and blame that you should pay for it. You know, you 
walked out, why should I have to sell the house? And all the rest of it. And I 
think the divorce process as it now is, encourages people to have this sort of 
blame culture. You know it's his fault, I'm divorcing him on his unreasonable 
behaviour 
... 
why should I have to put myself out and move to a small two 
bedroom house? So I would've welcomed that 
... 
principle 
... 
of no-fault 
divorce. ' 
Participant G employs the interests of children in her argument in favour of a no- 
fault framework: 
'I was quite in sympathy with something that would stop a lot of the silly 
game playing that sometimes goes on. And certainly when we're trying to 
sort out children, one of the things we try and do is get off the blame thing. 
And it's difficult for parents if they're feeling aggrieved and that they've 
been wrongly done to. So theoretically no fault divorce would fit quite well 
with our philosophy about relationship breakdown, and how really the only 
thing you have to do is to try and pick up the pieces, and look to the future, 
and sort that out as best you can. ' 
Although having reservations about the 'cooling-off 'periods set out in the 1996 
Act, Participant G expresses support for both mediation and, 'the provision of a 
good service of information 
... 
that explained to people the range of options, and 
what they might need to do, and how you go about it'. Information is regarded as a 
fundamentally good thing, as is the opportunity to obtain it 'from places other than 
lawyers'. For this particular participant, information is 'about quality of life issues'. 
She then continues: 
'I think it is investing in children, because it's got to help children, for 
parents to feel empowered, to feel freer, to be able to make clear and 
sensible choices, and to really weigh up the pros and cons. But I don't 
think the links are made between providing that kind of service for 
parents, and actually 'well that's probably going to be better for the 
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kids'. ' 
When it comes to the issue of mediation, the picture that is presented by the two 
solicitor mediators is something of a mixed one. Participant 0, whose clientele was 
fairly evenly split between legal aid and private fee paying, is relatively optimistic. 
Although accepting that a 'cultural shift' in favour of mediation is some way off, 
she argues that things are moving: 'people are actually starting to come along, and 
ringing up and saying... 'I've heard about mediation, or my solicitor's 
recommended mediation". In contrast, however, the view offered by Participant P 
is more pessimistic. Over ninety percent of this participant's clients were legally 
aided, and in her view it simply does not possess appeal beyond this limited group: 
6not many private intelligent people are keyed into it I don't think'. 
The way in which mediation has been received by the legal profession is also 
somewhat mixed. Both participants emphasise that mediation is not a substitute for 
legal advice 
- 
there will always be cases that are unsuitable, whilst the mediator 
will also invariably send the parties back to talk to their solicitors about any 
proposals that are made. Once again, Participant 0 provides the optimistic view: 
'at the end of the day, family lawyers I think are very different from a lot 
of other lawyers, you know we wouldn't actually be doing the job if we 
didn't have care and concern for our clients, and wanted to achieve things 
in the best way, which sounds very corny, but I think it is actually true. ' 
For this participant, mediation is viewed as having a positive future. It is 
increasingly gaining acceptance within the profession and, 'it slots into the current 
processes perfectly alright'. However, Participant P suggests that the future is much 
more uncertain. Whilst some solicitors are very keen - primarily she suggests 
because the clients that they refer have limited earning potential for them - others 
are described as 'just completely anti'. Although viewing mediation very much as 
the 'way forward', this is tempered by the underlying concern that 'it might also die 
a death 
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One interesting factor that emerges from these discourses, does suggest that there 
may be some (albeit limited) merit to the suggestion made by the Formal policy- 
makers during the Family Law Act debates, namely that financial issues can impact 
on behaviour. For example, Participant 0 observes that people are beginning to 
come to mediation: 'people who are earning 
... 
very good incomes who think, 
especially the men actually, I want to get it sorted, and so I'll 
... 
instigate it'. In a 
similar vein, Participant P makes the point that parties attending for mediation are 
required to fill in the same financial form that is required by the court. In the event 
that mediation breaks down, it is then possible to proceed to court with minimum 
delay. This participant remarks that for privately paying clients, it is cheaper to do 
this in mediation that it is to pay a solicitor: 'And so they're quite into that'. 
Abottorn up' approach 
A common theme amongst the participants is that policy needs to be more, 'bottom 
up'. Indeed for those organisations also possessing a national presence, their role is 
perceived to include the 'feeding back' of what it is that service users need and 
want. Indeed one participant talks of the 'dual purpose' of his organisation. In 
addition to helping children, the organisation has what can effectively be described 
as a second role: 
'to campaign on children's behalf, because we hear from so many individual 
children we can use information collectively to say this is what children are 
saying about this issue, and whether that's comment in the media or 
campaigning to government, or comment on a White Paper, but to campaign 
on children's behalf about provision and their rights as well. ' [B] 
Similarly Participant C describes his organisation as a, 'social justice organisation'. 
He then goes on to explain that 'social justice' involves both service provision, and 
a movement towards a position, 'where the bits of practice that we do could 
inform 
... 
what's called influencing or lobby work in an attempt to produce policy 
changes at national level 
... 
which are focussed on justice for children'. 
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A bottom up perspective is seen to better serve the needs of both individuals, and 
the communities in which they live. Participant E highlights one aspect of this, 
pointing out that, 'every family's needs are different'. The recognition that one 
(policy) size does not invariably fit all, is echoed by a second participant. Although 
talking specifically about back to work policies, Participant N articulates the general 
local belief in the importance of sufficient flexibility in order to accommodate both 
individuality and choice. With regards to (what was then) the forthcoming policy 
requiring all parents signing on for income support to attend compulsory interviews, 
she advances the following argument: 
'that's great, do it in a really, really positive way, but don't force people. 
People must have the choice, and they know, most people know what's 
best for their children. For some lone parents it's for them to be at work, 
and the children to be cared for elsewhere, or for their children to be at 
school and supported through that way. So build a network to support 
individual lone parents' needs, and be there. ' 
Participant B argues that the result of employing a more grounded approach to 
policy would be, 'that communities themselves define and describe the services 
they need, and that services are delivered on their terms in the most helpful way to 
them'. With regards to national policy he makes the following observation: 
'It appears that governments do feel the need to nanny us, and the need 
to write policy that has kind of a public comfort in how it prescribes. ' 
Although this comment is specifically made with reference to social work and child 
protection, the observation is arguably transferable to family policy generally. For 
example, what seems to come through the national debate on divorce is a 'comfort' 
factor in supporting the traditional value of marriage. 
Participant A offers a rather critical assessment of national approaches to parenting. 
Reference is made to, 'top-heavy parenting and institutional stuff', which provokes 
the following comment: 
'It can be 
... 
unmeaningful to the actual parents, it could mean nothing to 
them. It could be very patronising to the parents 
... 
It's like the health 
campaigns. We need to stop people smoking, we need 
... 
people eating 
less fat in their diet you know, and when you get to a family that's ... living 
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on the breadline, you know a packet of fags keep the sanity in the household. 
It's just totally unrealistic, and their needs are so far removed from what's 
actually happening. ' 
The belief here is that policies should be 'dynamic', rather than operating as some 
kind of, 'conveyer belt of education'. Indeed this participant talks of the need to 
deal with parents on three different levels, if behaviour is to be effectively 
influenced behaviour. These levels are described as: 'A think level, a feel level, and 
a do level'. The reasoning underpinning this approach is that although it is always 
possible to tell parents what to do, they will not actually do it unless they really, as 
he puts it, 'think and feel what they're doing'. Policy therefore needs to be both 
relevant, and to make 'sense' to those with which it seeks to engage. 
This perspective represents a basic challenge to the efficacy of both 'top-down' 
policies and models of behaviour, and to the 'people like us' approach that arguably 
underpins them. As Participant A also argues: 
'I think when you look at your own learning, it's exactly the same. If 
somebody says well I'm telling you how to do it because I know the 
right way, you're going to automatically think well 
... 
it's not enabling 
learning to take place, and it's against all kind of learning philosophy 
and learning, learning behaviour really. ' 
Certainly Participant J would appear to echo the futility of trying to educate people 
about the 'right' way to behave. Indeed she draws a parallel with the response to 
teenage pregnancy in order to underline the point: 
'It's the same with teenage pregnancies, the way they again... get on their 
high horse here and say, ooh look if we give them, you know, contraception 
then they're going to have sex even more. Rubbish! Absolute rubbish! ... it 
will eventually filter through that it isn't all going to be solved by saying okay 
you know, wait with having sex until you're twenty-one, and then get married 
and sort it out. There's going to be so much proof that that 
is not what reality 
is about, I think so anyway. ' 
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Participant F also seems to connect with the idea of making policy relevant to 
people. For example, the following comment is made with reference to 'parenting 
education , in the teenage context: 
'This notion that you can offer teenagers in a way, some parenting education 
so that later on they will be better parents 
... 
my own experience is until 
you've got kids you haven't got a clue what it's like. Most teenagers have 
lovely romantic notions, including teenage girls who might even get pregnant 
quite early, and don't relate problems to them. And you're wasting your time 
really, at that stage trying to put anything that might be called parenting 
education. ' 
This participant also discusses her previous experiences of running parenting 
classes. Such classes can be successful, however she makes a point of stressing that 
they have to be both 'quite specific', and run by people who understand the 
circumstances of the participants. 
Policy agendas 
The majority of organisations operating outside the statutory and divorce 
frameworks do receive some form of funding from either local or central 
government. A number also take referrals from statutory authorities. The impact 
that funding is perceived to have on the organisations' respective agendas is, 
however, a somewhat mixed one. Several participants express the opinion that 
funding arrangements do not impinge upon their work (for example, Participants B 
and D). Participant H also makes the following assertion: 'We don't compromise 
our standards in order to get the funding 
... 
If you want us to do it, you want us to do 
it because we do it in a particular way'. He then continues: 'everybody sees us as 
independent'. In a similar vein, Participant E refers to the value of independence: 
one of the things that was said to me almost universally by parents, was that thank 
goodness you're not part of the system'. Participant I also argues that her 
organisation follows its own agenda, with its own 'aims and objectives', 
6 constitution' and 'ethos'. 
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In contrast, Participant C remarks on the impossibility of voluntary organisations 
refusing to compromise: 'because that just doesn't happen, that's not the way the 
world works, and you'd quickly go under if you did'. This participant's 
organisation was involved in explicitly marketing itself with local authorities and 
central government funding agencies, with the result that most of its projects had up 
to 50% local authority money in them. However, he refers to an ongoing debate 
within the organisation about whether to keep to this level of public funding: 
'so therefore to retain our autonomy in terms of our values, you know 
our values base, and some autonomy in terms of what we actually do, or 
whether in order to expand we ought to take more central or local 
government money'. 
What had apparently happened in this situation, was a gradual shift in the emphasis 
of the organisation's work in order to secure funding: 
'I suppose that happens on an incremental basis really, you know each 
time we get into a negotiation with the local authority they'll say... 'oh 
we want this and we want that', and we'll say 'we wont give you that but 
we'll give you this'... and there's a sort of process of negotiation. Certainly 
what we provide is 
... 
is compromised by what the local authorities are 
wanting. ' [C] 
The result of the whole process is thus a 'compromise' or 'clash' between 'central 
government political agenda, coming directly from central government into the 
local economy', 'the local authority itself having it's own political agenda to 
respond to' and the organisation. 
Participant J also makes reference to the impact that central government agendas 
may have in the future. Her organisation had recently received additional funding 
from government, however concern is expressed over the possible effects that the 
increasing emphasis on marriage within national policy, may have on work done 
locally: 
'And I think this will grow, because with us getting bigger, and needing 
more money, and needing to expand, there will be .... a definite view 
that there are a lot more problems going on ... and ... that trying to talk 
people back into stable relationships is not going to solve those problems. 
' 
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For Participant A, as a small organisation chasing limited funding, a significant 
amount of time is spent reacting to funders: 'We jump through hoops if we know 
there's 
... 
social services or the council saying well, this in the next two years we'll 
be aiming for 
... 
We need to keep a track of that and keep moulding our service to 
what they need'. One result is that the organisation is now beginning to provide 
what are described as 'main theme choices', rather than 'selective choice'. The 
services available are thus, to some extent, responding to funders rather than the 
needs of the clients. However, he also expresses the opinion that the organisation 
does go its own way to some degree 
- 
and indeed that the presentation of services 
can be altered in order to secure funding: 'It's like flower arranging 
- 
same flowers, 
different arrangement'. Therefore although national and local government agendas 
are having some influence, it can arguably be said that the majority of local 
organisations do not regard their work as being subordinated to such outside 
influences. 
Concluding comments 
In contrast to a number of their national counterparts, the local 'family policy 
community' clearly does not regard the fact of divorce itself as fundamentally 
problematic. Nor indeed is separation and divorce approached with any underlying 
sense of unease or discomfort. Implicit within the street-level discourses is the 
perception that the breakdown of relationships is a fact of life to be dealt with, and 
through which families and their various members are to be supported. 
The nature of that support is generally 'inclusive' in the sense that it is based upon 
the active involvement of service users. This inclusion is evident within the various 
programmes, courses and fora operated across the groups and organisations, and 
indeed within the agendas around which these are constructed. For example, 
Participant D describes how her work on race and parenting employs a service-user 
based agenda: 
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I we had like a consultation process before we even... [started] 
... 
because 
the course was based on the consultation from the parents, they would talk 
about what was happening for them as parents. ' 
One dominant message emerging from the Family Law Act debates is the idea that 
spouses, parents and families are effectively measured against some kind of ideal 
model. However, for local workers such an approach is not only considered 
inappropriate, but as potentially problematic. Whilst 'Formal' policy-makers regard 
divorce law as an opportunity to induce what they regard as ideal or 'rational' 
behaviour, local participants view its focus on marriage and particular 'types' of 
behaviour as factors that may actually operate to inhibit how people in a range of 
very different situations actually 'do' family life. For example, the inability to 
match up to the policy 'model' can engender feelings of inadequacy and personal 
failure. 
This issue of children within the local context is an interesting one. The view 
articulated by a number of participants, in particular those from organisations 
working with children, echoes that of the Child Advocates 
- 
namely that listening 
to, and the active participation of children in the family 'situation' is key. However, 
particularly with regards to those participants working within the formal divorce 
process, there is some evidence of children also being viewed more as the objects of 
welfare. This prompts the question as to whether this 'dual' image actually reflects 
a deeper sense of uncertainty about children and the nature of childhood within 
modem society. Certainly some sense of uncertainty does appear to be reflected in 
some of the discourses articulated at national level. This, in turn, suggests that this 
is an issue that requires further consideration by those involved at all levels of 
policy formulation and delivery. 
Underpinning the local approach is a very particular conception of family - and 
indeed one that represents a major discontinuity with national policy and the focus 
of national debates. At the local level there is not just an acceptance that families 
come in all shapes and sizes, but rather a celebration of that fact. For example, the 
values and philosophy set out in the literature provided by Participant A's 
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organisation, include a belief in, 'respecting and valuing the uniqueness and 
diversity of each individual'. Similarly, the principles underpinning the services 
provided to children and families by Participant F, seek to 'value every child and 
young person as a unique individual'. What can thus be seen within local work is 
an effective crystallisation of the recent sociological 'take' on family 
- 
namely that 
families are what families do. This, in turn, raises a fundamental question regarding 
the relevance of those more limited concepts of 'family' that are circulating at 
national level. 
An additional key factor that underlies local work, relates to the range of personal 
and social circumstances that are believed to impact on family life and behaviour. 
One example was mentioned in the discussion surrounding the difficulties involved 
in maintaining contact with children after divorce. A second illustration is provided 
by Participant J, who makes the following comment with regards to parent 
' education': 
'Well then again, you see these thing that, that, by sending you know, 
parents of unruly children to parenting classes again, that you're going to 
solve it. Because why are these kids so unhappy? They're not just unhappy 
because of the way that they live, they're unhappy because their needs aren't 
met at school either, they've been let down by the system in several guises, 
not just because their mum is a single mum, or their father is you know, 
maybe drinking too much or having an affair with a neighbour or something 
like that. ' 
The clear implication is that top-down models of how to 'do' family are overly 
simplistic, and fail to appreciate the complexity of factors, circumstances and issues 
that impact very fundamentally on people's ability to conform to them. This, in 
turn, suggests the need for a greater appreciation on the part of policy-makers that 
real life is not always as simple as it may appear in a policy statement. 
The flexible and reflexive approach offered by local participants provides an 
extremely interesting contrast to national approaches. Of course it is true national 
policy will always be constrained in the sense that it is about providing general rules 
or frameworks for the mass of population. However, the work that 
is being done at 
street level 
- 
and in particular their conceptions of family, and appreciation of the 
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reality of modern family life 
- 
do raise some very fundamental questions about the 
nature of the family policy that is being formulated at national level. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
Introduction 
The story of the Family Law Act 1996 is largely one of tension, negotiation and, 
ultimately, of a somewhat 'uncomfortable' compromise. The study data reveals 
that one basic 'tension' existing within the national policy-making community 
surrounds the issue of marriage and, in particular, the nature of the connections that 
are made between divorce law and marriage. The picture provided by the data is far 
from being a simple black and white one 
- 
indeed the discourses articulated by 
some of the constituents are both shifting and complex. However, what is clear is 
the fact that the national policy-making community is effectively attempting to 
operate on a stage that encompasses a broad continuum of opinion. Situated on one 
side of this continuum are the Idealist constituents, for whom divorce law is cast 
firmly in the role of 'supporting' marriage. This view is set against, at the opposite 
end of the continuum, those views articulated by the pragmatic constituents. 
Amongst the Pragmatic Progressives, the attempt to utilise divorce law in order to 
support marriage is viewed as illogical, inappropriate, and largely irrelevant (in that 
they doubt its efficacy). Instead the 'proper' role of law is constructed in terms of 
bringing marriages to an end in the best and most efficient way possible - 
essentially to resolve disputes involving children, property and finances and, for 
some participants, to attempt to maximise the potential for constructive post-divorce 
relations. 
Underpinning this 'tension' surrounding the role or function ofdivorce law, is an 
even more basic tension between the different 'world-views' held by those 
constituents who comprise the national policy-making community. Indeed it is 
these basic views and values that provide the essential 'frame' for constituents' 
contributions to the whole divorce debate. An insight into the fundamentally 
different world-views that are juxtaposed within the policy reform process, are 
278 
revealed by the competing ways in which both the 'problem' of divorce, and the 
broad legal 'role' are constructed and discussed. 
Amongst the Idealist constituents, there is a strong sense that some kind of 'moral' 
malaise underlies the changes that society is witnessing in family structures. These 
changes include an apparent increase in the rate of divorce, and reflect the 
perception of the nuclear family as uniquely beneficial to the well being of both 
individuals and the wider society. One result is that divorce thus becomes 
problematised principally on moral grounds 
- 
as violating both religious norms, and 
also notions of 'family' and personal responsibility. This vision of deterioration 
and decline, within which the law is conceptualised as a complicit actor, reflects a 
Utopian vision of an ideal society based upon a common social bond of shared 
values, and populated by the traditional family. 
The 'backward' facing vision provided by the Idealists, which reaches back towards 
an elusive 'golden age' of society and family, in turn provides the foundation for 
the construction of law as a vehicle for the realisation of that ideal society. Law 
thus becomes cast as a mechanism for social change. The mechanism by which that 
support is to be achieved involves a degree of turning back the divorce 'clock'. The 
fact of marriage breakdown is reconstructed as a 'public' matter, and is thus 
subjected to investigation and, ultimately, to adjudication by the courts. Personal 
relationships are therefore constituted as a legitimate site of legal regulation, and the 
law is accorded a role in the enforcement of personal morality. 
This Idealist discourse echoes some of the arguments advanced by Devlin (1965), 
namely that the law may legitimately intervene in individual morality in order to 
preserve the fabric of society. In this particular instance, it would seem that the 
fabric that Idealist constituents wish to preserve has in fact already unravelled, 
which raises fundamental questions about the extent of the influence that the 
idealistic vision has on the policy process. However, what can be said is that law is 
constructed in terms of doctrine - as being about 'first principles'. Part of its role is 
thus the setting and enforcing of standards. 
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The issue with which policy-makers are wrestling in this context, is largely one of 
social control or regulation. Of course social order constitutes a fundamental pre- 
requisite for society. For example, as Douglas observes, society is only possible to 
the extent that its members share certain symbolic meanings. However, whilst 
society demands constraint and a sharing of values, at the same time what he terms 
the 'necessity of meaning' creates opposing demands of freedom, individuality, 
choice and differentiation of self. The 'problem' of social order is thus described in 
the following terms: 
'essentially the problem of producing some sharedness of meanings and 
some coordination of activities of the members of any society sufficient to 
allow them to achieve what they consider to be adequate gratification of 
their needs and desires through their everyday fives. ' (1971: 3) 
Amongst Idealists, the dominant perception is that social 'deviance' (in this instance 
divorce and the movement away from the traditional nuclear family) produces 
social disorder and disintegration. Strong suggests that this position echoes views 
that he describes as, 'little more than intellectualised forms of the ancient belief that 
"moral decay causes social decay"' Gbid.: 5). However for these particular 
constituents, and indeed arguably for much of the broader political constituency 
itself social rules, and in particular moral rules, are identified as the specific kind of 
shared meaning that produces social order. Legislation incorporating universal or 
absolutist moral 'rules' thus provides the solution to a fragmented society and value 
system. 
Within the Family Law Act process itself, this 'perspective' crystallised as pressure 
in favour of an explicitly coercive divorce law - in effect for the re-imposition of an 
external moral code. Law is perceived as a tool with which to shape and define the 
parameters of behaviour of those couples whose relationship is breaking down. 
Arguably the aim is thus to accomplish a measure of social engineering - in this 
instance to 'encourage' people to stay married. The mechanism by which this result 
is to be achieved, is through the institutionalisation of disincentives to divorce. In 
essence a more difficult and unpleasant divorce process is advocated, with the aim 
of deterring those who are contemplating the possibility. 
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Amongst the more pragmatic constituents, the 'problem' of divorce is constructed 
primarily in practical rather than moral terms. Here the focus is on the difficulties 
allegedly created by the operation of existing divorce law. Therefore, in essence, 
discourses are framed by what can be described as a 'legal realist' or 6law in action' 
perspective. The 'problem' is conceptualised largely in terms of how the law 
actually performs, and the way in which it impacts upon families, individuals, and 
the nature and quality of the various family relationships. Particular concern is 
reserved for those relationships that necessarily survive the granting of the divorce 
decree 
- 
namely those involving children. 
It is inevitably much harder to identify some kind of Utopian vision underpinning 
the perspective articulated by these more pragmatic members of the policy 
community. Arguably it is not even appropriate to talk in those terms, as an 
assertion that marriage is 'best' or the 'ideal' often co-exists alongside the belief 
that society needs to accept and deal with the reality of divorce in a 'better' way. 
However, what can be said about the more pragmatic 'world views' is that in 
contrast to the idealist visions, they do pay very real attention to the conditions of 
existence of modem family life. Furthermore they also display a general respect for 
those conditions. 
The view of society offered by the Pragmatic Progressives 
- 
and indeed by much of 
the broad Progressive constituency 
- 
can be described as a 'forward' facing one. It 
is accepting, albeit to varying degrees, of the changes that have taken place in social 
and familial behaviour and values. This 'societal view' in turn provides a 
foundation for the construction of a law that reflects those changes. Here the 
questions to be asked of law are less concerned with how things 'ought' to be, 
focussing instead on how they 'are'. How they 'are' relates back to the reality of 
society and social life, to the 'performance' of law, and indeed to the limitations of 
law when dealing with intimate relationships. This recognition that marriage and 
family life have changed, combined with the view that the law is limited in what it 
can do to transform such deeply entrenched social changes, generates pressure for a 
different form of legal process 
- 
one that reflects social pressures for a more 'open' 
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approach to marriage, and which seeks to facilitate the best possible outcome for 
failed marriages. 
A question of compromise 
One interesting aspect of the process, that was to ultimately prove crucial to the 
final form of the Family Law Act, was that neither the Idealists nor the most 
pragmatic members of the Progressive constituency were ultimately able to carry 
the day. The end result was therefore one of compromise. The form of that 
compromise was a piece of legislation that sought to satisfy more pragmatic 
constituents with its introduction of no-fault divorce, whilst at the same time 
seeking the approval of the more idealist-oriented constituents through its emphasis 
on marriage. The Act thus attempted to create law with an essentially 'dual' 
character. The new divorce law both looked 'backwards' in that it was premised on 
the principles of saving and supporting marriage 
- 
as one of the national 
participants suggests, marr iage was cast as the 'gold standard' [14]. At the same 
time, however, the law also looked 'forwards' through its administration of the 
reality of marriage breakdown 
- 
although that administrative function was also 
subject to a default standard of the 'good' divorce. 
This duality may be partly attributable to the fact that neither constituency seems to 
have felt able to argue its position through to the logical conclusion. Despite their 
strongly held personal views, the Idealists do recognise both the extent to which 
society has changed, and some of the limitations of law in the context of intimate 
relationships. This recognition does seem to prevent them from arguing in favour 
of what would appear to be the logical conclusion to their analyses - namely a law 
that prevents divorce. Similarly, the Pragmatic Progressives are not prepared to 
argue in favour of a process that would bring marriages to an end in the most 
efficient manner 
- 
namely divorce on demand as a purely administrative process. 
One example of just such a process is evident in Sweden. Here a waiting period is 
only necessary where there are minor children, or one spouse disagrees with the 
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divorce. The parties are responsible for their own economic support post-divorce, 
marital property is divided evenly between the spouses and children (born within or 
legitimated by marriage) are subject to a 'joint custody' rule (Olah: 2001). In 
comparison, however, constituents appear to deem such a position to be both 
socially and politically unacceptable within the English context. 
A degree of 'compromise' would thus already seem to exist at either end of the 
policy spectrum, with constituencies apparently feeling some degree of constraint 
deriving from the 'opposing' perspective. However, another factor at work would 
also seem to be the inherent appeal of the middle ground. For example, the idea of 
saving 'saveable' marriages was particularly identified as a concept possessing the 
ability to appeal across the policy community, with the result that it ultimately 
represented a key site of compromise: 
'That was a phrase 
... 
and it really caught 
... 
people's imagination because 
I think they feel the concept of saving the saveable marriage, isn't about 
interfering in people and saying don't get divorced, its about saying let's 
find out the ones that are saveable, the people who in a sense get caught 
up in the whole process 
... 
So I think that phrase encapsulated a sort of 
national hope that we could actually make a difference, and we could do 
that in a way that wouldn't be intrusive, and we wouldn't be telling people 
what to do, and it was just simply you know something that we could all 
say, you know yes of course we want to save the saveable marriage. ' [51 
This 'compromise' was able to dovetail with the marriage-saving agenda of the 
Idealists. At the same time it was accepted by several of the Pragmatic 
Progressives, who anticipated that it would have no practical effect - it 
consequently represented a concession that actually involved no loss on their part. 
In addition, the concept also allowed those constituents who naturally occupied the 
more central ground to both feel that they were doing something positive, and to 
demonstrate their belief in the importance and primacy of marriage. 
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An alternative perspective 
An interesting contrast to the debates being conducted at national level is provided 
by the 'street-level' perspective, as articulated by local participants in the study. 
For local workers, the role of policy is constructed primarily in responsive terms. In 
common with some of the more pragmatic national constituents, the view is that 
policy should have a social basis 
- 
namely that it should be rooted in the social 
reality of individuals and families. Indeed to invoke Rodger's (1995) distinction 
between 'moral regulation' and 'family policy' 
- 
whilst national policy falls 
somewhat between the two, work at the local level clearly belongs to the category 
of family policy. Local stakeholders do not construct policy as some kind of tool 
for moralisation, nor do they see their role as somehow 'policing' families. Instead 
the function of policy is to provide a non-judgemental 'service' that caters to the 
diversity of families, and to their needs and circumstances. This may crystallise in, 
for example, helping people through a particular situation, or in supporting them to 
'do' family life in the best way that they can. 
This construction of the policy 'role' is based upon a world-view that does not 
simply accept social and familial diversity (and indeed underpinning that, moral 
diversity), but is happy to go a step further and actually celebrate it. Amongst local 
participants there is a general valuing of families, and a fundamental respect for 
their individual experience and the way in which they deal with family life. 
Morality is therefore regarded as a largely private issue. It is, however, important to 
recognise that the approach is not a completely laissez-faire one in the sense that 
6 anything goes'. Whilst emphasis is placed upon individuals negotiating their own 
6 moral terrains' (see for example, Smart et al 1999), intervention seeks to ensure the 
achievement of 'good enough' parenting and family life (see for example, 
participants F, H). The basis for regulatory intervention at local level is thus more 
akin to that of Mill's 0 974) 'harm principle'. 
It is arguable that this alternative approach is partially underpinned by a different 
societal 'vision'. Here neither social order, nor indeed the continued existence of 
society itself, is viewed in terms of integration and adherence to an absolute set of 
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values. Instead it is the responsible exercise of individual freedom of choice that it 
key. Furthermore, there is also a fundamental willingness to place trust in the 
parties themselves. Individuals are generally deemed to be the 'experts' when it 
comes to their particular situation, and it is they rather than the practitioner who will 
often know what is best for them. Pound's (1908) individual 'human factor' is thus 
central to local practice. Rather than adopting the (national) role of social engineer, 
local family policy therefore appears to operate more in the role of a mechanic 
involved in 'tuning-up' 
- 
essentially in assisting or improving family functioning. 
Arguably therefore parallels can be drawn between the local workers and 
Llewellyn's (1960) judges 
- 
both are guided by their 'situation sense', and indeed 
are working at the level of 'isness' rather than 'oughtness'. 
What is also particularly notable when comparing the local and national contexts is, 
firstly, the degree of consensus that exists within the local policy community. 
Whilst much of the national debate is characterised by tension, local stakeholders 
demonstrate a marked degree of solidarity in their thinking and approach. 
Secondly, and again in contrast to the 'difficulties' experienced with national 
policy, the assessments of the work that is being done locally are largely positive. 
Of course these self-assessments do come with the inevitable 'health warning', in 
that service providers are unlikely to be openly critical of their own services. 
However, in view of the dependence of local groups upon client satisfaction in 
order to secure the funding necessary for their continual survival, it is legitimate to 
suggest that they must indeed be doing something 'right'. 
This issue of funding does mean that it should be recognised that the relative 
absence of idealism at this level may not be wholly attributable to a more 
individualistic and flexible 'world view' on the part of local participants. It is 
arguable that local policy, particularly within the voluntary sector, is to some extent 
a 'consumer product'. Local organisations must therefore respond positively to the 
diverse situations and demands of the individuals and families who constitute their 
markets. However as discussed in the preceding chapter, the fact that local workers 
are explicitly critical of the idealist and universal tone of national policy, does 
suggest the presence of a genuinely different value system at ground level. 
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The'failure' of compromise 
Following its receipt of Royal Assent on 4 July 1996, the life of the Family Law 
Act has proved to be both controversial, and relatively brief. Part 11 of the 1996 
Act, which contains the new divorce provisions, was originally scheduled for 
implementation in 2000. However, On 17 June 1999, the Lord Chancellor 
confirmed in a written answer to a Parliamentary question that the Government was 
no longer intending to implement Part 11 as originally planned. 
The reasons given for this decision were located in what have been described as the 
'disappointing' interim findings from the information meeting pilots. Indeed the 
Lord Chancellor's answer stated that the requirement to attend an information 
meeting prior to initiating divorce proceedings, was actually failing to satisfy either 
of its two objectives 
- 
namely those of supporting families, and of reducing conflict 
in divorce. The following was provided as one apparent example of this failure: 
6 only 7% of those attending the pilots had been diverted into mediation, 
and 39% of those attending had reported they were more likely than before 
to go to a solicitor. ' (Lord Chancellor's Department: No. 159/99) 
On 16 January 2001 it was finally announced that when there was sufficient 
Parliamentary time, the Government intended to ask Parliament to repeal Part 11 of 
the Family Law Act. The accompanying Press Notice (Lord Chancellor's 
Department 20/01) emphasised the centrality of compulsory information meetings 
to the new divorce process, describing them as intended to help couples either to 
save their marriages, or to end them with minimum acrimony and distress. 
However, the Press Notice then went on to state that none of the six models tested 
in the pilot schemes had ultimately proved to be 'good enough' to justify the 
implementation of the new process on a national scale. 
The Press Notice did expand on the situation, stating that the research conducted 
into the pilot schemes showed that although those attending did find the provision 
of information to be valuable, the information meetings themselves were generally 
not effective in helping most people to save their marriages. The main reason 
for 
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this was the fact that the meetings simply came too late in the day. The research 
was also reported to show that the meeting tended to incline those who were unsure 
about the state of their marriage, towards seeking a divorce 
Additional 'problems' included that the format of meetings was insufficiently 
flexible to provide people with information tailored to their needs. Furthermore, the 
marriage counselling, conciliatory divorce and mediation promoted by the meeting 
were all dependent upon the willing involvement of both parties. However, it was 
generally only the party petitioning for divorce who actually attended the 
information meeting. Some concern was also expressed that the complexity of the 
new divorce process might actually create delay and uncertainty 
- 
something that 
was not in the best interest of either the parties or their children. 
The Final Evaluation Report on the Information Meeting pilots was also published 
on 16 January 2001. As stated in the Government Press Notice, and indeed echoing 
points articulated by some of the study participants, the Report (Lord Chancellor's 
Department 2001) found that those attending the Information Meetings were a 
diverse bunch. Some were unsure what to do about their marriages, others were 
certain that they wanted a divorce, whilst a further group sought information on 
specific issues. Generally, however, it was the case that attendees expected 
information to be more personally tailored to their individual needs. Rather than 
simply providing a forum for the provision of information, they also expected that 
their questions would be answered. Thus the Report concludes that what people 
seemed to want was an individual meeting that was sensitive both to their personal 
situation, and to the particular stage that they had reached in the process of marriage 
breakdown. 
Although not highlighted by the Government, the Report does also place a 
significant emphasis on the fact that those who attended the meetings did find the 
provision of information to be valuable. However, echoing some of the criticism 
that has been aimed at the 1996 Act as a whole, issues do surround the dual nature 
of the function accorded to the meetings. For example it is noted that a basic 
tension exists between presenting and receiving information about both marriage 
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saving and the divorce process within the context of the same meeting. Indeed this 
is something that is also articulated by one of the study participants: 
'The concern is 
... 
that there may in effect have been a trade-off, 
that the price of having a meeting which is better for saving a few 
extra saveable marriages, may actually be worse in terms of its 
effectiveness at giving people information about parenting, 
mediation and the divorce processes because it comes too early. ' [31 
One additional interesting observation arising out of a comparison between the 
Report and the Government's Press Notice, is that the Report appears to be 
underpinned by a slightly different 'take' on the basic purpose of the information 
meetings. For example, whilst the Government emphasises the objectives of saving 
marriages and promoting conciliatory divorce, the Report argues that the meetings 
actually have 'two principal objectives'. The first of these is described as directing 
the individual's attention to those issues that should be considered when 
contemplating bringing one's marriage to an end. The second is to provide 
information on the various options for the resolution of difficulties, and the support 
services available. 
With regards to supporting and saving marriage, the Report agrees that information 
about marriage support came too late for many parties. Indeed over half were 
already separated by the time that they attended a meeting. However, arguably in 
contrast to the assumptions that appear to underpin much of the new divorce 
process, it notes that many people had actually already made attempts to save their 
marriage. Consequently at this stage, counselling was only of limited success in 
dissuading people from going ahead with divorce. 
Despite this finding, the incorporation of a counselling element was not regarded as 
being without merit. Indeed it is reported that the meeting with a marriage 
counsellor appears to have had a positive impact on the quality of spousal 
relationships, and to have helped people to examine their options and to decide what 
further help might be needed. In essence therefore 'marriage counselling' was 
helpful both in ending the uncertainty, and in helping attendees to move on with 
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their lives and face the future more positively. Thus what comes through the 
Report, is almost a questioning as to whether the law really 'should' be involved in 
social engineering, either in the sense of trying to get people to stay together, or by 
encouraging them to follow a particular 'route' through the divorce process. 
To some extent, the tone of the Evaluation Report on Information Meetings echoes 
the work of the research team commissioned by the Legal Services Commission to 
monitor the pilots of the 1996 Act's mediation component. Their report had been 
published by the Commission in December of 2000 (LSC 2000). The background 
to this report lay in the hope that the new legislation would result in mediation, 
rather than lawyers, becoming the principal method of resolving disputes. In 
addition to utilising the Information Meeting to raise the possibility of mediation, 
Part III of the Act also provides that parties seeking legal aid must consider the 
mediation option. Indeed anyone seeking legal aid for lawyer representation is 
required to first attend a meeting with a mediator (subject to certain exceptions), the 
purpose of which is to determine whether mediation is suitable in the light of the 
nature of the dispute and the relationship between the parties. This requirement 
extends to all disputes involving money, property or children (section 29). 
One of the Report's findings, was that public funding did not have an immediate 
impact on the volume of mediation work. Although the requirement that potential 
legal aid applicants first explore the option of mediation did significantly increase 
the number of cases referred to mediation providers, only a small increase in the 
number of mediation starts ultimately resulted (para. 7.1 Summary). In addition, 
and although people's experience of mediation was generally positive (para. 17 
Summary), the response to solicitors was even more favourable. Indeed the 
partisanship of solicitors was found to constitute an important factor, in that it was 
highly valued by those facing the stress of separation and divorce (para. 20.1 
Summary). As Gwynn Davis, the Academic Director of the research team notes, 
the Act envisaged mediation as part of the mainstream. However the reality, as 
indeed was emphasised by several of the study participants, is that it actually 
constitutes only a 6minority taste' (Davis 2000). 
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The findings of both of these reports arguably represent a fundamental challenge to 
the idea that divorce law actually 'can' fulfil the role of a social engineer 
- 
in 
essence that law can change behaviour in the sphere of intimate relationships. 
Consequently they also constitute a challenge to the basic Idealist position itself, 
and to the universal models of morality and behaviour that underpin it. In contrast, 
however, the Government response to the findings suggests that it is law in the 
particular form of the Family Law Act that is not able to secure a change in 
behaviour. This seems to suggest either a continued adherence to the belief that this 
constitutes a legitimate and achievable role for law, or alternatively a fundamental 
unwillingness within Government to really challenge the Idealist view that this is 
indeed how the proper role of law should be constructed. 
The national focus 
The apparent inability of the new divorce process to either support or save 
marriages in practice, represents something of a crystallisation of the views 
expressed by a number of the national policy-makers who participated in the study. 
Furthermore, it would also seem to reinforce much of the criticism articulated 
locally with regards to the 'marriage-centric' nature of national policy and thinking. 
In view of both this, and particularly of the fact that work being conducted at local 
level does appear to be achieving positive results, a key question prompted by the 
data is thus why the perspective of local workers - which arguably constitutes the 
6 genuine' voice of pragmatism 
- 
does not appear to be articulated at national level. 
Indeed one central finding of the study, is the fact that the perception that marriage 
is somehow 'best' continues to resonate right across the national policy-making 
community. The failure to challenge what seems to be the commonsense idea 'that 
everybody knows' marriage is best, is a marked one. 
As evidenced by the chapters detailing the history of divorce law, this perception of 
marriage is a long-standing one. Just one example of its continued endurance 
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beyond the direct question of divorce law reform, was provided by a House of 
Lords debate on 'Marriage and Family Values', held on 17 January 2001. The Lord 
Bishop of St Albans represents just one example of the 'traditional' idealist 
position: 
'Of course I recognise that not all marriages are good and I recognise 
that relationships break down. But surely we have a moral duty to ensure 
that marriages survive. Exhortation is not enough. We need to engineer 
our society legally, educationally and financially so that fewer of our 
children are caught up in the anguish of family breakdown. ' 
(vol. 620, col. 1136). 
In contrast, Lord Janner of Braunstone offers an example of the more pragmatic 
view: 
6we must recognise reality, and reality is changing. The reality is diversity 
and the fact that some of our children live in ways that are different from the 
way in which we have decided to live our lives. The reality is that we must 
help them and, above all, their children. ' (ibid., col. 1137) 
However, as with the Family Law Act debates, this position is once again prefaced 
by what seems to be the inevitable caveat: 'We believe in marriage and, yes, we 
believe in virtue 
... 
and in all that is best in the world' (loc. cit.. ). 
At national level there is a tendency, principally among 'political' constituents, to 
seek to apply personal beliefs to policy. Discourses make frequent reference to 
personal beliefs, convictions and experiences of family life. The task of law and 
policy is then constructed in terms of those beliefs. This contrasts sharply with the 
local situation, where 'the personal' is constructed much more in terms of what can 
be learnt from the experiences of others. Indeed, at this level, there is an awareness 
that personal views can potentially inhibit one's ability to work effectively with the 
variety of people and situations with whom local organisations come into contact. 
Policy (and thinking) is thus not constructed through the lens of personal belief 
systems. 
As alluded to earlier in the thesis, this divergence of perspective may well 
be partly 
attributable to the cultural and experiential 'gap' that exists 
between those operating 
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at street-level, vis a vis the relative detachment of national politics. Local practice 
is inevitably shaped and constrained by the situations and needs of service users. In 
comparison, the distance at which politics operates from street-level, arguably 
affords politicians the comparative luxury of being able to articulate their personal 
views. 
It is also suggested that one further possible reason for the pre-eminence of these 
absolutist visions of society, may lie in the fact that such visions require others to 
see the world in the same way. As Douglas observes: 
'There can be no other legitimate view of the world. The assumption of 
absolutism in beliefs or morality, then, is a form of mental imperialism 
which, if successful, constrains others to act so as to best serve our own 
interests. The acceptance of our absolutist theory would order the world 
in complete accord with our own best interests (as we see them). ' 
(1971: 245) 
An absolutist approach to social rules and social order may thus possess an inherent 
appeal, particularly for those occupying positions of influence. 
A question, however, remains as to why there was no real articulated challenge to 
the national focus on marriage, and ultimately to the general principles of saving 
and supporting marriages, from those participants who do not constitute part of the 
formal political constituency. Indeed this absence is particularly surprising in view 
of the preference expressed by several participants for a 'straightforward divorce 
act' [9]. As one participant, who actually represented a marriage support 
organisation, observed: 
6a good divorce law would actually be just that, it would be about dealing 
with people who 
... 
were clear that they wanted a divorce, but of course 
that's in an ideal world. ' [51 
Although some constituents did regard the making of connections between divorce 
law and marriage to be inappropriate, they did not feel that it was possible to mount 
an argument against them. As discussed in previous chapters, the reasons 
for this 
included that such an argument was not felt to be 'acceptable'. Furthermore the aim 
of supporting marriage was regarded as so 'reasonable' that one simply could not 
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oppose it, whilst the general principles were viewed as the political 'price' of 
achieving no-fault divorce. 
One further aspect of the relative absence of challenge to the primacy placed on 
marriage, appears to reflect an awareness amongst study participants of the broader 
context within which divorce reform is conducted, and the inherent difficulties that 
this creates for the reform process. As one participant remarked of the whole 
reform issue: 
'it's a political hot potato, it always has been. This was the first 
government sponsored reform of divorce procedure since the 
mid-nineteenth century, and the reason is because any time anybody 
does anything on family issues, or homosexuality or anything like 
that, the Daily Mail jumps on them, and Middle England is up in 
arms. ' [61 
This broader context was exacerbated by the political make-up of the House of 
Commons at the time 
- 
in particular the Conservative Government's small majority, 
and its consequent reliance on support from the Labour opposition. As this 
participant then goes on to observe: 
'the problem the Conservatives had, was that they had a majority of 
seven, and its own backbenchers 
... 
all the family people, were using it 
as a means of getting their own points across. ' [61 
It was also recognised that within the broader political and social contexts, divorce 
law is an issue that resonates beyond simply dealing with the breakdown of 
marriage. As another constituent observes: 
'Politically, to bring in divorce law is a killer 
... 
because, it kind of 
becomes the vehicle for all these other kind of issues to do with women, 
and to do with 
... 
fairness, and to do with men, and to do with morality 
and sexual morality, and 
... 
you name it. ' [51 
The need to ensure that reform was politically acceptable thus became a central 
influence in the shaping of the new law. A key element of that acceptability lay in 
the connections made between the law and marriage. 
As this constituent suggests: 
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'They must've known that they wouldn't bring through a change in divorce law if 
they didn't appear to be supporting marriage [51 
One result of this pressure was ultimately the incorporation of the concept of saving 
the saveable marriage. However, the need to secure political acceptance, also 
impacted upon the concept of 'responsibility'. A divorce law that ensured spouses 
accepted responsibility for children and partners, was perceived to make no-fault 
divorce more acceptable 
- 
particularly amongst those idealist constituencies for 
whom no-fault equated to 'easy' divorce. As one constituent stated: 
'If on the one hand one lobby is saying 'please don't make divorce easier' 
and the other is saying 'well don't make it easier but could you not make 
it less stressful, could you just not make it a more sensible thing'... And 
what was quite interesting, if you analyse the objections of both and put 
them together, it seemed to be resolved by the requirement that the taking 
of responsibility 
... 
And if you like that became the key determinant of 
divorce reform. The system and philosophy should be enabling people to 
better understand their responsibility, and to discharge that responsibility 
before they took on new responsibility. ' [21 
Consequently there appears to be the perception amongst policy-makers that in 
order to have an effective voice at national level, and indeed to be taken seriously, it 
is necessary to conduct the debate with the broader, more ideologically charged and 
generally pro-marriage context. This is reinforced by the demonstration amongst 
participants of an acute awareness as to the 'political' nature of divorce law reform 
- 
'politics', with both a small and a capital 'p', operates as a significant influence 
on the construction of divorce law and the nature of its role. 
One example of this awareness is provided by participants who described the 
necessity of 'selling' their position within the political arena. Indeed several talked 
at some length about their lobbying experiences, and the careful framing of 
arguments in order to secure a receptive 'political' audience. The skills 
involved in 
briefing effectively were described by one particular participant: 
'I learnt what it means if it's going to be effective, it doesn't mean 
making a lot of noise, it means knowing exactly where to lob your 
ball 
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if you like. So if you think of the image of lobbing the ball, I mean a 
good tennis player knows precisely how to lob, exactly were, when. 
So I mean lobbying really is that kind of skill. ' [91 
A further example of the 'political' nature of the whole reform process is provided 
by constituents who talk explicitly about the way in which it was utilised in order to 
advance their own position. An illustration of this is provided by one constituent, 
who referred to the exercise of 'sheer optimism' on the part of her interest group. 
This particular constituent represented a marriage organisation, and whilst accepting 
that 'it's probably true' that divorce law might not be the place to be trying to 
support marriage, she then goes on to ask the question, 'but where else can you get 
it in? ' [51 
Divorce law reform thus offered an invaluable opportunity for certain organisations 
to make themselves heard: 'The need to reform divorce would obviously become a 
point at which we could engage politically, and 
... 
from a policy point of view' [5]. 
She says of the Family Law Act process: 'It was a very clear example that if you 
have a policy concern 
... 
you find a piece of legislation that you might be able to 
attach to. ' This constituent was aware that her organisation would be used by 
government in order to combat some of the more heavily ideological arguments 
advanced by political opponents to the legislation, and was thus keen to ensure that 
they also gained from the process. With particular regards to the issue of funding 
for marriage support services (which was ultimately incorporated into section 22 of 
the Act), she states: 'Government needed the middle-ground, and we'd got the 
middle-ground backing things' [51. 
The 'issue' of children 
The children 6 question I is an interesting one. Within the study sample, the Child 
Advocates displayed some concern that the reform process had relatively little to 
say about children. It should, however, be noted that the Family Law 
Act itself has 
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been described as embodying, 'a far more child-centred divorce law than any 
previous UK statute' (Reece 2000: 85-6). This latter position is illustrated by the 
argument that section 11 (3) of the Act witnessed the first introduction of the 
&paramountcy principle' into the law of divorce. By virtue of section 11 (2) the 
court also has power to postpone divorce indefinitely if the circumstances are likely 
to require it to exercise any of its powers under the Children Act, it is not in a 
position to do so without further consideration, and the circumstances are 
exceptional. In deciding whether circumstances are likely to require it to exercise 
its powers, the court is instructed to treat the child's welfare as paramount (section 
110). 
Despite this divergence in interpretation, the study clearly demonstrates that 
children featured very strongly in both the debates surrounding the 1996 Act, and 
the thinking that underpinned it. Indeed children are employed to justify the 
different stances adopted by various national policy-makers 
- 
whether that stance 
takes the shape of restricting divorce, reducing conflict between parents, or seeking 
to enhance good relationships with both parents post-divorce. As one of the 
national participants states: 
'I felt, especially for the children 
... 
that I had that responsibility to do what 
I could to give them the best life that was within my power. ' [81 
Family law has been accused of operating according to a 'dependency framework', 
into which a limited notion of children's agency is slotted (Neale and Smart 1998: 
14). Certainly what comes through the majority of discourses articulated at national 
level is that children's competence to speak within the divorce context is strictly 
limited, and that their welfare is generally best served by parents. It is, however, 
suggested that such a construction of welfare is unsurprising. As King and Piper 
observe: 
'It is hardly surprising that the law's utterances on children's 
well-being concentrate upon the parent-child relationship. The law 
'knows' children through the parent or parents. Parents have legal 
rights, duties and responsibilities. These not merely empower the 
parents to take decisions about their children's lives, but they are the 
very threads which the law attaches to people who become legal 
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parents, jerking them into response when things go 'wrong' in the 
child's life. ' (1995: 55) 
The study reveals a predominant national construction of children caught up in 
separation and divorce as the recipients of both parental and adult responsibilities 
and duties. Indeed the widely presumed needs of children have prompted an 
emphasis on the continuing participation of both parents in the child's life after 
separation. However, as King and Piper (1995) have also noted, within certain 
areas of law children are now increasingly being defined in terms of the rights 
attributed to them. Thus in certain quarters the child is beginning to be constructed 
as a legal person whose interests must be represented at court hearings, and whose 
views must be sought on issues concerning his or her future welfare. Whilst the 
Child Advocates argue in favour of the introduction of such a legal construct into 
the divorce context, the local participants in the study suggest that a street-level 
version is actually already operating on the ground. 
The work being done locally also reveals that children do need to talk about family 
breakdown, that they have views that deserve to be heard and respected, and indeed 
that they want to have some positive input into the whole process. This local 
'picture' derives support from various research studies that have recently looked at 
how children experience parental separation and divorce. For example, 
Bretherton's study of thirty children of divorced parents, found that only forty-four 
percent felt that they had been involved in the decision-making process. In 
comparison, eighty-three percent of the children said that they would have liked to 
be so involved. As the author observes: 
'They felt that as the person most affected by the decision, they should 
be involved in the process'. They did not expect or want to have the final 
decision, but wanted to have their say. ' (2002: 453) 
Interestingly these responses were obtained despite the fact that all of the children 
had actually met with a Family Court Welfare Officer at some point during the 
process, who had then gone on to prepare a welfare report. 
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In a similar vein, Butler et at found that children wanted to be told what was going 
on, even if it was sometimes difficult for them to comprehend. With regards to 
issues of contact and residence, they were strongly of the belief that their opinion 
was important, and that to be asked for it was even more so. As the study observes, 
children are involved in divorce in the sense that they do 'experience' it: 'probably 
on much the same terms as adults' (2002: 98). It is therefore important that this 
experience is both respected and valued within the process. 
Some of the national participants did question whether children had any place 
within the formal divorce process. However, and particularly in light of the local 
findings, it is argued that such a position requires adjustment. Indeed what is 
needed, is a new 'child responsiveness' (King and Piper 1995) oil the part of both 
the courts, and the various adults who are faced with children-related issues. At this 
point it is useful to make reference to Smart and Neale, who suggest that children 
should be entitled to what they term 'self 
-defined' rights to be listened to 0 998: 
40). In essence, the task of defining and operational is ing rights is down to the 
children themselves 
- 
children should be invited to participate but how to proceed, 
and whether indeed to do so is their decision. The 'flip-side' of this will thus 
involve adults learning to trust children's judgement, and according them the 
competence to decide whether and how to exercise their right to be heard. 
This reorientation does involve placing a whole new set of demands upon the 
divorce system. In addition it also represents a challenge to some fairly set 
preconceptions about family, parents and children. Indeed as Butler et al argue: 
'any informed understanding of how a child is or might be 'involved' 
with their parents' divorce implies as much a change in our collective 
understanding and attitudes towards children as it implies the 
development of a new repertoire of skills in talking and listening to 
children. ' (2002: 89-90) 
The fact that the task is a difficult one does not, however, mean that it is one that 
policy-makers and the law should continue to duck. In the 
light of the Family Law 
Act, the Lord Chancellor's Department has sponsored the production of a series of 
'Divorce and Separation Leaflets' for children of varying ages, aimed at 
helping 
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them to understand what is going on within their families and providing information 
about courts and divorce proceedings. These leaflets can be downloaded from the 
internet, or are available through a range of other sources. A parallel leaflet, 
providing information and guidance to parents on how to discuss the issues with 
their children, is also available. This does represent the beginnings of a movement 
towards a greater recognition of children, however, there remains a very long way 
to go if they are going to be genuinely recognised as competent individual subjects 
within a modern divorce process. 
Developments in 'family policy' 
Despite the difficulties resulting from the Family Law Act's focus on marriage, 
family policy at the national level has continued to negotiate the ground between 
advocating absolutism in the form of marriage, and embracing diversity. One 
example of this is provided by the publication of the New Labour Government's 
Consultation Paper, 'Supporting Families' in November 1998, which conducts 
something of a balancing act between extolling the virtues of marriage and 
attempting not to be overly prescriptive: 
'This Government believes that marriage provides a strong foundation 
for stable relationships. This does not mean trying to make people 
marry, or criticising or penalising people who choose not to. We do not 
believe that the Government should interfere in people's lives in that way. 
But we do share the belief of the majority of people that marriage provides 
the most reliable framework for raising children. ' 
(Home Office 1998: para. 4.3) 
The Consultation Paper is a substantial document, that sets out the five following 
key areas for action: (1) Better services and support for parents; (2) Financial 
support; (3) Helping families balance work and home; (4) Strengthening marriage; 
and (5) Better support for serious family problems. The Paper has been described 
as moving parenting to the heart of policy (Maclean, M.: 'Governments and 
Families Conference', University of Nottingham, 9 April 1999). What is, however, 
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of particular interest, are those measures that are particularly proposed in order to 
support marriage. Very briefly these include: providing couples intending to marry 
with a guide to the rights and responsibilities involved in marriage (Home Office 
1998: para. 4.13), an acceptance of pre-nuptial agreements, on the basis that the 
greater security they provide on property matters may make it more likely that 
people will marry rather than simply live together (para 4.22); an enhanced role for 
Registrars which would incorporate making information about marriage (including 
marriage preparation packs and information about pre-marriage support services) 
available to couples, (para. 4.26); and an enhanced, and thus more meaningful and 
personal marriage ceremony (para. 4.28). 
The extent to which these measures might actually succeed in strengthening 
marriage is somewhat open to question (see, for example, Fox Harding 2000), as 
indeed is the legitimacy of attempting to strengthen marriage itself. Certainly 
responses to the Consultation Paper were mixed. Whilst some respondents felt that 
the proposals did not go far enough, others were of the opinion that the focus was 
placed too heavily on marriage at the expense of other relationships (Home Office 
1999). 
This 'division' of opinion is also reflected, to some extent, amongst academic 
commentators. For example, Weeks refers to the Consultation Paper as, 'the most 
liberal intervention in debates on the family ever to come out of Whitehall' (1999: 
225). He suggests that the endorsement of any particular family form is avoided, 
while the overall tone of the document is actually one of pragmatic adjustment to 
the changing social realities. Indeed the defence of marriage is conducted, 'in terms 
of pragmatism, the needs of children and the majority choices of the British people 
rather than principle, whether Christian or secular communitarianism' (225). 
However, despite this apparent movement away from moral absolutism, he does 
suggest that government remains unable to fully endorse the diversity of modem 
family life: 'it cannot quite bring itself to question the institution of marriage, or the 
primacy of the two-parent (heterosexual) family' (229). 
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Other commentators have arguably placed a different interpretation on this policy 
development. For example, Barlow and Duncan (2000a) argue that the 
Consultation Paper represents the codification of New Labour's desire to use 
legislation to promote what it sees as desirable family forms, and to discourage 
other less favoured family practices. They make the point that alternative 
partnership and parenting forms are barely mentioned, whilst nothing is said about 
same sex parenting (2000b). Even an awareness of the scale of marriage 
breakdown is not regarded as undermining the essential benefits of the institution: 
'All observations and proposals seem almost entirely premised upon 
the essential superiority of the married family form, which merely 
requires strengthening before it is able to flourish again. ' (2000b: 131) 
In a similar vein, Fox Harding does refer to the 'laissez-faire disclaimers' present 
within the document. This, she suggests, reflects an anticipation on the part of 
government, that it might be criticised for attempting to lecture or pressure people 
into particular family forms. However, despite this, she then goes on to identify 
certain values and preferences as emerging from the Consultation Paper. Those 
preferences are stated as follows: 
'for stable relationships, for long-term commitment, for good quality 
and dedicated parenting, and indeed for marriage rather than some other 
basis for sexual and parenting partnerships. ' (2000: 11-2). 
Adrian James ('Governments and Families Conference', University of Nottingham, 
9 April 1999) agrees that the Paper does not explicitly deny alternative family 
forms. However, he also makes the additional suggestion that marriage, parenting 
and family are taken to apply to the same thing. In reality, therefore, diverse family 
forms are not supported. Indeed change is positively resisted through the support 
accorded to marriage. The result is therefore that the 'words and music' do not 
match within the context of the Paper. 
James also questions whether 'Supporting Families' is actually about providing 
support or exercising control. Fox Harding suggests that the majority of the Paper's 
proposals actually fall into the relatively non-directive 
'support' category. She 
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does, however, characterise the Paper as 'subtly controlling' in that it seeks to 
change the culture when it comes to seeking help and advice. Seeking help is a 
matter that should be left to individuals, however government aims to change the 
culture in order that they want to seek such help: 'What is proposed is a change in 
people's thinking and their internal controls, a change of consciousness' (2000: 27). 
The Consultation Paper is also characterised as reflecting a more explicit focussing 
on the relationship between government and parenting, a focus that may be 
producing a more controlling, prescriptive, coherent and targeted approach to 
individuals in their parenting roles. Consequently Government is now identified as 
'traditional' on family in the sense that the policy emphasis is placed on stable 
marriages, and also on partnerships that closely resemble marriage (Fox Harding 
2000: 28). 
This idea of an evolving emphasis on partnerships that resemble marriage is a 
policy theme that has been endorsed in the recently published report: 'Moving 
Forward Together. A Proposed Strategy for Marriage and Relationship Support for 
2002 and Beyond' (Advisory Group on Marriage and Relationship Support, Lord 
Chancellor's Department, April 2002). Within this report is a recognition of the 
need for an effective support strategy that takes account of the structure of modem 
relationships and families (ibid.: para. 4.1). Secondly, what is also required is a 
more, 'long-term proactive, positive and preventative approach'. Such an approach 
is believed to foster a 'better understanding of what makes relationships succeed', 
and an 'investing in relationships'. This broader strategy is regarded as likely to 
offer more effective support for relationships, than the simple provision of an 
'Accident and Emergency service' once crisis point is reached (ibid.: para. 7.5). 
The tone of the Advisory Group's report reflects both the arguments advanced by 
several study participants, and arguably also the deficiencies within the Family Law 
Act scheme itself. However, although it does appear to represent something of a 
shift away from the policy adherence to marriage, concerns about the 
falling annual 
rates of marriage and the fact that 'over two in every 
five marriages will end in 
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divorce' remain (ibid.: para. 3, Summary). In addition, it is the achievement of the 
pseudo-marriage' model of family that remains a central aim of policy: 
'The adult couple 
... 
is the cornerstone of the family. Strong and stable 
relationships benefit all in society. There is a growing body of evidence 
in this country which demonstrates the health benefits, and benefits to 
children, of committed couple relationships. In arguing for greater support 
for the couple, we do not in any sense question the validity or stability 
provided by other relationships, such as lone parent families. We are not 
proposing that there should be some effort to make people marry, or that 
there should be any criticism of, or penalty for, those who choose not to. 
But the adverse effects on society of relationship breakdown, and the 
positive benefits of stable couple relationships, make a strong case for 
action. ' (ibid.: para. 10.1) 
The way forward? 
Announcing the abandonment of the 1996 Act, Lord Irvine stressed the 
Government's commitment, 'to supporting marriage and to supporting families 
when relationships fail'. The Family Law Act was presented as, 'not the way to 
achieve those aims. ' (LCD 2001: 20/01) Yet just over a year earlier, the 
introduction to the 'Supporting Families' Consultation Paper had asserted that there 
was a tendency for family policy to suffer from the 'misguided view' that there 
were 'large levers' that governments could pull in order to influence how families 
behave: 
'The truth is that families are, and always will be, mainly shaped by 
private choices well beyond the influence of government. ' 
(Home Office 1998: 5) 
Despite this assertion there does, however, appear to have been something of a 
reluctance amongst national policy makers to abandon the view of law as providing 
such levers. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 'Supporting Families' itself does 
seem to be somewhat illustrative of that reluctance. Indeed one commentator 
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remarked shortly after its publication that although the document recognised that 
there had never been a 'golden age' of the family, its tenor was very much that of 
attempting to create one tomorrow (David Morgan.: ESRC Seminar Group, 
Tostmodern' Kinship, University of Leeds, 6 November1998). In January of 2001, 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine reiterated New Labour's position on m arriage and 
family values: 
'The role of the state is to encourage, not to compel; to provide practical 
help, not to preach. I can assure noble Lords that the Government are 
certainly not neutral. We have made clear our support for the institution 
of marriage and for the farnily. ' 
(House of Lords Debates, 17 January 2001, vol. 620, col. 1164) 
This stance appears to have been largely reiterated in his forward to the recent 2002 
Paper on marriage and relationship support. Although stating that the Government, 
'has no desire to tell people how to live their lives', he then continues to make the 
following assertion: 'But if couples' lives can be improved 
- 
and those of their 
children 
- 
then that is something worth doing' (Lord Chancellor's Department 
2002: 2). 
One result of this reluctance has been that of problematic policy compromise 
- 
in 
particular compromise in order to accommodate the Idealist position. Within the 
context of divorce law, legislators have long wrestled with the issue of how to 
regulate the breakdown of the marital relationship. That the law has fundamental 
'jobs' that must be fulfilled 
- 
namely the resolution of disputes, the allocation of 
property and finances, and securing the welfare of minor children - is undisputed. 
However, beyond that, the issue of whether divorcing parties should be subject to 
some form of universal moral code or simply allowed to negotiate their own moral 
terrains remains open to question. 
The Family Law Act attempted to negotiate a route between 'moral regulation' and 
'family policy' (Rodger 1995) - between the promotion of a common morality a la 
Devlin, and an appreciation that law needs to engagewith real life as it is. The end 
result is thus, according to Bainham (1998), an Act whose most notable feature is 
the inconsistency in its ideological base. The concept of no-fault, non-adversarial 
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divorce is promoted. However, at the same time, procedures are also incorporated 
that make the obtaining of a divorce more difficult 
- 
indeed it is suggested that the 
procedural complexity and built-in delay is actually demonstrative of official 
disapproval of divorce. Furthermore, the Act claims to be in favour of marriage, yet 
through its focus on post-divorce relationships, it effectively stretches the notion of 
family well beyond the confines of marriage. 
As anticipated by both a number of study participants and academic commentators, 
the information meeting and mediation pilots demonstrated that individuals do not 
invariably match up to preferred models of behaviour that enshrined within 
legislation. Indeed some very basic questions surround whether such 'soft' or 
'internal' control is actually vested with the capacity to change and shape personal 
behaviour in this context. For example, Barlow and Duncan (2000b) suggest that 
the very idea that providing information or establishing 'models' of behaviour will 
prompt people to act in the 'right' way, is fundamentally flawed. Indeed the 
attempt to alter decision-making about partnering and parenting by changing legal 
parameters, may be rendered irrelevant by what they term the 'rationality mistake' 
- 
namely that people do not go about making decisions in the way in which 
government assumes that they do. 
With specific regard to the 'Supporting Families' Consultation Paper, and using 
recent empirical research on mothers' views on marriage and cohabitation, Barlow 
and Duncan question whether marriage can be strengthened by continuing to focus 
legal privileges on it. With its revelation that very few mothers actually see 
marriage as a superior form of either partnering or parenting, the research casts very 
serious doubt on the efficacy of the Paper's provisions. Indeed the decisive factor 
for most mothers was actually the quality of the relationship with their partner - 
something that appeared to be unaffected by marital status. Furthermore, marriage 
was also seen as largely irrelevant to the welfare of children 
(2000b: 138). These 
findings thus lead the authors to suggest that government has misunderstood the 
ways in which people make decisions about partnering, with the result that 
it 
'misplaces' the role of family law - in effect people will not choose marriage on the 
basis of the fact that it comes with certain legal privileges. 
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The gap identified by Barlow and Duncan as existing between actual moral 
behaviour and that assumed by the Consultation Paper, does appear to be similarly 
present in the context of relationship breakdown and the Family Law Act 1996. 
Certainly this view is reinforced by the comment made by Maclean and Richards 
- 
namely that the Family Law Act model, 'may mistakenly assume a rational and 
well-disposed divorcing population' (1999: 269). 
The Family Law Act represented an attempt to impose universal codes of behaviour 
through a combination of both external (in the sense of coercive process that must 
be adhered to) and internal (in the sense of the model divorce that may be aspired 
to) mechanisms. However, the lessons of history suggest that there are some very 
real problems surrounding the efficacy of attempting to impose some kind of 
universal or absolute code through the medium of divorce law. Whatever the 
situation in the past, this kind of vision simply no longer 'fits' with the lived reality 
of large sections of modern society. As Douglas argues, in today's pluralist western 
societies, absolutist rules or laws no longer represent an effective mechanism for the 
achievement of social order. Indeed they assume a degree of congruence between 
legislation and societal values that simply no longer exist. The only effective route 
to achieving social order is thus through its purposeful construction by individuals 
- 
provided that they 'choose wisely in doing that constructive work' (1971: 320). 
It is interesting to note that even one of the study's staunchest advocates in favour 
of returning to a more restrictive process, does question the ability of law to 
genuinely save marr iages. With reference to the piloting of the 1996 Act's 
provisions, the following comment is made: 
'Perhaps, not, I don't know. In the light of those findings perhaps 
it can't. I don't think it does any harm ... I think it does no harm for 
people to go through a process. ' [ 111 
This suggests that the 'value' of an absolutist process may thus lie not in its 
functionalism in the sense of positively changing behaviour, but rather in its 
symbolism 
- 
namely its 'ability' to symbolise the importance of marriage. Indeed it 
has been suggested that the current divorce law effectively provides something 
for 
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everyone 
- 
the retention of the concept of matrimonial fault satisfies the Idealist 
constituencies, whilst the practice of divorce enables those who wish to do so, to 
effectively work 'around' it (Mavis Maclean: Socio-Legal Studies Association 
Annual Conference, University of Bristol, 6 April 2001). 
Whilst this may be true, the question remains as to whether, in the twenty-first 
century, the law should continue to employ a corrective framework based on 
punishment and deterrence. Indeed as one of the national participants observes: 
'If at the end of the day [marriage] is gone, does society need to have 
fault at the centre of this process? Now if your answer to that is yes, 
my question is whose benefit is that for? If your answer is no, the mere 
fact that a marriage has broken down irretrievably is sufficient, then it 
must follow that we have to reform the law. If your agenda is to punish 
people who fail in their marriage, or to make a statement of social 
disapproval, you don't need to reform the law. ' [101 
The failure of one's marriage is not evidence of some kind of deviance or pathology 
that requires correction or punishment. Furthermore, the idealist adherence to 
universalist values and the concept of matrimonial fault have both created very real 
problems and difficulties for families and their various members, and have led to 
the manipulation and avoidance of the law. The history of divorce law has largely 
been one of compromise between idealism and pragmatism 
- 
in effect between 
supporting and ending marriage. However, as history has also demonstrated, that 
compromise has often proved to be an uncomfortable and ineffective one. Indeed in 
the case of the Family Law Act, it has proved to be one of outright failure. At the 
outset of the thesis, it was suggested that one of the central issues for policy-makers 
was whether law should be about the world as it is, or as they would like it to be. 
The reality is that the world has changed, and it is time for divorce law to face up to 
and deal with it. 
With its institutionalisation of disincentives to divorce, the Family Law Act sought 
to eliminate, or at least to deny some of the pluralist and complex social reality with 
which it was faced. However, as demonstrated by the pilots, the end result was the 
production of a legal framework that was essentially 
ignored at the social level. To 
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reconstruct the context of debate away from fundamental moral precepts, towards 
an embracing of the diversity of family life and a trust of more individual morality 
will require a good deal of political courage. The inherently 'political' nature of 
marriage and its breakdown, combined with the historical 'baggage' that comes 
with it, makes divorce law reform a controversial issue. Furthermore, the 
correctional approach to policy based on punishment and the institutional isation of 
deterrence, is an influential one that reaches well beyond the 'family' context. For 
example within the criminal justice field, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 has 
introduced a number of new initiatives 
- 
including Parenting Orders, Child Safety 
Orders, local child curfews and final warnings 
- 
that have been described as, 'a 
relatively directive and punitive response to anti social child and youth behaviour 
and the assumed associated poor parenting' (Fox Harding 2000: 26). 
Despite the undisputed difficulty that is involved, divorce law reform is not an issue 
that should continue be ducked. Indeed Lady Justice Hale who is 
- 
as both the 
Commissioner in charge of the Law Commission's work in family law during the 
much of the divorce reform process, and a member of the judiciary - uniquely 
qualified to comment on these issues, has made the following observation when it 
comes to divorce policy: 
'The idea of offering the public a service is commonplace in many 
other areas of activity but something of a novelty in this context. ' 
(2000: 146) 
The time to provide just such a service that recognises and deals with individual 
moral choice has now arrived. The vast majority of (national) participants within 
the study favoured the introduction of no-fault divorce, together with the provision 
of information and opportunities for mediation. This is a view that 
is strongly 
supported amongst practitioners, professionals, and indeed a number of academic 
commentators. It is not possible to legislate either for 
'happy' marriages or for 
some kind of moral 'truth' - and it is time for attempts to 
do so to cease. The 
'good' or 'moral' life does not reside in family structures, 
but rather in the ethics of 
behaviour and the morality of relationships 
(Morgan 1996). 
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It is recognised that it is highly unlikely that the present Government will be 
prepared to confront the Idealist elements within both politics and the media, who 
continue to exert a pivotal influence over family policy. Nevertheless, the basic 
reality is one that needs to be recognised within the policy context. Llewellyn 
(1931) argues that it is impossible to really understand tlýe meaning and effect of 
law without studying the person upon whom it impacts. Policy makers must 
therefore abandon their traditional adherence to marriage and instead look to the 
reflexive, creative and fundamentally nonjudgemental work that it is being done at 
street-level, if workable divorce reform is to be achieved within the foreseeable 
future. 
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Appendix 1 
National Participants 
1 Member of law review and reform body. 
2 Representative of government department charged with task of reforming 
divorce law. 
Representative of government department charged with task of reforming 
divorce law. 
4 Director of Public Policy: Children's Organisation. 
5 Director of Marriage 'Support' and Research Organisation. 
6 Executive Officer: Family Solicitors' Organisation. Practising family 
solicitor. 
7 Church of England representative. 
Government Minister. 
Director: National Mediation Organisation. 
10 Mediation Advisor: Children's Organisation. Also involved in the 
management of divorce information meeting pilots. 
11 Member of House of Commons: Conservative. 
12 Member of House of Lords: Conservative. 
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13 National Co-ordinator: Children's Rights Organisation. 
14 Director: Marriage Support Organisation. 
15 Advisor on Family Law: Solicitors' Organisation. 
Nine of the Participants were female, and six were male. 
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Appendix 2 
Local Participants 
A Family Support Supervisor: Locally based voluntary organisation providing 
a range of family support services. 
B Director: Telephone help-line for children and young people. 
C Regional Manager: National Children's Organisation. 
D Project Leader: National Children's Organisation. 
Project works with the parents of 'black' children, and aims to explore 
parenting experiences and develop parenting skills. 
E Co-ordinator: Child Contact Centre. 
F Family Resource Panel Manager: Local Social Services Department. 
G Senior Probation Officer: Family Court Welfare Service. 
H Director of Social Services: National Christian Organisation. 
I- Local Co-ordinator: National Parent Visiting and Support Organisation. 
i Call-taker and Trainer: Telephone help-line for parents. 
Health Visitor. 
L Local Co-ordinator: National Organisation providing Support and 
Information to Fathers experiencing Family Breakdown. 
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m Local Facilitator: Runs Parenting Courses for National Parent Support 
Organisation. 
N Regional Development Worker: National Organisation supporting Lone 
Parents. 
0 Solicitor-Mediator. 
p Solicitor-Mediator. 
Eleven of the Participants were female, and five were male. 
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